were producible by him) within his power. And it is no | finite is not to be looked upon as emerging or springing up wiser an inference from the former, than it would be from of itself out of nothing, or as proceeding from some third this latter, that a house, a book, and a child, are the same thing with one another, and with the person that produced them; because, so far as they were produced by him, he had it in his power to produce them. And that the effects of divine power are produced thereby totally, whereas those of human power are produced by it but in part only, doth, as to the strength and reasonableness of the argument, nothing alter the case.

And as to the next, That infinite being should seem to exclude all finite; I confess that such as are so disposed, might here even wrangle continually, as they might do about any thing in which infiniteness is concerned; and yet therein show themselves (as Seneca I remember speaks in another case) not a wit the more learned, but the more troublesome. But if one would make short work of it, and barely deny that infinite being excludes finite, (as Scotus doth little else; besides denying the consequence of the argument, by which it was before enforced, viz. [that an infinite body would exclude a finite; for where should the finite be, when the infinite should fill up all space? And therefore by parity of reason, why should not infinite being exclude finite ?] showing the disparity of the two cases,) it would perhaps give them some trouble also to prove it. For which way would they go to work? Infinite self-subsisting being includes all being, very true; and therefore, we say, it includes finite. And what then? Doth it, because it includes it, therefore exclude it? And let the matter be soberly considered; somewhat of finite being and power, we say, (and apprehend no knot or difficulty in the matter,) can extend so far as to produce some proportionable effect, or can do such and such things. And what, doth it seem likely then, that infinite being and power can therefore do just nothing? Is it not a reason of mighty force, and confoundingly demonstrative, that an agent can do nothing, or cannot possibly produce any the least thing, only because he is of infinite power?

For if there be a simple inconsistency between an infinite being and a finite, that will be the case; that, because the former is infinite, therefore it can produce nothing. For what it should produce cannot consist with it, i. e. even not being finite; and then certainly if we could suppose the effect infinite, much less. But what, therefore, is power the less for being infinite? or can infinite power, even because it is infinite, do nothing? What can be said or thought more absurd, or void of sense? Or shall it be said that the infiniteness of power is no hinderance, but the infiniteness of being? But how wild an imagination were that of a finite being, that were of infinite power! And besides, is that power somewhat, or nothing? Surely it will not be said it is nothing. Then it is some being; and if some power be some being, what then is infinite power? is not that infinite being? And now, therefore, if this infinite can produce any thing, which it were a strange madness to deny, it can at least produce some finite thing. Wherefore there is no inconsistency between the infinite and finite beings, unless we say the effect produced, even by being produced, must destroy, or even infinitely impair, its cause, so as to make it cease at least to be infinite. But that also cannot possibly be said of that which is infinite and necessary; which, as hath been shown, cannot, by whatsoever productions, suffer any diminution or decay. If here it be further urged, But here is an infinite being now supposed; let, next, be supposed the production of a finite: this is not the same with the other; for surely infinite, and finite, are distinguishable enough, and do even infinitely differ. The finite is either something or nothing: nothing it cannot be said; for it was supposed a being, and produced; but the production of nothing is no production. It is somewhat then; here is therefore an infinite being, and a finite now besides. The infinite, it was said, cannot be diminished; the finite, a real something, is added. Is there therefore nothing more of existent being than there was before this production? It is answered, Nothing more than virtually was before; for when we suppose an infinite being, and afterwards a finite; this

thing as its cause, but as produced by that infinite, or springing out of that, which it could not do, but as being before virtually contained in it. For the infinite produces nothing, which it could not produce. And what it could produce, was before contained in it, as in the power of its cause. And to any one that attends, and is not disposed to be quarrelsome, this is as plain and easy to be understood, as how any finite thing may produce another, or rather, more plain and easy, because a finite agent doth not entirely contain its effect within itself, or in its own power, as an infinite doth. If yet it be again said, that which is limited is not infinite, but suppose any finite thing produced into being after a pre-existent infinite, this infinite becomes now limited; for the being of the finite is not that of the infinite, each hath its own distinct being. And it cannot be said of the one, it is the other; therefore each is limited to itself. I answer; that which was infinite becomes not hereby less than it was, for it hath produced nothing but what was before virtually contained in it, and still is, for it still totally sustains the other. But whatsoever it actually doth, it can do, or hath within its power: therefore if it were infinite before, and is not now become less, it is still infinite.

