Yea, and much may be said, I conceive with convincing | a common cause, which we design by the name of God. evidence, against it. As may perhaps be seen in the sequel of this discourse. In the meantime, that there is, however, a necessary being, unto which all the perfections whereof we have any footsteps or resemblances in the creation do originally and essentially belong, is undeniably evident. Now, that we may proceed, what can self-essentiate, underived power, wisdom, goodness, be, but most perfect power, wisdom, goodness? Or such, as than which there can never be more perfect? For since there can be no wisdom, power, or goodness, which is not either original and self-essentiate, or derived and participated from thence; who sees not that the former must be the more perfect? Yea, and that it comprehends all the other (as what was from it) in itself, and consequently that it is simply the most perfect? And the reason will be the same, concerning any other perfection, the stamps and characters whereof we find signed upon the creatures. But that the being unto which these belong is absolutely and universally perfect in every kind, must be further evidenced by considering more at large the notion and import of such a self-originate necessary being. Some indeed, both more anciently, and of late, have inverted this course; and from the supposition of absolute perfection, have gone about to infer necessity of existence, as being contained in the idea of the former. But of this latter we are otherwise assured upon clearer and less exceptionable terms. And being so, are to consider what improvement may be made of it to our present purpose. And in the general, this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary being we have already evinced, that it have in it (some way or other, in what way there will be occasion to consider hereafter) the entire sum and utmost fulness of being, beyond which or without the compass whereof no perfection is conceivable, or indeed (which is of the same import) nothing. Let it be observed, that we pretend not to argue this from the bare terms necessary being only, but from hence, that it is such as we have found it; though indeed these very terms import not a little to this purpose. For that which is necessarily of itself, without being beholden to any thing, seems as good as all things, and to contain in itself an immense fulness, being indigent of nothing. Nor by indigence is here meant cravingness, or a sense of want only; in opposition whereto, every good and virtuous man hath or may attain a sort of dvrápρkcia or self-fulness, and be satisfied from himself: (which yet is a stamp of divinity, and a part of the image of God, or such a participation of the divine nature, as is agreeable to the state and condition of a creature:) but we understand by it (what is naturally before that) want itself really, and not in opinion, as the covetous is said to be poor. On the other hand, we here intend not a merely rational, (much less an imaginary,) but a real self-fulness. And so we say, what is of that nature, that it is, and subsists wholly and only of itself, without depending on any other, must owe this absoluteness to so peculiar an excellency of its own nature, as we cannot well conceive to be less than whereby it comprehends in itself the most boundless and unlimited fulness of being, life, power, or whatsoever can be conreived under the name of a perfection. For taking notice of the existence of any thing whatsoever, some reason must be assignable, whence it is that this particular being doth exist, and hath such and such powers and properties belonging to it, as do occur to our notice therein. When we can now resolve its existence into some cause that put it into being, and made it what it is, we cease so much to admire the thing, how excellent soever it be, and turn our admiration upon its cause, concluding that to have all the perfection in it which we discern in the effect, whatsoever unknown perfection (which we may suppose is very great) it may have besides. And upon this ground we are led, when we behold the manifold excellences that lie dispersed among particular beings in this universe, with the glory of the whole resulting thence, to resolve their existence into a So that whatever there is of strength in that way of arguing, the glory of it cannot be without injury appropriated to the present age, much less to any particular person therein: it having, since Anselm, been ventilated by divers others heretofore. D. Scot. dist. 2. Q. 2. Th. Aquin. P. 1. Q. 2. And now considering him as a wise Agent, (which hath been proved,) and consequently a free one, that acted not from any necessity of nature, but his mere good pleasure herein, we will not only conclude him to have all that perfection and excellency in him which we find him to have displayed in so vast and glorious a work, but will readily believe him (supposing we have admitted a conviction concerning what hath been discoursed before) to have a most inconceivable treasure of hidden excellency and perfection in him, that is not represented to our view in this work of his: and account, that he who could do all this which we see is done, could do unspeakably more. For though, speaking of natural and necessitated agents, which always act to their uttermost, it would be absurd to argue from their having done some lesser thing, to their power of doing somewhat that is much greater; yet as to free agents, that can choose their own act, and guide themselves by wisdom and