be entitled to his allowance, though none was due to the other members of the firm; and assignees were enabled to execute any powers which the bankrupt would have been entitled to execute for his own benefit. Creditors who might have petitioned for a commission against all the parties of a firm, were allowed, if they saw cause, to petition for a joint commission against two or more of the partners; and the commissioners were empowered to commit all persons summoned as witnesses, who should refuse to attend or give evidence, or to produce books or writings of which they were in possession. Several new regulations were made with respect to the voting in the choice of assignees, and the proof of proceedings in bankruptcy.

On the 26th of June, Mr M. A. Taylor moved, that the House should resolve itself into a committee to consider of the act of the 53d Geo. III. c. 24., under which the Vice-Chancellor's Court had been instituted. Mr Taylor had, last session, brought for ward a similar proposition, which had been negatived by only four votes. The smallness of this majority encouraged him to renew his motion, with some hopes of success. He trusted that, on the present occasion, the House would agree with him in believing there was something fundamentally wrong in the system of the Court of Chancery and the appellant jurisdiction, as far as regarded the expense and delay to which suitors were subjected. The consequence was, that those in affluent circumstances alone could stand the expense, while those who had not opulent resources were seriously injured, or altogether ruined. The delay also was grinding and oppressive; indeed, the oppression to which matters of equity were liable was enough to exhaust any moderate patience, and destroy any moderate fortune. In proof of this, he stated an instance of a writ

of error in the Court of Chancery, which was instituted in 1814, and was still on the paper. It arose out of a decree pronounced by the Master of the Rolls in 1812. He could, if necessary, state from twenty to forty instances of a similar kind. There was one instance, in particular, in which there was a property of twenty-eight shares, each share being worth L.1200; after twelve years, the property was sold under a decree, ordering the shares to be equally divided. A person whom he knew held one of the shares, and expected L.1200; but his costs came to L.750, so that there came into his pockets, out of this property, but L.450. There were other cases of a like nature, which as strongly affected the character of the appellant jurisdiction, as to the excessive expense and delay attendant on its proceedings.

After the reports of the two Committees of the House of Commons, in 1811 and 1812, the abuses in the Courts of Equity became so apparent, that the House of Lords appointed a Committee, who made a report upon it. Out of that report arose the bill for creating the Vice-Chancellor's Court. That bill was strenuously opposed by the greatest characters in the House of Commons. In particular, Sir S. Romilly exerted all his eloquence to induce the House to reject it. That great person clearly foretold all the evils that had since happened. The present Vice-Chancellor himself opposed every part of the bill. However, the bill passed the House in an evil hour; for from the passing of that bill he dated the extinction of the right of the suitor to the material privilege of having his cause heard before the Great Seal. In very few instances before that period had causes been set down before the Master of the Rolls; but so different was the case after the passing of the bill, that the late Master of the Rolls (Sir W. Grant) had told him he had

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the last nine years, it would take four years to get through those 155 appeals. Now, one great object of the bill for establishing the Vice-Chancellor's court had been, to hasten the decision of appeals in the House of Lords; and yet it was now acknowledged, even by the learned Lord himself, that unless some plan were adopted for getting rid of the Scotch appeals, he could not go He now expected that it would be proposed to constitute some intermediate tribunal to hear the appeals from Scotland; a measure which was recommended by some of the Judges several years ago, but which dropped to the ground. It was not his wish that the Vice-Chancellor's court should be destroyed at once, for he was desirous that time should be afforded to Parliament and to his Majesty's Government to consider what it would be advisable to substitute. But he was convinced the House would not suffer the subjects of this country to be left in so perilous and distressing a situation. He concluded by stating it as his intention, if he obtained the committee, to propose the abolition of the Vice-Chancellor's Court, after a period of two years.

The Attorney-General opposed the motion. The exertions of the Lord Chancellor, he said, were too universally acknowledged, to require any description. The learned Lord sat from October in one year, to September in another; and often gave up holidays to the dispatch of any pressing business. A little attention to the returns before the House would show that, except as to appeals, there was no material arrear of business before the Chancellor. Since the Vice-Chancellor's Court had been established, the Lord Chancellor had been a good deal occupied in the hearing of appeals; but that must inevitably happen where the power of appeal existed, and where parties were not satisfied. In estimating the quan

tity of business got through by the Lord Chancellor, the House ought to look at the number of motions taken before that learned Judge. Each motion, in many cases, amounted to the hearing of a cause. Appeals, very frequently, were taken in the shape of motions. A cause having been decided by the Vice-Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chancellor was moved to stay proceedings under the decree, and upon that motion the whole question of appeal was gone into. To compare the business of the Lord Chancellor with that of the other Judges of the Court was not fair, because his Lordship was occupied during the session of Parliament three days a-week in hearing appeals. Besides, the cases which came before him were generally of the first importance, and such as were litigated with the greatest anxiety and pertinacity. Those which went before the Vice-Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls were comparatively slight. But, to look at the business actually got through by the Lord Chancellor :-In 1821, he had heard 8 causes, 6 exceptions, 5 pleas and demurrers, 57 petitions, 103 bankrupt petitions, 245 lunatic petitions, and 418 motions. In 1821, then, the Lord Chancellor had disposed of 890 different matters. 1820 he had got through 1015. 1819, there were 1011. The honourable member had said, that the establishment of the Vice-Chancellor's Court had not tended to the dispatch of business in the House of Lords. In the ten years running from 1803 to 1813, the Lord Chancellor had disposed of 193 appeals. Between the year 1813 and the present time, no fewer than 421 appeals had been disposed of; and the advantage of enabling the Lord Chancellor to proceed with the appeals was prodigious; for many of them were brought merely for the purpose of delay, and consequently disappeared the moment they were pressed upon. He

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FOR several years back, the subject of Parliamentary Reform had, in some measure, "fallen into the sere and yellow leaf;" and like all matters which have been frequently discussed to little purpose, had not only become somewhat stale and threadbare, but had been regarded by its abettors and partisans as utterly hopeless and unattainable, while so many interests and feelings were arrayed in opposition to any modification of the present system. It is true that proofs upon proofs had been accumulated to establish the existence of venality and corruption in electors and representatives; that, in some flagrant instances, as in Grampound, these proofs had been so clear as to lead to the disfranchisement of the borough, and the conviction and punishment of the candidates; and that seats in Parliament were as notoriously bought and sold as cattle in Smithfield market: but still it was contended, that these causes of individual corruption furnished no argument against the practical result of

the whole system; that the influence of wealth in the election of representatives could not be destroyed without at the same time infringing the right of property itself; that that influence was as prevalent and unquestionable in the return of opposition as of ministerial members; that even the rotten boroughs were not without their advantages, as through that channel men of great genius and talents, but without political influence or connections, were able to find their way into Parliament; and that, upon the whole, the House of Commons, as at present constituted, contained a fair and sufficient representation of all the classes and interests in the kingdom. In addition to these considerations, was appended the usual caveat against rash and experimental innovation on established institutions; against hazarding the certain and known advantages of the present system, for the mere problematical results of abstract speculation; against the absurdity, in short, of not acquiescing impli