a nature, as, being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to its nature, should be capable of acting unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine (that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel) it to do also. And except it were affirmed impossible to God to have made such a creature, (that is, that it implied a contradiction, which certainly can never be proved,) there is no imaginable pretence why it should not be admitted he hath done it; rather than so fatally expose the wisdom, goodness, and righteousness of God, by supposing him to have made laws for his reasonable creatures, impossible, through his own irresistible counter-action, to be observed; and afterwards to express himself displeased, and adjudge his creatures to eternal punishments, for not observing them.

I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible, nor again, what hath been done to manifest the vanity of those attempts. But I must confess a greater disposition to wonder, that ever such a thing should be disputed, than dispute so plain a case. And that a matter whereupon all moral government depends, both human and divine, should not have been determined at the first sight. It is not hard for a good wit to have somewhat to say for any thing; but to dispute against the common sense of mankind, we know beforehand, is but to trifle: as the essay to prove the impossibility of local motion. The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks, should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather choose to

have our sight, hearing, and motive-power, or what not besides disputed, or even torn away from us, than ever suffer ourselves to be disputed into a belief that the holy and good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish, the same thing. Nor is it difficult to urge more puzzling sophisms against the former, than for this latter. But the efforts of a sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all morality and religion, at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of brass with straws and feathers. Nor is the assault, on this part, more feeble and impotent, than the defence is wont to be of the other. For I would appeal to the quick refined sense of any sober and pious mind, after serious, inward consultation with itself; being closely urged, with the horror of so black a conception of God, that he should be supposed irresistibly to determine the will of a man to the hatred of his own most blessed self, and then to exact severest punishments for the offence done; what relief it would now be to it, to be only taught to reply, that man is under the law, and God above it-a defence that doubles the force of the assault. What! that God should make a law, and necessitate the violation of it! and yet also punish that violation! And this be thought a sufficient salvo, that himself is not subject to any law! Will a quick-scented, tender spirit, wounded by so unsufferable indignity, offered to the holy God, be any whit eased or relieved, by the thin sophistry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word law? which sometimes signifies the declared pleasure of a ruler to a subject; in which sense any eye can see

God can be under no law, having no superior; but not seldom, also, an habitual fixed principle and rule of acting after one steady tenor: in which sense how manifest is it, that the perfect rectitude of God's own holy gracious nature is an eternal law to him, infinitely more stable and immutable than the ordinances of day and night! Or what relief is there in that dream of the supposed possibility of God's making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself? For what can be supposed more repugnant, or what more impertinent? If innocent, how were it punishable? A law already made in the case, how can it be innocent?

But whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replies, to and fro, in this matter; that which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy, with many, hath been the authority and name of this or that man of reputation, and the force of that art of imputing a doctrine, already under a prejudicial doom, to some or other illreputed former writer. I profess not to be skilled in the use of that sort of weapons. And what reputation cught to be of so great value with us, as that of God and religion? Though if one would take that invidious course, it were easy to evince, that such a predeterminative influx to the production of all whatsoever actions, is the dearly espoused notion of one, of as deservedly an ill character, as ever had the name of a Christian writer. And whether he would not take that name for a dishonour to him, I pretend not to know. But let us take this sober account of the present case, that in this temporary state of trial, the efficacious grace of God is necessary to actions sincerely good and

holy; which therefore all ought undespairingly to seek and pray for; but that in reference to other actions, he doth only supply men with such a power, as whereby they are enabled, either to act, or, in many instances, (and especially when they attempt any thing that is evil,) to suspend their own action. And surely it carries so unexceptionable a face and aspect with it, that no man that is himself sober, will think the worst name, of whosoever shall have said the same thing, were a prejudice to it; or should more oblige him to reject it, than we would think ourselves obliged to throw away gold, or diamonds, because an impure hand hath touched them; or to deny Christ, because the devils confessed him. Though also, if any should impute the so stating of this matter to any author, that hath been wont to go under an ill name and character, in the Christian church; there were a great oversight committed; to say no harder thing of it. For the writers whose names would be supposed a prejudice, have neither said the same thing, nor with the same design. They would have this indetermination of the power afforded to the creature, to be so universal, as to extend equally to evil actions and to good; and have asserted it with a manifest design to exclude efficacious grace, in reference to the best actions. Whereas this account would make it not of so large extent: (as it were very unreasonable any should :) for though it may well be supposed extendible to many actions, besides those that are intrinsically evil, or to any that are not spiritually good, yet nothing enforces (nor can it be admitted) that it should actually and always extend so far. For who can doubt but God can overrule the inclinations and

actions of his creature, when he pleases; and, as shall best consist with his wisdom, and the purity of his nature, either lay on or take off his determining hand. Nor is it here asserted with any other design, than to exempt the blessed God, as far as is possible, from a participation in the evil actions of his creatures; in the meantime entitling him most entirely to those that are sincerely good : though it must be left imputable to men themselves (it being through their own great default) if they have not the grace which might effectually enable them to do such also. And as for the latter. This supposed indetermination of the human will, in reference, especially, to wicked actions, is far from being capable of inferring, that God cannot therefore foreknow them; or any thing more, than that we are left ignorant of the way, how he foreknows them. And how small is the inconvenience of acknowledging that, yea, and how manifest the absurdity of not acknowledging the like, in many cases! since nothing is more certain, than that God doth many things besides, whereof the manner how he does them, we can neither explicate nor understand! For neither is it difficult to assign instances more than enough of actions done by ourselves of the manner whereof we can give no distinct account, as those of vision, intellection, with sundry others.

Some have been at great pains, we well know, to explain the manner of God's foreknowledge of these futurities, otherwise than by laying the foundation thereof in his supposed efficacious will or decree of them. They that can satisfy themselves with what Thomas and Scotus have attempted, and the followers of them both-that can understand