been, when as the effects that serve so justly to endear and recommend to us civil government, (as peace, safety, order, quiet possession of our rights,) we cannot but know, are not inseparably and incommunicably approriate, or to be attributed to the person of this or that particular and mortal governor, but may also proceed from another: yea, and the same benefits may (for some short time at least) be continued without any such government at all. Nor is this intended merely as a rhetorical scheme of speech, to beguile or amuse the unwary reader; but, without arrogating any thing, or attributing more to it, than that it is an altogether inartificial and very defective, but true and naked, representation of the very case itself as it is. It is professedly propounded, as having somewhat solidly argumentative in it. That is, that (whereas there is most confessedly sufficient, yet) there is unspeakably less evidence to most people in the world, under civil government; that there actually is such a government existent over them; and that they are under obligation to be subject to it; than there is of the existence of a Deity, and the consequent reasonableness of religion. If therefore the ordinary effects and indications of the former be sufficient, which have so contingent and uncertain a connexion with their causes, (while those which are more extraordinary are so exceeding rare with the most,) why shall not the more certain ordinary discoveries of the latter be judged sufficient, though the most have not the immediate notice of any such extraordinary appearances as those are which have been before mentioned?

VI. Moreover, I yet demand further, whether it may be thought possible for any one to have a full rational certainty that another person is a reasonable creature, and bath in him a rational soul, so as to judge he hath sufficient ground and obligation to converse with him, and carry towards him as a man? Without the supposition of this, the foundation of all human society and civil conversation is taken away. And what evidence have we of it, whereunto that which we have of the being of God (as the foundation of religious and godly conversation) will not at least be found equivalent.

incomparably greater certainty, than the latter doth an in-dwelling reasonable soul. In which way we shall find what will aptly serve our present purpose, though we are far from apprehending any such union of the blessed God with this world, as is between the soul and body of a man. It is manifestly possible to our understandings, that there may be, and (if any history or testimony of others be worthy to be believed) certain to experience and sense, that there often hath been, the appearance of human shape and of agreeable actions without a real man. But it is no way possible such a world as this should have ever been without God. That there is a world, proves that eternal Being to exist, whom we take to be God, (suppose we it as rude a heap as at first it was, or as we can suppose it,) as external appearance represents to us that creature which we take to be a man: but that as a certain infallible discovery, necessarily true; this but as a probable and conjectural one, and (though highly probable) not impossible to be false.

And if we will yet descend to a more particular inquiry into this matter, which way will we fully be ascertained that this supposed man is truly and really what he seems to be? This we know not how to go about, without recollecting what is the differencing notion we have of a man; that he is, viz. a reasonable, living creature, or a reasonable soul, inhabiting, and united with a body. And how do we think to descry that, here, which may answer this common notion we have of a man? Have we any way besides that discovery which the acts and effects of reason do make of a rational or intelligent being? We will look more narrowly, i. e. unto somewhat else than his external appearance; and observe the actions that proceed from a more distinguishing principle in him, that he reasons, discourses, doth business, pursues designs; in short, he talks and acts as a reasonable creature: and hence we conclude him to be one, or to have a reasonable soul in him.

And have we not the same way of procedure in the other case? Our first view or taking notice of a world full of life and motion, assures us of an eternal active Being, besides it, which we take to be God, having now before our Will we say that mere human shape is enough to prove eyes a darker shadow of him only, as the external bulk of such a one a man? A philosopher would deride us, as the the human body is only the shadow of a man. Which, Stagyrite's disciples are said to have done the Platonic when we behold it stirring and moving, assures us there is man. But we will not be so nice. We acknowledge it somewhat besides that grosser bulk, (that of itself could is, if no circumstances concur (as sudden appearing, va- not so move,) which we take to be the soul of a man. nishing, transformation, or the like) that plainly evince Yet, as a principle that can move the body makes not up the contrary; so far as to infer upon us an obligation not the entire notion of this soul, so an eternal active being, to be rude and uncivil; that we use no violence, nor carry that moves the matter of the universe, makes not up the ourselves abusively towards one that only thus appears a full notion of God. We are thus far sure in both cases, human creature. Yea, and to perform any duty of jus- i. e. of some mover distinct from what is moved. But we tice or charity towards him within our power, which we are not yet sure, by what we hitherto see, what the one or owe to a man as a man. As suppose we see him wronged the other is. But as when we have upon the first sight or in necessity, and can presently right or relieve him; thought it was a reasonable soul that was acting in the though he do not or cannot represent to us more of his former, or a man, (if we will speak according to their case than our own eyes inform us of. And should an act of sense who make the soul the man,) in order to being sure, murder be committed upon one whose true humanity was (as sure as the case can admit,) we have no other way, not otherwise evident, would not the offender be justly li- but to consider what belongs more distinguishingly to the able to the known and common punishment of that event? notion of a man, or of a reasonable soul; and observe how Nor could he acquit himself of transgressing the laws of actions and effects, which we have opportunity to take humanity, if he should only neglect any seasonable act of notice of, do answer thereto, or serve to discover that. So justice or mercy towards him, whereof he beholds the pre-when we would be sure what that eternal active Being is sent occasion. But if any one were disposed to cavil, or play the sophist, how much more might be said, even by infinite degrees, to oppose this single evidence of any one's true humanity, than ever was or can be brought against the entire concurrent evidence we have of the existence of God. It is, here, most manifestly just and equal, thus to state the case, and compare the whole evidence we have of the latter, with that one of the former; inasmuch as that one alone is apparently enough to oblige us to carry towards such a one as a man. And if that alone be sufficient to oblige us to acts of justice or charity towards man, he is strangely blind that cannot see infinitely more to oblige him to acts of piety towards God.