Wherefore the true reason why the position of a finite thing after a supposed all-comprehending infinite, doth no way intrench upon or detract from the other's all-comprehensive infinity, is, that it was formerly contained, and still is, within the virtue and power of the other.

It is true, that if we should suppose any thing besides that supposed infinite to be of itself, that would infer a limitation of the former. Infer I say, not cause it; that is, it would not make it cease to be all-comprehendingly infinite, but it would argue it not to have been so before; and that the supposition of its infinity was a false supposition, because it would then appear that the former did not comprehend all being any way in itself. Somewhat being now found to be in being, which hath no dependence thereon; whence it would be evident neither can be so. Of which, some good use may be made to a further purpose by and by.

Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corollary, from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of necessary self-subsisting matter was before shown to be a vain, it now also appears plainly to be altogether an impossible, supposition. For since the necessary self-subsisting being is infinite and all-comprehensive; and if matter were supposed necessary, we must have another necessary being to form the world, inasmuch as matter is not selfactive, much less intelligent, as it hath both been proved it cannot be, and that the Former of this world must be. It is therefore out of question, that because both cannot be all-comprehensive, they cannot both be necessary. Nor can the vastly different kinds or natures of these things salve the business; for be they of what kinds they will, they are still beings. Besides, if matter were necessary and self-subsisting, every particle of it must be so. And then we shall have not only two, but an infinite number of such infinities, and all of the same kind. But being, only of this or that sort, (as is apparent where more sorts do exist than one,) could not be simply infinite, except as the other depends thereon; and as this one is radically comprehensive of all the rest, that can come under the general and most common notion of being. For that there is some general notion wherein all being agrees, and by which it differs from no being, is, I think, little to be doubted; how unequally soever, and dependently the one upon the other, the distinct sorts do partake therein. Whereupon the expression, super-essential, and others like it, spoken of God, must be understood as rhetorical strains, importing more reverence than rigid truth. Except by essence, as was formerly said, only that which is created be meant. And that only a purer and more noble kind of essence were intended to be asserted to him, which yet seems also unwarrantable and injurious, that a word of that import should be so misapplied and transferred from the substance, to signify in him any ignorance; that is, that he means his intelligence is of an infinitely distinct and more excellent sort from that which he causes in us, as appears by his annexed reason, ro de TAYTWV ALTLOV, OVČEV EGLY EKELVwv, Enn. 6. I. 9. c. 6.

nothing but the shadow, rather, of being. And that they who would seem zealously concerned to appropriate all being unto God, should, in the height of their transport, so far forget themselves as to set him above all being, and

CHAPTER V.

so deny him any at all. For surely that which simply is Demands in reference to what hath been hitherto discoursed, with some reaabove all being is no being.

sonings thereupon: 1, is it possible that, upon supposition of this being's existence, it may be, in any way suitable to our present state, made known to us that it doth exist? Proved, 1. That it may. 2. That, since any other fit way that can be thought on is as much liable to exception as that we have already, this must be, therefore, sufficient. Strong impressions. Glorious apparitions. Terrible voices. Surprising transformation. If these are necessary, is it needful they be universal? frequent? If not, more rare things of this sort not wanting. 2. Demand. Can subjects, remote from their prince, sufficiently be assured of his existence? 3. Demand. Can we be sure there are men on earth?

First, Do they believe, upon supposition of the existence of such a Being, that it is possible it may be made known to us, in our present state and circumstances, by means not unsuitable thereto, or inconvenient to the order and government of the world, that it doth exist? It were strange to say or suppose, that a Being of so high perfection as this we have hitherto given an account of, if he is, cannot in any fit way make it known that he is, to an intelligent and apprehensive sort of creatures.

