Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub

though very judicious in themselves, could not be serviceable in the plan we had adopted.

The peace, which has contributed fo much to the happiness of Europe in general, has taken fomething from the entertainment of the curious and idle part of it. We are now deprived of those mighty events, of those astonishing revolutions of fortune, of those matters of anxious hope and fear, which diftinguished the late troubled and glorious. period. We do not, however, despair, by the continuance of our former industry, and the continuance of the public indulgence to it, of furnishing, from the occafional political tranfactions of each fucceeding year both foreign and domeftic, fomething, which may not prove altogether unworthy of the reader's attention; and which may fupply the lofs of the military materials.

THE

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

State of Europe in the beginning of this year. Ill ftate of the British alliance. Condition of the northern powers. War reaches to the fouthern. Family compact. Some articles from it. Obfervations upon them. Confequences of this treaty to Europe. War declared against Spain. State of Spain and Great Britain at the beginning of the war between them. Advantages and disadvantages on each fide.

[blocks in formation]

not to be expected, that the confederacy, which had held together fo long, and under fuch difficulties and difappointments, should now break to pieces, juft at the moment when the states which compofed it seemed in a condition to reap the mature fruits of their unanimity and perfeverance. The king of Pruffia was not in a state either to allure or to intimidate. Great Britain could not increase his fubfidy, nor reinforce his armies. The allied army in Weftphalia played a defenfive, and, on the whole of the campaign, a lofing game; and there was no body fo fanguine as to think that Great Britain could increase her ftrength in Germany, where fhe paid already one hundred thousand men, and expended five millions annually.

Although nothing feems more certain, in a general view of the politicat fyftem, than that the king of Pruffia is not the natural and neceffary ally of this nation; yet his fortune neither was, fince the be ginning of the war, nor is it now a matter of indifference to us.

The late Mr. Shippen was of opinion, that the power of France was become an object of much lefs terror fince the growth of the power of Ruffia. But he never imagined it poffible, that all the great continental powers of Europe fhould ever be united with France; and that they should confpire to load her fcale, inftead of ballancing it. He never could forefee, what has actually happened in this war, that this very power of Ruffia could co-operate with France, and even with Sweden; and what is full as extraordinary, that both these latter could co-operate with Austria to deftroy in effect the fyftem, which had been established by the treaty of Weftphalia; that fyftem, which

it had been the great drift of policy, and the great object of war to both France and Sweden in the laft century to establish and to confirm, and to the house of Auftria conftantly to appofe. The deftruction of the king of Pruffia feemed to include the deftruction of the treaty of Weftphalia; becaufe he is the only power in the empire capable of afferting the independency of its members, and fupporting the declining credit of the Proteftant cause.

The total ruin of Saxony, with fuch circumftances of unpardonable cruelty by that prince himself, and the exhaufted ftate of all the other Proteftant members of the empire, have narrowed that intereft more and more to the fingle object of Pruffia. As this intereft was firft formed in the empire, fo its condition there cannot fail of having the moft fenfible influence on all the potentates of the fame communion. Even in this light, England had an intereft that the king of Pruffia fhould not be entirely crushed by the prevalence of a combination compofed in fo extraordinary a manner, that its fuccefs muft neceffarily produce a total revolution in the fyftem of Europe, and draw on a series of confequences, which, though it is impoffible to particu→ larize, must have undoubtedly been of the most important and alarming nature.

But there was an intereft yet nearer to us, the fate of our own army in Germany, which could not furvive the deftruction of the king of Pruffia for an hour. These circumftances rendered the prospect of the campaign in Germany very gloomy; as there was no fort of ground to fuppofe that this prince, upon whofe fate fo many important

interefts

interefts immediately depended, could hold out till the middle of fummer. Befides, Denmark fhewed no favourable difpofitions towards us; and Holland difcovered evident marks of coldness, if not of abfolute alienation. Such was the difpofition of the powers in the north.

The fouthern powers of Europe, whofe total unconnection with the caufes, and whofe great remoteness from the feat of war might appear sufficient to ensure their tranquility, began to enter into action with a fpirit equal to that of any of the parties, who had from the beginning acted as principals; new fewel was heaped upon the fire of contention, which had wafted fo many nations, just as it feemed to be on the point of expiring.

That alliance between the branches of the houfe of Bourbon, of which we have spoken last year, and which is so well known by the name of the Family Compact, is one of the most extraordinary tranfactions of this, or, perhaps, of any time. It has already produced fome effects anfwerable to its defign; it may produce others ftill more important; and on the whole must be confidered as an event of the most extenfive, lasting, and alarming influence.

