So that a confinement of him somewhere, was thought | nor would it answer any valuable end or purpose to revive altogether necessary. the mention of such horrid opinions, or tell the world what such a one said or thought two thousand years ago; if their grave had been faithful to its trust, and had retained their filthy poisonous savour within its own unhallowed cell.

Secondly, And then, with the same pretence of great observance and respect, it is judged too great a trouble to him, and inconsistent with the felicity of his nature and being, that he should have given himself any diversion or disturbance, by making the world; from the care and labour whereof he is with all ceremony to be excused, it being too painful and laborious an undertaking for an immortal and a happy being. Besides that he was altogether destitute of instruments and utensils requisite to so great a performance.b

Whence also, Thirdly, He was with the same reason to be excused of all the care and encumbrance of government; as indeed, what right or pretence could he have to the government of a world that chose him not, which is not his inheritance, and which he never made? But all is very plausibly shadowed over with a great appearance of reverence and veneration, with magnificent elogies of his never-interrupted felicity; whence also it is made a very great crime not to free even the divine nature itself from business: though yet the true ground and root of this Epicurean faith doth sometime more apparently discover itself, even an impatiency of the divine government, and a regret of that irksome bondage which the acknowledgment of a Deity, that were to be feared by men, would infer upon them.

But since (against what were so much to have been desired, that their womb might have been their grave) their grave becomes their womb, where they are conceived, and formed anew, and whence by a second birth they spring forth afresh, to the great annoyance of the world, the debauching and endangering of mankind; and that it is necessary some remedy be endeavoured of so mortal an evil, it was also convenient to run it up to its original, and contend against it as in its primitive state and vigour. Wherefore this being a true (though it be a very short) account of the Epicurean god, resulting all into this shorter sum, That he is altogether unconversable with men, (and such therefore as cannot inhabit their temple, and for whom they can have no obligation or rational design to provide any,) it will be requisite in reference hereto, and suitable to our present scope and purpose, severally to evince these things:-1. That the existence of such a being as this were impossible ever to be proved unto men, if it did exist-2. That being supposed without any good ground, it is equally unimaginable that the supposition of it can intend any valuable or good end-3. That this supposed being cannot be God, and is most abusively so called; as hereby, the true God, the Cause and Author of all things, is intended to be excluded-4. That it belongs to, and may be deduced from, the true notion of God which hath been given, (and proved by parts of a really existent Being,) that he is such as can converse with men.

And therefore, Fourthly, He is further expressly asserted to be such as need not be feared, as cares not to be worshipped, as with whom neither anger nor favour hath any place. So that nothing more of duty is owing to him than a certain kind of arbitrary veneration, which we give to any thing or person that we apprehend to excel us, and to be in some respect better than ourselves: an observance merely upon courtesy. But obedience and subjection to For the first, That there is no way to prove the existence his government, fear of his displeasure, expectation of his of such a being, is evident. For what ways of proving it favour and benefits, have no place left them. We are not can be thought of, which the supposition itself doth not obliged to worship him as one with whom we have any forbid and reject? Is it to be proved by revelation? But concern, and do owe him no more homage than we have that supposes converse with men, and destroys what it to the Great Mogul, or the Cham of Tartary, and indeed should prove, that such a being, having no converse with are less liable to his severity, or capable of his favours, men, doth exist. And where is that revelation? Is it than theirs; for of theirs, we are in some remote possi-written or unwritten; or who are its vouchers? Upon bility, of his, in none at all. In one word, all converse what authority doth it rest? Who was appointed to inform between him and man, on his part by providence, and on the world in this matter? Was Epicurus himself the ours by religion, is quite cut off. Which evidently appears common oracle? Why did he never tell men so? Did he (from what hath been already collected out of his own ever pretend to have seen any of these his vogued gods? words, and theirs who pretended to speak that so admired No, they are confessed not to be liable to our sense, any author's mind and sense) to be the scope and sum of the more than the inane itself. And what miracles did he ever Epicurean doctrine, in this matter; and was indeed ob- work to confirm the truth of his doctrine in this matter? served to be so long ago, by one that we suppose to have Which sure was reasonably to be expected from one who had better opportunity and advantages to know it, than would gain credit to dictates so contrary to the common we: who, discoursing that a man cannot live pleasantly, sentiments of the rest of mankind, and that were not to according to the principles of Epicurus; and that accord-be proved any other way. And what other way can be ing to his doctrine beasts are more happy than men; devised? Can it admit of rational demonstration? What plainly gives this reason why he says so, viz. that the shall be the medium? Shall it be from the cause? But Epicureans took away providence, and that the design of what cause can (or ever did) he or his followers assign of their discoursing concerning God was, that we might not God? Or from effects? And what shall they be, when the fear him. matter of the whole universe is supposed ever to have been of itself, and the particular frame of every thing made thereof, to have resulted only of the casual coalition of the parts of that matter, and no real being is supposed besides? Or shall it be that their idea, which they have of God, includes existence, as so belonging to him that he cannot but exist? But by what right do they affix such an idea to their petite and fictitious deities? How will they prove their idea true? Or are we bound to take their words for it? Yea it is easily proved false, and repugnant esset. Intelligitur enim a beata immortalique natura, et iram et gratiam se gregan. Quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere motus, &c. Sect. 1. cap. 3. An et mundum fecit, et in mundo homines ut ab hominibus coleretur? At quid Deo cultus hominum confert, beato, et nulla re indigenti. Sect. 2. cap. 3.

