and part are innate ideas, extenfion and number must be fo too; it being impoffible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extenfion and number, I leave to be confidered by thofe, who are the patrons of innate principles.

$.7. "That God is to be worshipped," Idea of woris, without doubt, as great a truth as any fhip not incan enter into the mind of man, and de- nate. ferves the first place amongst all practical principles. But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of God and worship are innate. That the idea the term worship ftands for, is not in the understanding of children, and a character ftamped on the mind in its first original, I think, will be eafily granted, by any one that confiders how few there be, amongst grown men, who have a clear and diftinct notion of it. And, I fuppofe, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say that children have this practical principle innate, "that God is to be worshipped;" and yet, that they know not what that worship of God is, which: is their duty. But to pass by this:

not innate.

§. 8. If any idea can be imagined innate, Idea of God the idea of God may, of all others, for many reafons be thought fo; fince it is hard to conceive, how there fhould be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity: without a notion of a law-maker, it is impoffible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to obferve it. Befides the atheists, taken notice of amongst the ancients, and left branded upon the records of hiftory, hath not navigation difcovered, in these later ages, whole nations at the bay of Soldania (a), in Brazil (6), in Boranday (c), and in the Caribbee islands, &c. amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conver

(a) Roe apud Thevenot, p. 2. () Martiniere 30 Terry and 13.

(b) Jo. de Lery, c. 16. Ovington 8.

fione, has these words (d): " Reperi eam gentem nul"lum nomen habere, quod Deum & hominis animam "fignificet, nulla facra habet, nulla idola." These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters, and difcipline, and the improvements of arts and fciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoyed thefe in a very great measure; who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. It will, I doubt not, be a furprize to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, let them confult the king of France's late envoy thither. (e), who gives no better account of the Chinese themfelves (ƒ). And if we will not believe La Loubere, the miffionaries of China, even the Jefuits themselves, the great encomiafts of the Chinese, do all to a man agree, and will convince us that the fect of the literati, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheists. Vid. Navarette, in the collection of voyages, vol. the firft, and Historia cultus Sinenfium. And perhaps if we fhould, with attention, mind the lives and difcourfes of people not fo far off, we should have too much reafon to fear, that many in more civilized countries have no very strong and clear impreffions of a deity upon their minds; and that the complaints of atheism, made from the pulpit, are not without reafon. And though only fome profligate wretches own it too bare-facedly now; yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the magiftrate's fword, or their neighbour's cenfure, tie up people's tongues which, were the apprehenfions of punishment or hame taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheism, as their lives do (g).

§. 9.

(d) Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum 48. (c) La Lou. bere du Royaume de Siam, t. 1. c. 9. fect. 15, & c. 20, fect. 22, & c. 224 fect. 6. (f) Ib. t. 1. c. 20. fect. 4, & c. 23. (g) On this reafoning of the author against innate ideas, great blame hath been laid: because it seems to invalidate an argument commonly afed to prove the being of a God, viz. univerfal confent: To which our

auther

§. 9. But had all mankind, every where, a notion of a God (whereof yet hiftory tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For though no nation were to be found without a name, and fome few dark notions of him: yet that would not prove them to be natural impreffions on the mind, any more than the names of fire, or the fun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate because the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are fo univerfally received and known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want

of

author anfwers, I think that the universal confent of mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vastly greater majority of mankind have in all ages of the world actually believed a God; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually difbelieved it; and confequently those who have actually oppofed the belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that comparing thofe that have actually difbelieved, with those who have actually believed a God, their number is fo inconfiderable, that in refpect of this incomparably greater majority, of those who have owned the belief of a God, it may be faid to be the univerfal consent of mankind.

This is all the univerfal confent which truth or matter of fact will allow; and therefore all that can be made ufe of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and fpeak deceitfully for God; if this univerfality fhould be urged in a strict fense, not for much the majority, but for a general confent of every one, even to a man, in all ages and countries; this would make it either no argument, or a perfectly ufelefs and unneceffary one. For if any one deny a God, fuch a univerfality of confent is deftroyed; and if nobody does deny a God, what need of arguments to convince atheists?

