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is owing to a selfmoving power in this case, is the additional degree of motion; and that the other degree of motion which it had from gravity, is of no consideration in the case, does not help the effect of the free selfmoving power in the least; the effect is just the same, as if the body had received from itself one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So if we should suppose a selfmoving power given to the scale of a balance, which has a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale ; and we ascribe to it an ability to add to itself another degree of force the same way, by its selfmoving power ; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium ; and so much power as the scale has to give itself an overbalance from a perfect equipoise, so much selfmoving selfpreponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium. I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be essential to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference ; and that so far as the Will is destitute of this, so far it is destitute of that freedom by which it is its own master, and in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being in the least passive, or subject to the power and sway of something else, in its motions and determinations. Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's selfdetermination in such a state be not absurd and inconsistent. And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth; that every free act is done in a state of freedom, and not after such a state. If an act of the Will be an act wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a state of freedom, and in the time of freedom. It will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue, and coexist with the act; the soul remaining in possession of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in the possession of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it. Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty, in that notion of a state of Liberty, viz. as implying a state of Indifference, or whether the soul ever exerts an act of choice or preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the question is sufficient to shew the absurdity of the affirmative answer; for how ridiculous would it be for any body to insist, that the soul chooses one thing before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each . This is the same thing as to say, the soul prefers one thing to another, at the very same time that it has no preference. Choice and preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium. Motion may be the next moment after rest; but cannot coexist with it, in any, even the least part of it. So choice may be immediately after a state of Indifference, but has no coexistence with it; even the very beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So that the Will does not so much as begin to act in the time of such Liberty; freedom is perfectly at an end, and has ceased to be, at the first moment of action; and therefore Liberty cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denomination, or any part of it, any more than if it had ceased to be twenty years before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness succeed one another instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightsome or bright, any more at the first moment of perfect darkness, than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital at the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it consists in, or implies Indifference, can denominate nothing free, at the first moment of preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no Liberty of which the soul is possessed, or ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, consists in Indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very essence of Liberty is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory. If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but trick and delusion ; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation itself, but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference ; that the act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses its own sovereignty, consists in its causing or determining the change or transition from a state of Indifference to a certain preference, or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which has hitherto been even ; and that this act the Will exerts in a state of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself....I say, if any one chooses to express his notion of Liberty after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can make out his matters any better than before. What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so, that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines to put itself out of that state, and give itself a certain preponderation; then I would inquire, whether the soul does not determine this of choice ; or whether the Will’s coming to a determination to do so, be not the same thing as the soul's coming to a choice to do so. If the soul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determineit voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own Will, then in what sense does its Will de

termine it 2 And if the Will does not determine it, then how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the determination What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the Will is not concerned 2....But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and to turn itself one way ; then the soul is already come to a choice, and chooses that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time : The soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other.....And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity in the obscurity of expression, is more nonsensical, and increases the inconsistence. To say, the free act of the Will, or the act which the Will exerts in a state of freedom and Indifference, does not imply preference in it, but is what the Will does in order to causing or producing a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to will and to choose are the same thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order to cause or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted without choice, in order to produce itself. If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Liberty, and a state of Indifference are not the same, and that the former may be without the latter ; but should say, that Indifference is still essential to the freedom of an act of Will, in some sort, namely, as it is necessary to go immediately before it; it being essential to the freedom of an act of Will that it should directly and immediately arise out of a state of Indifference : Still this will not help the cause of Arminian Liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of Indifference, without

any intervening choice to choose and determine it, then the act, not being determined by choice, is not determined by the Will ; the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free Will have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is entirely inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of Volition. If any should suppose, that these difficulties and absurdities may be avoided, by saying that the Liberty of the mind consists in a power to suspend the act of the Will, and so to kecp it in a state of Indifference, until there has been opportunity for consideration ; and so shall say that, however Indifference is not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that the mind must make its choice in a state of Indifference, which is an inconsistency, or that the act of Will must spring immediately out of Indifference ; yet indifference may be essential to the liberty of acts of the Will in this respect, viz. That Liberty consists in a Power of the mind to forbear or suspend the act of Volition, and keep the mind in a state of Indifference for the present, until there has been opportunity for proper deliberation: I say, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great mistake : It reconciles no inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty with which the affair is attended.....For here the following things must be observed : 1. That this suspending of Volition, if there be properly any such thing, is itself an act of Volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily ; it chooses, on some consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or determination, is an act of the Will : And indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis; for it is supposed that the Liberty of the Will consists in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the Will exerciscs its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the Will 2 The Liberty of the Will is not exercised in anything but what the Will does. 2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the Will, but it is supposed to be the only free act of the Will ; because it is said, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists....Now if this be so, then this is all

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