The treaty of Vienna in 1756, between France and Auftria, has certainly contributed not a little to give that new turn to affairs, by which almost all the difcourfes, that have hitherto been written on the interefts of princes, rendered erroneous, and of little ufe in future fpeculations. That treaty, however, tho' it feems entirely to have disjointed the ancient fyftem of alliance by which France

are

was formerly counterpoifed, may, poffibly, not be fo much a lafting change, as a temporary and excentric deviation from the fphere in which the houfe of Auftria had formerly moved, and into which it feems fo fuitable to her natural and permanent intereft to return. The Bourbon compact is of a different nature; and it feems to have at length produced that entire union between the French and Spanish monarchies, which was fo much dreaded on the death of Charles II. and which it was the great purpose of the treaty of partition, and the war of the grand alliance to prevent. We have feen it take place in our days, comparatively with very little notice; fo much greater is our prefent ftrength; or fo much greater was the apprehenfion in thofe days, than the danger of the actual event in the prefent.

It was a bold push in France to attempt, and an uncommon fuccefs to procure, towards the clofe of an unfortunate and difgraceful war, an alliance of this kind. France could not have expected from the most fortunate iffue of her affairs, an advantage fo great as that which the derived from her uncommon diftreffes. It is fome time fince the jealoufy of her power has began to abate. But in fact her fecurity, and probably too her power, will be greatly increafed by this very circumftance. Instead of forming fuch an object as alarmed mankind, and against which all Europe ufed to unite, the is herfelf become the center of an alliance, which extends from the northern to the fouthern extrem ty ofEurope; and fhe was, in this war, actually united with Ruffia, Sweden. Auftria, the empire, Spain, and Naples; to fay nothing of Den[B] 2

mark,

mark, with which he had also fome connections.

With other nations, however, her ties are comparatively flight but the engagements of the Bourbon compact form rather an act of incorporation than an alliance. It contains ftipulations hitherto unheard of in any treaty. By the 23d and 24th articles, the fubjects of the feveral branches of the houfe of Bourbon are admitted to a mutual naturalization, and to a participation of fuch privileges and immunities, as if they were natural born fubjects of the countries of their respective fovereigns. The direct trade to America forms the only exception to this comprehenfive community of interefts. The tenor of this article is of infinite confequence to the general trading intereft of Europe; all the ftates of which, by the 25th article of the fame alliance, are excluded from any prospect of obtaining fimilar advantages.

This forms a civil union in al-, most the stricteft fenfe; the political union is even more perfect. By the Ift and 16th articles, the two monarchs of France and Spain agree to look upon every power as their enemy, which becomes an enemy of the other; that a war declared againft either, fhall be regarded as perfonal by the other; and that, when they happen to be both engaged in a war against the fame enemy or enemies, they will wage it jointly with their whole forces; and that their military operations fhall proceed by common confent, and with a perfect agreement.

By the 26th article, they agree reciprocally to disclose to each other their alliances and negotiations.

By the 17th and 18th, they for

mally engage not to make, or even to liften, to any propofal of peace from their common enemies, but by mutual confent; being refolved, in time of peace as well as in time of war, each mutually to confider the interefts of the allied erown as its own; to compenfate their ferveral loffes and advantages, and to act as if the two monarchies formed only one and the fame power. The king of the Sicilies, and the infant duke of Parma are comprehended in this treaty.

Here is the model of the most perfect confederacy. There is but one restriction to the extent of this scheme; but this particular reftriction is a key to the whole treaty; as it fhews, in the most fatisfactory manner, against what object it was principally directed. For by the 8th article it is provided, that Spain fhall not be bound to fuccour France, when she is engaged in a war in confequence of her engagements by the treaty of Weftphalia, or other alliances with the princes and ftates of Germany and the north, unless fome maritime power take part in those wars, or France be attacked by land in her own country. This exception of the maritime powers indicates fufficiently that the tendency of this article is to affect England, and ferves to point out clearly, though obliquely, to the other powers of Europe, that their connection with England is the great circumftance which is to provoke the enmity of Spain.

It should feem that this treaty alone, when once its true nature came to be difcovered, if no other caufe exifted, would have been fufficient to justify Great Britain in a declaration of war against a monarchy, which had united itself in fo intimate

« AnteriorContinuar »