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things yet wanting, in the account which is given us of some of the meaner of those functions, which he would attribute only to organized matter, or (to use his own expression) to the conformation of the members of the body, and the course of the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, &c. For howsoever accurately he describes the instruments and the way, his account seems very little satisfying of the principle, either of spontaneous motion, or of sensation. As to the former, though it be very apparent that the muscles, seated in that opposite posture wherein they are mostly found paired throughout the body, the nerves and the animal spirits in the brain, and (suppose we) that glandule seated in the inmost part of it, are the instruments of the motion of the limbs and the whole body; yet, what are all these to the prime causation, or much more, to the spontaneity of this motion? And whereas, with us, (who are acknowledged to have such a faculty independent on the body,) an act of will doth so manifestly contribute, so that, when we will, our body is moved with so admirable facility, and we feel not the cumbersome weight of an arm to be lifted up, or of our whole coporeal bulk, to be moved this way or that, by a slower or swifter motion. Yea, and when as also, if we will, we can, on the sudden, in a very instant, start up out of the most composed, sedentary posture, and put ourselves, upon occasion, into the most violent course of motion or action. But if we have no such will, though we have the same agile spirits about us, we find no difficulty to keep in a posture of rest; and are, for the most part, not sensible of any endeavour or urgency of those active particles, as if they were hardly to be restrained from putting us into motion; and against a reluctant act of our will, we are not moved but with great difficulty to them, and that will give themselves, and us, the trouble. This being, I say, the case with us; and it being also obvious to our observation, that it is so very much alike, in these mentioned respects, with brute creatures, how inconceivable is it, that the directive principle of their motions, and ours, should be so vastly and altogether unlike? (whatsoever greater perfection is required, with us, as to those more noble and perfect functions and operations which are found to belong to us.) That is, that in us, an act of will should signify so very much, and be for the most part necessary to the beginning, the continuing, the stopping, or the varying of our motions; and in them, nothing like it, nor any thing else besides, only that corporeal principle! which he assigns as common to them and us, the continual heat in the heart, (which he calls a sort of fire,) nourished by the blood of the veins; the instruments of motion already mentioned, and the various representations and impressions of external objects, as there and elsewherem he expresses himself! Upon which last, (though much is undoubtedly to be attributed to it,) that so main a stress should be laid, as to the diversifying of motion, seems strange; when we may observe so various motions of some silly creatures, as of a fly in our window, while we cannot perceive, and can scarce imagine, any change in external objects about them: yea, a swarm of flies, so variously frisking and plying to and fro, some this way, others that, with a thousand diversities and interferings in their motion, and some resting; while things are in the same state, externally, to them all. So that what should cause, or cease, or so strangely vary such motions, is from thence, or any thing else he hath said, left unimaginable. As it is much more, how, in creatures of much strength, as a bear or a lion, a paw should be moved sometimes so gently, and sometimes with so mighty force, only by mere mechanism, without any directive principle, that is not altogether corporeal. But most of all, how the strange regularity of motion in some creatures, as of the spider in making its web, and the like, should be owing to no other than such causes as he hath assigned of the motions in general of brute creatures. And what though some motions of our own seem wholly involuntary, (as that of our eyelids, in the case which he supposes,) doth it therefore follow they must proceed from a principle only corporeal, as if our soul had no other act belonging to it, but that of willing? Which he doth not

1 De Passion. part. 1. art. 8.

m Princip. Philosoph. Dioptric. c. 4. Dissert. de method. n De Pass. art. 13.

downright say; but that it is its only, or its chief act : and if it be its chief act only, what hinders but that such a motion may proceed from an act that is not chief? Or that it may have a power that may, sometimes, step forth into act (and in greater matters than that) without any formal deliberated command or direction of our will? So little reason is there to conclude, that all our motions common to us with beasts, or even their motions themselves, depend on nothing else than the conformation of the members, and the course which the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, do naturally follow, in the brain, the nerves, and the muscles, after the same manner with the motion of an automaton, &c.

