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reward; or, on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indige nation and punishment.
In these things is all the difference from mere machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity or privilege, in any respect ; all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the Arminians themselves come io, as they are forced often to explain themselves. (Though their explications overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained) for they are forced to explain a selfdetermining power of Will, by a power in the soul, to determine as it chooses or Wills ; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing, and, in many
instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice in the case.
Or, if their scheme makes any other difference than this, between men and machines, it is for the worse ; it is so far from supposing men to have a dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas, machines, are guided by an understanding cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner; the Will of man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence.
Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine
which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
WHEN Calviniste oppose the Arminian notion of the freedom of Will, and contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the Will, nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity ; their opposcrs cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in their doctrine of fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of necessity.
It would not be worth while to take notice of so impertinent an objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief Arminian writers. There were many important truths maintained by the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, and es pecially the Stoics, that are never the worse for being held by them. The Stoic philosophers, by the general agreement of Christian, and even Arminian divines, were the greatest, wis. est, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christiani. ty of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments of the false. ness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the Christian religion, relating to the unity and perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and happiness of mankind, &c. as observing how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and best of the Heathens, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alleges the agreement of the Stoics with us, wherein he supposes they maintained the like doctrine with us, as an argument against the truth of our doctrine ; yet, this very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the Stoics with the Arminians, wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their dac. trine.* So that, when the Stoic: agree with them, this it seems) is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a consutation of ours, as shewing that our opinions are contrary to the natural sense and common reason of mankind : Nevertheless, when the Staies agree with us, it argues no such thing in our favor ; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shews our doctrine to be heathenish.
It is observed by some Calvinistic writers, that the Arminjans symbolize with the Stoics, in some of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total corruption and deprav. ity of heart; and in what they held of man's ability to make himself truly virtuous and conformed to God; and in some other doctrines.
It may be further observed, it is certainly no better objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the ancient Stoic philosophers, than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, that father of atheism and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of the Sadducees and Jesuits.
I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning fate, in order to determine what is truth ; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems, that they differed among themselves ; and probably the doctrine of fate as maintained by most of them, was, in some res. pects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine
• Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. II. p. 325, 386, 327.
them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice, I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated that the scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the Stoics, by fate, meant any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of the advantage and benefit of the use of means and endeavors, or makes it less worth the while for men to desire, and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists ; 1 hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence ; as has been shewn. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable ; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world's being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides, not as the soul of the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and dosign, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above or without himself, I wholly renounce any such doctrine.
As to Mr. Hobbes' maintaining the same doctrine concerning necessity, I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, that Jesus is the Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the
pen of some illminded mischievous man, that it must ner. er be reccired, we shall n: ver know, when we hold any of the
most precious and evident truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be lamented; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejec. tion on that account. It is common for the corruptions of the hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile purposes.
I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes in many more things than the Calvinists.* As, in what he is said to hold concerning original sin, in denying the necessity of supernatural illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and other things.
Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.
SOME may possibly object against what has been supposed of the absurdity and inconsistence of a selfdetermining power in the Will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive, which, (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing on the other side; that if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the Will of God himself is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which, says the author of the Essay on the Frecdom of the IVill in God and in the Creature, page 85, 86, 6 What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God ? . Does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom? Does it not
* Dr. Gill, in his Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. III. p. 183, &c.