But if we would take a nearer and more strict view of this parallel, we would state the general and more obvious aspect of this world on the one hand, and the external aspect and shape of a man on the other; and should then see the former doth evidence to us an in-dwelling Deity diffused through the whole, and actuating every part with

(which that it is, we are already sure, and) which we have taken to be God, that, I say, we may be sure of that also, we have the same thing to do. That is, to consider what more peculiarly belongs to the entire notion of God, (and would even in the judgment of opposers be acknowledged to belong to it,) and see whether his works, more narrowly inspected, do not bear as manifest correspondency to that notion of God, as the works and actions of a man do to the notion we have of him. And certainly we cannot but find they do correspond as much. And that upon a serious and considerate view of the works and appearances of God in the world; having diligently observed and pondered the vastness and beauty of this universe, the variety, the multitude, the order, the exquisite shapes and numerous parts, the admirable and useful composure, of particular creatures; and especially the constitution and powers of the reasonable soul of man itself; we cannot, surely, if we be not under the possession of a very voluntary and obstinate blindness, and the power of a most vicious pre

judice, but acknowledge the making, sustaining, and go-active and designing cause? So much would plainly converning such a world, is as god-like, as worthy of God, and as much becoming him, according to the notion that hath been assigned of him, as at least the common actions of ordinary men, are of a man; or evidence the doer of them to be a human creature. Yea, and with this advantageous difference, that the actions of a man do evidence a human creature more uncertainly, and so as it is possible the matter may be otherwise. But these works of God do with so plain and demonstrative evidence discover him the Author of them, that it is altogether impossible they could ever otherwise have been done.

clude the sum of what we have been pleading for; and what can be plainer or doth require a shorter turn of thoughts? At this easy expense might any one that had a disposition to use his understanding to such a purpose, save himself from being an atheist. And where is the flaw? What joint is not firm and strong in this little frame of discourse? which yet arrogates nothing to the contriver; for there is nothing in it worthy to be called contrivance; but things do themselves lie thus. And what hath been further said concerning the perfection and oneness of this Cause of all things, (though somewhat more remote Now therefore, if we have as clear evidence of a Deity, from common apprehension,) is what it is likely would as we can have, in a way not unsuitable to the nature and appear plain and natural to such as would allow thempresent state of man; (and we can have in a suitable way, selves the leisure to look more narrowly into such things. that which is sufficient;) if we have clearer and more Atheism therefore seems to import a direct and open certain evidence of God's government over the world, hostility against the most native, genuine, and facile dicthan most men have or can have, of the existence of their tates of common reason. And being so manifest an enemy secular rulers; yea, more sure than that there are men on to it, we cannot suppose it should be at all befriended by earth, and that thence (as far as the existence of God will it. For that will be always true and constant to itself, make towards it) there is a less disputable ground for re-whatsoever false shows of it a bad cause doth sometimes ligious than for civil conversation; we may reckon ourselves competently well ascertained, and have no longer reason to delay the dedication of a temple to him, upon any pretence of doubt, whether we have an object of worship existing, yea or no.

Wherefore we may also by the way take notice how impudent a thing is atheism, that by the same fulsome and poisonous breath whereby it would blast religion, would despoil man of his reason and apprehensive power, even in reference to the most apprehensible thing; would blow away the rights of princes, and all foundations of policy and government, and destroy all civil commerce and conversation out of the world, and yet blushes not at the attempt of so foul things.