But as to the matter of sensation, his account seems much more defective and unintelligible, that is, how it should be performed (as he supposes every thing common to us with beasts may be) without a soul. For, admit that it be (as who doubts but it is) by the instruments which he assigns, we are still to seek what is the sentient, or what useth these instruments, and doth sentire or exercise sense by them. That is, suppose it be performed in the brain,P and that (as he says) by the help of the nerves, which from thence, like small strings, are stretched forth unto all the other members; suppose we have the three things to consider in the nerves, which he recites-their interior substance, which extends itself like very slender threads from the brain to the extremities of all the other members into which they are knit; the very thin little skins which enclose these, and which, being continued with those that inwrap the brain, do compose the little pipes which contain these threads; and lastly, the animal spirits which are conveyed down from the brain through these pipes-yet which of these is most subservient unto sense? That he undertakes elsewherer to declare, viz. that we are not to think (which we also suppose) some nerves to serve for sense, others for motion only, as some have thought, but that the enclosed spirits serve for the motion of the members, and those little threads (also enclosed) for sense. Are we yet any nearer our purpose? Do these small threads sentire? Are these the things that ultimately receive and discern the various impressions of objects? And since they are all of one sort of substance, how comes it to pass that some of them are seeing threads, others hearing threads, others tasting, &c. Is it from the diverse and commodious figuration of the organs unto which these descend from the brain? But though we acknowledge and admire the curious and exquisite formation of those organs, and their most apt usefulness (as organs, or instruments) to the purposes for which they are designed, yet what do they signify, without a proportionably apt and able agent to use them, or percipient to entertain and judge of the several notices, which by them are only transmitted from external things? That is, suppose we a drop of ever so pure and transparent liquor, or let there be three, diversely tinctured or coloured, and (lest they mingle) kept asunder by their distinct, infolding coats; let these encompass one the other, and together compose one little shining globe: are we satisfied that now this curious, pretty ball can see? Nay, suppose we it ever so conveniently situate; suppose we the fore-mentioned strings fastened to it, and these, being hollow, well replenished with as pure air or wind or gentle flame as you can imagine; yea, and all the before-described little threads to boot; can it yet do the feat? Nay, suppose we all things else to concur that we can suppose, except a living principle, (call that by what name you will,) and is it not still as incapable of the act of seeing, as a ball of clay or a pebble stone? Or can the substance of the brain itself perform that or any other act of sense, (for it is superfluous to speak distinctly of the rest,) any more than the pulp of an apple or a dish of curds? So that, trace this matter whither you will, within the compass of your assigned limits, and you are still at the same loss: range through the whole body, and what can you find but flesh and bones, marrow and blood, strings and threads, humour and vapour; and which of these is capable of sense? These are your materials and such like; order them as you will, put them into what method you can devise, and except p Princip. Philosoph. Sect. 189.

o As art. 16.

q De Passion. art. 11. r Dioptr. c. 4. S. 4, 5.

you can make it live, you cannot make it so much as feel, | to their several functions; it seems a much more easy much less perform all other acts of sense besides, unto performance, and is more conceivable, and within the which these tools alone seem as unproportionable, as a nearer reach of human apprehension, that they should be plough-share to the most curious sculpture, or a pair of furnished with such a one, than be made capable of so tongs to the most melodious music. admirable operations without it; and the former (though it were not a surer) were a more amazing, unsearchable, and less comprehensible discovery of the most transcendent wisdom, than the latter.

.

But how much more inconceivable it is, that the figuration and concurrence of the fore-mentioned organs can alone suffice to produce the several passions of love, fear, anger, &c. whereof we find so evident indications in brute creatures, it is enough but to hint. And (but that all persons do not read the same books) it were altogether unnecessary to have said so much, after so plain demonstration already extant, that matter, howsoever modified, any of the mentioned ways is incapable of sense.

Nor would it seem necessary to attempt any thing in this kind, in particular and direct opposition to the very peculiar sentiments of this most ingenious author, (as he will undoubtedly be reckoned in all succeeding time,) who, when he undertakes to show what sense is, and how it is performed, makes it the proper business of the soul, comprehends it under the name of cogitation; naming himself a thinking thing, adds by way of question, What is that? and answers, A thing doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, nilling, and also imagining, and exercising sense; says" expressly it is evident to all that it is the soul that exercises sense, not the body,w in as direct words as the so much celebrated poet of old. The only wonder is, that under this general name of cogitation he denies it unto brutes; under which name, he may be thought less fitly to have included it, than to have affirmed them incapable of any thing to which that name ought to be applied; as he doth not only affirm, but esteems himself by most firm reasons to have proved.

