connect with the building of Rome the word Rom put,* than the date 753. But on this subject we have spoken so largely in another place, that we shall say nothing of it at present.

Ideas are continually passing through our minds in an associated train, not only while we are awake, but also in our sleep. In treating of this subject, Mr. Stewart has naturally been led to introduce a disquisition concerning dreaming, perhaps the most interesting part of the work.

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His inquiry is, What is the state of the mind in sleep? or, ' in other words, what faculties then continue to operate, and 'what faculties are then suspended?' Vol. I. p. 327. And his theory is,That in sleep those operations of the mind are suspended, which depend on our volition. According to this doctrine,' he remarks, the effect which is produced on our 'mental operations, is strikingly analogous to that which is produced on our bodily powers. From the observations which have been already made, it is manifest, that in sleep, the body is, in a very inconsiderable degree, if at all, subject to our command. The vital and involuntary motions, however, suffer no interruption, but go on as when we are awake, in consequence of the operation of some cause unknown to us. In like manner, it would appear, that those operations of the mind which depend on our volition are suspended; while certain other operations are, at least, occasionally, 'carried on. This analogy naturally suggests the idea, that all our mental operations, which are independent of our will, may continue during sleep; and that the phenomena of dreaming may, perhaps, be produced by these, diversified in their apparent effects, in consequence of the suspension of ' our voluntary powers.' Stewart. Vol. I. p. 333.

The train of thought in the mind does not depend 'immediately on the will,' though, while we are awake, it is greatly affected by the will. This train, therefore, should proceed while we are asleep and, that the Author's hypothesis may be fully made out, there are two things to be proved: First, that the succession of our thoughts in sleep, is regulated by the same general laws of association, to which it is subject'ed while we are awake; and, Secondly, That the circum'stances which discriminate dreaming from our waking thoughts, are such as must necessarily arise from the suspen'sion of the influence of the will.' p. 335.

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In support of the first of these, the Author advances the following considerations.

* See Grey's Memoria Technica.

1. Our dreams are frequently suggested to us by bodily sensations and with these, it is well known, from what we experience while awake, that particular ideas are frequently very strongly associated. I have been told by a friend, that having occasion, in consequence of an indisposition, to apply a bottle of hot water to his feet when he went to bed, he dreamed that he was making a journey to the top of Mount Etna, and that he found the heat of the ground almost insupportable. Another person, having a blister applied to his head, dreamed that he was scalped by a party of Indians. I believe every one who is in the habit of dreaming, will re'collect instances, in his own case, of a similar nature.

2. Our dreams are influenced by the prevailing temper of the mind. p. 335.

After having made a narrow escape from any alarming danger, we are apt to awake, in the course of our sleep, with 'sudden startings; imagining that we are drowning, or on the brink of a precipice.' p. 336.

3. Our dreams are influenced by our prevailing habits of association while awake.' p. 336.

There are probably few mathematicians, who have not dreamed of an interesting problem, and who have not even fancied that they were prosecuting the investigation of it with ⚫ much success. They whose ambition leads them to the study of eloquence, are frequently conscious, during sleep, of a renewal of their daily occupations; and sometimes feel themselves possessed of a fluency of speech, which they never ex'perienced before.' p. 338.

The following paragraph is a proof, of how much beauty even metaphysical reasoning is susceptible.

As a farther proof that the succession of our thoughts in dreaming, is influenced by our prevailing habits of association; it may be remarked, that the scenes and occurrences which most frequently present themselves to the mind while we are asleep, are the scenes and occurrences of childhood and early youth. The facility of association is then much greater than in more advanced years; and although, during the day, the memory of the events thus associated, may be banished by the ob'jects and pursuits which press upon our senses, it retains a more permanent hold of the mind than any of our subsequent acquisitions; and, like the knowledge which we possess of our mother tongue, is, as it were, interwoven and incorporated with all its most essential habits. Accordingly, in old men, whose thoughts are, in a great measure, disengaged from the world, the transactions of their middle age, which once seemed so important, are often obliterated: while the VOL. III. N. S. L

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mind dwells, as in a dream, on the sports and the companions of their infancy.' p. 339.

II. From these different observations, we are authorised to 'conclude, that the same laws of association which regulate the train of our thoughts while we are awake, continue to operate during sleep. I now proceed to consider, how far the 'circumstances which discriminate dreaming from our waking thoughts, correspond with those which might be expected to result from the suspension of the influence of the will.' 1. If the influence of the will be suspended during sleep, all our voluntary operations, such as recollection, reasoning, &c. must also be suspended.

That this really is the case, the extravagance and inconsistency of our dreams are sufficient proofs. We frequently 'confound together times and places the most remote from each other; and, in the course of the same dream, conceive the same person as existing in different parts of the world. Sometimes we imagine ourselves conversing with a dead 'friend, without remembering the circumstance of his death, although, perhaps, it happened but a few days before, and 'affected us deeply.' p. 340.