Unto which purpose also much more may be seen in the same author elsewhere, when he more directly pleads (among divers more philosophical subjects) on behalf of religion against the Epicurean doctrine, which he saith they leave to us in word and show, but by their principles take away indeed, as they do nature and the soul, &c.

It is then out of question, that the doctrine of Epicurus utterly takes away all intercourse between God and man. Which yet were little worth our notice or consideration,

6 η θεία φύσις προς ταύτα μηδαμη προσαγέσθω, αλλα αλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω, και εν τη πασης μακαριότητι. Laertius, i. 10. Que molitio, quæ ferramenta, qui vectes, que machinæ, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? Vell. apud Cicer. de Natura Deorum. c Nibil beatius, nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius excogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, &c. Id. Orav, rny Ociar voir un DETOURLY anyway. Laert. ibid. Itaque imposuistis cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem, dies et noctes, timeremus. Quis enim non timeat omnia providentem, et cogitantem, et animadvertentem, et omnia ad se pertinere putantem, curiosum et plenum negotii Deum. Vell. ubi supra. Hu mana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret. In terris oppressa gravi sub religione Primum Gratus homo (meaning Epicurus, the first champion of irreligion.) Lucret. Το which purpose besides what we have in Laert. Το μακάριον και αφθαρτον, ουτέ αυτό πραγματα έχει, ούτε αλλων παρέχει ώςε ούτε οργαίς, ούτε χαρισι συνεχεται εν ασθενει γαρ παν το τοιούτον, ι. 10. Much more is collected in the Syntagm. Nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum æterna esset et beatissima. Habit enim veneraonem justam quicquid excellit. Et metus omnis, a vi atque ira Deorum pulsus

ὰ Και τοι ει μεν εν της προλήψει του θεού την πρόνοιαν απελίτον, εφαίνοντο αν ελπίσι χρήσαις πλέον έχοντες οι φρονιμοί των θηρίων προς το ήδέως ζην; έπει δε τελος ην του περι θεων λόγου, το μη φοβείσθαί θεου, αλλά παύσασθαι πραττομένους, βεβαιότερον οίμαι τούτο, &c. Plut.

e Adversus Colorem. Πως ουν απολείπουσι φύσιν και ψυχην και ζωον ; ως όρκον, ως ευχήν, ως θυσίαν, ως προσκύνησιν, ρηματι και λόγων, και των φαναι και προσποιείσθαι και ονομάζειν, α ταις αρχαις και τοις δόγμασιν avaipovoiv. Unto which purpose is that also in Tully. At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus Deos libros scripsit Epicurus. Ad quomodo in his 1 quitur? ut Coruncanium aut Scævolam Pontifices maximos te audire dicas non eum, qui subtulerit omnem funditus religionem: Nec manibus ut Xerxes, sed rationibus Templa Deorum et aras everterit. De Natura Deorum