And yet that particular reason seems a great deal more pious than it is cogent, which he gives for his choosing his particular way of differencing brutes from human creatures, viz. lest any prejudice should be done to the doctrine of the human soul's immortality; there being nothing, as he truly says, that doth more easily turn off weak minds from the path of virtue, than if they should think the souls of brutes to be of the same nature with our own; and therefore that nothing remains to be hoped or feared after this life, more by us than by flies or písmires. For surely there were other ways of providing against that danger, besides that of denying them so much as sense, (other than merely organical, as he somewhere alleviates the harshness of that position, but without telling us what useth these organs,) and the making them nothing else but well-formed machines.

y

But yet if we should admit the propriety of this appellation, and acknowledge (the thing itself intended to be signified by it) that all the powers belonging to mere brutal nature are purely mechanical, and no more; to what purpose is it here alleged, or what can it be understood to signify? What is lost from our cause by it? And what have atheists whereof to glory? For was the contrivance of these machines theirs? Were they the authors of this rare invention, or of any thing like it? Or can they show any product of human device and wit, that shall be capable of vying with the strange powers of those machines? Or can they imagine what so highly exceeds all human skill, to have fallen by chance, and without any contrivance or design at all, into a frame capable of such powers and operations?

If they be machines, they are (as that free-spirited author speaks) to be considered as a sort of machine made by the hand of God, which is by infinite degrees better ordered, and hath in it more admirable motions, than any that could ever have been formed by the art of man. Yea, and we might add, so little disadvantage would accrue to the present cause (whatever might to some other) by this concession, that rather (if it were not a wrong to the cause, which justly disdains we should allege any thing false or uncertain for its support) this would add much, we will not say to its victory, but to its triumph, that we did acknowledge them nothing else than mere mechanical contrivances. For, since they must certainly either be such, or have each of them a soul to animate, and enable them s In Dr. More's Immortality of the Soul. t Princip. Phil. part 4. 189. u Medit. 2.

w Dioptr. c. 4.

XI. But because whatsoever comes under the name of cogitation, properly taken, is assigned to some higher cause than mechanism; and that there are operations belonging to man, which lay claim to a reasonable soul, as the immediate principle and author of them; we have yet this further step to advance, that is, to consider the most apparent evidence we have of a wise, designing agent, in the powers and nature of this more excellent, and, among things more obvious to our notice, the noblest of his productions.

And were it not for the slothful neglect of the most to study themselves, we should not here need to recount unto men the common and well-known abilities and excellences which peculiarly belong to their own nature. They might take notice, without being told,. that first, as to their intellectual faculty, they have somewhat about them, that can think, understand, frame notions of things; that can rectify or supply the false or defective represen tations which are made to them by their external senses and fancies; that can conceive of things far above the reach and sphere of sense, the moral good or evil of actions or inclinations, what there is in them of rectitude or pravity; whereby they can animadvert, and cast their eye inward upon themselves; observe the good or evil acts or inclinations, the knowledge, ignorance, dulness, vigour, tranquillity, trouble, and, generally, the perfections or imperfections, of their own minds; that can apprehend the general natures of things, the future existence of what, yet, is not, with the future appearance of that to us, which, as yet, appears not,

Of which last sort of power, the confident assertion, "No man can have a conception of the future," needs not, against our experience, make us doubt; especially being enforced by no better, than that pleasant reason there subjoined, for the future is not yet; that is to say, because it is future; and so (which is all this reason amounts to) we cannot conceive it, because we cannot. For though our conceptions of former things guide us in forming notions of what is future, yet sure our conception. of any thing as future, is much another sort of conception from what we have of the same thing as past, as appears from its different effects; for if an object be apprehended good, we conceive of it as past with sorrow, as future with hope and joy; if evil, with joy as past, with fear and sorrow as future. And (which above all the rest discovers and magnifies the intellectual power of the human soul) that they can form a conception, howsoever imperfect, of this absolutely perfect Being, whereof we are discoursing. Which even they that acknowledge not its existence, cannot deny; except they will profess themselves blindly, and at a venture, to deny they know not what, or what they have not so much as thought of.