VII. And here it may perhaps prove worth our while (though it can be no pleasant contemplation) to pause a little, and make some short reflections upon the atheistical temper and genius, so as therein to remark some few more obvious characters of atheism itself.

put on; that having yet somewhat a more creditable name, and being of a little more reputation in the world, than plain downright madness and folly. And it will appear how little it is befriended, by any thing that can justly bear that name, if we consider the pitiful shifts the atheist makes for his forlorn cause; and what infirm tottering supports the whole frame of atheism rests upon. For what is there to be said for their hypothesis, or against the existence of God, and the dueness of religion? For it, there is directly nothing at all. Only a possibility is alleged, things might be as they are, though God did not exist. And if this were barely possible, how little doth that signify? Where reason is not injuriously dealt with, it is permitted the liberty of balancing things equally, and of considering which scale hath most weight. And is he not perfectly blind, that sees not what violence is done to free reason in this matter? Are there not thousands of things, not altogether impossible, which yet he would be concluded altogether out of his wits, that should profess And first, such as have not been themselves seized by to be of the opinion they are, or were actually so? And as the infatuation, cannot but judge it a most unreasonable to the present case, how facile and unexceptionable, how thing, a perverse and cross-grained humour, that so oddly plain and intelligible, is the account that is given of the writhes and warps the mind of a man, as that it never original of this world, and the things contained in it, by makes any effort or offer at any thing against the Deity; resolving all into a Deity, the Author and Maker of them? but it therein doth (by a certain sort of serpentine invo- Whereas the wild, extravagant suppositions of atheists, if Intion and retortion) seem to design a quarrel with itself: they were admitted possible, are the most unlikely that that is, with (what one would think should be most inti- could be devised. So that if there had been any to have mate and natural to the mind of man) his very reasoning laid wagers, when things were taking their beginning,there power, and the operations thereof. So near indeed was is nobody that would not have ventured thousands to one, the ancient alliance between God and man, (his own Son, that no such frame of things (no not so much as one single his likeness and living image,) and consequently between mouse or flea) would ever have hit. And how desperate reason and religion, that no man can ever be engaged in hazards the atheist runs, upon this mere supposed possian opposition to God and his interest, but he must be equal- bility, it will be more in our way to take notice by and by. ly so to himself and his own. And any one that takes no- But besides, that pretended possibility plainly appears tice how the business is carried by an atheist, must think, none at all. It is impossible any thing should spring up in order to his becoming one, his first plot was upon him- of itself out of nothing; that any thing that is alterable, self: to assassine his own intellectual faculty, by a sturdy should have been necessarily of itself, such as it now is; resolution, and violent imposing on himself, not to consi-that what is of itself unactive, should be the maker of der, or use his thoughts, at least with any indifferency, but other things; that the Author of all the wisdom in the with a treacherous predetermination to the part resolved world, should be, himself, unwise. These cannot but be on before-hand. Otherwise, it is hard to be imagined how judged most absolute impossibilities, to such as do not vi it should ever have been possible that so plain and evident olence to their own minds; or with whom reason can be proofs of a Deity as every where offer themselves unto allowed any the least exercise. Wherefore the atheistical observation, even such as have been here proposed, (that spirit is most grossly unreasonable, in withholding assent, do even lie open, for the most part, to common apprehen- where the most ungainsayable reason plainly exacts it. sion, and needed little search to find them out; so that it was harder to determine what not to say, than what to say,) could be overlooked.

For what could be more easy and obvious, than taking notice that there is somewhat in being, to conclude that somewhat must be of itself, from whence whatever is not so must have sprung? That, since there is somewhat effected or made, (as is plain, in that some things are alterable, and daily altered, which nothing can be that is of itself, and therefore a necessary being,) those effects have then had an active being for their cause? That since these effects are partly such as bear the manifest characters of wisdom and design upon them, and are partly, themselves, wise and designing; therefore they must have had a wisely

And are not the atheist's cavils as despicably silly against the Deity, and (consequently) religion? Whosoever shall consider their exceptions against some things in the notion of God, eternity, infinity, &c. which themselves, in the meantime, are forced to place elsewhere, will he not see they talk idly? And as for such other impeachments of his wisdom, justice, and goodness, as they take their ground for, from the state of affairs, in some respects, in this present world, (many of which may be seen in Lucretius, and answered by Dr. More in his Dialogues,) how inconsiderable will they be, to any one that bethinks himself, with how perfect and generous a liberty this world was made, by one that needed it not; who had no design, nor could have inclination to a fond, self-indulgent glorying

to despair of reconciliation-Why do we sort ourselves with devils? We profess not to be such.

