26 THE LIVING TEMPLE. PART. I thought, resolved and unresolved, a thousand times in a may think fit to use, for the avoiding the force of this day. That is, if any thing could be thought or resolved dilemma; and may rely upon as a ground, why they may at all, or, if this were a subject capable of framing or re-judge this choice the more secure; that is, that they say ceiving any sort of notion. But still that is the greatest difficulty, how there can be such a thing as thinking, or forming of notions. The case is plain of such notions as have no relation to matter, or dependence upon external sense. For what doth contribute to my contemplation of my own mind, and its acts and powers; to my animadversion, or knowing that I think, or will, this or that? But besides, and more generally, what proportion is there between a thought and the motion of an atom? Will we appeal to our faculties, to our reason itself? And whither else will we? Is there any cognation or kindred between the ideas we have of these things, the casual agitation of a small particle of matter, (be it as little or as round as we please to imagine,) and an act of intellection or judgment? And what if there be divers of them together? What can they do more towards the composing an intelligent thing, than many ciphers to the arithmetical composition of a number? It would be as rational to suppose a heap of dust, by long lying together, might at last become rational. Yes, these are things that have, some way or other, the power of motion; and what can they effect by that? They can frisk about, and ply to and fro, and interfere among themselves, and hit, and justle, and tumble over one another, and that will contribute a great deal; about as much, we may suppose, as the shaking of such dust well in a bag, by which means it might possibly become finer and smaller something; and by continuing that action, at length rational! No; but these atoms, of which the soul is made, have a greater advantage by their being disposed into a so well-contrived and filly organized receptacle as the body is. It is indeed true, and admirable, that the body is, as hath been before observed, so fitly framed for the purposes whereto the whole of it, and its several parts, are designed. But how unfitly is that commodious structure of it so much as mentioned, by such as will not allow themselves to own and adore the wisdom and power of its great Architect.. And what if the composure of the body be so apt and useful; so excellent in its own kind; is it so in every kind, or to all imaginable purposes? Or what purpose can we possibly imagine more remote or foreign to the composition of the body, than that the power of ratiocination should be derived thence? It might as well be said it was so made, to whirl about the sun, or to govern the motions of the moon and stars, as to confer the power of reason, or enable the soul to think, to understand, to deliberate, to will, &c. Yea, its organs, some of them, are much more proportionable to those actions, than any of them unto these. Which, though a well-habited body, while the soul remains in this imprisoned state, do less hinder, yet how doth it help? And that it might perform these acts without bodily organs, is much more apprehensible than how they can properly be said to be performed by them. And that, though they are done in the body, they would be done much better out of it. But shall it be granted that these soul-constituting atoms, till they be (or otherwise than as they are) united with a duly organized body, are utterly destitute of any reasoning or íntelligent power? Or are they, by themselves, apart from this grosser body, irrational? If this be not granted, the thing we intend must be argued out. Either, then, they are, or they are not. If the latter be said, then they have it of themselves, without dependence on the organized body; and so we are fairly agreed to quit that pretence, without more ado, of their partaking reason from thence. And are only left to weigh over again what hath been already said to evince the contrary, that is, how manifestly absurd it is, to imagine that particles of matter, by their peculiar size, or weight, or shape, or motion, or all of these together: and that, whether single or associated, should be capable of reasoning. If the former be the thing which is resolved to be stuck to, that is, that they are of themselves irrational, but they become reasonable by their being united in such a prepared and organized body, this requires to be a little further considered. And to this purpose it is necessary to obviate a pitiful shift that it is possible some they are rational by dependence on the body they animate; because they are only found so united with one another there; that there they have the first coalition; there they are severed from such as serve not this turn; there they are pent in, and held together as long as its due temperament lasts; which, when it fails, they are dissipated, and so lose their great advantage for the acts of reason, which they had in such a body. What pleasure soever this may yield, it will soon appear it does them little service. For it only implies, that they have their rationality of themselves, so be it that they were together; and not immediately from the body; or any otherwise, than that they are somewhat beholden to it, for a fair occasion of being together; as if it were, else, an unlawful assembly; or that they knew not, otherwise, how to meet and hold together. They will not say that the body gives them being, for they are eternal, and