untary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according to its pleasure, what advantage would it give? And what liberty, worth contending for, would be exercised in it? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: Which notion is apparently, perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's actions, which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of sovereignty of the Will, selfdetermining power, selfmotion, selfdirection, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis, power of choosing differently in given cases, &c. Fc. as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous affirmation, and dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused, unmeaning words, instead of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have: They never can answer the challenge.

The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, goes on that supposition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity; and yet he supposes, p. 175, that "such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of acting without any view, purpose or design, and even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions, and to all our principles of action; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature. Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a higher sort or degree of freedom, than a liberty of following one's own views and purposes, and acting agreeable to his own inclinations and passions? Who will ever reasonably suppose that liberty, which is an absurdity altogether inVOL. V. 2 T

consistent with a rational nature,, to be a kind of liberty above that which is consistent with the nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent?

The author of the Essays seems to suppose such a necessity to take place, as is inconsistent with some supposable power of arbitrary choice ;* or that there is some liberty conceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more properby in their power,† and by which events might be more dependent on ourselves; contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my Inquiry. What way can be imagined, of our actions being more in our power, from ourselves, or dependent on ourselves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act from our own inclination, pursue our own views, and execute our own designs? Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power, and dependent on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subjects of acts and events, contingently and fortuitously, without desire, view, purpose or design, or any principle of action within ourselves; as we must be acording to this author's own declared sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is opposed to moral necessity.

This author seems every where to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms necessary, unavoidable, impossible, &c. are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In p. 173, he says, "The idea of necessary and unavoidable, equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity." And in p. 184, "All things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike necessary." P. 174, "This inclination and choice is unavoidably caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions, that, in such circumstances, it was impossible we could act otherwise." He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men's actions as unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no power over their own actions, the *P. 169. P. 183. § P. 395, 396.

P. 191, 195, 197, 206.

order of them being unalterably fixed and inseparably linked together, &c.*

On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connexion between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's Wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of necessity improperly; and that all such terms as must, cannot, impossible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignificance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their use in common speech; and, that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's Wills, is more properly called certainty, than necessity; it being no other than the certain connexion between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence.

Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice in person's minds, arising from an insensible, habitual perversion and misapplication of such like terms as necessary, impossible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c. that they are ready to think, that to suppose a certain connexion of men's volitions, without any foregoing motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose such a strong, irrefragable chain of causes and effects, as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain, opposite desires and endeavors, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron: Whereas, all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the east is from the west, Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; yea with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavor to make some persons believe this, or at least

*P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 399, 205, 20€.

fully and steadily to believe it; for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot, impossible, &c. the association with these terms of certain ideas, inconsistent with liberty, is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former curvity again and again.

The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes that if men had the truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves, or one another, as at all praiseworthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions ;* which supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any of their actions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by reason of this necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavored to prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is there shewn, that this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of men's actions, which truly take place, is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praiseworthy or culpable: That the liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is inconsistent with the being of these; as it would suppose that men are not determined in what they do, by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions or aims whatsoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And it is not remarkable, that this author should suppose, that, in order to men's actions truly having any desert, they must be performed without any view, purpose, design, or desire, or any principle of action, or any thing agreeable to a rational nature? As it will appear that he does, if we compare p. 206, 207, with p. 175.

The Author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply implanted in man's nature, a strong and invincible apprehension or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty and contingence, of

P. 207, 209, and other places,

his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth does not agree with real fact,* is not agreeable to strict, philosophic truth,† is contradictory to the truth of things,‡ and which truth contradicts, not tallying with the real plan; || and that therefore such feelings are deceitful,¶ are in reality of the delusive kind.** He speaks of them as a wise delusion,†† as nice, artificial feelings, merely that conscience may have a commanding power; meaning plainly, that these feelings are a cunning artifice of the Author of Nature, to make men believe they are free, when they are not. He supposes that, by these feelings, the moral world has a disguised appearance. And other things of this kind he says. He supposes that all selfapprobation, and all remorse of conscience, all commendation or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at present are suggested by the words ought, should, arise from this delusion, and would entirely vanish without it.¶¶

All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and endeavored to demonstrate in my Inquiry, where I have largely shewn that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that attends men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment;*t and that it is agreeable to our natural notions, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other illdeservings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and not in the evil of something else, diverse from these, supposed to be their cause or occasion.*‡

I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of mankind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted in his mind, that in order to a

|| P. 205. ¶ P. 253, ‡‡ P. 211. $§ P. 153.

P. 186.

W 214.

¶¶ P. 160, 194, 199, 205, 206, 209. *+ Inquiry, Part IV. * Idem, Part IV. Sect. 1, throughout, and p. 395

Sect. 4, throughout.

....397.