X. And as to the unity, or onliness rather, of this being, or of the God-head, the deduction thereof seems plain and easy from what hath been already proved; that is, from the absolute perfection thereof. For though some do toil themselves much about this matter, and others plainly conclude that it is not to be proved at all in a rational way, but only by divine revelation; yet I conceive, they that I. AND if any should in the meantime still remain either follow the method (having proved some necessary self-sub-doubtful, or apt to cavil, after all that hath been said for sisting being the root and original spring of all being and proof of that being's existence which we have described, perfection, actual and possible, which is as plain as any I would only add these few things, by way of inquiry or thing can be) of deducing from thence the absolute, all- demand: viz. comprehending perfection of such necessary being, will find their work as good as done. For nothing seems more evident, than that there cannot be two (much less more) such beings, inasmuch as one comprehends in itself all being and perfection; for there can be but one all, without which is nothing. So that, one such being supposed, another can have nothing remaining to it. Yea, so far is it therefore, if we suppose one infinite and absolutely perfect being, that there can be another, independent thereon, (and of a depending infinity, we need not say more than we have, If indeed he is, and be the common Cause, Author, which if any such could be, cannot possibly be a distinct and Lord of us and all things, (which we do now but supGod,) that there cannot be the minutest finite thing ima pose: and we may defy cavil to allege any thing that is ginable, which that supposed infinity doth not comprehend, so much as colourable against the possibility of the supor that can stand apart from it, on any distinct basis of its position,) surely he hath done greater things than the makown. And that this matter may be left as plain as we can ing of it known that he is. It is no unapprehensible thing. make it; supposing it already most evident, That there is, There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of actually existing, an absolute, entire fulness of wisdom, him; nothing said concerning him, but will well admit power, and so of all other perfection-That such absolute that it is possible such a Being may be now existent. entire fulness of perfection is infinite-That this infinite Yea, we not only can conceive, but we actually have, and perfection must have its primary seat somewhere-That cannot but have, some conception of the several attributes its primary, original seat can be no where, but in necessary we have ascribed to him: so as to apply them, severally, self-subsisting being. We hereupon add, that if we sup- to somewhat else, if we will not apply them, jointly, to pose multitude, or any plurality of necessary self-originate him. We cannot but admit there is some eternal, necesbeings, concurring to make up the seat or subject of this sary being; somewhat that is of itself active; somewhat infinite perfection; each one must either be of finite and that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have partial perfection, or infinite and absolute. Infinite and in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not absolute it cannot be, because one self-originate, infinitely impossible they may meet, and agree together, in full perand absolutely perfect being, will necessarily comprehend fection to one and the same existent being. And hence it all perfection, and leave nothing to the rest. Nor finite, is manifestly no unapprehensible thing, that such a Being because many finites can never make one infinite; much doth exist. Now supposing that it doth exist, and hath less can many broken parcels or fragments of perfection been to us the Cause and Author of our being; hath given ever make infinite and absolute perfection; even though us the reasonable, intelligent nature which we find ourtheir number, if that were possible, were infinite. For the selves possessors of; and that very power whereby we perfection of unity would still be wanting, and their com-apprehend the existence of such a Being as he is to be posmunication and concurrence to any work (even such as we see is done) be infinitely imperfect and impossible. We might, more at large, and with a much more pompous number and apparatus of arguments, have shown that there can be no more gods than one. But to such as had rather be informed, than bewildered and lost, clear proof that is shorter, and more comprehensive, will be more grateful. Nor doth this proof of the unity of the God-head any way impugn the trinity, which is by Christians believed, therein, (and whereof some heathens, as is known, have not been wholly without some apprehension, however they came by it,) or exclude a sufficient, uncreated ground of trinal distinction. As would be seen, if that great difference of beings, necessary and contingent, be well stated, and what is by eternal, necessary emanation of the divine zature, be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the divine will; and the matter be thoroughly examined, whether herein be not a sufficient distinction of that which is increated, and that which is created. In this way it is possible it might be cleared, how a trinity in the Godhead may be very consistently with the unity thereof. But that it is, we cannot know, but by his telling us so. It being among the many things of God, which are not to be known, but by the Spirit of God revealing and testifying them, in and according to the Holy Scriptures: as the things of a man are not known but by the spirit of a man. And what further evidence we may justly and reasonably take from those Scriptures, even in reference to some of the things hitherto discoursed, may be hereafter shown.

sible, (all which we for the present do still but suppose,) while also his actual existence is not unapprehensible; were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say, that if he do exist, he cannot also make our apprehensive nature understand this apprehensible thing that he doth exist? We will therefore take it for granted, and as a thing which no man well in his wits will deny, that upon supposition such a Being, the Cause and Author of all things, do exist, he might, in some convenient way or other, with sufficient evidence, make it known to such creatures as we, so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist.