self-subsisting, as they will have it. Yea, and of themselves (though the case be otherwise with the Cartesian particles) undiminishable, as to their size, and, as to their figure and weight, unalterable; so that they have neither their littleness, their roundness, nor their lightness, from the body, but only their so happy meeting. Admit this, and only suppose them to be met out of the body. And why may not this be thought supposable? If they be not rational till they be met, they cannot have wit enough to scruple meeting, at least somewhere else, than in the body. And who knows but such a change may happen? As great as this, are by these persons supposed to have happened, before the world could have come to this pass it is now at; who can tell but such a number of the same sort of atoms (it being natural for things so much of a complexion and temper to associate and find out one another) might ignorantly, and thinking no harm, come together And having done so, why might they not keep together? Do they need to be pent in? How are they pent in, whils in the body? If they be disposed, they have ways enough to get out. And if they must needs be inclined to scatter when the crasis of the body fails, surely a way might be found to hem them in, if that be all, at the time of expiration, more tightly and closely, than they could be in the body. And what reason can be devised, why, being he come rational, by their having been assembled in the body, they may not agree to hold together, and do so in spite of fate, or maugre all ordinary accidents, when they find it convenient to leave it? And then upon these no-way impossible suppositions, (according to their principles, so far as can be understood, with whom we have to do,) will they now be rational out of the body? Being still endowed (as they cannot but be) with the same high privileges of being little, round, and light, and being still also together; and somewhat more, it may be, at liberty, to roll and tumble, and mingle with one another, than in the body? If it be now affirmed, they will, in this case, be rational, at least as long as they hold together, then we are but where we were. And this shift hath but diverted us a little; but so, as it was easy to bring the matter, again, about, to the same point we were at before. Wherefore the shelter of the body being thus quite again forsaken, this poor expulsed crew of dislodging atoms are exposed to fight in the open air, for their rationality, against all that was said before. But if this refuge and sanctuary of the body be not merely pretended to, but really and plainly trusted in, and stuck to, then are we sincerely and honestly to consider what a body so variously organized can do, to make such a party of atoms (that of themselves are not so, singly, nor together) become rational. And surely, if the cause were not saved before, it is now deplorate, and lost without remedy. For what do they find here that can thus, beyond all expectation, improve them to so high an excellency? Is it flesh, or blood, or bones, that puts this stamp upon them? Think, what is the substance of the nobler parts, the liver, or heart, or brain, that they should turn these, before, irrational atoms, when they fall into them, into rational, any more than if they were well soaked in a quagmire, or did insinuate themselves into a piece of soft dough? But here they meet with a benign and kindly unbecome a serious person to laugh at what is ridiculous, than gravely to weigh and ponder what is weighty and considerable; provided he do not seek occasion of that former sort, on purpose to gratify a vain humour; but only allow himself to discourse suitably to them, when they occur. And their dotage who would fain serve themselves of so wildly extravagant and impossible suppositions, for the fostering their horrid misbelief, that they have no God to worship, would certainly justify as sharp ironies, as the prophet Elijah bestows upon them who worshipped Baal, instead of the true God. heat and warmth, which comfortably fosters and cherishes | fitly be entertained but with derision. Nor doth it more them, till at length it hath hatched them into rational. But methinks they should be warm enough of themselves, since they are supposed so much to resemble fire. And, however, wherein do we find a flame of fire more rational, than a piece of ice? Yea, but here they find a due temper of moisture as well as heat. And that surely doth not signify much; for if the common maxim be true, that the dry soul is the wisest, they might have been much wiser, if they had kept themselves out of the body. And since it is necessary the soul should consist of that peculiar sort of atoms before described; and the organical body (which must be said for distinction sake, the soul being all this XIV. Nor is any thing here said intended as a reflection while supposed a body also) consists of atoms too, that are on such as, being unfurnished with a notion of created, of a much coarser alloy, methinks a mixture should not intelligent spirits, that might distinguish their substance be necessary, but a hinderance, and great debasement, ra- from the most subtile matter, have therefore thought that ther, to this rational composition. Besides, that it cannot their mind or thinking power might have some such subbe understood, if it were necessary these atoms should stratum, unto which it is superadded, or impressed thereon receive any tincture from the body, in order to their being by a divine hand; in the meantime not doubting their rational, what they can receive, or