whole being. If it is said that a person is ruined "body and soul," the meaning is that the ruin is complete.

About the word "body" there is no doubt or difficulty. It has always and everywhere signified the same thing. But the English word "soul," or the word which corresponds to it in some other languages, has not always been used in the same sense. We do not, it would seem, use it uniformly even now. Thus it may be doubted whether we mean the same thing, i.e., the same part of man's composite being, when we say that a person's soul is given to music or art, as when we say that his soul is in God's keeping.

The only way of arriving at a definition of the word "soul" is, I think, to examine it historically. The philosophers of ancient Greece were the first persons who occupied themselves with the scientific and logical treatment of the soul. The Greek word usually translated "soul"- the word ux-was not yet solidified when it came into the hands of Plato and Aristotle; it was in a sort of fluid state, and they could more or less mould it at will. Still it possessed a certain definite signification.

Greek thought recognised in human nature body and soul. It understood by the body the material substance which is visible and tangible, and which is laid after death in the grave. It understood by the soul all that is not body. But for a long time it did not inquire how the non-corporeal part of human nature should be defined.

It is clear, however, that, if the vxn or "soul" were an equivalent expression for all that is not corporeal in human nature, it would possess a very wide range of meaning. It might be predicated of beings, and even of inanimate things, which would not be looked upon in the modern world as having souls. Thus Aristotle quotes a saying of Thales, the first of the celebrated Seven Wise Men of Greece, that "the magnet must have a soul (vxh), for it attracts iron." He himself speaks of the “soul” (vxí) of a plant, understanding no more by it than the vital principle, which is the source of growth and fertility. Similarly he speaks of the "soul" of an animal as, e.g., of a horse or a dog; and here the vxí is higher and nobler than in a plant, as it includes not life alone but instinct, appetite and affection; but it is not yet all that is understood by "soul" to

day. It would be difficult to put the Aristotelian view more exactly than in Grote's words, "The varieties of soul are distributed into successive stages, gradually narrowing in extension and enlarging in comprehension; the first or lowest stage being co-extensive with the whole, but connoting only two or three simple attributes; the second or next above connoting all these and more besides, but denoting only part of the individuals denoted by the first; the third connoting all this and more, but denoting yet fewer individuals, and so forward. Thus the concrete individuals, called living bodies, include all plants as well as all animals; but the soul, called Nutritive by Aristotle, corresponding thereto connotes only nutrition, growth, decay, and generation of another similar individual. In the second stage, plants are left out, but all animals remain; the Sentient soul, belonging to animals, but not belonging to any plants connotes all the functions and faculties of the Nutritive soul, together with sensible perception (at least in its rudest shape) besides. We proceed onward in the same direction, taking in additional faculties -the Movent, Appetitive, Phantastic (Imaginative) Noetic (Intelligent) soul, and thus diminishing the

total of individuals denoted. But each higher variety of soul continues to possess all the faculties of the lower. Thus the Sentient soul cannot exist without comprehending all the faculties of the Nutritive, though the Nutritive exists (in plants) without any admixture of the Sentient. Again, the Sentient soul does not necessarily possess either memory, imagination, or intellect (Nous), but no soul can be either Imaginative or Noetic without being Sentient as well as Nutritive. The Noetic soul, as the highest of all, retains in itself all the lower faculties, but these are found to exist apart from it." I

There is then a fux or "soul" of men as well as of the lower animals or of plants, and it is in a fuller sense a soul; for it is the seat not of the vital principle only nor of the appetite and affection only, but of the rational and moral faculties. Aristotle calls it the intelligent or ratiocinative soul. It is the part of human nature which in the Aristotelian philosophy is supreme.

As a Greek, although the wisest of the Greeks, Aristotle recognised, and could recognise, nothing higher than this intellectual soul. His philoso

' Grote, Aristotle, vol. ii., chap. xii. p. 191.

phical doctrine of the soul is the highest of which Greek thought was capable.

It can now be seen that the ʊx or "soul" as conceived by the Greeks possessed three several meanings which may be ranged, as it were, in an ascending scale of dignity. If it were necessary to find English equivalents for them (though the equivalence cannot be exact) they might perhaps be taken as "life," "sense," and "reason." For "life" may naturally represent the vital principle, "sense' "the emotional, and "reason" the intellectual or ratiocinative. But in the Greek, and specially the Aristotelian uses of "soul," the higher meaning, as it was developed, included the lower; it was not something generically different from the lower, but was always that and something added to it, and although the something so added was infinitely the greater part of the soul in its new meaning, it was not the whole.

Thus the ux of a plant was its life, or, more strictly, its principle of growth and fertility.

The uxn of an animal was its life plus its sentient or appetitive principle; it was primarily the sense and only in a secondary degree the life, but strictly considered it was made up of both.