I would crave leave to ask your lordship, were there ever in the world any atheifts or no? If there were not, what need is there of raifing a queftion about the being of a God, when nobody questions it? What need of provifional arguments against a fault, from which mankind are fo wholly free, and which, by an univerfal confent, they may be prefumed to be fecure from? If you fay (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been atheists in the world, then your lordship's univerfal confent reduces itself to only a great majority; and then make that majority as great as you will, what I have faid in the place quoted by your lordfhip, leaves it in its full force; and I have not faid one word that does in the leaft invalidate this argument for a God. The argument I was upon there, was to fhew, that the idea of God was not innate; and to my purpofe it was fufficient, if there were but a lefs number found in the world, who had no idea of God, than your lordship will allow there have been

• In his third letter to the bishop of Worcester.

of

of fuch a name, or the abfence of fuch a notion out of men's minds, any argument against the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof that there was no load-ftone in the world, becaufe a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any fuch thing, nor a name for it; or be any fhow of argument to prove, that there are no diftinct and various fpecies of angels, or intelligent beings above us, becaufe we have no ideas of fuch diftinct fpecies, or names for them: for men being furnished with words, by the common language of their own countries, can scarce avoid having fome.

kind

of profeffed atheifts; for whatfoever is innate, muft be univerfal in the ftrictest fenfe. One exception is a fufficient proof againft it. So that all that I faid, and which was quite to another purpofe, did not at all tend, nor can be made ufe of, to invalidate the argument for a Deity, grounded on fuch an univerfal confent, as your lordship, and all that build on it, muft own; which is only a very difproportioned majority: fuch an univerfal confent my argument there neither affirms nor requires to be lefs than you will be pleafed to allow it. Your lordfhip therefore might, without any prejudice to thofe declarations of good will and favour you have for the author of the " Effay of Human Understanding," have spared the mentioning his quoting authors that are in print, for matters of fact to quite another purpose, "as going about to invalidate the argument for a Deity, from the univerfal confent of mankind;" fince he leaves that uni verfal confent as entire and as large as you yourself do, or can own, or fuppofe it. But here I have no reafon to be forry that your lordfhip has given me this occafion for the vindication of this paffage of my book; if there fhould be any one befides your lordfhip, who fhould fo far mistake it, as to think it in the leaft invalidates the argument for a God, from the univerfal confent of mankind.

But becaufe you queftion the credibility of thofe authors I have quoted, which you fay were very ill chofen; I will crave leave to fay, that he whom I relied on for his teftimony concerning the Hottentots of Soldania, was no lefs a man than an ambassador from the king of England to the Great Mogul of whofe relation, monfieur Thevenot, no ill judge in the cafe, had fo great an esteem, that he was at the pains to translate into French, and publifh it in his (which is counted no injudicious) collection of travels. But to intercede with your lordship, for a little more favourable allowance of credit to fir Thomas Roe's relation; Coore, an inhabitant of the country, who could fpeak English, affured Mr. Terry that they of Soldania had no God. But if he too have the ill luck to find no credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a divine of the church of England, now living, and admit of his teftimony in confirmation of fir Thomas Roe's. This worthy gentleman, in the relation of his voyage to Surat, printed but two years fince, fpeaking of

• Terry's Voyage, p. 17, 23.

the

kind of ideas of those things, whofe names, those they converse with, have occafion frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of excellency, greatness, or fomething extraordinary; if apprehenfion and concernment accompany it; if the fear of abfolute and irrefiftible power fet it on upon the mind, the idea is likely to fink the deeper, and spread the farther; efpecially if it be fuch an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the vitible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear fo plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot mifs the difcovery of a deity.

the fame people, has thefe words: +"They are funk even below idolatry, are deftitute of both prieft and temple, and faving a little fhow of rejoicing, which is made at the full and new moon, have loft all kind of religious devotion. Nature has fo richly provided for their convenience in this life, that they have drowned all fenfe of the God of it, and are grown quite careless of the next."

a

But to provide against the cleareft evidence of atheism in thefe people, you fay," that the account given of them, makes them not fit to be a ftandard for the fenfe of mankind." This, I think, may pafs for nothing, till fomebody be found, that makes them to be a ftandard for the fenfe of mankind. All the ufe I made of them was to show, that there were men in the world that had no innate idea of a God. But to keep fomething like an argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying thofe Cafers to be men. What elfe do thefe words fignify? « people fo ftrangely bereft of common fenfe, that they can hardly be reckoned among mankind, as appears by the best accounts of the Cafers of Soldania, &c." I hope, if any of them were called Peter, James, of John, it would be paft fcruple that they were men: however, Courwee, Wewena, and Cowfheda, and thofe others who had names, that had no places in your nomenclator, would hardly pafs mufter with your lordship. My lord, I fhould not mention this, but that what you yourself fay here, may be a motive to you to confider, that what you have laid fuch a firefs on concerning the general nature of man, as a real being, and the subject of properties, amounts to nothing for the diftinguishing of fpecies; fince you yourself own that there may be individuals, wherein there is a common nature with a particular fubfiftence proper to each of them; whereby you are fo little able to know of which of the ranks of forts they are, into which you fay God has ordered beings, and which he hath diftinguished by effential properties, that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckoned among mankind or no.