how they can receive immortality, much less the existence of a Deity, the any thing. They have not pores that can admit an adven-Author and former of them, and all things. For they are titious moisture, though it were of the divinest nectar, and no way guilty of that blasphemous nonsense, to make the body could never so plentifully furnish them with it. them consist of necessary, self-subsistent matter, every Wherein then lies the great advantage these atoms have by minute particle whereof is judged eternal and immutable, being in the body, to their commencing rational? If there and in themselves, for aught we can find asserted, destitute be such advantage, why can it not be understood? Why of reason; and which yet acquire it by no one knows what is it not assigned? Why should we further spend our coalition, without the help of a wise efficient, that shall guesses what may possibly be said? But yet, may not direct and order it to so unimaginable an improvement. much be attributed to the convenient and well-fenced These persons do only think more refined matter capable cavity of the brain's receptacle, or the more secret cham- of that impression and stamp; or of having such a power bers within that, where the studious atoms may be very put into it, by the Creator's all-disposing hand. Wherein, private and free from disturbance? Yet sure it is hard to to do them right, though they should impose somewhat say, why they that are wont to do it here, might not as well hardly upon themselves, if they will make this estimate of philosophize in some well-chosen cavern, or hole of a rock; the natural capacity of matter; or if they think the acts nor were it impossible to provide them there, with as soft and power of reason in man, altogether unnatural to him; 2 bed. And yet would it not be some relief to speak of yet they do, in effect, the more befriend the cause we are the fine slender pipes, winding to and fro, wherein they pleading for; (as much as it can be befriended by a mismay be conveyed so conveniently from place to place, that apprehension; which yet is a thing of that untoward if they do not fall into a reasoning humour in one place, genius, and doth so ill consort with truth, that it is never they may in another? Why, what can this do? It seems admitted as a friend, in any one respect, but it repays it somewhat like Balaam's project, to get into a vein of in- with a mischievous revenge, in some other; as might many cantation, by changing stations. And transplace them as ways be shown in this instance, if it were within the comyou will, it requires more magic than ever he was master pass of our present design ;) it being evident, that if any of, to make those innocent, harmless things, masters of portion of matter shall indeed be certainly found the actual subject of such powers, and to have such operations belonging to it, there is the plainer and more undeniable necessity and demonstration of his power and wisdom, who can make any thing of any thing; of stones raise up children to Abraham! and who shall then have done that which is so altogether impossible, except him to whom all things are possible? There is the more manifest need of his hand to heighten dull matter, to a qualifiedness for performances so much above its nature; to make the loose and independent parts of so fluid matter cohere and hold together; that, if it were once made capable of knowledge, and the actual subject of it, whatsoever notions were impressed thereon, might not be, in a moment, confounded and lost: as indeed they could not but be, if the particles of matter were the immediate seat of reason; and so steady a hand did not hold them, in a settled composure, that they be not disordered, and men have, thence, the necessity of beginning afresh, to know any thing, every hour of the day. Though yet it seems a great deal more reasonable to suppose the souls of men to be of a substance in itself more consistent, and more agreeable to our experience; who find a continual ebbing and flowing of spirits, without being sensible of any so notable and sudden changes in our knowledge, as we could not but, thereupon, observe in ourselves; if they, or any as fluid finer matter, were the immediate subjects of it. It is therefore however sufficiently evident, and out of question, that the human soul (be its own substance what it will) must have an efficient diverse from matter; which it was our present intendment to evince. And so our way is clear to proceed to, reason. For do but consider, what if you had a large phial capable of as great a quantity as you can think needful, of very fine particles, and replenished with them, closely stopped, and well luted; suppose these as pure and fit for the purpose as you can imagine, only not yet rational; will their faring to and fro, through very close and stanch tubes, from one such receptacle to another, make them at last become so? It seems then, do what you will with them, toss and tumble them hither and thither, rack them from vessel to vessel, try what methods you can devise of sublimation or improvement, every thing looks like a vain and hopeless essay. For indeed, do what you please or can think of, they are such immutable entities, you can never make them less, or finer, than they originally were: and rational they were not, before their meeting in the body; wherefore it were a strange wonder, if that should so far alter the case with them, that they should become rational by it. XIII. And now I must, upon the whole, profess not to be well pleased with the strain of this discourse; not