Upon which presumed ground we will only reason thus, or assume to it; That there is no possible and fit way of doing it which is not liable to as much exception as the evidence we already have. Whence it will be consequent, that if the thing be possible to be fitly done, it is done already. That is, that if we can apprehend how it may be possible such a Being, actually existent, might give us that evidence of his existence that should be suitable to our present state, and sufficient to out-weigh all objections to the contrary; (without which it were not rationally sufficient;) and that we can apprehend no possible way of doing this, which will not be liable to the same, or equal objections, as may be made against the present means we have for the begetting of this certainty in us, then we have already sufficient evidence of this Being's existence. That is, such as ought to prevail against all objections, and obtain our assent that it doth exist.

Here it is only needful to be considered what ways can

be thought of, which we will say might assure us in this matter, that we already have not. And what might be objected against them, equally, as against the means we now have.

II. Will we say such a Being, if he did actually exist, night ascertain us of his existence, by some powerful impression of that truth upon our minds? We will not insist what there is of this already. Let them consider, who gainsay what they can find of it in their own minds; and whether they are not engaged by their atheistical inclinations in a contention against themselves, and their more natural sentiments, from which they find it a matter of no small difficulty to be delivered? It was not for nothing, that even Epicurus himself calls this of an existing deity, a proleptical notion. But you may say, the impression might have been simply universal, and so irresistible as to prevent or overbear all doubt, or inclination to doubt.

And, first, for the universality of it, why may we not suppose it already sufficiently universal? as hath been heretofore alleged. With what confidence can the few dissenting atheists, that have professed to be of another persuasion, put that value upon themselves, as to reckon their dissent considerable enough to implead the universality of this impression? Or what doth it signify more to that purpose, than some few instances may do, of persons so stupidly foolish, as to give much less discovery of any rational faculty than some beasts, to the impugning the universal rationality of mankind?

| truer for this, only, that such and such believe it with a
sturdy confidence. It is true, that the universality and
naturalness of such a persuasion, as pointing us to a com-
mon cause thereof, affords the matter of an argument, or
is a medium not contemptible nor capable of answer, as
hath been said before. But to be irresistibly captivated
into an assent, is no medium at all; but an immediate
persuasion of the thing itself, without a reason.
III. Therefore must it yet be demanded of atheistical
persons, what means, that you yet have not, would you
think sufficient to put this matter out of doubt? Will you
say, some kind of very glorious apparitions, becoming the
majesty of such a one as this Being is represented, would
have satisfied? But if you know how to fancy, that such
a thing as the sun, and other luminaries, might have been
compacted of a certain peculiar sort of atoms, coming to-
gether of their own accord, without the direction of a wise
agent; yea, and consist so long, and hold so strangely
regular motions; how easy would it be to object that, with
much advantage, against what any temporary apparition,
be it as glorious as you can imagine, might seem to signify
to this purpose!

Would dreadful loud voices proclaiming him to be, of whose existence you doubt, have served the turn? It is likely, if your ear would have permitted you to use your wit, you would have had some subtle invention how, by some odd rencounter of angry atoms, the air or clouds might become thus terribly vocal. And when you know Besides that, your contrary profession is no sufficient already, that they do sometimes salute your ears with very argument of your contrary persuasion, much less, that you loud sounds, (as when it thunders,) there is little doubt never had any stamp or impression of a Deity upon your but your great wit can devise a way how possibly such minds, or that you have quite rased it out. It is much to sounds might become articulate. And for the sense and be suspected that you hold not your contrary persuasion coherent import of what were spoken; you that are sc with that unshaken confidence, and freedom from all fear- good at conjecturing how things might casually happen, ful and suspicious misgivings, as that you have much more would not be long in making a guess that might serve that reason to brag of your disbelief for the strength, than you turn also; except you were grown very dull and barren, have for the goodness, of it. And that you have those and that fancy that served you to imagine how the whole qualmish fits, which bewray the impression, (at least to frame of the universe, and the rare structure of the bodies your own notice and reflection, if you would but allow of animals, yea, and even the reasonable soul itself, might yourselves the liberty of so much converse with your-be all casual productions, cannot now devise how, by selves,) that you will not confess, and yet cannot utterly chance, a few words (for you do not say you expect long deface. But if in this you had quite won the day, and orations) might fall out to be sense though there were no were masters of your design, were it not pretty to suppose intelligent speaker. that the common consent of mankind would be a good But would strange and wonderful effects that might surargument of the existence of a Deity, except only that it prise and amaze you do the business? We may challenge wants your concurrence? If it were so universal as to in-you to try your faculty, and stretch it to the uttermost; clude your vote and suffrage, it would then be a firm and solid argument; (as no doubt it is, without you, a stronger one than you can answer;) but when you have made a hard shift to withdraw your assent, you have undone the Deity, and religion! Doth this cause stand and fall with you, unto which you can contribute about as much as the fly to the triumph? Was that true before, which now your hard-laboured dissent hath made false? But if this impression were simply universal, so as also to include you, it matters not what men would say or object against it; (it is to be supposed they would be in no disposition to object any thing;) but what were to be said, or what the case itself, objectively considered, would admit. And though it would not (as now it doth not) admit of any thing to be said to any purpose, yet the same thing were still to be said, that you now say. And if we should but again unsuppose so much of the former supposition, as to imagine that some few should have made their escape, and disburthened themselves of all apprehensions of God, would they not, with the same impudence as you now do, say that all religion were nothing else but enthusiastical fanaticism; and that all mankind, besides themselves, were enslaved fools?