to itself, while they would have that to be necessarily | prompted, become thus ignorantly officious to these idle, existent (as they must if they will have it existent at all, voluptuary godlings; and should so effectually take course unto which, in the meantime, they deny the other perfec- they might be known to the world, who no way ever tions which necessary existence hath been proved to include. obliged it, nor were ever like to do! But to regress a But how vain and idle trifling is it, arbitrarily and by a little, fain I would know what is this thing they call narandom fancy to imagine any thing what we please, and ture? Is it any thing else than the course and inclination attributing of our own special grace and favour necessary of conspiring atoms, which singly are not pretended to existence to it, thence to conclude that it doth exist, only bear any such impression; but as they luckily club and because we have been pleased to make that belong to the hit together, in the composition of a human soul, by the notion of it? What so odd and uncouth composition can merest and strangest chance that ever happened? But we form any conception of, which we may not make exist, would we ever regard what they say whom we believe to at this rate? speak by chance? Were it to be supposed that characters But the notion of God is not arbitrary, but is natural, and words serving to make up some proposition or other, proleptical, and common to men, impressed upon the minds were by some strange agitation of wind and waves impressed of all: whence they say it ought not to be drawn into con- and figured on the sand; would we, if we really believed troversy. What! the Epicurean notion of him? We the matter came to pass only by such an odd casualty, shall inquire further into that anon. And in the mean- think that proposition any whit the truer for being there, time need not doubt to say, any man might with as good or take this for a demonstration of its truth, any more than pretence imagine the ridiculous sort of gods described in if we had seen it in a ballad? Because men have casuCicero's ironical supposition, and affirm them to exist, as ally come to think so, therefore there are such beings, (to they those they have thought fit to feign, and would impose be called gods,) between whom and them there never was upon the belief of men. And when they have fancied or shall be any intercourse or mutual concern. It follows these to exist, is not that a mighty proof that they indeed as well, as that because the staff stands in the corner, the do so? But that which for the present we allege, is, that morrow will be a rainy day. The dictates of nature are supposing their notion were ever so absolutely universal indeed most regardable things taken as expressions of his and agreeing with the common sentiments of all other men, mind, or emanations from him, who is the Author and God they have yet precluded themselves of any right to argue, of nature: but abstracted from him, they are and signify from its commonness, to the existence of the thing itself. as much as a beam cut off from the body of the sun; or a Nor can they upon their principles form an argument person that pretends himself an ambassador, without crehence, that shall conclude or signify any thing to this pur- dentials. pose. None can be drawn hence, that will conclude immediately, and itself reach the mark, without the addition of some further thing, which so ill sorts with the rest of their doctrine, that it would subvert the whole frame. That is, it follows not, that because men generally hold that there is a God, that therefore there is one; otherwise than as that consequence can be justified by this plain and irrefragable proof-That no reason can be devised of so general an agreement, or of that so common an impression upon the minds of men, but this only; that it must have proceeded from one common cause, viz. God himself; who having made man so prime a part of his creation, hath stamped with his own signature this nobler piece of his workmanship, and purposely made and framed him to the acknowledgment and adoration of his Maker.

But how shall they argue so, who, while they acknowledge a God, deny man to be his creature, and will have him and all things to be by chance, or without dependence on any Maker? What can an impression infer to this purpose, that comes no one can tell whence or how; but is plainly denied to be from him, whose being they would argue from it?

The observation of so common an apprehension in the minds of men, might (upon their supposition) beget much wonder, but no knowledge; and may perplex men much, how such a thing should come to pass, without making them any thing the wiser; and would infer astonishment, sooner than a good conclusion, or than it would solidly prove any important truth. And do they think they have salved the business, and given us a satisfying account of this matter, by telling us, This impression is from nature, as they speak? It were to be wished some of them had told us, or could yet tell us, what they meant by nature. Is it any intelligent principle, or was it guided by any such? If yea, whence came this impression, but from God himself? For surely an intelligent Being, that could have this universal influence upon the minds of all men, is much liker to be God than the imaginary entities they talk of, that are bodies, and no bodies, have blood, and no blood, members, and no members, are some where, and no where; or if they be any where, are confined to some certain places remote enough from our world; with the affairs whereof, or any other, they cannot any way concern themselves, without quite undoing and spoiling their felicity. If they say No, and that nature, which put this stamp upon the minds of men, is an utterly unintelligent thing, nor was ever governed by any thing wiser than itself-strange! that blind and undesigning nature should, without being f Deos, Strabones, patulos, nævum habentes, silos, flaccos, frontones, capitones-De Natura Deorum, l. 1.

Indeed, (as is imported in the words noted from that graves pagan a little before,) the principles of these men destroy quite nature itself, as well as every thing of religion; and leave us the names and show of them, but take away the things themselves. In sum, though there be no such impression upon the minds of men as that which they talk of, yet if there were, no such thing can be inferred from it, as they would infer; their principles taking away all connexion between the argument, and what they would argue by it.