that I think it unsuitable to its subject, (for I see not how it is fitly to be dealt with in a more serious way,) but that I dislike the subject. And were it not that it is too obvious, how prone the minds of some are to run themselves into any the grossest absurdities rather than admit the plain and easy sentiments of religion; it were miserable trifling to talk at this rate, and a loss of time not to be endured. But when an unaccountable aversion to the acknowledgment and adoration of the ever-blessed Deity, hurries away men, affrighted and offended at the lustre of his so manifest appearances, to take a bad, but the only shelter the case can admit, under the wings of any the most silly, XV. The second inquiry, whether it be not also manifoolish figment; though the ill temper and dangerous state fest, from the powers and operations which belong to it as of the persons is to be thought on with much pity, yet the it is reasonable, that it must have had an intelligent efthings which they pretend being in themselves ridiculous, ficient? That is, since we find, and are assured, that there if we will entertain them into our thoughts at all, cannot) is a sort of being in the world (yea somewhat of ourselves, ། and that hath best right, of any thing else about us, to be | called ourselves) that can think, understand, deliberate, argue, &c. and which we can most certainly assure ourselves (whether it were pre-existent in any former state, or no) is not an independent or uncaused being, and hath therefore been the effect of some cause; whether it be not apparently the effect of a wise cause? And this, upon supposition of what hath been before proved, seems not liable to any the least rational doubt. For it is already apparent, that it is not itself matter; and if it were, it is however the more apparent, that its cause is not matter; inasmuch, as if it be itself matter, its powers and operations are so much above the natural capacity of matter, as that it must have had a cause, so much more noble and of a more perfect nature than that, as to be able to raise and improve it, beyond the natural capacity of matter; which it was impossible for that, itself, to do. Whence it is plain, it must have a cause diverse from matter. Wherefore this its immaterial cause must either be wise and intelligent, or not so. But is it possible any man should ever be guilty of a greater absurdity than to acknowledge some certain immaterial agent, destitute of wisdom, the only cause and fountain of all that wisdom, that is, or hath ever been, in the whole race of mankind. That is as much as to say, that all the wisdom of mankind hath been caused without a cause. For it is the same thing, after we have acknowledged any thing to be caused, to say it was caused by no cause, as to say it was caused by such a cause as hath nothing of that in it, whereof we find somewhat to be in the effect. Nor can it avail any thing, to speak of the disproportion or superior excellency in some effects to their second, or to their only partial causes. As that there are sometimes learned children of unlearned parents. For who did ever in that case say the parents were the productive causes of that learning? or of them, as they were learned? Sure that learning comes from some other cause. But shall it then be said, the souls of men have received their being from some such immaterial agent destitute of wisdom; and afterward, their wisdom and intellectual ability came some other way; by their own observation, or by institution and precept, from others? Whence then came their capacity of observing, or of receiving such instruction? Can any thing naturally destitute even of seminal reason, (as we may call it,) or of any aptitude or capacity tending thereto, ever be able to make observations, or receive instructions, whereby at length it may become rational? And is not that capacity of the soul of man a real something? Or is there no difference between being capable of reason and incapable? What, then, did this real something proceed from nothing? Or was the soul itself caused, and this its capacity uncaused? Or was its cause, only, capable of intellectual perfection, but not actually furnished therewith? But if it were only capable, surely its advantages for the actual attainment thereof have been much greater than ours. Whence it were strange if that capacity should never have come into act. And more strange, that we should know, or have any ground to pretend, that it hath not. But that there was an actual exercise of wisdom in the production of the reasonable soul is most evident. For is it a necessary being? That we have proved it is not. It is therefore a contingent, and its being depended on a free cause, into whose pleasure, only, it was resolvable, that it should be or not be; and which therefore had a dominion over its own acts. If this bespeak not an intelligent agent, what doth ? And though this might also be said concerning every thing else which is not necessarily, and so might yield a more general argument to evince a free designing cause; yet it concludes with greater evidence concerning the reasonable soul; whose powers and operations it is so manifestly impossible should have proceeded from matter. And therefore even that vain and refuted pretence itself, that other things might, by the necessary laws of its motion, become what they are, can have less place here. Whence it is more apparent that the reasonable soul must have had a free and intelligent cause, that used liberty and counsel, in determining that it should be, and especially that it should be such a sort of thing as we find it is. For when we see how aptly its powers and faculties serve for their proper and peculiar operations, who that is not beside himself can think that such a thing was made by one that knew not what he was doing? or that such powers were not given on purpose for such operations? And what is the capacity, but a power that should sometime be reduced into act, and arrive to the exercise of reason itself? Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way? That is, in the same kind, or in some more excellent and noble kind? For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational, taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more. For we suppose all things equally known to him, (which, so far as is requisite to our present design, that is, the representing him the proper object of religion, or of that honour which the dedication of a temple to him imports, we may in due time come more expressly to assert,) and that the knowledge which is with us the end of reasoning, is in him in its highest perfection, without being at all beholden to that means; that all the connexion of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view, and are known to be connected, but not because they are so. We say, it conceivable that man's knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not, in the same, or this more perfect kind? And may use those words to this purpose, not for their authority, (which we expect not should be here significant,) but the convincing evidence they carry with them, "He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know ?" That we may drive this matter to an issue, it is evident the soul of man is not a necessary, self-originate thing; and had therefore some cause. We find it to have knowledge, or the power of knowing, belonging to it. Therefore we say, So had its cause. We rely not here upon the credit of vulgar maxims, (whereof divers might be mentioned,) but the reason of them, or of the thing itself we allege. And do now speak of the whole, entire cause of this being, the human soul, or of whatsoever is casual of it; or of any perfection naturally appertaining to it. It is of an intelligent nature. Did this intelligent nature proceed from an unintelligent, as the whole and only cause of it? That were to speak against our own eyes, and most natural, common sentiments; and were the same thing as to say that something came of nothing. For it is all one to say so, and to say that any thing communicated what it had not to communicate. Or (which is alike madly absurd) to say that the same thing was such, and not such, intelligent, and not intelligent, able to communicate an intelligent nature, (for sure what it doth it is able to do,) and not able, (for it is not able to communicate what it hath not,) at the same time. It is hardly here worth the while to spend time in countermining that contemptible refuge, (which is as incapable of offending us, as of being defended,) that human souls may perhaps only have proceeded in the ordinary course of generation from one another. For that none have ever said any thing to that purpose deserving a confutation, except that some sober and pious persons, for the avoiding of some other difficulties, have thought it more safe to assert the traduction of human souls, who yet were far enough from imagining that they could be total, or first causes to one another: and doubted not, but they had the constant necessary assistance of that same Being we are pleading for, acting in his own sphere, as the first cause in all such, as well as any other, productions. Wherein they nothing oppose the main design of this discourse; and therefore it is not in our way, to offer at any opposition unto them. But if any have a mind to indulge themselves the liberty of so much dotage, as to say the souls of men were first and only causes to one another; either they must suppose them to be material beings; and then we refer them to what hath been already said, showing that their powers and operations cannot belong to matter, nor arise from it; or immaterial, and then they cannot produce one another in the way of generation. For of what pre-existent substance are they made? Theirs who beget them? Of that they can part with nothing; separability, at least, of parts being a most confessed property of matter. Or some other? Where will they find that other spiritual substance, that belonged not inseparably to some individual being before? And besides, if it were pre-existent, as it must be if a soul be generated out of it, then they were not the first and only causes of this production. And in another way than that of generation, how will any form the notion of making a soul? Let experience and the making of trial convince the speculators. By what power, or by what art, will they make a reasonable soul spring up out of nothing? It might be hoped that thus, without disputing the possibility of an eternal, successive production of souls, this shift may appear vain. But if any will persist, and say, that how, or in what way soever they are produced, it is strange if they need any nobler cause than themselves; for may not any living thing well enough be thought capable of producing another of the same kind, of no more than equal perfection with itself? To this we say, besides that no one living thing is the only cause of another such, yet if that were admitted possible, what will it avail? For hath every soul that hath ever existed, or been in being, been produced, in this way, by another? This