judgment therein, the matter is not so. As when some great prince bestows a rich largess upon some mean person, especially that deserved nothing from him, or was recommended by nothing to his royal favour, besides his poverty and misery; we justly take it for a very significant demonstration of that princely munificence and bounty, which would incline him to do much greater things, when he should see a proportionable cause. But now, if taking notice of the excellences that appear in created beings, and inquiring how they come to exist and be what they are, we resolve all into their cause; which, considering as perfectly free and arbitrary in all his communications, we do thence rationally conclude, that if he had thought fit, he could have made a much more pompous display of himself; and that there is in him, besides what appears, a vast and most abundant store of undiscovered perfection... When next we turn our inquiry and contemplation more entirely upon the cause, and bethink ourselves, But how came he to exist and be what he is? Finding this cannot be refunded upon any superior cause; and our utmost inquiry can admit of no other result but this, that he is of himself what he is, we will surely say then, He is all in all. And that perfection which before we judged vastly great, we will now conclude altogether absolute, and such beyond which no greater can be thought. Adding, I say, to what pre-conceptions we had of his greatness, from the works which we see have been done by him, (for why should we lose any ground we might have esteemed ourselves to have gained before?) the consideration of his necessary self-subsistence: and that no other reason is assignable of his being what he is, but the peculiar and incommunicable excellency of his own nature; whereby he was not only able to make such a world, but did possess eternally and invariably in himself all that he is, and hath: we cannot conceive that all to be less than absolutely universal, and comprehensive of whatsoever can lie within the whole compass of being. For when we find that among all other beings, (which is most certainly true not only of actual, but all possible beings also,) how perfect soever they are or may be in their own kinds, none of them, nor all of them together, are or ever can be of that perfection, as to be of themselves without dependence on somewhat else as their productive, yea and sustaining, cause; we see besides, that their cause hath all the perfection, some way, in it that is to be found in them all: there is also that appropriate perfection belonging thereto, that it could be; and eternally is (yea and could not but be) only of itself, by the underived and incommunicable excellency of its own being. And surely, what includes in it all the perfection of all actual and possible beings, besides its own, (for there is nothing possible which some cause, yea and even this, cannot produce,) and inconceivably more, must needs be absolutely and every way perfect. Of all which perfections this is the radical one, that belongs to this common Cause and Author of all things, that he is necessarily and only self-subsisting. art. 1. contra Gentil. 1. 1. c. 10. Bradwardin. 1. 1. c. 1. And by divers of late, as is sufficiently known, some rejecting, others much confiding in it, both of these former, and of modern writers. And hence we may see what it is to be nearer, or at a further distance from not-being. For these things that came contingently into being, or at the pleasure of a free cause, have all but a finite and limited being, whereof some, having a smaller portion of being than others, approach so much the nearer to not-being. Proportionably, what hath its being necessarily and of itself, is at the furthest distance from no-being, as comprehending all being in itself. Or, to borrow the expressions of an elegant writer, translated into our own language,d have the essence of a man, yet not of the heavens, or of angels." "We are confined and limited within a particular essence, but God, who is what he is, comprehendeth all possible essences." For if this high prerogative in point of being had been wanting, nothing at all had ever been. Therefore we attribute to God the greatest thing that can be said or thought, (and not what is wholly diverse from all other perfection, but which contains all others in it,) when we affirm of him that he is necessarily of himself. For though when we have bewildered and lost ourselves (as we soon may) in the contemplation of this amazing subject, we readily indulge our wearied minds the ease and liberty of resolving this high excellency of self or necessary existence into a mere negation, and say that we mean by it nothing"We have much more non-essence than essence; if we else than that he was not from another; yet surely, if we would take some pains with ourselves, and keep our slothful shifting thoughts to some exercise in this matter, though we can never comprehend that vast fulness of perfection which is imported in it, (for it were not what we plead for, if we could comprehend it,) yet we should soon see and confess that it contains unspeakably more than a negation, even some great thing that is so much beyond our thoughts, that we shall reckon we have said but a little in saying we cannot conceive it. And when we have stretched our understandings to the utmost of their line and measure, though we may suppose ourselves to have conceived a great deal, there is infinitely more that we conceive not. Wherefore that is a sober and most important truth