2. We have also too much reason to add, That as the supposition of such a being, or sort of beings, can have no sufficient ground; so it is equally unconceivable that it can be intended for any good end. Not that we think the last assertion a sufficient sole proof of this; for we easily acknowledge that it is possible enough, men may harmlessly and with innocent intentions attempt the building very weighty and important truths upon weak and insufficient foundations; hoping they have offered that as a support unto truth, which proves only a useless cumber. Nor were it just to impute treachery, where there is ground for the more charitable censure, that the misadventure proceeded only from want of judgment and shortness of discourse. But it is neither needful nor seemly, that charity which can willingly wink in some cases, should therefore be quite blind; or that no difference should be made of well-meant mistakes, and mischief thinly hid and covered over with specious pretences. And let it be soberly considered, what can the design be, after the cashiering of all solid grounds for the proving of a Deity, at length to acknowledge it upon none at all? As if their acknowledgment must owe itself not to their reason, but their courtesy. And when they have done what they can to make the rest of men believe they have no need to own any God at all, and they can tell how all that concerns the making and governing the world may well enough be despatched without any, yet at last they will be so generous as to be content there shall be one, however. What, I say, can the design of this be, that they who have contended with all imaginable obstinacy against the most plain and convincing evidences, that do even defy cavil; have quite fought themselves blind, and lost their eyes in the encounter; so that they are ready to swear the sun is a clod of dirt, and noon-day light is to them the very blackness of darkness? They cannot see a Deity encircling them with the brightest beams, and shining upon them with the most conspicuous glory through every thing that occurs, and all things that encompass them on every side. And

g Plutarch.

yet when all is done, and their thunder-struck eyes make them fancy they have put out the sun; they have won the day, have cleared the field, and are absolute victors; they have vanquished the whole power of their most dreaded enemy, the light that reveals God in his works after all this, without any inducement at all, and having triumphed over every thing that looked like an argument to prove it, they vouchsafe to say however, of their own accord, There is a God. Surely if this have any design at all, it must be a very bad one. And see whither it tends. They have now a god of their own making; and all the being he hath, depends upon their grace and favour. They are not his creatures, but he is theirs; a precarious deity, that shall be as long, and what, and where, they please to have him. And if he displease them, they can think him back into nothing. Here seems the depth of the design. For see with what cautions and limitations they admit him into being. There shall be a god, provided he be not meddlesome, nor concern himself in their affairs to the crossing of any inclinations of humours which they are pleased shall command and govern their lives; being conscious that if they admit of any at all that shall have to do with their concernments, he cannot but be such as the ways they resolve on will displease. Their very shame will not permit them to call that God, which if he take any cognizance at all of their course will not dislike it. And herein that they may be the more secure, they judge it the most prudent course, not to allow him any part or interest in the affairs of the world at all.