it were ridiculous to say, for if every one were so produced, there was then some one, before every one; inasmuch as that which produces, must surely have been before that which is produced by it. But how can every one have one before it? A manifest contradiction in the very terms! For then there will be one without the compass of every one. And how is it then said to be every one? There is then it seems one besides, or more than all. And so all is not all. And if this be thought a sophism, let the matter be soberly considered thus: The soul of man is either a thing of that nature universally (and consequently every individual soul) as that it doth exist of itself, necessarily and independently, or not. If it be, then we have, however, a wise intelligent being necessarily existing, the thing we have been proving all this while. Yet this concession we will not accept, for though it is most certain there is such a being, we have also proved the human soul is not it. Whence it is evidently a dependent being, in its own nature, that could never have been of itself, and consequently not at all, had it not been put into being by somewhat else. And being so in its own nature, it must be thus with every one that partakes of this nature. And consequently it must be somewhat of another nature that did put the souls of men into being. Otherwise, the whole stock and lineage of human souls is said to have been dependent on a productive cause, and yet had nothing whereon to depend: and so is both caused by another, and not caused. And therefore since it is hereby evident it was somewhat else, and of another nature, than a human soul, by which all human souls were produced into being: we again say, that distinct being either was a dependent, caused being, or not. If not, it being proved that the soul of man cannot but have had an intelligent or wise cause, we have now what we seek-an independent, necessary, intelligent being, if it do depend, or any will be so idle to say so; that, however, will infallibly and very speedily lead us to the same mark. For though some have been pleased to dream of an infinite succession of individuals of this or that kind, I suppose we have no dream as yet, ready formed, to come under confutation, of infinite kinds or orders of beings, gradually superior, one above another; the inferior still depending on the superior, and all upon nothing. And therefore, I conceive, we may fairly take leave of this argument from the human soul, as having gained from it sufficient evidence of the existence of a necessary being, that is intelligent, and designedly active, or guided by wisdom and counsel, in what it doth. We might also, if it were needful, further argue the same thing from a power or ability manifestly superior to, and that exceeds the utmost perfection of, human nature, viz. that of prophecy, or the prediction of future contingeneies; yea, and from another that exceeds the whole sphere of all created nature, and which crosses and countermands the known and stated laws thereof, viz. that of working miracles; both of them exercised with manifest design; as might evidently be made appear, by manifold instances, to as many as can believe any thing to be true, more than what they have seen with their own eyes; and that do not take present sense, yea, and their own only, to be the alone measure of all reality. But it is not necessary we insist upon every thing that may be said, so that enough be said to serve our present purpose. XVI. And that our purpose may yet be more fully served, and such a being evidenced to exist as we may with satisfaction esteem to merit a temple with us, and the religion of it, it is necessary that we add somewhat concerning, 9. The divine goodness; for unto that eternal Being, whose existence we have hitherto asserted, goodness also cannot but appertain; together with those his other attributes we have spoken of. It is not needful here to be curious about the usual scholastical notions of goodness, or what it imports, as it is wont to be attributed to being in the general, what, as it belongs in a peculiar sense to intellectual beings, or what more special import it may have, in reference to this. That which we at present chiefly intend by it, is a propension to do good with delight; or most freely, without other inducement than the agreeableness of it to his nature who doth it; and a certain delectation and complacency, which, hence, is taken in so doing. The name of goodness (though thus it more peculiarly signifies the particular virtue of liberality) is of a significancy large enough, even in the moral acceptation, to comprehend all other perfections or virtues, that belong to, or may any way commend, the will of a free agent. These therefore we exclude not; and particularly whatsoever is wont to be signified, as attributable unto God, by the names of holiness, as a steady inclination unto what is intellectually pure and comely, with an aversion to the contrary; justice, as that signifies an inclination to deal equally, which is included in the former, yet as more expressly denoting what is more proper to a governor over others, viz. a resolution not to let the transgressions of laws, made for the preservation of common order, pass without due animadversion and punishment; truth, whose signification also may be wholly contained under those former more general terms, but more directly contains sincerity, unaptness to deceive, and constancy to one's word: for these may properly be styled good things in a moral sense; as many other things might, in