which is occasionally drawn forth (as is supposed) from the so admired Des Cartes by the urgent objections of his very acute, friendly adversary, that the inexhaustible power of God is the reason for which he needed no cause; and that since that unexhausted power, or the immensity of his essence, is most highly positive, therefore he may be said to be of himself positively, i. e. not as if he did ever by any positive efficiency cause himself (which is most manifestly impossible) but that the positive excellency of his own being was such, as could never need, nor admit of, being caused. And that seems highly rational, (which is so largely insisted on by Doctor Jackson, and divers others,) that what is without cause must also be without limit of being; because all limitation proceeds from the cause of a thing, which imparted to it so much and no more; which argument, though it seems neglected by Des Cartes, and is opposed by his antagonist; yet I cannot but judge that the longer one meditates, the less he shall understand, how any thing can be limited ad intra, or from itself, &c. As the author of the Tentam. Phys. Theol. speaks. But that we may entertain ourselves with some more particular considerations of this necessary being, which may evince that general assertion of its absolute plenitude or fulness of essence: it appears to be such, III. As is first, at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity. For what can be at a greater, than that which is necessarily, which signifies as much as whereto not to be is utterly impossible? Now an utter impossibility not to be, or the uttermost distance from no being, seems plainly to imply the absolute plenitude of all being. And, if here it be said that to be necessarily and of itself needs be understood to import no more than a firm possession of that being which a thing hath, be it never so scant or minute a portion of being; I answer, it seems indeed so, if we measure the signification of this expression by its first and more obvious appearance. But if you consider the matter more narrowly, you will find here is also signified the nature and kind of the being possessed, as well as the manner of possession, viz. that it is a being of so excellent and noble a kind, as that it can subsist alone without being beholden: which is so great an excellency, as that it manifestly comprehends all other, or is the foundation of all that can be conceived besides. Which, they that fondly dream of necessary matter, not considering, unwaringly make one single atom a more excellent thing than the whole frame of heaven and earth: that being supposed simply necessary, this the merest piece of hap-hazard, the strangest chance imaginable, and beyond what any but themselves could ever have imagined. And which, being considered, would give us to understand that no minute or finite being can be necessarily. b Ad ob. in Med. resp. quarta. Nor is this precariously spoken, or as what may be hoped to be granted upon courtesy. But let the matter be rigidly examined and discussed, and the certain truth of it will most evidently appear. For if any thing be, in this sense, remoter than other from no-being, it must either be, what is necessarily of itself, or what is contingently at the pleasure of the other. But since nothing is, besides that selforiginate necessary being, but what was from it; and nothing from it but what was within its productive power; it is plain all that, with its own being, was contained in it. And therefore, even in that sense, it is at the greatest distance from no-being; as comprehending the utmost fulness of being in itself, and consequently absolute perfection. Which will yet further appear, in what follows. We therefore add, IV. That necessary being is most unmixed or purest being, without allay. That is pure which is full of itself. Purity is not here meant in a corporeal sense, (which few will think,) nor in the moral; but as, with metaphysicians, it signifies simplicity of essence. And in its present use is more especially intended to signify that simplicity which is opposed to the composition of act and possibility. We say then, that necessary being imports purest actuality; which is the ultimate and highest perfection of being. For it signifies no remaining possibility, yet unreplete or not filled up, and consequently the fullest exuberancy and entire confluence of all being, as in its fountain and original source. We need not here look further to evince this, than the native import of the very terms themselves; necessity and possibility; the latter whereof is not so fitly said to be excluded the former, as contingency is, but to be swallowed up of it; as fulness takes up all the space which were otherwise nothing but vacuity or emptiness. It is plain then that necessary being engrosses all possible being, both that is, and (for the same reason) that ever was so. For nothing can be, or ever was, in possibility to come into being, but what either must spring, or hath sprung, from the necessary self-subsisting being. So that unto all that vast possibility, a proportionable actuality of this being must be understood to correspond. Else the other were not possible. For nothing is possible to be produced which is not within the actual productive power of the necessary being: I say within its actual productive power; for if its power for such production were not already actual, it could never become so, and so were none at all: inasmuch as necessary being can never alter, and consequently can never come actually to be what it already is not; upon which account it is truly said, In æternis posse et esse sunt idem. Wherefore in it, is nothing else but pure actuality, as profound and vast as is the utmost possibility of all created or producible being; i. e. it can be nothing other than it is, but can do all things, of which more hereafter. It therefore stands opposed, not only, more directly, to impossibility of being, which is the most proper notion of no-being, but some way, even to possibility also. That is, the possibility of being any thing but what it is; as being every way complete and perfectly full already. V. Again, we might further add, that it is the most abstracted being, or is being in the very abstract. A thing much insisted on by some of the schoolmen. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue after their manner, may carry some such sense as this, (if it may, being by somewhat else. And inasmuch as there is no middle sort of being betwixt necessary and not necessary, and all that is not necessary is caused, it is plain that which is necessary must be the cause of all the rest. And surely what is the cause of all being besides its own, must needs, one way or other, contain its own and all other in itself, and is consequently comprehensive of the utmost fulness of being; or is the absolutely perfect being, (as must equally be acknowledged,) unless any one would imagine himself to have got the notice of some perfection that lies without the compass of all being. Nor is it an exception worth the mentioning, that there may be a conception of possible being or perfection, which the necessary being hath not caused. For it is, manifestly, as well the possible cause of all possible being and perfection, as the actual cause of what is actual. And what it is possible to it to produce, it hath within its productive power, as hath been said before. throughout, be called sense,) that whereas no created na- | ture is capable of any other than mere mental abstraction, but exists always in concretion with some subject, that, be it never so refined, is grosser and less perfect than itself; so that we can distinguish the mentally abstracted essence, and the thing which hath that essence; by which concretion, essence is limited, and is only the particular essence of this or that thing, which hath or possesses that essence. The necessary being is, in strict propriety, not so truly said to have essence, as to be it, and exist separately by itself; not as limited to this or that thing. Whence it is, in itself, universal essence, containing therefore, not formally, but eminently, the being of all things in perfect simplicity. Whence all its own attributes are capable of being affirmed of it in the abstract, that it is wisdom, power, goodness; and not only hath these, and that upon this account it is a being, which is necessarily and of itself. For that which is necessarily and of itself, is not whatsoever it is by the accession of any thing to itself, whereof And if the matter did require it, we might say further, necessary being is incapable; but by its own simple and that the same necessary being which hath been the prounvariable essence. Other being is upon such terms ductive cause, is also the continual root and basis of all powerful, wise, yea, and existent, as that it may cease to being, which is not necessary. For what is of itself, and be so. Whereas to necessary being, it is manifestly repug- cannot, by the special privilege of its own being, but be, nant, and impossible either simply not to be, or to be any needs nothing to sustain it, or needs not trust to any thing thing else but what and as it is. And though other things besides its own eternal stability. But what is not so, may have properties belonging to their essence not separa- seems to need a continual reproduction every moment, ble from it, yet they are not their very essence itself. And, and to be no more capable of continuing in being by itself, whereas they are in a possibility to lose their very exist- than it was, by itself, of coming into being. For (as is ence, the knot and ligament of whatsoever is most intimate frequently alleged by that so often mentioned author) since to their actual being, all then falls from them together. there is no connexion betwixt the present and future time, Here, essence, properties, and existence, are all one simple but what is easily capable of rupture, it is no way consething that can never cease, decay, or change, because the quent that, because I am now, I shall therefore be the whole being is necessary. Now, all this being supposed, next moment, further than as the free Author of my being of the force of that form of speech, when we affirm any shall be pleased to continue his own most arbitrary inthing in the abstract of another, we may admit the common fluence, for my support. This seems highly probable to sense of men to be the interpreter. For every body can be true, whether that reason signify any thing or nothing. tell, though they do not know the meaning of the word And that thence, also, continual conservation differs not abstract, what we intend when we use that phrase or from creation. Which, whether (as is said by the same manner of speaking. As when we say, by way of hyper-author) it be one of the things that are manifest by natural bolical commendation, Such a man is not only learned, light, or whether a positive act be needless to the annihibut learning itself; or he not only hath much of virtue, lation of created things, but