And for the mere irresistibleness of this impression; it is true, it would take away all disposition to oppose, but it may be presumed this is none of the rational evidence which we suppose you to mean; when you admit (if you do admit) that, some way or other, the existence of such a being might be possibly made so evident, as to induce a rational certainty thereof. For to believe such a thing to be true only upon a strong impulse, (how certain soever the thing be,) is not to assent to it upon a foregoing reason. Nor can any, in that case, tell why they believe it, but that they believe it. You will not sure think any thing the

and then tell us what imagination you have formed of any thing more strange and wonderful, than the already extant frame of nature, in the whole, and the several parts of it. Will he that hath awhile considered the composition of the world; the exact and orderly motions of the sun, moon, and stars; the fabric of his own body, and the powers of his soul, expect yet a wonder, to prove to him there is a God? But if that be the complexion of your minds, that it is not the greatness of any work, but the novelty and surprisingness of it, that will convince you, it is not rational evidence you seek: nor is it your reason, but your idle curiosity, you would have gratified; which deserves no more satisfaction than that fond wish, that one might come from the dead to warn men on earth, lest they should come into the place of torment.

And if such means as these that have been mentioned should be thought necessary, I would ask, Are they necessary to every individual person, so as that no man shall be esteemed to have had sufficient means of conviction, who hath not with his own eyes beheld some such glorious apparition; or himself heard some such terrible voice; or been the immediate witness or subject of some prodigious wonderful work? Or will the once seeing, hearing, or feeling them suffice? It is not necessary there should be a frequent repetition and renewal of these amazing things, lest the impression wearing off, there be a relapse, and a gradual sliding into an oblivion, and unapprehensiveness of that Being's existence, whereof they had, sometime, received a conviction. Now if such a continual iteration of these strange things were thought necessary, would they not hereby soon cease to be strange? And then if their strangeness was necessary, by that very thing, wherein their sufficiency for conviction is said to consist, they should become useless. Or if by their frequent variations