another notion of goodness, which it belongs not to our present design to make mention of. But these are mentioned as more directly tending to represent to us an amiable object of religion; and are referred hither, as they fitly enough may, out of an unwillingness to multiply, without necessity, particular heads or subjects of discourse. In the meantime, as was said, what we principally intend, is, That the Being whose existence we have been endeavouring to evince, is good, as that imports a ready inclination of will to communicate unto others what may be good to them; creating, first, its own object, and then issuing forth to it, in acts of free beneficence, suitable to the nature of every thing created by it. Which, though it be the primary or first thing carried in the notion of this goodness, yet because that inclination is not otherwise good than as it consists with holiness, justice, and truth, these therefore may be esteemed, secondarily at least, to belong to it, as inseparable qualifications thereof. Wherefore it is not a merely natural and necessary emanation we here intend, that prevents any act or exercise of counsel or design; which would no way consist with the liberty of the divine will, and would make the Deity as well a necessary Agent, as a necessary Being; yea, and would therefore make all the creatures merely natural and necessary emanations, and so destroy the distinction of necessary and contingent beings: and, by consequence, bid fair to the making all things God. It would infer not only the eternity of the world, but would seem to infer either the absolute infinity of it, or the perfection of it, and of every creature in it, to that degree, as that nothing could be more perfect in its own kind, than it is; or would infer the finiteness of the divine Being. For it would make what he hath done the adequate measure of what he can do, and would make all his administrations necessary, yea, and all the actions of men, and consequently take away all law and government out of the world, and all measures of right and wrong, and make all punitive justice, barbarous cruelty: and consequently, give us a notion of goodness, at length, plainly inconsistent with itself. All this is provided against, by our having first asserted soever their real identity may be, so we do not know, but that within the compass of universal perfection there may be some particular ones, of which there is no footstep in the creation, and whereof we have never formed any thought,) nor (more certainly) in degree; for surely the world, and the particular creatures in it, are not so perfect in correspondence to those attributes of its great Architect, which we have mentioned, viz. his power, wisdom, and goodness, as he might have made them, if he had pleased. And indeed, to say the world were absolutely and univer sally perfect, were to make that God. the wisdom of that Being, whereunto we also attribute | of divine perfections, but under the notion of many, what goodness; which guides all the issues of it, according to those measures or rules which the essential rectitude of the divine will gives, or rather is, unto it: whereby also a foundation is laid of answering such cavils against the divine goodness, as they are apt to raise to themselves, who are wont to magnify this attribute to the suppression of others; which is, indeed, in the end, to magnify it to nothing. And such goodness needs no other demonstration, than the visible instances and effects we have of it in the creation and conservation of this world; and particularly, in his large, munificent bounty and kindness towards man, whereof his designing him for his temple and residence, will be a full and manifest proof. And of all this, his own self-sufficient fulness leaves it impossible to us to imagine another reason, than the delight he takes in dispensing his own free and large communications. Besides, that when we see some semblances and imitations of this goodness in the natures of some men, which we are sure are not nothing, they must needs proceed from something, and have some fountain and original, which can be no other than the common Cause and Author of all things. In whom, therefore, this goodness doth firstly and most perfectly reside. CHAPTER IV. Generally all supposable perfection asserted of this Being; where, First, A being absolutely perfect is endeavoured to be evinced from the (already proved) nccessary being; which is shown to import, in the general, the utmost fulness of being. Also divers things in particular that tend to evince that gene ral. As that it is at the remotest distance from no being. Most purely actual. Most abstracted being. The productive and conserving cause of all things else. Undiminishable. Incapable of addition. Secondly, Hence is more expressly deduced, the infiniteness of this being. An inquiry whether it be possible the creature can be actually infinite? Difficulties concerning the absolute fulness and infiniteness of God considered. 