there be such a being as whereto it properly belongs: supposing, and taking for granted as a matter out of question, that (even in their own sense) if such a being as we have described do exist, it is most properly God; and that they will not go about to call it by another name; or that they will not pretend this name agrees to any other thing so fitly as to him. And because we have already proved this Being doth exist, and that there can be but one such, it plainly follows theirs is in propriety of speech (even though he did exist) no God; and that much less should he appropriate the name, and exclude the only true God. For since the high and dignifying eulogies, which they are wont to bestow upon their feigned deity, do plainly show they would have it thought they esteem him the most excellent of all existent beings; if we have proved a really existent Being to be more excellent than he, it is evident, even upon their own grounds, that this is God. Hither the Deity must be deferred, and theirs must yield, and give out; inasmuch as we cannot suppose them so void of common sense, as to say the less excellent being is God, and the more excellent is no God. But if they should be so, (whereas the controversy is not about the name,) we have our main purpose, in having proved there is a Being actually existent, that hath all the real excellences which they ascribe to their deities, and infinitely more. And as concerning the name, who made them dictators to all the world, and the sole judges of the propriety of words? or with what right or pretence will they assume so much to themselves, so as, against the rest of the world, to name Yet all this while they court him at a great rate, and all that God, from which they cut off the principal perfections religion is taken away under pretence of great piety: wor- wont to be signified by that name? And if we speak of ship they believe he cares not for, because he is full and such perfections as tend to infer and establish religion and needs nothing. In this world he must not be, for it is a providence, who but themselves, did ever call that God place unworthy of him. He must have had no hand in in the eminent sense, that they supposed could not hear framing, nor can they think fit he should have any in the prayers, and thereupon dispense favours, relieve the afflict government of it. For it would be a great disturbance to ed, supply the indigent, and receive suitable acknowledg him, and interrupt his pleasures. The same thing as if ments? They indeed (saith a famed writers of Roman certain licentious courtiers, impatient of being governed, history) that exercise themselves in the atheistical sorts of should address themselves to their prince in such a form philosophy, (if we may call that philosophy,) as they are wont of speech, that it is beneath him to receive any homage to jeer at all appearances of the gods, whether among the from them, it would too much debase majesty; that his Greeks or the Barbarians, will make themselves matter of dominions afford no place fit for his residence, and there-laughter of our histories, not thinking that any God takes fore it would be convenient for him to betake himself into care of any man.-Let the story he there tells shift for itself; some other country, that hath better air and accommoda- in the meantime it appears they escaped not the infamy of tion for delight; that diadems and sceptres are burthen- atheists, who (whatever deities they might imagine be some things, which therefore if he will quit to them, he sides) did deny God's presence, and regard to men. may wholly give up himself to ease and pleasure. Which sort of persons he elsewhere of ten animadverts upon. But do we need to insist, that all the rest of the world acknowledged no gods, whom they did not also worship? What meant their temples and altars, their prayers and sacrifices? Or did they take him for God, whom they believed to take no care of them, or from whom they expected no advantage? Even the barbarous Seythians themselves understood it most inseparable to belong to a deity, to be beneficent; when they upbraidingly tell Alexander, That if he were a god, (as they it seems had heard he vogued himself,) he should bestow benefits upon men, and not take from them what was their own.

Yea, and whatsoever would any way tend to evince his necessary existence, is with the same courtship laid aside; (although if he do not exist necessarily and of himself, he cannot have any existence at all; for as they do not allow him to be the cause of any thing, so they assign nothing to be the cause of him ;) that is, with pretence there is no need it should be demonstrated, because all men believe it without a reason, nature having impressed this belief upon the minds of all; or (which is all one) they having agreed to believe it because they believe. But though they have no reason to believe a Deity, they have a very good one why they would seem to do so, that they may expiate with the people their irreligion by a collusive pretending against atheism. And because they think it less plausible plainly to deny there is a God, they therefore grant one to please the vulgar, yet take care it shall be one as good as none, lest otherwise they should displease themselves and so their credit and their liberty are both cared for together.

V. But this covering is too short, and the art by which they would fit it to their design, when it should cheat others, deceives themselves. For it is most evident,

3. That the being with the pretended belief whereof they would mock the world, is no God; and that consequently, while they would seem to acknowledge a deity, they really acknowledge none at all. Our contest hath not, all this while, been a strife about words, or concerning the name, but the thing itself. And not whether there be such a thing in being to which that name may, with whatsoever impropriety, be given, but whether

And by the way, it is observable how contradictions and repugnant the Epicurean sentiments are in this, even to themselves: that speaking of friendship, (of which they say many generous and brave things,) they gallantly profess (as Plutarch testifies of them) that it is a more pleasant thing to benefit others than to receive benefits oneself. They yet, while they seem so greatly concerned that their gods be every way most perfectly happy, deny to them this highest and most excellent part of felicity. That a virtuous man may a great deal more benefit the world than they, and consequently have more pure and lively relishes of a genuine and refined pleasure.

Upon the whole, it is manifest they so maim the notion of God, as to make it quite another thing. And if they think to wipe off any thing of the foul and odious blot wherewith their avowed irreligion hath stained their name and memory, by the acknowledgment of such a God; they effect the like thing by it, and gain as much to the repu tation of their piety as he should of his loyalty, who being

k Lib. non posse suaviter vivi, &c.