(which it is possible to suppose) a perpetual amusement | the place; bounds are set about the designed theatre of be still kept up in the minds of men, and they be always this great appearance: all are strictly required to observe full of consternation and wonder, doth this temper so much their due and awful distances, and abstain from more aubefriend the exercise of reason, or contribute to the sober dacious approaches and gazings; lest that terrible glory consideration of things? As if men could not be rational, break out upon them, and they perish: an irreverent or without being half mad! And indeed they might soon disrespectful look, they are told, will be mortal to them, become altogether so, by being but awhile beset with or a very touch of any part of this sacred enclosure. In objects so full of terror, as are by this supposition made the morning of the appointed day, there are thunders, and the necessary means to convince them of a Deity. And lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the hallowed mount. were this a fit means of ruling the world, of preserving The exceeding loud sound of trumpet proclaims the Lord's order among mankind? What business could then be descent. He descends in fire, the flames whereof envelop followed? Who could attend the affairs of their callings? the trembling mount, (now floored with a sapphire paveWho could either be capable of governing, or of being ment, clear as the body of heaven,) and ascend into the governed, while all men's minds should be wholly taken middle region, or, as it is expressed, into the midst or up, either in the amazed view or the suspenseful expec- heart of the heavens. The voice of words, (a loud and tation, of nought else but strange things? To which pur- dreadful voice,) audible to all that mighty assembly, in pose much hath been of late, with so excellent reason, which were six hundred thousand men, (probably more discoursed by a noted author, that it is needless here to than a million of persons,) issues forth from amidst that say more. And the aspect and influence of this state of terrible glory, pronouncing to them that I am Jehovah thy things would be most pernicious upon religion, that should God. And thence proceeding to give them precepts so be most served thereby, and which requires the greatest plain and clear, so comprehensive and full, so unexceptionseverity and most peaceful composure of mind to the dueably just and righteous, so agreeable to the nature of man, managing the exercises of it. How little would that con- and subservient to his good, that nothing could be more tribute to pious and devout converses with God, that worthy the great Creator, or more aptly suitable to such a should certainly keep men's minds in a continual com- sort of creatures. motion and hurry! This course, as our present condition is, what could it do but craze men's understandings, as a too bright and dazzling light causeth blindness, or any over-excelling sensible object destroys the sense; so that we should soon have cause to apply the Erpen. proverb, "Shut the windows that the house may be light." And might learn to put a sense, not intolerable, upon those passages of some mystical writers, that God is to be seen, -in a divine cloud or darkness, as one;d and with closed eyes as another, speaks; though what was their very sense I will not pretend to tell.

It is very likely, indeed, that such a demonstration would leave no spectator in doubt concerning the existence of God; and would puzzle the philosophy of the most sceptical atheist to give an account, otherwise, of the phenomenon. And if such could devise to say any thing that should seem plausible to some very easy half-witted persons, that were not present, they would have a hard task of it to quiet the minds of those that were; or make them believe this was nothing else but some odd conjuncture of certain fiery atoms, that, by some strange accident happened into this occursion and conflict with one another; or some illusion of fancy, by which so great a multitude were all at once imposed upon; so as that they only seemed to themselves to bear and see, what they heard and saw not. Nor is it likely they would be very confident of the truth of their own conjecture, or be apt to venture much upon it themselves; having been the eye and earwitnesses of these things.

Besides that, by this means, there would naturally ensue the continual excitation of so vexatious and enthralling passions, so servile and tormenting fears and amazements, as could not but hold the souls of men under a constant and comfortless restraint from any free and ingenuous access to God, or conversation with him; wherein the very life of religion consists. And then, to what purpose doth the discovery and acknowledgment of the Deity serve? But is it necessary this course shall be taken to make Inasmuch as it is never to be thought that the exist- the world know there is a God? Such an appearance, inence of God is a thing to be known, only that it may be deed, would more powerfully strike sense; but unto sober known; but that the end it serves for, is religion; a com- and considerate reason were it a greater thing than the placential and cheerful adoration of him, and application making such a world as this, and the disposing this great of ourselves with at once both dutiful and pleasant affec- variety of particular beings in it, into so exact and elegant tions towards him. That were a strange means of coming an order; and the sustaining and preserving it in the same to know that he is, that should only tend to destroy or state, through so many ages? Let the vast and unknown hinder the very end itself of that knowledge. Wherefore extent of the whole, the admirable variety, the elegant all this being considered, it is likely it would not be in- shapes, the regular motions, the excellent faculties and sisted upon as necessary to our being persuaded of God's powers of that inconceivable number of creatures contained existence, that he should so multiply strange and astonish-in it, be considered. And is there any comparison between ing things, as that every man might be a daily, amazed be- that temporary, transient, occasional, and this steady, perholder and witness of them. manent, and universal discovery of God? Nor (supposing the truth of the history) can it be thought the design of this appearance to these Hebrews was to convince them of the existence of a Deity, to be worshipped; when both they had so convincing evidence thereof many ways before; and the other nations, that which they left, and those whither they went, were not without their religion and worship, such as it was: but to engage them, by so majestic a representation thereof, to a more exact observance of his will, now made known. Though, had there been any doubt of the former, (as we can hardly suppose they could before have more doubted of the being of a God, than that there were men on earth,) this might collaterally, and besides its chief intention, be a means to confirm them concerning that also: but that it was necessary for that end, we have no pretence to imagine. The like may be

