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derived its ducal titles. This town made no greater defence than Miranda. From thence a deMay 15 tachment marched to Moncorvo, which was furrendered in the like manner; and every thing was cleared before them to the banks of the Douro. A party under count O Reilly made a forced march of fourteen leagues, May 24. in two days, to the city of Chaves, which was immediately evacuated. By thefe fucceffes they became masters of almost the whole of the extenfive province of Tralos Montes, and their progrefs fpread a general alarm. Oporto was almoft given up as loft; and the admiralty of England prepared transports to carry off the effects of the British factory. However, the body which had traverfed this province without refiftance, attempting to cross the Douro, had its progrefs checked on that fide. The pealants, animated and guided by fome English officers, and feizing a difficult pafs, repulfed and drove them back to Torre de Moncorvo. They are faid to have been guilty of fome cruelties to the Spanifh prifoners who fell into their hands. These cruelties were afterwards feverely retaliated upon them. These people, on both fides naturally ferocious, had not been fufficiently inured to war, to moderate its fury, and reduce it under laws; they hated mutually, and they gave a full scope to their hatred: they did not fee each other as foldiers, but as enemies.

The fecond body of the Spaniards, which we have mentioned as the connective link between the two others, entered into the province of Beira, at the villages called Val de Mula and Val de Coelha. They were joined by strong detachments

amounting to almost the whole ar. my in Tralos Montes, and immediately laid fiege to Almeida, which, though in no good order, was the ftrongest and beft provided place upon the frontiers of Portugal. Befides, it was of the greatest importance from its middle fituation, as the poffeffion of it would greatly facilitate the operations upon every fide, and would efpecially tend to forward an attempt upon Lisbon, which was the capital object, towards which, at this time, all the endeavours of the Spaniards feem to have been directed.

Almeida was defended with fufficient refolution; but its fate was forefeen as foon as it was attempted, there being no means of affording relief to any of the places befieged. It furrendered, Aug. 25. however, upon terms honourable to the garrison.

The Spaniards, having made themfelves mafters of this place, overfpread the whole territory of Caftel Branco, a principal district of the province of Beira, making their way to the fouthward, until they approached the banks of the Tagus. During the whole of their progrefs, and indeed during the whole campaign, the allied troops of Great Britain and Portugal had nothing that could be called a body of an army in the field, and they could not think of oppofing the enemy in a pitched battle. All that could be done was by the defence of paffes, by skirmish, and by furprife.

By this time the count of la Lippe Buckeburg had arrived in Portugal. Lord Tyrawly, who had been fent, at the defire of the court of Lifbon, thither before the breaking out of the war, being difgufted by the behaviour of fome perfons at court, and much difappointed in his expectations of the

the exertion they had promifed to make of their own force, and even of the ufe they had made of the fuccours from England, had been recalled very early in the campaign, and probably not contrary to his own inclination.

It is impoffible to exprefs the joy which filled the whole nation at the arrival of fo celebrated an officer as the count la Lippe to their affiftance. More unanimity was now expected, as the count had no thing to complain of, and came an entire ftranger to all the subjects of debate, which had hitherto existed between the British general and the court of Lisbon.

That army, which we have mentioned as the third corps deftined for the invasion of Portugal, affembled on the frontiers of Eftremadura, with an intention of penetrating into the province of Alentejo. Had this third body been joined to the others already in Portugal, it would probably have formed fuch an army as might, in fpite of any obstruction, have forced its way to Lisbon: had it acted feparately, it might have greatly diftraced the defence, fo as to enable fome other body to penetrate to that city. It was neceffary to prevent, if poffible, their entrance into Portugal; fince their mere entrance would have been almost equal, in its confequenees, to a victory on their fide.

and able officer, though at a distance of five days march, and in spite of all the disappointments and obftructions to which fervices of this kind are fo liable, when they cannot be executed immediately; yet effected a complete fur- Aug. 27. prife on the town of Valentia de Alcantara; took the general, who was to have commanded in the intended invafion, one colonel, two captains, and foventeen fubaltern officers. One of the beft regiments in the Spanish fervice was intirely deftroyed.