1 Vid. et lib. maxime cum princip. viris Phil. & c.

accused of treason against his prince, shall think to vindi- of those do, that have been proved to belong to him. cate himself by professing solemnly to own the king; Which is that we have next to consider, viz. provided you only mean by it the king of clubs, or any VI. That it may evidently be deduced from what hath such painted one the pack affords. But here it may be been said, tending to prove those things of God which are demanded, Is every misapprehension of God to be under- included in the notion of him, and from that notion itself, stood as a denial of his being? If so, whom can we un- that he is such as can converse with men. That is, having dertake to assoil of atheism? Or who can certainly acquit proved-That there is an eternal, self-subsisting, indehimself? For how impossible is it to be sure we have no pendent, necessary Being, of so great activity, life, power, untrue conception of a Being so infinitely, by our own wisdom, and goodness, as to have been the Maker of this confession, above all our thoughts? Or how is it to be world: and by this medium-That we see this world is avoided, in somewhat or other, to think amiss of so un-in being, which otherwise could never have been, much less known and incomprehensibly excellent a Being, either such as we see it is: it therefore follows, that this great by detracting somewhat that belongs to it, or attributing Creator can have influence upon the creatures he hath somewhat that belongs not? And since many, we are sure, made, in a way suitable to their natures. It follows, I have thought and spoken unworthily of God, besides say, from the same medium, (the present visible existence Epicureans, are all these to go into the account of atheists? of this world, which could not otherwise be now in being,) Or whereas it is commonly wont to be said, Whatsoever that he can thus have influence upon his creatures: for it is in God, is God: how can they who deny any thing of is hence manifest that he hath; they depend on him, and him, which is really in him, be excused of denying his are sustained by him; nor could more subsist by themwhole being? Or where will we fix the bounds of our selves, than they could make themselves, or of themselves -censure? have sprung out of nothing. And if it were possible they could, being raised up into being, continue in being of themselves; yet since our present question is not concerning what they need, but what God can do; and our adversaries in the present cause do not (as hath been noted) upon any other pretence deny that he doth concern himself in the affairs of the universe, but that he cannot; (that is, that it consists not with his felicity, and he cannot be happy;) is it not plain that he can with the same facility continue the influence which he at first gave forth, and with as little prejudice to his felicity? For if it be necessary to him to be happy, or impossible not to be so, he must be ever so. His happiness was not capable of being discontinued, so long as while he made the world, settled the several orders and kinds, and formed the first individuals of every kind of creatures. Therefore having done this, and without diminution to his happiness, was it a more toilsome and less tolerable labour to keep things as they were, than to make them so? If it was, (which no man that understands common sense would say,) surely that blind thing which they more blindly call nature, (not understanding or being able to tell what they mean by it,) and would have be the only cause of all things, acting at first to the uttermost, and having no way to recruit its vigour and reinforce itself, its labour and business being so much increased, and jaded and grown weary; had given out, and patiently suffered all things to dissolve and relapse into the old chaos long ago. But if the labour was not greater, to continue things in the state wherein they were made, than to make them; surely a wise, intelligent Deity, which we have proved made them, could as well sustain them, being made, as their brutal (and as unintelligible as unintelligent) nature do both.

Many things should be said (if we will speak at all) to so manifold an inquiry: but it belongs not to the design of this discourse to examine and discuss all men's sentiments of God that have been exposed to the view of the world, or arbitrate among the dissenting parties; much less to explain or abet every school-maxim that hath reference to this theme; the authors or lovers whereof will be sufficiently prompted by their own genius to do at least as much as can be requisite herein. But whatever the real sameness is supposed to be, of the things attributed to God, it is acknowledged we cannot but conceive of them as divers; and so that our conception of any one is not adequate to the entire object, which is confessed incomprehensible. Yet any one attribute gives a true notion of the object, so far as it reaches, though not a full. As I may be said truly to see a man, when I only see his face, and view not every part and limb; or to know him, while yet I have not had opportunity to discern every quality in his temper, and what his dispositions and inclinations, in all respects, are. Moreover, it's one thing to deny any divine perfection, another, only not to know it.