are, perhaps, some of them the greatest pretenders to rea son. They rely little upon authority of former times and Yea, but we have no hope to be forgiven the sin we do ages, upon vulgar principles and maxims, but are vogued not leave, nor power to leave the sin which now we love. great masters of reason, diligent searchers into the myste This, instead of lessening, makes the wonder a miracle. Ories of nature, and can philosophize (as sufficiently appears) wretched, forlorn creature! Wouldst thou have God out beyond all imagination. But 'tis hoped it may be truly of being for this? (I speak to thee who dost not yet pro- said, for the vindication of philosophy and them that profess to believe there is no God, but dost only wish it.) The fess it, that modern atheists have little of that to glory in; sustainer of the world! the common basis of all being! and that their chief endowments are only their skill to Dost thou know what thou sayest? Art thou not wishing please their senses, and a faculty with a pitiful sort of thyself and all things into nothing? This, rather than drollery to tincture their cups, and add a grace to their humble thyself, and beg forgiveness! This, rather than otherwise dull and flat conversation. Yet all this howso become again a holy, pure, obedient creature, and again ever being considered, there is here but little advance made blessed in him, who first made thee so! It can never to the finding out whence atheism should proceed. For, cease, I say, to be a wonder, we never ought to cease won- that want of reason shall be thought the cause, what dering, that ever this befell the nature of man, to be prone hath been already said seems to forbid; that many igno to wish such a thing, that there were no God! rant persons seem possessed with a great awe of a Deity, from which divers, more knowing, have delivered themselves. And yet neither doth the former signify any thing (in just interpretation) to the disrepute of religion. For truth is not the less true, for that some hold it they know not how or why. Nor doth the latter make to the reputation of atheism, inasmuch as men, otherwise rational, may sometimes learnedly dote. But it confirms us that atheism is a strange thing, when its extraction and pedigree are so hardly found out, and it seems to be directly of the lineage, neither of knowledge nor ignorance, neither sound reason nor perfect dotage.

But this is, 'tis true, the too common case; and if we will only have what is more a rarity go for a wonder, how amazing then is it, That if any man would, even never so fain, he ever can make himself believe there is no God! and shape his horrid course according to that most horrid misbelief! By what fatal train of causes is this ever brought to pass? Into what can we devise to resolve it? Why such as have arrived to this pitch are much addicted to the pleasing of their senses; and this they make their business; so as that, for a long time, they have given themselves no leisure to mind objects of another nature; especially that should any way tend to disturb them in their easy course; till they are gradually fallen into a forgetful sleep, and the images of things are worn out with them, that had only more slightly touched their minds before. And being much used to go by the suggestions of sense, they believe not what they neither see nor feel.

This is somewhat, but does not reach the mark; for there are many very great sensualists, (as great as they at least,) who never arrive hither, but firmly avow it that they believe a Deity, whatsoever mistaken notion they have of him; whereupon they imagine to themselves impunity in their vicious course.

But these, it may be said, have so disaccustomed themselves to the exercise of their reason, that they have no disposition to use their thoughts about any thing above the sphere of sense; and have contracted so dull and sluggish a temper, that they are no fitter to mind or employ themselves in any speculations that tend to beget in them the knowledge of God, than any man is for discourse or business when he is fast asleep.

Nor doth it at all urge to say, And why may we not as well stand wondering, whence the apprehension of a God, and an addictedness to religion, should come, when we find them peculiar neither to the more knowing nor the more ignorant? For they are apparently and congruously enough to be derived from somewhat common to them both-the impression of a Deity, universally put upon the minds of all men, (which atheists have made a shift to rase out, or obliterate to that degree, as to render it illegi ble,) and that cultivated by the exercise of reason, in some, and in others, less capable of that help, somewhat confirmed by education, and the other accessaries mentioned above.