IV. And if their frequency and constant iteration be acknowledged not necessary, but shall indeed be judged wholly inconvenient, more rare discoveries of him, in the very ways we have been speaking of, have not been wanting. What would we think of such an appearance of God as that was upon mount Sinai, when he came down (or caused a sensible glory to descend) in the sight of all that great people; wherein the several things concurred that were above mentioned? Let us but suppose such an appearance, in all the concurrent circumstances of it, as that is said to have been. That is we will suppose an equally great assembly or multitude of people is gathered together, and solemn forewarning is given and proclaimed among them, by appointed heralds or officers of state, that, on such a prefixed day, now very nigh at hand, the divine majesty and glory (even his glory set in majesty) will visibly ap-said, concerning other miracles heretofore wrought, that the pear, and show itself to them. They are most severely enjoined to prepare themselves, and be in readiness against that day. Great care is taken to sanctify the people, and

a Now were not that a most improper course, and unsuitable to the naBare of man, that should rather tend to destroy his reason or judgment, than Convince it?

Dr. Spencer, of Prodigies. A discourse, which, though it disproves not

intent of them was to justify the divine authority of him
who wrought them, to prove him sent by God, and so
countenance the doctrine or message delivered by him.

the reality or true significancy of such portents, yet aptly tends to prevent or
correct the ill use of them.
c D. Areop. I. de myster. Theol. c. 1.
– Τις ο θείος γνόφος.

e Procl. in Plat. Theol. μυσαντας ενεδύεσθαι τη αγνώς ως και κρυφίως των αντων εναδι.

!

their constitution and form of polity, known for many ages
to have been a theocracy; their usual ways of consulting
God, upon all more important occasions:-whosoever,
say, shall soberly consider these things, (and many more
might easily occur to such as would think fit to let their
thoughts dwell awhile upon this subject,) will not only,
from some of them, think it highly improbable, but from
others of them, plainly impossible, that the history of this
appearance should have been a contrived piece of falsehood.
Yea, and though, as was said, the view of such a thing
with one's own eyes would make a more powerful impres-
sion upon our fancy, or imagination, yet, if we speak of
rational evidence (which is quite another thing) of the truth
of a matter of fact that were of this astonishing nature, I
should think it were as much (at least if I were credibly
told that so many hundred thousand persons saw it at
once) as if I had been the single unaccompanied spectator
of it myself. Not to say that it were apparently, in some
respect, much greater; could we but obtain of ourselves
to distinguish between the pleasing of our curiosity, and
the satisfyng of our reason. So that, upon the whole, I
see not why it may not be concluded, with the greatest
confidence, that both the (supposed) existence of a Deity
is possible to be certainly known to men on earth, in
some way that is suitable to their present state; that
there are no means fitter to be ordinary, than those we
already have, and that more extraordinary, additional con-
firmations are partly, therefore, not necessary,
and partly
not wanting.

Not that they tended (otherwise than on the by) to prove | duct through the wilderness, and settlement in Canaan;
God's existence: much less, was this so amazing an ap-
pearance needful, or intended for that end; and least of
all, was it necessary that this should be God's ordinary
way of making it known to men that he doth exist: so as
that for this purpose he should often repeat so terrible
representations of himself. And how inconvenient it were
to mortal men, as well as unnecessary, the astonishment
wherewith possessed that people, is an evidence; and
their passionate affrighted wish thereupon, "Let not God
any more speak to us, lest we die." They apprehended
it impossible for them to outlive such another sight!

V. Again, it may be further demanded, (as that which may both immediately serve our main purpose, and may also show the reasonableness of what was last said,) Is it sufficiently evident to such subjects of some great prince as live remote from the royal residence, that there is such a one now ruling over them?