And such mere nescience is so far from being guilty of the horrid crime of atheism, that it's not so much as culpable, further than as it is obstinately persisted in, against sufficient evidence: for we are not obliged to know every thing, but what is to us knowable, and what we are concerned to know. Again, (and which is most considerable to our purpose,) we are not concerned to know what God is in himself, otherwise than as we may thereby know what he is in relation to us, viz. as he is the Author of our beings, the Governor of our lives and actions, and thereupon the object of our religion; for a religious respect unto him is the very end of that knowledge. Now, if any other than that sort of persons we oppose have taken up apprehensions of him not so suitable to that end, it were to be wished they saw it, and would unthink all those thoughts. But surely, they who must professedly contend against the very notions themselves which directly influence all our practice toward God, so considered, would suggest such as are wholly inconsistent therewith; who oppose the knowledge of God to the end of that knowledge, and do not merely mistake the way to that end while they are aiming at it, but most avowedly resist and disclaim the end itself; are to be distinguished from them who professedly intend that same end, only see not wherein their misapprehension are prejudical and repugnant to it; otherwise are ready to reject them. And the former are therefore most justly to be singled out, and designed the objects of our direct opposition. Nor are they so fitly to be opposed under any other notion, as that of atheists. For since our knowledge of God ought chiefly to respect him in that fore-mentioned relative consideration, and the inquiry, What is God? signifies, as it concerns us, What is the object of religion? they denying any such thing, deny there is a God. Nor do they deny him in that relative consideration only; but (as every relation is founded in somewhat that is absolute) the very reason of their denying him so, is, that they deny in him those absolute and positive perfections that render him such; as certain

So much then of intercourse God could have with his creatures, as his continual communication of his influence to be received by them amounts to. And then man, not being excluded their number, must share in this possible privilege according to the capacity of his nature. And inasmuch as we have also proved more particularly concerning man, that he immediately owes the peculiar excellences of his intelligent nature, as it's such, to God only; it is apparently consequent, that having formed this his more excellent creature, according to his own more express likeness, stamped it with the glorious characters of his living image, given it a nature suitable to his own, and thereby made it capable of rational and intelligent converse with him; he hath it ever in his power to maintain a continual converse with this creature, by agreeable communications; by letting in upon it the vital beams and influences of his own light and love, and receiving back the return of its grateful acknowledgments and praises. Wherein it's manifest he should do no greater thing than he hath done: for who sees not, that it is a matter of no greater difficulty to converse with, than to make a reasonable creature? Or who would not be ashamed to deny, that he who hath been the only Author of the soul of man, and of the excellent powers and faculties belonging to it, can more easily sustain what he hath made, and converse with that his creature, suitably to the way wherein he hath made it capable of his converse? Whereto the consider

ation being added of his gracious nature, (manifested in this creation itself,) it is further evident, that he is (as things are now ordered, whereof more hereafter) not only able, but apt and ready, to converse with men, in such a way as shall tend to the improving of their being unto that blessedness whereof he hath made them naturally capable; if their own voluntary alienation and aversion to him (yet not overcome) do not obstruct the way of that intercourse. And even this were sufficient to give foundation to a temple, and both afford encouragement and infer an obligation to religion; although no other perfection had been, or could be, demonstrated of the Divine Being, than what is immediately to be collected from his works, and the things whereof he hath been the sole and most arbitrary Author. For what if no more were possible to be proved, have we not, even by thus much, a representation of an object sufficiently worthy of our homage and adoration? He that could make and sustain such a world as this, how inexpressibly doth he surpass in greatness the most excellent | of all mortal creatures! to some or other of whom, upon some (merely accidental) dignifying circumstances, we justly esteem ourselves to owe a dutiful observance and subjection.

If he did not comprehend within his own being simply all perfection; if there were many gods and worlds besides, and he only the Creator and absolute Lord of our vortex; were not that enough to entitle him to all the obedience and service we could give him, and enable him sufficiently to reward it, and render his presence and cherishing | influences (which he could every where diffuse within this circle, and limited portion of the universe) even infinitely covetable and desirable to us? Yea, if he were the only entire Author of our own particular being, how much more is that, than the partial, subordinate interest of a human parent, to whom (as even an Epicurean would confess) nature itself urges and exacts a duty, the refusal whereof even barbarian ingenuity would abhor, yea and brutal instinct condemn? How much greater and more absolute is the right which the parentage of our whole being challenges? If every man were created by a several god, whose creative power were confined to only one such creature, and each one were the solitary product and the charge of an appropriate deity, whose dominion the state of things would allow to be extended so far only, and no further; were there therefore no place left for religion, or no tie unto love, reverence, obedience, and adoration, because the author of my being comprehended not in himself all perfection, when as yet he comprehended so much as to be the sole cause of all that is in me; and his power over me, and his goodness to me, are hereby supposed the same which the only one God truly hath and exerciseth towards all? If all that I am and have be for him, I cannot surely owe to him less than all.

