The exercise of the established religion, and its ministers, were constantly protected by the junta ; but it is true that the Piedmon→ tese church had been already protected by the principles of the authors of the revolution, by the affection of the people, and the conduct of the clergy, who, far from taking part against liberty, appeared in general to identify themselves with the nation, and to partake of its desires and its hopes.

But all the wisdom of the administration of the junta could not make the enlightened part of the citizens forget, that it no longer marched in the constitutional line after the departure of the Regent. This line was in no way doubtful: the junta ought to have declared that King Charles Felix was in a state of coercion, to have named a Regency, and convoked the electoral assemblies. But the majority of the junta, overwhelmed at first by the distress of its situation, and supported latterly by the hope of pacification, could not decide to take courageous resolutions. The minister of war, who saw with grief this false position of the constitutional government, and who did not think that it ought to remain in that state to wait the issue of a negociation which offered so few favorable chances, reflected for a moment whether it would be expedient to get rid of it by a grand stroke of policy. From the time of the arrival of the regiments from Alexandria he found himself in some sort master of the capital, and he might have forced the junta to adopt the constitutional measures which I have indicated. SantaRosa was not a man to abstain by any personal consideration from an action which he might think just and useful to his country; and if he decided not for the latter, I think it must be attri buted, either to the fear lest a violent step should deprive the government of the support of the general opinion, which regarded the junta as a legally established authority, or to the hope of determining the junta to enter into the constitutional path the moment our situation became more advantageous.

24

There was only one mode left of ameliorating our situation;

I regret being unable to transcribe here the mandatory letters of the Bishops of Asti and Vigevano, which recal to the mind the happy epochs of the history of Italy, in which the heads of the Church were the first defenders of the liberties of the people.

2 M. de Beauchamp cites, with an air of triumph, a fact which, according to him, proved very clearly that the people of Turin showed itself royalist, in spite of the constitutional government. "On the 6th April," says he, "the inhabitants illuminated their houses to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of King Charles Felix. The junta, far from having given orders for it, had not even foreseen this explosion of true national sentiments." All this is very well, M. de Beauchamp, but there is a very simple reply to make to you, viz, that the junta, by a proclamation of the 6th April, signed Marentini, and counter-signed Dalpozzo, invited the citizens to celebrate the royal anniversary.

viz. to march on Novaro; but before speaking of it, I ought to give an idea of the forces of both parties.

The Count de la Tour had at Novaro ten battalions, sixteen squadrons (the body-guards forming a strong squadron); a numerous detachment of carbineers, infantry and cavalry, several batteries of artillery, and a few hundred men of the contingents of the Montferrat brigade. I believe I may estimate the effective force of all these troops at 8000 men.

The Count might also reckon, on an emergency, upon the forces under the command of the Count Andezeno, in Savoy. And the forts of Fenestrelles were commanded by an officer of the counterrevolutionary party, sure of his garrison.

The constitutional government had nine battalions, twenty squadrons, and two batteries of artillery at Alexandria, and at Voghera, forming nearly 6000 men; four battalions, a squadron of light horse, 150 carbineers, and a regiment of artillery at Turin, which might be estimated at 3600 men. The garrison of Genoa consisted of about 2000 men.

There were also two battalions of chasseurs, belonging to the army of Alexandria, one of which was at Novi, and the other at Voghera, but their officers were not yet organised in a way so as to be able entirely to depend upon them.

We had besides, in the different depôts of the brigades, that of Savoy excepted, a certain number of soldiers who had not followed the example of the general defection: these daily augmented, owing to the influence of the political chiefs of the provinces.

It will be seen by this sketch how much we were inferior in positive forces, having two citadels, Genoa, and the frontier of Plaisance to guard, and the garrisons of Nice and Savoy against us. The constitutional government, notwithstanding, determined to try the chance of a march on Novaro. Our situation was painful and difficult, and it was necessary to get out of it if we wished an honorable pacification; but should this be refused us, there remained perhaps still a chance of success amidst so many misfortunes. The armies of Novaro and Alexandria, re-united under the same colors, might cross the Tesino, and instantly act on the defensive. They would have found auxiliaries at every step; a new army would have been formed behind them; and who knows whether Naples, informed of our bold march, would not have conjured up the remembrances of 1282? Italy would have thus given to the world the terrible spectacle of a national war, the issue of which could not have been doubtful.

Should it be said that our march on Novaro would have been improper, after the negotiations which had been entered upon with Count Mocenigo, I have first to observe, that the fortunate

success of that expedition was precisely what would have secured that of the negociation, as our situation in that case would have been such as to obtain for the country proper conditions to guaranty it from the resentment of absolute power. Again, that the junta had in no way promised to circumscribe its military operations. I shall give a third reason, which I think is unanswerable: Count de la Tour had again put in force his original designs on the capital; he had crossed the Sesia, established his head-quarters at Verceil,' and directed his columns towards the grand route for Turin his advance posts were only 24 miles from it. This was the way in which he wished to support the negociation of Count Mocenigo, and this is what required the movement of the constitutional troops.

Colonel Regis, an officer covered with wounds, and of brilliant valor, who, far from aspiring to a superior command, sought always to avoid it, received an order to take the command of the constitutional corps which was ready to march. The minister of war wrote to him as follows: "Present yourself before the soldiers of Novaro; sustain, without returning, their first fire. They may forget themselves in an unguarded moment, but they will soon recognise brothers, by your attitude; and, whatever may be the result, the first signal of civil war will not have been given by the soldiers of liberty."