Therefore is this matter still most mysteriously intricate, that there should be one temper and persuasion, agreeing to two so vastly different sorts of persons, while yet we are to seek for a cause (except what is most tremendous to think of) from whence it should proceed, that is common to them both. And here is, in short, the sum of the won der, that any, not appearing very grossly unreasonable in So indeed, in reason, one would expect to find it; but other matters, (which cannot be denied even of some of the case is so much otherwise, when we consider particular the more sensual and lewder sort of atheists,) should, in so instances, that we are the more perplexed and entangled plain and important a case, be so, beyond all expression, in this inquiry, by considering how agreeable it is, that the absurd; that they without scruple are pleased to think matter should be thus; and observing that it proves, oft-like other men in matters that concern and relate to comtimes, not to be so; insomuch that reason and experience seem herein not to agree, and hence we are put again upon new conjectures what the immediate cause of this strange malady should be. For did it proceed purely from a sluggish temper of mind, unapt to reasoning and discourse; the more any were so, the more disposed they should be to atheism: whereas, every one knows that multitudes of persons of dull and slow minds, to any thing of ratiocination, would rather you should burn their houses, than tell them they did not believe in God: and would presently tell you, it were pity he should live, that should but intimate a doubt whether there were a God or no. Yea, and many, somewhat more intelligent, yet in this matter are shy of using their reason, and think it unsafe, it not profane, to go about to prove that there is a God, lest they should move a doubt, or seem hereby to make a question of it. And in the mean time, while they offer not at reasoning, they more meanly supply that want, after a sorry fashion, from their education, the tradition of their forefathers, common example, and the universal profession and practice of some religion round about them; and it may be only take the matter for granted, because they never heard such a thing was ever doubted of or called in question in all their lives.

Whereas, on the other hand, they who incline to atheism

8 Anst. Eth. I. 3.

mon practice, and wherein they might more colourably, and with less hazard, go out of the common road; and are here only so dangerously and madly extravagant. Theirs is therefore a particular madness; the dementia quoad hoc; so much the stranger thing, because they whom it pos sesses do only in this one case put off themselves, and are like themselves and other men in all things else. If they reckoned it a glory to be singular, they might (as hath been plainly shown) more plausibly profess it as a principle, that they are not bound to believe the existence of any secular ruler (and consequently not be subject to any) longer than they see him, and so subvert all policy and government; or pretend an exemption from all obligation to any act of justice, or to forbear the most injurious violence towards any man, because they are not infallibly certain any one they see is a human wight, and so abjure all morality, as they have already so great a part; than offer with so fearful hazard to assault the Deity, (of whose existence, if they would but think a while, they might be most infallibly assured,) or go about to subvert the foundations of religion. Or, if they would get themselves glory by great adventures, or show themselves brave men by expressing a fearless contempt of divine power and justice; this fortitude is not human. These are without the compass of its object; as inundations, earthquakes, &c., are

said to be, unto which, that any one should fearlessly ex-| shall have little else to do, besides only the applying of pose himself, can bring no profit to others, nor therefore glory to him.

In all this harangue of discourse, the design hath not been to fix upon any true cause of atheism, but to represent it a strange thing; and an atheist, a prodigy, a monster, amongst mankind; a dreadful spectacle, forsaken of the common aids afforded to other men; hung up in chains to warn others, and let them see what a horrid creature man may make himself by voluntary aversion from God that made him.

In the meantime, they upon whom this dreadful plague is not fallen, may plainly see before them the object of that worship which is imported by a temple-an existing Deity, a God to be worshipped. Unto whom we shall yet see further reason to design and consecrate a temple for that end, and even ourselves to become such, when we have considered what comes next to be spoken of: his conversableness with men.

CHAPTER VI.

What is intended by God's conversableness with men, considered only as fundamental and presupposed to a temple. An account of the Epicurean deity.

Its existence impossible any way to be proved, if it did exist. Nor can be affirmed to any good intent. That such a being is not God. That the absolate perfection proved of God represents him a fit object of religion. From thence more particularly deduced to this purpose. His omnisciency, omnipotency, unlimited goodness, immensity. Curcellæus's arguments against this last considered.

principles already asserted (or possibly the more express adding of some or other that were implied in what hath been said) to this purpose. From which principles it will appear, that he not only can, but that in the former sense he doth, converse with men, and is graciously inclined thereto in the latter. And yet because the former is more deeply fundamental, as whereon all depends, and that the act of it is not denied for any other reason than an imagined impossibility; that is, it is not said he doth not sus tain and govern the world upon any other pretence, but that he cannot, as being inconsistent with his nature and felicity. This we shall therefore more directly apply ourselves to evince, That his nature doth not disallow it, but necessarily includes an aptitude thereto.