They may take notice of their power of comparing things, of discerning and making a judgment of their agreements and disagreements, their proportions and disproportions to one another; of affirming or denying this or that, concerning such or such things; and of pronouncing, with more or less confidence, concerning the truth or falsehood of such affirmations or negations.

And moreover, of their power of arguing, and inferring one thing from another, so as from one plain and evident principle, to draw forth a long chain of consequences, that may be discerned to be linked therewith.

They have withal to consider the liberty and the large capacity of the human will, which, when it is itself, rejects the dominion of any other than the supreme Lord, and refuses satisfaction in any other than the supreme and most comprehensive good.

And upon even so hasty and transient a view of a thing furnished with such powers and faculties, we have suf

x Resp. sextæ. Dissert. de Method. c. 5. z Dissert. de Method. sect. 5.

y Resp. sexte. a Hobbes's Human Nature.

ficient occasion to bethink ourselves. How came such a thing as this into being? whence did it spring, or to what original doth it owe itself? More particularly we have here two things to be discoursed.-First, That, notwithstanding so high excellences, the soul of man doth yet appear to be a caused being, that sometime had a beginning. -Secondly, That, by them, it is sufficiently evident, that it owes itself to a wise and intelligent cause.

As to the former of these, we need say the less, because that sort of atheists with whom we have chiefly now to do, deny not human souls to have had a beginning, as supposing them to be produced by the bodies they animate, by the same generation, and that such generation did sometimes begin; that only rude and wildly moving matter was from eternity; and that by infinite alterations and commixtures in that eternity, it fell at last into this orderly frame and state wherein things now are, and became prolific, so as to give beginning to the several sorts of living things which do now continue to propagate themselves; the mad folly of which random fancy we have been so largely contending against hitherto. The other sort, who were for an eternal succession of generations, have been sufficiently refuted by divers others, and partly by what hath been already said in this discourse; and we may further meet with them ere it be long. We in the meantime find not any professing atheism, to make human souls, as such, necessary and self-originate beings.

Yet it is requisite to consider not only what persons of atheistical persuasions have said, but what also they possibly may say. And moreover, some that have been remote from atheism, have been prone, upon the contemplation of the excellences of the human soul, to overmagnify, yea and even no less than deify, it. It is therefore needful to say somewhat in this matter. For if nothing of direct and downright atheism had been designed, the rash hyperboles, as we will charitably call them, and unwarrantable rhetorications of these latter, should they obtain to be looked upon and received as severe and strict assertions of truth, were equally destructive of religion, as the others' more strangely bold and avowed opposition to it. Such, I mean, as have spoken of the souls of men as parts of God, one thing with him; a particle of divine breath; an extract or derivation of himself; that have not feared to apply to them his most peculiar attributes, or say that of them, which is most appropriate and incommunícably belonging to him alone. Nay, to give them his very name, and say in plain words they were God.c

wherein they experience so many. Yea, whether those changes import any immutation of their very essence or no, the repugnancy being so plainly manifest of the very terms, necessary and changeable. And inasmuch as it is so evident that a necessary being can receive no accession to itself; that it must always have, or keep itself, after the same manner, and in the same state; that if it be necessarily such, or such, (as we cannot conceive it to be, but we must, in our own thoughts, affix to it some determinate state or other,) it must be eternally such, and ever in that particular unchanged state.

Therefore be the perfection of our souls as great as our most certain knowledge of them can possibly allow us to suppose it, it is not yet so great, but that we must be constrained to confess them no necessary, self-originate beings, and, by consequence, dependent ones, that owe themselves to some cause.

XII. Nor yet (that we may pass over to the other strangely distant extreme) is the perfection of our souls so little, as to require less than an intelligent cause, endowed with the wisdom which we assert and challenge unto the truly necessary, uncaused Being. Which, because he hath no other rival or competitor for the glory of this production, than only the fortuitous jumble of the blindlymoving particles of matter, directs our inquiry to this single point: Whose image the thing produced bears? Or which it more resembles ? stupid, senseless, unactive matter, (or at the best. only supposed moving, though no man, upon the atheists' terms, can imagine how it came to be so,) or the active, intelligent Being, whom we affirm the cause of all things, and who hath peculiarly entitled himself, the Father of spirits.

That is, we are to consider whether the powers and operations belonging to the reasonable soul do not plainly argue-1. That it neither rises from, nor is, mere matter; whence it will be consequent, it must have an efficient, diverse from matter-2. That it owes itself to an intelligible efficient.

