plices, and the one word that can be said in favour of Guido himself is that he died with courage. "When he had mounted the platform," says the Yellow Book, "he asked pardon for his sins, and begged them to pray for his soul, adding that they should say a Pater, an Ave, and Salve Regina for him. When he had made the confessor announce that he was reconciled, he adjusted his neck upon mannaia, and with the name of Jesus on his lips he was beheaded. The head was then shown to the people by the executioner." Thus died the infamous Guido Franceschini, who, but for the accident of the Yellow Book falling into the hands of Robert Browning, would long ago have been forgotten. The accident, which gave Guido immortality, was happy for the poet. The theme was perfectly suited to Browning's talent and temperament. The life which burns in every line of it gave his dramatic genius its best opportunity. Even those for whom, as for ourselves, Browning's style is a thing of corners and rough edges, cannot but admire the amazing vitality of 'The Ring and the Book.' Here we Here we are confronted not so much with poetry as with life itself. Guido and the Abate Paolo speak and move as they spoke and moved at Arezzo. The hapless and injured Pampilia suffers again the cruellest tortures. The characters and incidents of the tragedy are alike so real that you forget the words in which they are clothed: you look upon them disembodied of their art. And the comparison of the Yellow Book with the poem reveals most vividly the poet's method. In many a passage he keeps so close to his original as to reproduce word for word the actual speeches of the dead. Then by a flash of insight he shows you how little he is trammelled by the literal truth. The characters of the drama are realised with an understanding which will astonish all those who read the Yellow Book, at once by its simplicity and by its justice. The raw material is all there, to be sure, but how wonderfully it is transformed by the magician's wand! And in one respect the poet gives us the same impression as the record in prose. He, too, like the Yellow Book, turns the story this way and that, looks at it from everyone's point of view, and snatches the heart of truth from the body of discordant statement. On every page the strange process of translation from prose to verse is visible. But nowhere can you judge better of the charity with which Browning has put his case than in the two books entitled "Half-Rome" and "The Other Half-Rome," which give in plain substance two pamphlets, written, while the case pending, for and against the infamous Guido. Here, then, is a book which we may commend to all readers, which not only sets before us the clear outlines of an ancient and bitter tragedy, but lights up in a sudden flash the inward processes of a poet's brain. was RECIPROCITY IN DEFENCE. IT is being more clearly borne in on us day by day that our method of setting up strictly local defence systems in the outlying portions of the Empire, dependent in every case on the supposition of supplementation in war by the armaments of the United Kingdom, cannot, under modern conditions, be considered sound. However sufficient such a general system may have been when our seapower was unchallengeable, and while all modern naval powers were Western, it is by no means necessarily so when these conditions no longer obtain. The immense development of foreign armaments in Europe renders the supplement ation, both as regards sea-power and expeditionary forces, to be obtained from the Mother Country less certain; while the development of foreign power in the East renders it more than ever necessary. Without that supplementation not one of these provincial systems can for a moment be considered sufficient. Nor is there any possibility of any single one of them being made sufficient by local effort alone within any reasonable period of time. It is evident, then, that neither the general system of Imperial defence, nor any one of the local systems, can be considered sound, unless some provision is made for the necessary supplementation by some other method than entire dependence some on the Mother Country. That provision can only be made, economically and efficiently, by grafting on to the present system one in which reciprocity as regards mobile forces, naval and military, will be maintained between the outlying parts of the Empire themselves. For such a system to be truly efficient, and at the same time truly economical, it will have to be based on the fullest recognition of the special strategical and political characteristics of the different units, and their mutual strategic interdependence. No Imperial unit will derive greater benefit from the establishment of a reciprocal system of defence than would India. Owing to her unique strategic position, the sea forces which are necessary for the protection of her own interests, under modern conditions, must also have immense strategic value for the whole Empire. She may, therefore, reasonably count on assistance from other units in the establishment and maintenance of her new system; and also hope for reciprocal measures in their defence systems, which would ensure her having at her service that reserve of mobile land forces which may at any time become necessary for her efficient protection. The idea of reciprocity in defence has already been mooted and is receiving considerable support in India. 'The Civil and Military Gazette,' Pacific Oceans, to such an Lahore, published last August extent that it might well form a series of articles outlining a the basis of discussion as to scheme for defensive union be- the reciprocal measures which tween India and the North the latter might undertakeIndian Ocean Crown Colonies, such as the organisation of as a preliminary step towards well-trained mobile land forces, a reciprocal Eastern defence which, while strengthensystem. The Crown Colonies ing their own local systems, would afford India the best and allowing of mutual rebases for sea defence, and could inforcement, would also solve also give her very considerable the financial assistance in maintaining a naval force. India, on the other hand, could, without weakening herself in any way, supply the urgent need of larger normal garrisons in the Crown Colonies, whose security-inasmuch as they are her natural defences from the sea-is of vital interest to herself. Here we might find a solution for the question of disposal of any surplus of land forces in India due to the improvement of our relations with Russia. But the scheme is intended to have even wider aims than these. A naval force maintained by this North Indian Ocean combine, if based alternatively on ports in Ceylon and the Straits, would tend to balance developments in the Near and Middle as well as the Far East, and could be so constituted as to fill up the loose design of the "Pacific Fleet" determined on at the Defence Conference last year. A battle - squadron so based would revolutionise the whole question of naval defence east of Suez. It would benefit not only the North Indian Ocean group, but also all the dominions touching the Indian or difficulty of reinforoing the garrisons of the Dependencies in case of need. The value to India of the existence of such forces in the Dominions is clearly shown by the fact that, of all the mobile forces of Great Britain, the British garrison in South Africa alone escapes the immobilising influence of foreign armaments in Europe; and in the event of complications in Atlantic and Mediterranean waters, would be the sole asset which could be counted on for rapid reinforcement of the Indian garrison. But the mobility of even this reserve asset, be it remembered, is entirely dependent on our command of the Indian Ocean, which in case of complications in Europe would be by no means assured. 