only the withholding of injustice, and goodness in him, but he is virtue, justice, and fluence, let them examine that apprehend the cause to goodness itself, (as was once said of an excellent pagan need it. And if, upon inquiry, they judge it at least virtuose, that I may borrow leave to use that word in the evidenceable by natural light to be so, (as I doubt not moral sense,) every one knows the phrase intends the ap- they will,) they will have this further ground upon which propriating all learning, virtue, justice, goodness, to such thus to reason: that, inasmuch as the necessary being a one. Which, because they know unappropriable to any subsists wholly by itself, and is that whereon all other man, they easily understand it to be, in such a case, a doth totally depend, it hereupon follows, that it must, rhetorical strain and form of speech. And yet could not some way, contain in itself all being. We may yet furknow that, if also they did not understand its proper and ther add, native import. And so it may as well be understood what is meant by saying of God, He is being itself. With which sense may be reconciled that of (the so named) Dionysius the Areopagite; that God is not so properly said to be of, or be in, or to have, or partake, of being, as that it is of him, &c. Inasmuch as he is the pre-existent Being to all being; i. e. if we understand him to mean all besides his own. In which sense taking being for that which is communicated and imparted, he may truly be said, (as this author and the Platonists generally speak,) to be super-essential or super-substantial. But how fitly being is taken in that restrained sense, we may say more hereafter. In the meantime, what hath been said concerning this abstractedness of the necessary being, hath in it some things so unintelligible, and is accompanied with so great (unmentioned) difficulties, (which it would give us, perhaps, more labour than profit to discuss,) and the absolute perfection of God appears so evidenceable otherwise, by what hath been and may be further said, that we are no way concerned to lay the stress of the cause on this matter only. VI. Moreover, necessary being is the cause and author of all being besides. Whatsoever is not necessary, is caused; for not having being of itself, it must be put into e To which purpose we may take notice of the words of one, not the less worthy to be named, for not being reckoned of that fore-mentioned order, Si enim denominativè de eo quippiam prædicaretur, abstractum esset tum aliud ab ipso, tum ipso prius. Quod sane impium est, quare neque ens est sed esseutia, neque bonus sed bonitas est. Jul. Scal. Exerc. 365. 1 Και αυτό δε το είναι εκ του προοντος, και αυτού εστι δε το είναι, και ουκ That the necessary being we have evinced, though it have caused and do continually sustain all things, yet doth not itself in the meantime suffer any diminution. It is not possible, nor consistent with the very terms necessary being, that it can. It is true, that if such a thing as a necessary atom were admitted, that would be also undiminishable, it were not else an atom. But as nothing then can flow from it, as from a perfect parvitude nothing can, so it can effect nothing. And the reason is the same of many as of one. Nor would undiminishableness, upon such terms, signify any thing to the magnifying the value of such a trifle. But this is none of the present case: for our eyes tell us here is a world in being, which we are sure is not itself necessarily; and was therefore made by him that is. And that, without mutation or change in him; against which the very notion of a necessary being is most irreconcilably reluctant; and therefore without diminution, which cannot be conceived without change.h Wherefore how inexhaustible a fountain of life, being, and all perfection, have we here represented to our thoughts! from whence this vast universe is sprung, and is continually springing, and that in the meantime receiving no recruits or foreign supplies, yet suffers no impairment or lessening of itself! What is this but absolute all-fulness? And it is αυτός του είναι, και εν αυτωι εστι το είναι, και ουκ αυτος εν τωι είναι, και AVTOV EXEL TO EIVAL, KAι OVK AUTOS EXEL TO εival. De Divinis nomin. Co. 5.. g Proclus in Plat. Theol. 1. 2. c. 4. Η Εν δε ταύτης της χορεία, καθορα, πηγήν μεν ζωης, πηγήν δε νου, αρχην οντος, αγαθού αιτιαν ρίζαν ψυχης ουκ εκ χεόμενων απ' αυτού είτ' εκείνων CλATTOVVTWV. Plotinus Enn. 6. l. 9. c. 9. so far from arguing any deficiency or mutability in his nature, that there is this continual issue of power and virtue from him, that it demonstrates its high excellency that this can be without decay or mutation. For of all this, we are as certain as we can be of any thing: that many things are not necessarily, that the being must be necessary from whence all things else proceed, and that with necessary being change is inconsistent. It is therefore unreasonable to entertain any doubt that things are so, which most evidently appear to be so, only because it is beyond our measure and compass to apprehend how they are so. And it would be to doubt, against our own eyes, whether there be any such thing as motion in the world, or composition of bodies, because we cannot give a clear account, so as to avoid all difficulties, and the entanglement of the common sophisms about them, how these things are performed. In the present case, we have no difficulty but what is to be resolved into the perfection of the divine nature, and the imperfection of our own. And how easily