As to the former, we need not deal distinctly and severally concerning their original and their nature. For if they are not mere matter, it will be evident enough they do not arise from thence.

So that all will be summed up in this inquiry. Whether reason can agree to matter considered alone, or by itself?

But here the case requires closer discourse. For, in order to this inquiry, it is requisite the subject be determined we inquire about. It hath been commonly taken for granted, that all substance is either matter or mind; when yet it hath not been agreed what is the distinct notion of the one or the other. And for the stating their difference, there is herein both an apparent difficulty and necessity.

A difficulty; for the ancient difference, that the former is extended, having parts lying without each other, the latter unextended, having no parts, is now commonly exploded, and, as it seems, reasonably enough; both because we scarce know how to impose it upon ourselves, to conceive of a mind or spirit that is unextended, or that hath no parts; and that, on the other hand, the atoms of matter, strictly taken, must also be unextended, and be without parts. And the difficulty of assigning the proper difference between these two, is further evident, from what we experience how difficult it is to form any clear distinct notion of substance itself, so to be divided into matter and mind, stripped of all its attributes. Though, as that celebrated

Now it would render a temple alike insignificant, to suppose no worshipper, as to suppose none who should be worshipped. And what should be the worshipper, when our souls are thought the same thing with what should be the object of our worship? But methinks, when we consider their necessitous, indigent state, their wants and cravings, their pressures and groans, their grievances and complaints, we should find enough to convince us they are not the self-originate or self-sufficient being; and might even despair any thing should be plain and easy to them, with whom it is a difficulty to distinguish themselves from God. Why are they in a state which they dislike? Wherefore are they not full and satisfied? Why do they wish and complain? Is this Godlike? But if any have a doubt hanging in their minds concerning the unity of souls with one another, or with the soul of the world, let them read what is already extant: and supposing them, thereupon, distinct beings, there needs no more to prove them not to be necessary, independent, uncaused ones,d than their sub-author also speaks, we can be surer of nothing, than that jection to so frequent changes; their ignorance, doubts, irresolution, and gradual progress to knowledge, certainty, and stability in their purposes; their very being united with these bodies in which they have been but a little while, as we all know; whereby they undergo no small change, (admitting them to have been pre-existent,) and

b Sen. Ep. 92. Hor. Serm. M. Anton. aroomаσμa cavrov. e The Pythagoreans, concerning whom it is said, they were wont to admonish one another to take heed, lest they should rent God in themselves.My dagway ToY, EV EAUTOIS, Osov. Jamblich. de vit. Pythag. Plato, who undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul by such arguments as, if they and conclude any thing, would conclude it to be God; that it is the fountain, the principle (nyn, kai apyn] of motion; and adds, that the principle is unbegotten, &c. in Phadone. Makes it the cause of all things, and the ruler of all, De Leg. L. 10. though his words there seem meant of the soul of the world.

there is a real somewhat, that sustains those attributes.

Yet also, who sees not a necessity of assigning a difference? For how absurd is it, to affirm, deny, or inquire, of what belongs, or belongs not, to matter, or mind, if it be altogether unagreed, what we mean by the one, or the other.

Concerning which soul, afterwards, inquiring whether all ought not to account it God, he answers, Yes certainly, except any one be come to extreme mad ness. And whether an identity were not imagined of our souls, with that of the world, or with God, is too much left in doubt, both as to him and some of his followers; to say nothing of modern enthusiasts.

d Dr. More's Poem. Antimonopsuchia. His Immortality of the Soul. Mr. Baxter's Appendix to the Reasons of Christian Religion, &e.

e As is to be seen in that accurate discourse of Mr. Locke. His Essay of Human Understanding, published since this was first written.

That the former, speaking of any continued portion of matter, hath parts actually separable; the other being admitted to have parts too, but that cannot be actually separated; with the power of self-contraction, and self-dilatation, ascribed to this latter, denied of the former, seem as intelligible differences, and as little liable to exception, as any we can think of. Besides what we observe of dulness, inactivity, insensibility, in one sort of substance; and of vigour, activity, capacity of sensation, and spontaneous motion, with what we can conceive of self-vitality, in this latter sort; i. e. that whereas matter is only capable of having life imparted to it, from somewhat that lives of itself, created mind or spirit, though depending for its being on the supreme cause, hath life essentially included in that being, so that it is inseparable from it, and it is the same thing to it, to live, and to be. But a merely materiate being, if it live, borrows its life, as a thing foreign to it, and separable from it.