2. If the influence of the will during sleep be suspended, the mind will remain as passive, while its thoughts change from one subject to another, as it does during our waking hours, while different perceptible objects are presented to

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"Of this passive state of the mind in our dreams, it is unnecessary to multiply proofs; as it has always been consider⚫ed as one of the most extraordinary circumstances with which they are accompanied. If our dreams, as well as our waking thoughts, were subject to the will, is it not natural to conclude, that in the one case, as well as in the other, we would endeavour to banish, as much as we could, every idea which had a tendency to disturb us; and detain those only which we found to be agreeable? So far, however, is this power over our thoughts from being exercised, that we are frequently oppressed, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary, with dreams which affect us with the most painful emotions.' p. 342.

3. If the influence of the will be suspended during sleep, the conceptions which we then form of sensible objects, will be attended with a belief of their real existence, as much as the perception of the same objects is while we are awake.

In treating of the power of Conception, I formerly observed, that our belief of the separate and independent existence of the objects of our perceptions, is the result of experience; which teaches us that these perceptions do not depend on

'our will. If I open my eyes, 1 cannot prevent myself from seeing the prospect before me. The case is different with ' respect to our conceptions. While they occupy the mind, 'to the exclusion of every thing else, I endeavoured to shew, that they are always accompanied with belief; but as we can banish them from the mind, during our waking hours, at pleasure; and as the momentary belief which they produce, is continually checked by the surrounding objects of our perceptions, we learn to consider them as fictions of our own 'creation; and, excepting in some accidental cases, pay no ' regard to them in the conduct of life. If the doctrine, however, formerly stated with respect to conception be just, and if, at the same time, it be allowed, that sleep suspends the 'influence of the will over the train of our thoughts, we should 'naturally be led to expect, that the same belief which accom'panies perception while we are awake, should accompany the conceptions which occur to us in our dreams. It is scarcely 'necessary for me to remark, how strikingly this conclusion coincides with acknowledged facts.' p. 343.

"From these principles may be derived a simple, and, I think, 'a satisfactory explanation of what some writers have repre'sented as the most mysterious of all the circumstances con'nected with dreaming; the inaccurate estimates we are apt to form of Time, while we are thus employed;-an inaccuracy which sometimes extends so far, as to give to a single instant, the appearance of hours, or perhaps of days. A sudden noise, for example, suggests a dream connected with that perception; and, the moment afterwards, this noise has the effect of awaking us, and yet, during that momentary interval, a long series of circumstances has passed before the imagination. The story quoted by Mr. Addison from the Turkish Tales, of the miracle wrought by a Mahometan Doctor, to convince an infidel Sultan, is, in such cases, nearly • verified.

The facts I allude to at present are generally explained by supposing, that, in our dreams, the rapidity of thought is greater than while we are awake:-but there is no necessity for having recourse to such a supposition. The rapidity of thought is, at all times, such, that in the twinkling of an eye, a crowd of ideas may pass before us, to which it would re'quire a long discourse to give utterance; and transactions may be conceived, which it would require days to realize. But, in sleep, the conceptions of the mind are mistaken for realities; and therefore, our estimates of Time will be formed, not according to our experience of the rapidity of thought, but according to our experience of the time requisite for realizing what we conceive. Something perfectly analogous to this

may be remarked in the perceptions we obtain by the sense of sight. When I look into a shew-box, where the deception is imperfect, I see only a set of paltry dawbings of a few inches diameter; but, if the representation be executed with so much skill, as to convey to me the idea of a distant prospect, every object before me swells in its dimensions, in proportion to the extent of space which I conceive it to occupy; and what seemed before to be shut up within the limits of a small wooden frame, is magnified, in my apprehension, to an immense landscape of woods, rivers, and mountains. p. 346.

This beautiful theory will, we hope, in some degree compensate to our readers for the dry discussions of the former part of this article. We are aware at the same time, how much it is injured by the abridgements which our limits have obliged

us to make.

Here, for the present, we stop. The subject of abstraction is so closely connected with the subjects of Mr. Stewart's second volume, that we shall not at present notice it.

Art. III. An Essay on the Life of Michel de L'Hôpital, Chancellor of France. By Charles Butler, Esq. small Svo. pp. 80. Price 4s. Longinan and Co. 1814.

IT might be made a question which is greater, the pleasure, or the disgust, of beholding an individual of exalted faculties and virtues, maintaining, for a course of years, an unremitting contest for justice with surrounding millions of his species; with consummate policy restraining their bad passions, sometimes by setting these passions to disable one another, sometimes contriving delays to mitigate their violence; sometimes managing to make what is right so palpably identical with what is immediately advantageous, as to constrain its adoption even on the grossest principles of self-interest; keeping parties in a state so balanced as to gain time and impunity for some attempts at the formation of another interest and combination better than any of them; slowly insinuating correction into their practical institutions; and all the while most assiduously labouring, though with small success, to diminish the ignorance and the prejudices of the whole community.

It cannot, however, be a question long; since this illustrious mortal cannot be contemplated as a detached object, present. ing to view nothing but its own excellence. It stands inseparably conjoined with the degraded mass, and as necessarily forces on our perception the character of that mass as its own. And