Nor yet, though it may be a less laborious work than the former that we have despatched, is it altogether needless to deal somewhat more expressly in this matter; inasmuch as what opposition hath been made to religion in the world, hath for the most part been more expressly directed against this ground of it. I say more expressly; for indeed by plain and manifest consequence it impugns that also of God's existence: that is, through this it strikes at the other. For surely (howsoever any may arbitrarily, and with what impropriety and latitude of speech they please, bestow titles and eulogies here or there) that being is not God, that cannot converse with men, supposing them such as what purely and peculiarly belongs to the nature of man would bespeak them. So that they who have imagined such a being, and been pleased to call it God, have at once said and unsaid the same thing. That I. NOR is the thing here intended less necessary to a deity was but a creature, and that only of their own fancy; temple and religion than what we have hitherto been dis- and they have by the same breath blown up and blasted coursing of. For such a sort of deity as should shut up their own bubble, made it seem something and signify itself, and be reclused from all converse with men, would nothing: have courted it into being, and rioted it again leave us as disfurnished of an object of religion, and would quite out of it. In their conceit, created it a god; in their render a temple on earth as vain a thing, as if there were practice, a mere nullity. And it equally served their turn, none at all. It were a being not to be worshipped, nor and as much favoured the design of being wicked, to ac with any propriety to be called God, more (in some re-knowledge only a god they could imagine and dis-imagine spect less) than an image or statue. We might with as rational design worship for a god what were scarce worthy to be called the shadow of a man, as dedicate temples to a wholly unconversable deity. That is, such a one as not only will not vouchsafe to converse with men, but that cannot admit it; or whose nature were altogether incapable of such converse.

For that measure and latitude of sense must be allowed unto the expression, [conversableness with men,] as that it signify both capacity and propension to such converse: that God is both by his nature capable of it, and hath a gracious inclination of will thereunto. Yea and we will add, (what is also not without the compass of our present theme, nor the import of this word whereby we generally express it,) that he is not only inclined to converse with men, but that he actually doth it. As we call him a conversable person that upon all befitting occasions doth freely converse with such as have any concern with him. It will indeed be necessary to distinguish God's converse with men, into That which he hath in common with all men, so as to sustain them in their beings, and some way influence their actions; (in which kind he is also conversant with all his creatures;) and That which he more peculiarly hath with good men.

And though the consideration of the latter of these will belong to the discourse concerning his temple itself which he hath with and in them; yet it is the former only we have now to consider as presupposed thereto, and as the ground thereof; together with his gracious propension to the latter also.

As the great apostle, in his discourse at Athens, lays the same ground for acquaintance with God, (which he intimates should be set afoot and continued in another sort of temple than is made with hands,) that he hath given to all breath and being and all things, and that he is near and ready, (whence they should therefore seek him, if haply they might feel after him, and find him out,) in order to further converse. And here, our business will have the less in it of labour and difficulty; for that we

a Ac designare quidem non licet quibus in locis Dii degant. Cum ne

at their own pleasure, as to have acknowledged none at all. It could do no prejudice to their affairs to admit of this fictitious deity, that they could make be what or where they pleased; that should affect ease and pleasure, and (lest his pleasure and theirs should interfere) that they could confine to remote territories, and oblige to keep at an obedient and untroublesome distance. Nor, though no imagination could be more madly extravagant than that of a God no way concerned in the forming and governing of the world; and notwithstanding whom, men might take their liberty to do what they listed; yet (as hath been observed long ago, that no opinion was ever so monstrously absurd, as not to be owned by some of the philosophers) hath not this wanted patronage, and even among them who have obtained to be esteemed (not to say idolized) under that name. Which would be seen, if it were worth the while to trouble the reader with an account of the Epicurean deity. As it can only be with this design, that the representation may render it (as it cannot but do) ridiculous to sober men; and discover to the rest the vanity of their groundless and self-contradicting hope, (still too much fostered in the breasts of not a few,) who promise themselves impunity in the most licentious course of wickedness, upon the security only of this their own idle dream. That is, if there be a God, (which they reckon it not so plausible flatly to deny,) he is a being of either so dull and phlegmatic a temper that he cannot be concerned in the actions and affairs of men, or so soft and easy that he will not. But because his good will alone was not so safely to be relied on, it was thought the securer way not to let it be in his power to intermeddle with their concernments. And therefore being to frame their own God, to their own turn, thus the matter was of old contrived.

First, Great care was taken, That he be set at a distance remote enough; that he be complimented out of this world, as a place too mean for his reception, and unworthy such a presence; they being indeed unconcerned where he had his residence, so it were not too near them.

noster quidem hic mundus, digna sit illorum sedes.Phil. Epicur. Syntag.