But if, instead of such distinction, we should shortly and at the next have pronounced, that as mind is a cogitant substance, matter is incogitant; how would this have squared with our present inquiry? What antagonist would have agreed with us upon this state of the question? i. e. in effect, whether that can rean or think, that is incapable of reason or thought? Such, indeed, as have studied more to hide a bad meaning, than express a good, have confounded the terms matter or body, and substance. But take we matter as contradistinguished to mind and spirit, as above described: and it is concerning this that we intend this inquiry.

And here we shall therefore wave the consideration of their conceits, concerning the manner of the first origination of men, who thought their whole being was only a production of the earth. Whereof the philosophical account deserves as much laughter, instead of confutation, as any the most fabulously poetical: that is, how they were formed (as also the other animals) in certain little bags, or wombs of the earth, out of which when they grew ripe, they broke forth,f &c.

upon any of those little motes a stream whereof you may perceive when the sun shines in at a window, and he doubts not but many myriads of even ordinary atoms, go to the composition of any one of these scarcely discernible motes ;) how sportful a contemplation were it, to suppose one of those furnished with all the powers of a reasonable soul! Though it is likely they would not laugh at the jest, that think thousands of souls might be conveniently placed upon the point of a needle. And yet, which makes the matter more admirable, that very few, except they are very carefully picked and chosen, can be found among those many myriads, but will be too big to be capable of rationality. Here sure the fate is very hard, of those that come nearest the size, but only, by a very little too much corpulency, happen to be excluded, as unworthy to be counted among the rational atoms. But sure if all sober reason be not utterly lost and squandered away among these little entities, it must needs be judged altogether incomprehensible, why, if upon the account of mere littleness, any atom should be capable of reason, all should not be so: and then we could not but have a very rational world. At least, the difference in this point being so very small among them, and they being all so very little, methinks they should all be capable of some reason, and have only less or more of it, according as they are bigger or less. But there is little doubt, that single property of less magnitude, will not be stood upon as the characteristical difference of rational and irrational atoms; and because their more or less gravity is reckoned necessarily and so immediately to depend on that, (for those atoms cannot be thought porous, but very closely compacted each one within itself,) this, it is likely, will as little be depended on And so their peculiar figure must be the more trusted to, as the differencing thing. And because there is in this respect so great a variety among this little sort of people, or nation, as this author somewhere calls them, (whereof he gives so punctual an account, as if he had been the generalissimo of all their armies, and were wont to view them at their rendezvous, to form them into regiments and squadAnd only consider what is said of the constitution androns, and appoint them to the distinct services he found nature of the human soul itself; which is said to be com- them aptest for,) no doubt it was a difficulty to determine posed of very well polished, the smoothest and the roundest which sort of figure was to be pitched on to make up the atoms; and which are of the neatest fashion, and every rational regiment. But since his power was absolute, and way, you must suppose, the best conditioned the whole there was none to gainsay or contradict, the round figure country could afford; of a more excellent make, as there was judged best, and most deserving this honour. Otheris added, than those of the fire itself. And these are the wise, a reason might have been asked (and it might have things you must know, which think, study, contemplate, been a greater difficulty to have given a good one) why some frame syllogisms, make theorems, lay plots, contrive busi- other figure might not have done as well; unless respect ness, act the philosopher, the logician, the mathematician, were had to fellow-atoms, and that it was thought, they of statesman, and every thing else; only you may except the this figure could better associate for the present purpose; priest, for of him there was no need. and that we shall consider of by and by. We now proceed on the supposition that possibly a single atom, by the advantage of this figure, might be judged capable of this high achievement. And in that case, it would not be impertinent to inquire whether, if an atom were perfectly round, and so very rational, but by an unexpected misadventure, it comes to have one little corner somewhere clapped on, it be hereby quite spoiled of its rationality? And again, whether one that comes somewhat near that figure, only it hath some little protuberances upon it, might not by a little filing, or the friendly rubs of other atoms, become rational? And yet, now we think on it, of this improvement he leaves no hopes, because he tells us, though they have parts, yet they are so solidly compacted that they are by no force capable of dissolution. And so whatever their fate is in this particular, they must abide it without expectation of change. And yet, though we cannot really alter it for the better with any of them, yet we may think as favourably of the matter as we please; and for any thing that yet appears, whatever peculiar claim the round ones lay to rationality, we may judge as well; and shall not easily be disproved of any of the rest.