Such as have either had, or supposed themselves to have, their particular tutelary genii, (of whom there will be more occasion to take notice hereafter,) though they reckoned them but a sort of deputed or vicarious deities, underling gods, whom they never accounted the causes of their being; yet how have they coveted and gloried to open their breasts to become their temples, and entertain the converse of those supposed divine inhabitants! If they had taken one of these to be their alone creator, how much greater had their veneration and their homage been! This, it may be hoped, will be thought sufficiently proved in this discourse, (at least to have been so by some or other,) that we are not of ourselves; and that our extraction is to be fetched higher than from matter, or from only human progenitors. Nothing that is terrene and mortal could be the author of such powers as we find in ourselves; we are most certainly the offspring of some or other deity. And he that made us, knows us thoroughly, can apply himself inwardly to us, receive our addresses and application, our acknowledgments and adoration; whereunto we should have, even upon these terms, great and manifest obligation, although nothing more of the excellency and perfection of our Creator were certainly known

to us.

VII. But it hath been further shown, That the necessary Being from whence we sprang, is also an absolutely and infinitely perfect Being:-That necessary Being can

not be less perfect, than to include the entire and inexhaustible fulness of all being and perfection:-That therefore the God to whom this notion belongs, must consequently be every way sufficient to all, and be himself but one; the only Source and Fountain of all life and being; the common Basis and Support of the universe; the absolute Lord of this great creation, and the central Object of the common concurrent trust, fear, love, and other worship of his intelligent and reasonable creatures. And therefore there remains no greater or other difficulty, in apprehending how he can, without disturbance to himself or interruption of his own felicity, intend all the concernments of his creatures, apply himself to them according to their several exigences, satisfy their desires and cravings, inspect and govern their actions and affairs; than we have to apprehend a Being absolutely and every way perfect. Whereof if we cannot have a distinct apprehension all at once, i. e. though we cannot comprehend every particular perfection of God in the same thought, (as our eye cannot behold, at one view, every part of an over-large object, unto which, however, part by part, it may be successively applied,) we can yet in the general apprehend him absolutely perfect; or such to whom, we are sure, no perfection is wanting: and can successively contemplate this or that, as we are occasionally led to consider them: and can answer to ourselves difficulties that occur to us, with this easy, sure, and ever ready solution; That he can do all things; that nothing is too hard for him; that he is full, all-sufficient, and every way perfect. Whereof we are the more confirmed, that we find we cannot, by the utmost range of our most enlarged thoughts, ever reach any bound or end of that perfection, which yet we must conclude is necessarily to be attributed to an absolutely perfect Being. And this we have reason to take for a very sufficient answer to any doubt that can arise, concerning the possibility of his converse with us; unless we will be so unreasonable as to pretend, that what is brought for solution hath greater difficulty in it than the doubt; or that because we cannot apprehend at once infinite perfection, therefore it cannot be; which were as much as to say, that it cannot be because it is infinite; for it were not infinite, if we could distinctly apprehend it. And so were to make it a reason against itself, which is most injuriously and with no pretence attempted, except we could show an inconsistency in the terms; which it is plain we can never do, and should most idly attempt. And it were to make our present apprehension the measure of all reality, against our experience; which (if our indulgence to that selfmagnifying conceit do not suspend our further inquiries and researches) would daily bring to our notice things we had no apprehension of before. It were (instead of that just and laudable ambition of becoming ourselves like God, in his imitable perfections) to make him like ourselves; the true model of the Epicurean deity.

Nor can any thing be more easy, than that wherein we pretend so great a difficulty; that is, to apprehend somewhat may be more perfect than we can apprehend. What else but proud ignorance can hinder us from seeing, that the more we know, the more there is that we know not? How often are we outdone by creatures of our own order in the creation! How many men are there whom we are daily constrained to admire, as unspeakably excelling us, and whom we cannot but acknowledge to be far more knowing, discerning, apprehensive of things, of more composed minds, of more penetrating judgments, of more quick and nimble wits, easily turning themselves to great variety of objects and affairs without distraction and confusion, of more equal and dispassionate tempers, less liable to commotion and disturbance, than ourselves.

How absurd and senseless a pretence is it against the thing itself, that we cannot apprehend an infinite perfection in one common fountain of all perfection; or because we cannot go through a multitude of businesses without distraction, that therefore he that made us and all thing cannot. If we would make ourselves the measure, it is likely we should confess we are outstripped, when we are told that Julius Cæsar could dictate letters, when he was intent upon the greatest affairs, to four (and if he had nothing else to divert him, to seven) secretaries at once; that