2. The onliness of this being. The Trinity not thereby excluded. Wherefore it must also be acknowledged that an absolutely perfect being cannot be immediately demonstrated from its effects, as whereto they neither do, nor is it within the capacity of created nature that they can, adequately correspond. Whence, therefore, all that can be done for the evincing of the absolute and universal perfection of God, must be in some other way or method of discourse. And though it be acknowledged that it cannot be immediately evidenced from the creation, yet it is to be hoped that mediately it may. For from thence (as we have seen) a necessary self-originate being, such as hath been described, is, with the greatest certainty, to be concluded; and, from thence, if we attentively consider, we shall be led to an absolutely perfect one. That is, since we have the same certainty of such a necessary self-originate being, as we have that there is any thing existent at all; if we seriously weigh what kind of being this must needs be, or what its notion must import, above what hath been already evinced; we shall not be found, in this way, much to fall short of our present aim, though we have also other evidence that may be produced in its own fitter place. Here therefore let us awhile make a stand, and more distinctly consider how far we are already advanced, that we may with the better order and advantage make our further progress. These two things, then, are already evident: 1. That there is a necessary being that hath been eternally of itself, I. SOME account has been thus far given of that Being, without dependence upon any thing, either as a productive whereunto we have been designing to assert the honour of or conserving cause; and, of itself, full of activity and a temple. Each of the particulars having been severally vital energy, so as to be a productive and sustaining cause insisted on, that concur to make up that notion of this to other things. Of this any the most confused and indisbeing, which was at first laid down. And more largely, tinct view of this world, or a mere taking notice that there what hath been more opposed, by persons of an atheistical is any thing in being that lives and moves, and withal that or irreligious temper. But because, in that fore-mentioned alters and changes, (which it is impossible the necessary account of God, there was added to the particulars there being itself should do,) cannot but put us out of doubt. enumerated, (out of a just consciousness of human inabili-2. That this necessary, self-originate, vital, active being, ty to comprehend every thing that may possibly belong to him,) this general supplement, "That all other supposable excellences whatsoever, do in the highest perfection appertain also originally unto this Being," it is requisite that somewhat be said concerning this addition. Especially in as much as it comprehends in it, or may infer, some things (not yet expressly mentioned) which may be thought necessary to the evincing the reasonableness of religion, or our self-dedication as a temple to him. hath very vast power, admirable wisdom, and most free and large goodness belonging to it. And of this, our nearer and more deliberate view and contemplation of the world do equally ascertain us. For of these things we find the manifest prints and footsteps in it. Yea, we find the derived things themselves, power, wisdom, goodness, in the creatures: and we are most assured they have not sprung from nothing; nor from any thing that had them not. And that which originally had them, or was their first fountain, must have them necessarily and essentially (together with whatsoever else belongs to its being,) in and of itself. So that the asserting of any other necessary being, that is in itself destitute of these things, signifies no more towards the giving any account how these things came to be in the world, than if no being, necessarily existing, were asserted at all. We are therefore, by the exigency of the case itself, constrained to acknowledge, not only that there is a necessary being, but that there is such a one as could be, and was, the fountain and cause of all those several kinds and degrees of being and perfection that we take notice of in the world besides. Another sort of necessary being should not only be asserted to no purpose, there being nothing to be gained by it, no First, To show that the Being hitherto described is ab-imaginable use to be made of it, as a principle that can solutely or every way perfect. For instance, it may possibly be alleged, that if it were admitted there is somewhat that is eternal, uncaused, independent, necessarily existent, that is self-active, living, powerful, wise, and good; yet all this will not infer upon us a universal obligation to religion, unless it can also be evinced, 1. That this Being is every way sufficient to supply and satisfy all our real wants and just desires. And, 2. That this Being is but one, and so that all be at a certainty where their religion ought to terminate; and that the worship of every temple must concentre and meet in the same object. Now the eviction of an absolutely perfect Being would include each of these; and answer both the purposes which may seem hitherto not so fully satisfied. It is therefore requisite that we endeavour, Secondly, To deduce, from the same grounds, the lute infinity, and the unity or the onliness thereof. serve any valuable end; (for suppose such a thing as ne abso-cessary matter, it will, as hath been shown, be unalterable; and therefore another sort of matter must be supposed besides it, that may be the matter of the universe, raised up out of nothing for that purpose, unto which this so unwieldy and unmanageable an entity can never serve;) but also it will be impossible to be proved. No man can be able with any plausible show of reason to make it out. II. And for the former part of this undertaking, it must be acknowledged absolute or universal perfection cannot be pretended to have been expressed in any, or in all the works of God together. Neither in number, for aught we know, (for as we cannot conceive, nor consequently speak, |