This therefore is our present theme, whether such things as these be capable of such, or any acts of reason, yea or no? And if such a subject may admit of serious discourse; in this way it may be convenient to proceed, viz. either any such small particle, or atom (for our business is not now with Des Cartes, but Epicurus) alone, is rational, or a good convenient number of them assembled, and most happily met together. It is much to be feared the former way will not do. For we have nothing to consider in any of these atoms, in its solitary condition, besides its magnitude, its figure, and its weight, and you may add also its motion, if you could devise how it should come by it.

And now, because it is not to be thought that all atoms are rational, (for then the stump of a tree or a bundle of straw might serve to make a soul of, for aught we know, as good as the best,) it is to be considered by which of those properties an atom shall be entitled to the privilege of being rational, and the rational atoms be distinguished from the rest. Is it their peculiar magnitude or size that so far ennobles them? Epicurus would here have us believe, that the least are the fittest for this turn. Now if you consider how little we must suppose them generally to be, according to his account of them; (that is, that looking

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Upon the whole, no one of these properties alone is likely to make a rational atom: what they will all do,

motion besides their gravity, which cannot but be more, as they are bigger; (for
no doubt if you should try them in a pair of scales, the biggest would be found
to out weigh ;) whence also it should seem to follow, that the heaviest having
most in them of that which is the cause of motion, should be the most move
able, and so by consequence the biggest.
i That they are round, oblong, oval, plain, hooked, rough, smooth, bunch
backed, &c.

meeting together, may yet seem a doubt. That is, supposing we could hit upon one single atom that is at once of a very little size, and consequently very light and nimble, and most perfectly smooth, and unexceptionably round, (and possibly there may be found a good many such,) will not this do the business? May we not now hope to have a rational sort of people among them, that is, those of this peculiar family or tribe? And yet still the matter will be found to go very hard; for if we cannot imagine or devise how any one of these properties should contribute any thing (as upon our utmost disquisition we certainly cannot) towards the power of reasoning, it is left us altogether unimaginable how all these properties together should make a rational atom! There is only one relief remaining, that is, what if we add to these other properties some peculiarly brisk sort of actual motion: (for to be barely moveable will not serve, inasmuch as all are so :) but will not actual motion, added to its being irreprehensibly little, light, and round, especially if it be a very freakish one, and made up of many odd, unexpected windings, and turns, effect the business? Possibly it might do something to actual reasoning, supposing the power were there before: for who can tell but the little thing was fallen asleep, and by this means its power might be awakened into some exercise? But that it should give the power itself, is above all comprehension; and there is nothing else to give it. These that have been mentioned, being all the prime qualities that are assigned to atoms singly considered; all others that can be supposed, belonging to concrete bodies, hat are composed of many of them meeting together. And therefore hither in the next place our inquiry must be directed, whether any number of atoms, definite or indefinite, being in themselves severally irrational, can become rational by association, or compose and make up a rational soul?

Hitherto it must be acknowledged we have not fought with any adversary; not having met with any that have asserted the rationality of single, corporeal atoms; yet because we know not what time may produce, and whither the distress and exigency of a desperate cause may drive the maintainers of it, it was not therefore fit to say nothing to that supposable or possible assertion, I mean possible to be asserted, howsoever impossible it is to be true. Nor yet could it well admit of any thing to be said to it, but in that ludicrous and sportful way. If we will suppose any to be so foolish, they are to be dealt with according to their folly.

But now as to this other conceit, that atoms, provided they be of the right stamp or kind, may, a competent number of them assembled together, compose a reasonable soul, is an express article of the Epicurean creed. And therefore, here, we are to deal more cautiously; not that this is any whit a wiser fancy than the other, but that the truth in this matter is surer to meet with opposition in the minds of some persons, already formed unto that wild apprehension, and tinctured with it.