I now arrive at the fatal day of Novaro, which every Piedmontese would wish to efface from its annals; a day in which the country had to deplore at once the panic terror which struck the young soldiers of the constitutional army, and the culpable hesitation of the soldiers of Novaro.

The conduct of the latter army, and its irreparable consequences, are a new and striking proof of that political aphorism transmitted to us by the ancients; viz. that good citizens, when dissensions happen in their country, ought cordially to embrace a party, whatever may be the consequences.

If the army of Novaro had possessed the principles of passive obedience; if it had wished to bring under the subjection of royal authority a faction which it considered as culpable, it ought to have marched against that faction, and in some measure to have anticipated the resolution of its chief, by its strongly pronounced

It was then that St. Michel and Lisio had a conference at Verceil with the Count de la Tour; it had not, it could not have, any result; the Count de la Tour requiring that the constitutional party should submit without

reserve.

2

Regis was Colonel of the regiment of Savoy; was regarded by all the officers as one of the best Colonels of the army; and all the friends of liberty knew that there never was a better citizen.

wishes. A faction such as was displayed to you, soldiers of Novaro, separated from the people, separated from all that was worthy in the nation, what treatment did it require? It was by crushing it yourselves that you would have acquired a kind of glory in the eyes of one of the two parties which divide Europe, and have restored peace to your country. You dreaded, you say, civil war. Civil war is undoubtedly a great misfortune, but it can in no way be compared to that of the intervention of foreigners in the affairs of your country. This intervention disgraced the national character, prepared the state for the loss of its independence, if it is not already consummated; it menaced, in a word, the existence of the nation in its most precious elements, force and honor. Soldiers of Novaro, what have you to reply to this? And you, their general, I call upon you to tell me, why, instead of evacuating Verceil at the approach of the constitutional army, finding yourself much stronger in artillery, stronger in infantry, nearly equal in cavalry, and believing you had only to deal with a troop of rebels, unsupported by the national opinion, you did not fall upon them like a thunderbolt? You have the talents of a general, and Giflenga was with you; why have hesitated a single instant? Why quit Verceil at the approach of those factious troops, shut yourself up in Novaro, and afterwards......Count de la Tour, the Piedmontese honored and cherished you; but you have introduced the Austrians into their country! Neither we, nor our children, shall ever forget this!

I well know that the Count de la Tour may reply, that he was not sure of his army; that he could not remove from Novaro, without leaving a strong garrison there, on account of the dispositions of the people; that he had Lumelline on the flank of his line of operations, Lumelline filled with ardent patriots...... Yes, General, say nothing more; your sole line of operations consisted in a body of Austrians! this was clear to demonstration.

It is true that the army of Novaro revolted at the idea of fighting against us; it felt too well that the soldiers of liberty were the soldiers of their country; it well knew that the hopes of the House of Savoy were attached to our standards; the great majority of the army knew, and felt all this; how then could it support with frankness and lively energy the cause of absolute power? But then, why have you not embraced another party? There was no need to come to us; it was only requisite for you to declare that the assistance of the Austrians was to you the greatest of all evils. The chiefs of the army, and that host of officers attached to the honor of their country, would have, as faithful interpreters of the hearts of their soldiers, said to their general: "Let us come to a right understanding with our com

rades of Alexandria; we shall afterwards defend, or we shall cross, the Tesino together." Most assuredly the constitutional party would have made every sacrifice which loyal fellow-citizens and endeared comrades might have demanded of them in the interest of their common country. Re-united, the Piedmontese would have been in a situation to hope for a happy pacification, or they could have been at Milan in twenty-four hours, and Charles Felix would not now be the least independent of Princes, and his subjects would not be the most unfortunate of nations.

It was by a discharge of cannon that the constitutional army was received under the walls of Novaro, whilst it was in the act of tranquilly defiling, with no other object but that of presenting to their comrades the opportunity of a moral and political reconciliation. How many touching scenes does history present us on this subject! Novaro might have become immortal in our own history; but the men who were capable of soliciting the assistance of foreigners to enslave their country, cannot be sensible of the pleasures of a national reconciliation.

I shall dispense with giving an account of the battle of Novaro, as the particulars are already before the public: the brave of all countries and of all parties will not insult unfortunate valor. The constitutional troops of Alexandria yielded only to numbers, and to a concurrence of deplorable circumstances, the union of which is rare even in revolutionary times.

When the news of our defeat arrived at Turin, in the evening of the 8th April, the minister of war gave prompt orders to retire upon Alexandria, where he thought that we might for a moment arrest the progress of the enemy, in order afterwards to retire to Genoa, and there defend ourselves to the last extremity; but on learning some hours later, that St. Marsan and Lisio had only been able, notwithstanding all their efforts, to bring to Turin some feeble remains of cavalry; informed at the same time, that Regis had no longer the means of maintaining Casal, which was expected every moment to be occupied by an Austrian column, whilst another had marched on Voghera, Santa-Rosa feared all was irretrievably lost.

He assembled the junta,' announced to it that he was about to set out for Genoa, there to organise, if it were possible, the last means of defence, and invited the members of the junta to repair

The Prince of Cisterna was present at this sitting, of doleful memory. He had just arrived from Genoa with the Marquis of Prié. Both of them, on being informed that the constitutional government prolonged its existence in the midst of its dangers and misfortunes, came to devote themselves to its defence: they arrived at a cruel moment, but they had the satisfaction of having performed their duty.