And if that so amazing an appearance of the Divine Majesty (sometime afforded) were not necessary, but some way, on the by, useful, for the confirming that people in the persuasion of God's existence, why may it not be useful also, for the same purpose even now, to us? Is it that we think that can be less true now, which was so gloriously evident to be true four thousand years ago? Or is it that we can disbelieve or doubt the truth of the history? What should be the ground or pretence of doubt? If it were a fiction, it is manifest it was feigned by some person that had the use of his understanding, and was not beside himself, as the coherence and contexture of parts doth plainly show. But would any man not beside himself, designing to gain credit to a forged report of a matter of fact, ever say there were six hundred thousand persons present at the doing of it? Would it not rather have been pretended done in a corner? Or is it imaginable it should never have met with contradiction? That none of the pretended bystanders should disclaim the avouchment of it, and say they knew of no such matter? Especially if it be considered that the laws said to be given at that time, chiefly those which were reported to have been written in the two tables, were not so favourable to vicious inclinations, nor that people so strict and scrupulous observers of them; but that they would have been glad to have had To say No, is to raze the foundation of civil government, any thing to pretend, against the authority of the legisla- and reduce it wholly to domestical, by such a ruler as may ture, if the case could have admitted it. When they dis- ever be in present view. Which yet is upon such terms covered, in that and succeeding time, so violently prone never possible to be preserved also. It is plain many do and unretractable a propension to idolatry and other firmly enough believe that there is a king reigning over wickednesses, directly against the very letter of that law, them, who not only never saw the king, but never heard how welcome and covetable a plea had it been, in their any distinct account of the splendour of his court, the frequent, and, sometimes, almost universal apostacies, pomp of his attendance, or, it may be, never saw the man could they have had such a thing to pretend, that the law that had seen the king. And is not all dutiful and loyal itself that curbed them was a cheat! But we always obedience wont to be challenged and paid as such, as well find, that though they laboured, in some of their degene- as his other subjects? Or would it be thought a reason-* racies, and when they were lapsed into a more corrupted able excuse of disloyalty, that any such persons should state, to render it more easy to themselves by favour- say they had never seen the king, or his court? Or a able glosses and interpretations; yet, even in the most reasonable demand, as the condition of required subjection, corrupt, they never went about to deny or implead its that the court be kept, sometime, in their village, that they divine original, whereof they were ever so religious as- might have the opportunity of beholding at least some of sertors, as no people under heaven could be more; and the insignia of regality, or more splendid appearances of the awful apprehension whereof prevailed so far with them, that majesty, which claims subjection from them? Much as that care was taken (as is notoriously known) by those more would it be deemed unreasonable and insolent, that appointed to that charge, that the very letters should be every subject should expect to see the face of the prince numbered of the sacred writings, lest there should happen every day, otherwise they will not obey, nor believe there any the minutest alteration in them. Much more might is any such person. Whereas it hath been judged rather be said, if it were needful, for the evincing the truth of more expedient and serviceable to the continuing the venethis particular piece of history: and it's little to be doubted ration of majesty, (and in a monarchy of no mean reputabut any man who, with sober and impartial reason, con- tion for wisdom and greatness,) that the prince did very siders the circumstances relating to it; the easily evidence- rarely offer himself to the view of the people. Surely more able antiquity of the records whereof this a part; the ordinary and remote discoveries of an existing prince and certain nearness of the time of writing them, to the time ruler over them, (the effects of his power, and the influences when this thing is said to have been done; the great re- of his government,) will be reckoned sufficient, even as to putation of the writer even among pagans; the great mul- many parts of his dominions that possibly through many titude of the alleged witnesses and spectators; the no- succeeding generations never had cther. And yet how contradiction ever heard of; the universal consent and unspeakably less sensible, less immediate, less constant, suffrage of that nation through all times to this day, even less necessary, less numerous, are the effects and instances when their practice hath been most contrary to the laws of regal human power and wisdom, than of the divine; then given; the securely confident and unsuspicious refer- which latter we behold which way soever we look, and ence of later pieces of sacred Scripture thereto, (even some feel in every thing we touch, or have any sense of, and parts of the New Testament,) as a most known and un- may reflect upon in our very senses themselves, and in all doubted thing; the long series and tract of time through the parts and powers that belong to us; and so certainly, which that people are said to have had extraordinary and that if we would allow ourselves the liberty of serious sensible indications of the divine presence; (which, if it thoughts, we might soon find it were utterly impossible nad been false, could not, in so long a time, but have been such effects should ever have been without that only evicted of falsehood;) their miraculous and wonderful cause: that without its influence, it had never been poseduction out of Egypt, not denied by any, and more ob-sible that we could hear, or see, or speak, or think, or live, scurely acknowledged by some heathen writers; their con- or be any thing, nor that any other thing could ever have