'The Civil and Military Gazette' scheme, embracing as it does separate political units, such as India and the Crown Colonies, must inevitably present certain administrative difficulties. But, owing to our multitudinous forms of polity, this is an unavoidable condition which we have to reckon with in every step of our Imperial progress. In this connection it is interesting to observe that the policy outlined has been strongly supported by the leading organs of public opinion in both Crown Colonies, where administrative objections might be expected to have most weight. This support is the more notable in the case of Ceylon, of which, owing to its present low rate of defence expenditure, the largest proportional financial sacrifice seems to be demanded. The sacrifice would, however, be more apparent than real, in view of the important part which must must be necessarily allotted to Ceylon in any sound Eastern defence system. This, the shrewd instinct of the Colony has clearly perceived. 'The Times of Ceylon' has strongly advocated the adoption of the scheme in a series of remarkable editorials, in the last of which emphasis is placed on the very considerable financial assistance the Colony could afford to give towards the establishment of any such co-operative scheme of defence in the North Indian Ocean, in which India was recognised as the administrative centre. This final condition is worthy of careful note. There is no suggestion, either in India or the Crown Colonies, of a mere subsidy to the Admiralty, which might be used for lightening the burden of the British taxpayer. An increased naval subsidy being an addition to "Home Charges "-would be a positive political danger in India; whereas contribution from the Crown Colonies to the Indian exchequer, for the maintenance of an Imperially provided fleet, in their common interest, would be an offset to Home Charges, and politically popular as enabling the Dependency to take 8 preeminently important part in Imperial Defence. The establishment of a naval administration within the Indian Government itself is an essential part of the scheme, and probably that part which would make it politically possible. 'The Times of Ceylon' and The Straits Times' have both favourably received the idea of the Crown Colonies being regarded as sea-outposts of India. They recognise, of course, that as such their security, and therefore the sufficiency and sufficiency and efficiency of their garrisons, will be a matter of immediate interest to an Imperial unit which is their natural protector, and whose military resources are second only to those of the United Kingdom. They realise that their defence, if intrusted to Indian Adminstration, will be more efficiently provided for, owing to closer control and closer interest, and because it would not be so exposed to the fluctuating influences of political vicissitude at home. The supporters of the scheme maintain that the naval forces of the combine, if administered by the Indian Government, would not offend the principles of naval unity, because, the Indian Government being under control of the Imperial Government, an Indian Naval Administration would be under the ultimate influence of the Admiralty. It may even be suggested that a naval administration in India, being a part of the Indian Government itself, might in many ways prove to be a powerful ally to the Admiralty, in its almost superhuman struggle to ensure our naval supremacy throughout the world. So much for the question of a local naval administration. The Dependencies, moreover, are fully alive to the fact that what is requisite for their own security, and for Imperial defence in general in the East, is not mere contribution towards the maintenance of a two-power standard, but provision for an addition to that standard, as an essential part of a Reciprocal Eastern Defence system, embracing sea as well as land armaments. Few students of strategy in the East are inclined to treat a two-power standard as a strategic fetish, or as a panacea for all strategic ills. They realise, perhaps better than we do, that it was designed solely with reference to Western Powers (ie., Powers within the direct strategic sphere of the British Isles), whose fleets, however distributed, remained under our strategic control, owing to our strategic possessions, and our command of their communications with their home bases. From such Powers our Eastern Dependencies, or Dominions, had little or nothing to fear. But this two-power standard was in no way designed to cope with any first-class Power absolutely outside the strategio sphere of the United Kingdom, for the simple reason that no such Power existed when it was formulated. The advent of such Power is an entirely new factor in British Imperial defence, and therefore in world - strategy. For all our possessions in the Indian or Pacific Oceans it presents itself as a factor of supreme importance, inasmuch as they lie within the direct strategic sphere of this new genus of foreign Power, and far outside the effective defensive sphere of a two-power standard Navy, which, being absolutely dependent on disposition of Western fleets, may, under modern conditions, be forcibly tied to Western waters. Nor are the Crown Colonies, in particular, oblivious of the fact that by their actual position they, most of all, are open to attack; that their strategic importance invites attack; and that their potential influence on hostile communications renders their seizure the inevitable preliminary step in hostile operations, of which any one of the Dominions is the main objective. They realise, moreover, that no such deterrent influence can be exerted by naval forces based in the Dominions on any attack on them. The Dependencies see, then, that their own vital interests demand a considerable local addition to our existing two-power standard Navy, as part of a supplementary defence system, in the East. For the establishment of that supplementary system, and not for the maintenance of the existing insufficient system, they are willing, and even |