conceivable is it, that somewhat may be more perfect, than that we can conceive it. If we cannot conceive the manner of God's causation of things, or the nature of his causative influence, it only shows their high excellency, and gives us the more ground (since this is that into which both his own revelation and the reason of things most naturally lead us to resolve all) to admire the mighty efficacy of his all-creating and all-sustaining will and word; that in that easy unexpensive way, by his mere fiat, so great things should be performed. VII. We only say further, that this necessary Being is such to which nothing can be added; so as that it should be really greater, or better, or more perfect, than it was before. And this not only signifies, that nothing can be joined to it, so as to become a part of it, (which necessary being, by its natural immutability, manifestly refuses,) but we also intend by it, that all things else, with it, contain not more of real perfection than it doth alone. Which, though it carries a difficulty with it that we intend not wholly to overlook when it shall be seasonable to consider it, is a most apparent and demonstrable truth. For it is plain that all being and perfection which is not necessary, proceeds from that which is, as the cause of it; and that no cause could communicate any thing to another which it had not, some way, in itself. Wherefore it is manifestly consequent that all other being was wholly before comprehended in that which is necessary, as having been wholly produced by it. And what is wholly comprehended of another, i. e. within its productive power, before it be produced, can be no real addition to it, when it is. Now what can be supposed to import fulness of being and perfection, more than this impossibility of addition, or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect? And now these considerations are mentioned, without solicitude whether they be so many exactly distinct heads. For admit that they be not all distinct, but some are involved with others of them, yet the same truth may more powerfully strike some understandings in one form of representation, others in another. And it suffices, that (though not severally) they do together plainly evidence that the necessary being includes the absolute, entire fulness, of all being and perfection actual and possible within itself. Having therefore thus despatched that former part of this undertaking, the eviction of an every-way perfect being, we shall now need to labour little in the other, viz. VIII. Secondly, The more express deduction of the infiniteness and onliness thereof. For as to the former of these, it is in effect the same thing that hath been already proved; since to the fullest notion of infiniteness, absolute perfection seems every way most fully to correspond. For absolute perfection includes all conceivable perfection, leaves nothing excluded. And what doth most simple infiniteness import, but to have nothing for a boundary, or, which is the same, not to be bounded at all? bound or limit. This is the same with absolute perfection: which yet, if any should suspect, not to be so, they might, however, easily and expressly prove it of the necessary being, upon the same grounds that have been already alleged for proof of that:-as that the necessary being hath actuality answerable to the utmost possibility of the creature; that it is the only root and cause of all other being, the actual cause of whatsoever is actually; the possible cause of whatsoever is possible to be: which is most apparently true, and hath been evidenced to be so, by what hath been said, so lately, as that it needs not be repeated. That is, in short, that nothing that is not necessarily, and of itself, could ever have been or can be, but as it hath been or shall be put into being by that which is necessarily, and of itself. So that this is as apparent as that any thing is, or can be. But now let sober reason judge, whether there can be any bounds or limits set to the possibility of producible being; either in respect of kinds, numbers, or degrees of perfection? Who can say or think, when there can be so many sorts of creatures produced, (or at least individuals of those sorts,) that there can be no more? Or that any creature is so perfect as that none can be made more perfect? Which indeed, to suppose, were to suppose an actual infiniteness in the creature. And then it being, however, still but somewhat that is created or made, how can its maker but be infinite? For surely nobody will be so absurd as to imagine an infinite effect of a finite cause. Either therefore the creature is, or some time may be actually made, so perfect that it cannot be more perfect, or not. If not, we have our purpose; that there is an infinite possibility on the part of the creature, always unreplete; and consequently, a proportionable infinite actuality of power on the Creator's part. Infinite power, I say; otherwise there were not that acknowledged infinite possibility of producible being. For nothing is producible that no power can produce, be the intrinsic possibility of it (or its not-implying in itself a contradiction that it should exist) what it will. And I say, infinite actual power, because the Creator, being what he is necessarily, what power he hath not actually, he can never have, as was argued before. But if it be said, the creature either is, or may some time be, actually so perfect as that it cannot be more perfect; that, as was said, will suppose it then actually infinite; and