The count la Lippe, therefore, formed a defign of attacking an advanced body of the Spaniards, which lay on their frontiers, in a town called Valentia de Alcantara, as he heard that they had here amaffed confiderable magazines. The conduct of this important enterprize was committed to brigadier general Burgoyne. This gallant

Although they were disappointed in their expectations of finding magazines in this place, the effect of this well-conducted enterprize was not loft. The taking of this general was probably the cause which prevented the Spaniards from entering into the province of Alentejo. This feemed to have been for fome time the destination not only of that particular body, but also the great object of the Spanish army, which had hitherto acted in Beira. The former of thefe provinces is a plain, open, fertile country, where their cavalry, in which confifted the chief of their army, and in which lay their most marked fuperiority, might have acted, and acted decifively whereas the latter was a rough mountainous region, in which the horfe were fubfifted with difficulty, and could be of little fervice. To prevent, therefore, the entry of the Bourbon army from any quarter, into Alentejo, feemed to be the great and fingle object of the campaign on our fide. General Burgoyne, by this expedition into the Spanish territories, had already prevented it in one part; and the vigilance and activity of the fame officer had no fmall share in preventing it alfo on the other. That

That part of the Bourbon army, which acted in the territory of Caftel Branco, had made themselves mafters of feveral important paffes, which they obliged fome bodies of the Portuguese to abandon. They attacked the rear of the combined army, which was paffing the river Alveito, with the appearance of a retreat; but, in reality, with a view to draw them infenfibly into the mountainous tracts: here they were repulfed with lofs; but ftill they continued mafters of the country; and nothing remained but the paffage of the Tagus, to enable them to take up their quarters in Alentejo.

Burgoyne, who was pofted with an intention to obftruct them in their paffage, lay in the neighbourhood, and within view of a detached camp, compofed of a confiderable body of the enemy's cavalry, which lay near a village called Villa Velha. As he obferved that the enemy kept no very foldierly guard in this poft, and were uncovered both on their rear and

their flanks, he conceived a defign of falling on them by furprife. He confided the execution of this defign to colonel Lee, who turned their Oct. 6. camp, fell upon their rear in the night, made a confiderable flaughter, difperfed the whole party, destroyed their magazines, and returned with scarce any lofs. Burgoyne, in the mean time, fupported him by a feint attack in another quarter, which prevented the enemy's being relieved from the adjacent posts.

This advantage, being obtained in a critical moment, was attended

with important confequences. The feason was now far advanced; immenfe rains fell at this time; the roads were deftroyed; the country became impracticable; and the Spaniards, having seized no advanced posts in which they could maintain themfelves during the winter, and being especially unprovided with magazines for the fupport of their horse, every where fell back to the frontiers of Spain, where their fupplies were at hand, and where they were not liable to be harraffed by the efforts of the combined army.

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In this manner Portugal was faved, at least for that campaign, by the wife conduct of count la Lippe, and the distinguished valour of the English commanders and soldiery: all that was wanting towards their deliverance was accomplished by the fuccefs of the English army in more diftant quarters, and by the peace, in which fo valuable and fo expofed an ally was not neglected. There never was probably fo heavy a ftorm of national calamity, ready to fall upon an unprovided people, fo happily averted, or fo fpeedily blown over. Every thing, at the beginning of this campaign, bore the moft louring and ominous afpe& to the affairs of Great Britain. As it advanced, the fky continually cleared up; and the fortune of no nation, towards the close of it, was enlivened with a more brilliant and more unclouded profperity. We fhall now proceed in the relation of thofe fucceffes, and of the progrefs of the English arms in other parts of the world, where new fcenes of danger and honour were now opened to them.

CHAP.

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CHAP.

VII.

Expedition against Martinico, Force fent thither. Troops land at Car Navire Nature of the country. Attack of the pofts near Fort Royal. Fort Royal Surrendered. St. Pierre and the whole island capitulate. St. Lucie, the Grenades, and St. Vincent taken. Preparations for avar against the Spanish West Indies.

the last deal

money spent, it would have been an unpardonable error, from a confideration of almost any faving, to have left any thing imperfect; especially at a time, when the effect of every operation became, almoit hourly, more and more critical and decifive.

