and contains many new and highly valuable proví sions. Such a body of mercantile law, condensed in so small a compass, its various parts arranged and exhibited in so able a manner, is not to be found in the jurisprudence of any other nation. The commercial law of England exists not in any definite and distinct form. It must be sought in the voluminous pages of the statute book, and still more in the countless volumes of elementary treatises and reports of adjudged cases, which encumber the library, and distract the mind of the judge and the lawyer. Founded originally upon usage, it has, from time to time, received particular additions and alterations from acts of parliament, and derives its force and authority much less from positive regulations, than from the numerous and sometimes contradictory decisions of the courts. The lex mercatoria of England, though equally the law of the land, forms no part of what is called the common law. The former has borrowed most of its principles, and many of its rules, from the commercial regulations of the continental nations, and from none more than from those of France, whose celebrated ordinances, and enlightened authors, have contributed more to improve and enrich the commercial jurisprudence of England, than all the statutes of her parliaments, or the writings of her jurists. The treatises of Pothier, of Jousse, of Domat, of Emerigon, and of Valin, are deservedly held in the highest estimation in Great Britain; and neither national antipathy nor inveterate prejudice has been able to resist the influence of these luminous and masterly productions. Even the ordinances of Louis XIV. have extorted the highest encomiums from the bench and the bar of Eng land; and are cited as authority in almost every commercial question of importance, before the courts of that country. "In an age of science and of letters, whatever the wisdom and the genius of any nation has produced, which may contribute to private happiness or publick order, is entitled to credit and consideration. Whether it be the code of George or Napoleon, of Frederick or Alexander, which is offered to our notice, why should we not equally examine its principles and provisions?" PARTICULAR SYLLABUS. TITLE VIII. "Equidem contra existimo, judices, cùm in omni genere ac varietate artium, etiam illarum, quæ sine summo otio non facile discuntur, Cn. Pompeius excellat, singularem quandem laudem ejus et præstabilem esse scientiam, in fæderibus, pactionibus, conditionibus, populorum, regum, exterarum nationum; in universo denique belli jure ac pacis." (Note 1.) CIC. ORAT. PRO L. CORN. BALEO. CAP. VI. THE LAW OF NATIONS. 1. The following select chapters in Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace. Chap. 18. "Of the Rights of Em bassies." } BOOK II. Chap. 6. "Of the Right to things taken in War." Chap. 17. "Of Neuters in War." Chap. 21. "Of Faith during War; BOOK III. E. 2. Marten's Compendium of the Law of Nations. (Note 2.) 3. Vattel on the Law of Nature and Nations. (Note 3.) 4. Du Ponceau's translation of the first book of Bynkershoek's "Questiones Juris Publici," being a treatise on the Law of War. (Note 4.) E. 5. Schlegel upon the visitation of neutral vessels under convoy. Translated from the Danish. E. 6. The Earl of Liverpool's Discourse on the conduct of the Government of Great Bri tain in respect to Neutral Nations. 1757. 7. War in Disguise, or the Frauds of Neutral Flags; published in London, Octob. 1805. Reprinted in New-York, 1806. 8. An Answer to "War in Disguise," or Remarks upon the Doctrine of England concerning Neutral Trade. E. 9. An Examination of the British Doctrine which subjects to capture a neutral trade not open in time of peace, 1808. E. 10. Baring's Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences of the Orders in Council, and an examination of the conduct of Great Britain towards the neutral commerce of America. London, 1808. NOTES ON THE EIGHTH TITLE. (Note 1.) "EQUIDEM CONTRA EXISTIMO" &c. Cicero, in common with the learned of the ancient world, who knew the difficulties and vast extent of the science of national law, readily accorded the most elevated station in the empire of knowledge to him, who had made himself familiar with the laws which regulate nations during a state of war or peace. Pompey was distinguished in every science and art; but his greatest merit, and the brilliancy of his fame, rested on his acquaintance with this august system: "singularem quandem laudem ejus et præstabilem esse scientiam, in fœderibus, pactionibus, conditionibus, populorum, regum, exterarum nationum; in universo denique belli jure ac pacis." A knowledge of this law is essential to legal preeminence. However learned in the doctrines of the common or municipal law an advocate may be, he can never maintain a lofty character, if when called on, he shrinks from the discussion of questions involving nice and difficult points of natural jurisprudence, or of con ventional and diplomatic law. The liability to be thus called on is principally confined to lawyers resident in the commercial cities, or near the sea board. Here the most important questions of national, maritime, admiralty, and Roman law, may arise, and they are so intimately blended, that no one can calculate on the efficiency of his knowledge of either of these branches of law, who has not made himself somewhat acquainted with the remaining three. The Law of Nations may be defined a system or body of rules, ordained by nature, and the consent, express or implied, of sovereign states, for the guidance of international conduct. Thus contemplated, it embraces not only such rules as are dictated by the general principles of natural law applied to nations, considered as individuals in a state of nature, but also such voluntary, customary, and conventional obligations, as are consistent with this law of nature, though not prescribed by it. Hence the code of national jurisprudence is susceptible of four great divisions. 1. The implied, universal, or natural Law of Nations. 2. The voluntary Law of Nations. 3. The customary Law of Nations, and 4. The conventional, express, or particular Law of Nations. In the first are comprehended the principles of natural law, applied to nations as if they were individuals in a state of nature. The second embraces the decisions or rules of natural jurisprudence, changed and modified in reference to the aggregate and political character of the subject to which they are applied. |