persuade themselves, that Fundamental Articles of Faith are matters of pure Speculation, which they may either take up or lay down at pleasure, without any Guilt or Danger, fo long as they lead good Moral Lives, and form their actions on the principles of Virtue.

Indeed there are Innumerable Speculations, Innumerable Acts or Operations of the Understanding,which are not points of Duty, either in refpect of Natural Obligation, or of Pofitive Precept, which may be Innocently Exercised or Sufpended at pleasure; And every man may embrace or reject whatsoever Propofitions he pleaseth, concerning fuch points, according to his own measure and Manner of Thinking, without any Imputation of Guilt. But, how great a number foever there may be of Speculations, which are purely Arbitrary, and in themselves neither morally Good nor Evil; Or, how great foever the variety may be of those Propofitions, which in themselves are, morally speaking, Indifferent, and may be Innocently either embraced or rejeCc 3

&ted

i

cted; yet can it not be concluded either from the Number or Variety of them, that we are at liberty to revolve and indulge whatever notions and speculations we please, and that we may Innocently and Safely yield our Affent to, or withhold our Affent from all propofitions whatfoever, though finally terminating in the Understanding, in every cafe, according to our own Pleasure. Undoubtedly there are Blafphemous Thoughts of God, and various Propofitions following from them, which cannot, without Sin, under the pure Obligations of Natural Religion, be voluntarily entertain'd and indulged in the Mind, though confider'd Absolutely in Themselves, and without any relation to Immorality flowing from them into Outward action.

And in refpect of Pofitive Inftitutions, 'tis obfervable, that if the Bodily Paffions or Affections, the Inferior Faculties in man, can be properly fubject to Divine Laws; furely, the Understanding, the Superior and Nobler faculty, may well be thought capable of Pleafing or Pro

voking

voking God; of exalting it self in Stiffnefs and Arrogance against him, or of submitting it self Dutifully and Humbly to him, in Obedience to the Laws which he may prescribe to it: And 'tis further obfervable, that he hath actually prescribed fuch Laws to us; and our obligations to obey Them run manifeftly and diftinctly through the whole course of the Gofpel. And fince God hath laid Injunctions upon the Understanding, pofitively requiring its Affent to the Truths revealed in the Gofpel; therefore our Refusing to yield fuch Affent to them, is not a matter of Indifferency in Speculation, but includes a Criminal Act of the Will, and is directly finful, being a direct violation of the Divine Law; For Sin is the tranfgreffion of the Law.

But 'tis fometimes further urged by Unbelievers, that fuch our Refusal of Affent to Mysterious Truths is excufable, on account of our being unable to enter clearly and distinctly into the Nature and Reason of them: Whereas it ought to be well confider'd that if we could Diftinct

ly and Fully comprehend the Reasons of them,

C c 4

them, there would then be no virtue nor excellency in yielding Affent to them; there would then be no fuch Thing, as the Duty of Belief at all. For Belief in General fignifies an Affent to fomething, grounded Purely upon Teftimony; or, it confifts in our being perfuaded of the Truth of Things, which we ourselves do not otherwife know, than as we depend upon Them, purely on account of the confidence we repofe in the Knowledge and Fidelity of the Perfon who relates them. And Divine Faith is Therefore an Excellency in Us, and acceptable to God, because we pay honour to him, by depending intirely upon his Knowledge and Veracity, in our Affent to the Truths which he hath revealed, though our own narrow Understanding cannot compass the Nature and Reasons of them.

And Infidelity is Therefore highly Sinful and Dangerous, because we do Thereby offer great Indignity to God, Refusing to give credit to his Teftimony, and to depend upon his exprefs Word for the Truth of any thing, but what we ourfelves can clearly comprehend and ac

count

count for. And it may be observed, as an Illuftration of this Point, that when any Man of Superior understanding exprefsly declares the Truth of Something, which other Men of Lower Capacities cannot conceive, and which, according to their weak manner of Thinking, is Highly Improbable; Their Disbelief of fuch a Truth, which he profeffeth himfelf to be Clear in, must be a Provoking inftance of their Difregard and Difrefpect to him. For fuch Disbelief would be built upon a fuppofition, that their own Thoughts are as proper Standards of Truth as His, and they will not fo far depend upon him, as to believe what he affirms to be True, and what he declares himself to have a perfect Knowledge of, because they have not the like Knowledge of it upon their own minds.

And fince there is fo great a Difparity between the Thoughts and Conceptions of one Man and another, Difparity fufficient to render it Reasonable and Necef fary, in many cafes, that One man fhould depend upon Another, for the Truth of Things, which Himself not only cannot

clearly