year it was determined to refume the scheme of operations in the West Indies; where nothing had been attempted fince the year 1759. Diftreffed as the French trade to their islands had been, it ftill continued a resource to that nation. On the other hand, nothing could poffibly furnish us with places of more importance either to retain, or to exchange upon a peace, than our fuccefs in this part of the world. Another confideration had probably no fmall share in directing our arms towards that quarter. From the time that the difpofitions of Spain had become equivocal, it was neceffary to take fuch fteps as would put us in a refpectable fituation, in case a war with that kingdom fhould become unavoidable. It was therefore very proper to have a strong armament in the Weft Indies, that fide on which Spain is most vulnerable, and in which every wound affects a part of the quickeft fenfibility. Accordingly the force which was fent into the West Indies on this occafion, was very great; and, if we take the naval and military together, it was fuch an armament as had never been before feen in that part of the world. It was certainly very right to leave as little to hazard as poffible; and when, in the moft frugal method of proceeding, a great many men must have been VOL. V.

Every thing which had been an object of war in North America, was by this time completely acquired. It was therefore eafy to draw a very confiderable part of the army from thence. Eleven battalions were drawn from New York; a draught was alfo made from the garrison of Belleifle. There were reinforced by fome troops which had been scattered among the Leeward iflands; fo that the whole land armament did not full very fhort of twelve thousand men. Ge neral Monckton, who had acquired fo much reputation in North America, and had received a very grievous wound at the taking of Quebec, commanded the land forces in this expedition. The marine was under rear-admiral Rodney.

The failure in 1-59 did not difcourage our adminiftration from making Martinico the object of another attempt. The English fleet, after having rendezvouzed at Barbadoes, came before this island on the 7th of January, 1762. The troops landed at a creek called Cas Navire, without the lofs of a man i

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man; the fleet having been difpofed fo properly, and having directed their fire with fuch effect, that the enemy was obliged in a fhort time to abandon the batteries they had erected to defend this inlet.

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When the landing was effected, the difficulties were far from being at an end. It is true, that neither the number nor the quality of the enemy's regular troops in the island was very formidable. But the militia was numerous, well armed, and not unqualified for fervice in the only kind of war, which could be carried on in their country. Befides, the whole country was a natural fortification, from the number of ravines with rivulets between them, which lay from distance to distance. Wherever thofe grounds were practicable, the French had posted guards and erected batteries. It is easy from hence to difcern what obftructions the progrefs of an army was liable to, particularly with regard to its artillery. These obftructions were no where greater than in the neighbourhood of the place, against which the first regular attack was propofed.

This town and citadel is overlooked and commanded by two very confiderable eminences, called, Morne Tortenfon and Morne Garnier. Whilft the enemy kept poffeffion of thefe eminences, it was impoffible to at tack the town; if they loft them, it would prove impoffible to defend

it. Suitable to the importance of thofe fituations were the measures taken to render them impracticable. They were protected, like the other high grounds on this ifland, with very deep ravines; and this great natural ftrength was improved by every contrivance of art. The Morne Tortenfon was first to be

attacked to favour this operation, a body of regular troops and marines were ordered to advance on the right along the fea fide, towards the town, in order to take the redoubts which lay in the lower grounds. A thousand failors, in flatbottomed boats, rowed close to the fhore to affist them. On the left, towards the country, a corps of light infantry, properly fupported, was to get round the enemy's left; whilft the attack in the center was made by the British grenadiers and the body of the army, under the fire of batteries, which had been erected on the oppofite fide with great labour and perfeverance; the cannon haveing been dragged upwards of three miles by the feamen.

Thefe difpofitions for the attack of this difficult poft having been made with fo much judgment on the part of the commander, it was executed with equal fpirit and refolution by the foldiery. The attack fucceeded in every quarter. With irresistible impetuofity the enemy's works were fucceffively carried. They were driven from poft to poft; until our troops, after a ferp ftruggle, remained masters of the whole Morne : fome of the enemy fled precipitately into the town, to the very entrance of which they were pursued. Others faved themselves on the Morne Garnier, which was as ftrong, and much higher, than Morne Tortenfon,and overlooked and commanded it. Thus far had they proceeded with fuccefs; but nothing decifive could be done, without the poffeffion of the other eminence, our troops being much molefted by the enemy from that fuperior fituation.

It was three days before proper difpofitions could be made for driving

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