Wherefore such must be desired to consider in the first place, if they will be true disciples of Epicurus throughout, what he affirms of all atoms universally, that they must be simple, uncompounded bodies, (or, if you will, corpuscles,) not capable of division or section, by no force dissoluble, and therefore immutable, or in themselves void of any mutation.

Hereupon let it be next considered, if there were in them, those that are of the right size, shape, and weight, severally, some certain sparks or seeds of reason, (that we may make the supposition as advantageous as we can,) or dispositions thereto, yet how shall it be possible to them to communicate, or have that communion with one another, as together to constitute an actually and completely rational or thinking thing? If every one could bring somewhat to a common stock that might be serviceable to that purpose; how shall each one's proportion or share be imparted? They can none of them emit any thing, there can possibly be no such thing as an effluvium from any of them, inasmuch as they are incapable of diminution; and are themselves each of them as little as the least imaginable effluvithat we would suppose to proceed from this or that particular atom. They can at the most but touch one another; penetrate, or get into one another they cannot; insomuch

as if any one have a treasure in it, which is in readiness for the making up an intellective faculty or power among them that should be common to them all, yet each one remains so locked up within itself, and is so reserved and incommunicative, that no other, much less the whole body of them, can be any jot the wiser. So that this is like to be a very dull assembly.

But then, if there be nothing of reason to be communicated, we are yet at a greater loss; for if it be said, having nothing else to communicate, they communicate themselves, what is that self? Is it a rational self? Or is every single atom that enters this composition reason? Or is it a principle of reason? Is it a seed? Or is it a part? Is it a thought? What shall we suppose? Or what is there in the properties assigned to this sort of atoms that can bespeak it any of these? And if none of these can be supposed, what doth their association signify towards ratiocination? They are little, what doth that contribute? Therefore there may need the more of them to make a good large soul; but why must a little thing, devoid of reason, contribute more towards it, than another somewhat bigger? They are light, doth that mend the matter? They are the sooner blown away, they can the less cohere, or keep together; they are the more easily capable of dissipation, the less of keeping their places in solemn counsel. They are round, and exactly smooth. But why do they the more conveniently associate upon that account for this purpose? They cannot therefore come so close together as they might have done, had they been of various figures. They cannot, indeed, give or receive so rude touches. This signifies somewhat towards the keeping of state, but what doth it to the exercise of reason? Their being so perfectly and smoothly round, makes them the more incapable of keeping a steady station, they are the more in danger of rolling away from one another; they can upon this account lay no hold of each other. Their counsels and resolves are likely to be the more lubricous, and liable to an uncertain volubility. It is not to be imagined what a collection of individuals, only thus qualified, can do when they are come together, an assembly thus constituted. Are we hence to expect oracles, philosophical determinations, maxims of state? And since they are supposed to be so much alike, how are the mathematical atoms to be distinguished from the moral? those from the political? the contemplative from the active? Or when the assembly thinks fit to entertain itself with matters of this or that kind, what must be its different composure or posture? Into what mould or figure must it cast itself for one purpose, and into what, for another? It is hard to imagine that these little globular bodies, that we may well suppose to be as like as one egg can be to another, should by the mere alteration of their situation, in respect of one another, (and no alteration besides can be so much as imagined among them,) make so great a change in the complexion of this assembly; so that now, it shall be disposed to seriousness, and by some transposition of the spherical particles, to mirth; now to business, and by and by to pleasure. And seeing all human souls are supposed made of the same sort of material, how are the atoms modelled in one man, and how in another? What atoms are there to dispose to this sect more, and what to another? Or if a good reason can be assigned for their difference, what shall be given for their agreement? Whence is it that there are so many, so unquestionable, common notions every where received? Why are not all things transposed in some minds, when such a posture of the atoms as might infer it, is as supposable as any other? Yea, and since men are found not always to be of one mind with themselves, it is strange and incomprehensible, that such a situation of these atoms, that constitute his soul, should dispose him to be of one opinion, and another of another How are they to be ranged when for the affirmative? how for the negative? And yet a great deal more strange, that since their situation is so soon changed, and so continually changing, (the very substance of the soul being supposed nothing else than a thing very like, but a little finer than a busy and continually moving flame of fire,) any man should ever continue to be of the same opinion with himself, one quarter of an hour together; that all notions are not confounded and jumbled; that the same thing is not thought and un

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