therefore much more that its cause is so. And therefore in this way our present purpose would be gained also. But we have no mind to gain it this latter way, as we have no need. It is in itself plain, to any one that considers, that this possibility on the creature's part can never actually be filled up; that it is a bottomless abyss, in which our thoughts may still gradually go down deeper and deeper, without end: that is, that still more might be produced, or more perfect creatures, and still more, everlastingly, without any bound; which sufficiently infers what we aim at, that the Creator's actual power is proportionable. And indeed the supposition of the former can neither consist with the Creator's perfection, nor with the imperfection of the creature; it would infer that the Creator's productive power might be exhausted; that he could do no more, and so place an actual boundary to him, and make him finite. It were to make the creature actually full of being, that it could receive no more, and so would make that infinite. But it may be said, since all power is in order to act, and the very notion of possibility imports that such a thing, of which it is said, may, some time, be actual; it seems very unreasonable to say, that the infinite power of a cause cannot produce an infinite effect; or that infinite possibility can never become infinite actuality. For that were to say and unsay the same thing, of the same; to affirm omnipotency and impotency of the same cause; possibility and impossibility of the same effect. How urgent soever this difficulty may seem, there needs nothing but patience and attentive consideration to disentangle ourselves and get through it. For if we will but allow ourselves the leisure to consider, we shall find that We intend not now, principally, infiniteness extrinsi-power and possibility must here be taken not simply and cally considered, with respect to time and place, as to be eternal and immense do import; but intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection, without abstractedly, but as each of them is in conjunction with infinite. And what is infinite, but that which can never be travelled through, or whereof no end can be ever arrived unto? Now suppose infinite power had produced all that It may then be further urged, that there is therefore no such thing as infinite power or possibility. For how is that cause said to have infinite power, which can never produce its proportionable effect, or that effect have infinite possibility, which can never be produced? It would follow then, that power and possibility, which are said to be infinite, are neither power nor possibility; and that infinite must be rejected as a notion either repugnant to itself, or to any thing unto which we shall go about to affix it. it could produce, it were no longer infinite, there were an | done? The answer will be, Because eternity (in every and of it: i. e. it had found limits and a boundary beyond imaginable instant whereof, the inexhaustible power of which it could not go. If infinite possibility were filled God can, if he will, be still adding either more creatures, up, there were an end of that also; and so neither were or more perfection to a creature) can never be at an end. infinite. We might further argue the infinity of the necessary being, from what hath been said of its undiminishableness, by all its vast communications. Its impossibility to receive any accession to itself, by any its so great productions, both which are plainly demonstrable, as we have seen, of the necessary being, even as it is such, and do clearly, as any thing can, bespeak infinity. But we have thence argued its absolute perfection, which so evidently includes the same thing, that all this latter labour might have been spared; were it not that it is the genius of some persons not to be content that they have the substance of a thing said, unless it be also said in their own terms. And that the express asserting of God's simple infiniteness, in those very terms, is, in that respect, the more requisite, as it is a form of expression more known 'and usual. IX. There are yet some remaining difficulties in the matter we have been discoursing of; which partly through the debility of our own minds we cannot but find, and which partly the subtilty of sophistical wits doth create to us. It will be requisite we have some consideration of at least some of them, which we will labour to despatch with all possible brevity; leaving those that delight in the sport of tying and loosing knots, or of weaving snares wherein cunningly to entangle themselves, to be entertained by the school-men; among whom they may find enough, upon this subject, to give them exercise unto weariness; and, if their minds have any relish of what is more savory, I may venture to say, unto loathing. I answer, It only follows, they are neither power nor possibility, whereof there is any bound or end; or that can ever be gone through. And how absurd is it that they shall be said, as they cannot but be, to be both very vast, if they were finite; and none at all, for no other reason but their being infinite! And for the pretended repugnancy of the very notion of infinite, it is plain, that though it cannot be to us distinctly comprehensible, yet it is no more repugnant than the notion of finiteness. Nor when we have conceived of power, in the general, and in our own thoughts set bounds to it, and made finite, is it a greater difficulty (nay, they that try will find it much easier) again to think away these bounds, and make it infinite? And let them that judge the notion of infiniteness inconsistent, therefore reject it if they can. They will feel it reimposing itself upon them, whether they will or no, and sticking as close to their minds as their very thinking power itself. And who was therefore ever heard of, that did not acknowledge some or other infinite? Even the Epicureans themselves, though they confined their gods, they did not the universe. Which, also, though some Peripatetic atheists made finite in respect of place, yet in duration they made it infinite. Though the notion of an eternal world is encumbered with such absurdities and impossibilities, as whereof there is not the least shadow, in that, of an every way infinite Deity. Briedy, it consists not with the nature of a contingent being, to be infinite. For what is upon such terms, only, in being, is reducible to nothing, at the will and pleasure of its maker; but it is a manifest repugnancy, that what is at the utmost distance from nothing (as infinite fulness of being cannot but be) should be reducible thither. Therefore actual infinity cannot but be the peculiar privilege of that which is necessarily. · Yet may we not say, that it is not within the compass of infinite power to make a creature that may be infinite. For it argues not want of power that this is never to be done, but a still infinitely abounding surplusage of it, that can never be drained or drawn dry. Nor, that the thing itself is simply impossible. It may be, as is compendiously expressed by that most succinct and polite, writer, Dr. Boyle, in fieri, not in facto esse. That is, it might be a thing always in doing, but never done. Because it belongs to the infinite perfection of God, that his power be never actually exhausted; and to the infinite imperfection of the creature, that its possibility or capacity be never filled up: to the necessary self-subsisting being, to be always full and communicative; to the communicated contingent being, to be ever empty and craving. One may be said to have that, some way, in his power, not only which he can do presently, all at once, but which he can do by degrees, and supposing he have sufficient time. So a man may be reckoned able to do that, as the uttermost, adequate effect of his whole power, which it is only possible to him to have effected, with the expiration of his life's-time. God's measure is eternity. What if we say then, this is a work possible to be accomplished, even as the ultimate, proportionable issue of divine power, (if it were his will, upon which all contingent being depends,) that the creature should be ever growing in the mean while, and be absolutely perfect at the expiration of eternity? If then you be good at suppositions, suppose that expired, and this work finished, both together." Wherefore if you ask, Why can the work of making created being infinite, never be i Now Bishop of Clogher, in his Contemplat. Metaphys. It may possibly be here said, in short, But what have we all this while been doing? We have been labouring to prove that necessary being comprehends the absolute fulness of all being: and what doth this signify, but that all being is necessary? That God is all things, and so that every thing is God; that we hereby confound the being of a man, yea, of a stone, or whatever we can think of, with one another, and all with the being of God. And again, how is it possible there should be an infinite self-subsisting being? For then how can there be any finite, since such infinite being includes all being, and there can be nothing beyond all? Here therefore it is requisite, having hitherto only asserted, and endeavoured to evince that, some way, necessary being doth include all being, to show in what way. And it is plain it doth not include all, in the same way. It doth not so include that which is created by it, and depends on it, as it doth its own, which is uncreated and independent. The one it includes as its own, or rather as itself; the other, as what it is, and ever was, within its power to produce. If any better like the terms formally and virtually, they may serve themselves of them at their own pleasure, which yet, as to many, will but more darkly speak the same sense. We must here know, the productive power of God terminates not upon himself, as if he were, by it, capable of adding any thing to his own appropriate being, which is (as hath been evinced already) infinitely full, and incapable of addition, and is therefore all pure act; but on the creature, where there is still a perpetual possibility, never filled up; because divine power can never be exhausted. And thus all that of being is virtually in him, which, either having produced, he doth totally sustain, or not being produced, he can produce. Whereupon it is easy to understand, how necessary being may comprehend all being, and yet all being not be necessary. It comprehends all being, besides what itself is, as having had, within the compass of its productive power, whatsoever hath actually sprung from it, and having within the compass of the same power, whatsoever is still possible to be produced. Which no more confounds such produced or producible being with that necessary being which is its cause, than it confounds all the effects of human power with one another, and with the being of a man, to say, that he virtually comprehended them (so far as they nothing added to it; yet it is without dispute, that whatsoever is so full as that nothing can be added to it, is infinite. |