being involved in a desperate struggle with these two Powers, he would have persisted in his aggressions upon Turkey, commenced under the flimsiest pretexts that were ever offered, since the wolf challenged the lamb for disturbing the stream above him. Therefore, it was of paramount importance that, from the very first, Britain should have shown herself, both by word and deed, to be in earnest. She did neither through the medium of those in power. Her first words, through the ministers of her Sovereign, when the nefarious project was broached, were weak and expostulatory-her first deeds bore the semblance of a formal observation. Meantime the war went on, as did also diplomatic protocoling. Turkey, so far from proving the effete and wretched valetudinarian that she was represented, displayed an energy and a courage which excited the admiration of the people of Western Europe, whose warmest sympathy was already enlisted in her cause; and, at last, the Aberdeen Ministry, yielding rather, as we believe, to the torrent of public opinion, than influenced by a strong and irresistible sense of duty, gave orders for the fleet to move. It moved, but it did nothing more for a time. What instructions were issued we know not, but the fact is patent to Europe, that our ships were lying anchored off Constantinople when a Russian squadron destroyed that of the Turks at Sinope. It was a bad move for the Russians. Not all the paper that ever was manufactured from pulp, if covered with protocols and notes, could have averted the retribution due for that one day of slaughter. From the affair of Sinope the real commencement of the war, in so far as the Western Powers are concerned, may be dated. Every man in Britain and France, who was not an inveterate Russian at heart, felt that after that there could be no withdrawal. Sinope was to be avenged; for, though it was the Turkish ships that suffered, the insult was equally offered to the fleets of Britain and France, lying at anchor so near, and, alas! unable on the instant to inflict the proper retribution.

Faithful to the rule we have adopted, of not attempting to criticise naval

VOL. LXXVI.-NO. CCCCLXIX.

or military operations, we shall not say anything further in respect to the movements of the fleet in the Black Sea, beyond one remark with regard to the partial bombardment of Odessa. It is a favourite expression of Lord Aberdeen, and he has repeated it more than once, that war should be conducted with humanity. We agree with him. If our troops land upon the Russian territory, our soldiers ought to (and we are proud to say that we know they do) respect the lives and the property of non-combatants, and not to make these answerable for the sins of their nominal ruler. But we cannot for the life of us understand the policy, or even the humanity, of half-bombarding a city like Odessa, and leaving it to be repaired before it has actually surrendered. Surely there are some considerations of humanity due to our own forces. Recent accounts tell us that Odessa is as strong as ever, and that, if it be considered necessary again to approach the place, we shall find new batteries erected since we demolished the old ones, so that the work will have to be done twice instead of once and effectively. Odessa ought to have been taken and garrisoned, or reduced to a ruin. Pseudo- philanthropy in matters of this kind is not only absurd, but dangerous. The object of war is to cripple the opponent, and that object must be attained by every possible means. It is, we own, heart-rending to consider the condition of a beleaguered town or fortress, from which the supplies of water or provisions have been cut off, until the population or garrison are suffering the last extremities of famine; but is it the part of the investing general, under such circumstances, from considerations of humanity, to relieve the besieged, and to allow them, by the free admission of convoys, to protract a defence which he otherwise might shorten? As well might he send them in ammunition if theirs were exhausted, or tell off a certain number of his men to act as defenders in case the numbers of the garrison were materially reduced. There is but one rule in war-carry on so long as there is resistance; when resistance ceases, require surrender. Anything short of this is positive injustice to our own men, and

a wanton sacrifice of their lives. Every chance given to the enemy, weakly involves the future expenditure of our own blood, and that surely ought to be more precious in our eyes than consideration for the property of our foes. This is not a carpet contest; it is one for life or death; and we are bound to see that no false notions of humanity, which never will be reciprocated, are allowed to impede a struggle, upon the result of which the future destiny of Europe, and of civilisation, may depend. It is the general opinion of the country, and we share in it, that Lord Aberdeen's timid apprehension of war has been the direct cause of its outbreak. Let him beware, now that war has begun, lest he prolongs it through the same timidity. Let him, before he again attempts to give vent to his somewhat too extended sympathies, peruse the following extract from the writings of Macaulay, and at least have the grace to remain silent if he cannot acquiesce in the truth of the sentiment which it conveys :-" If there be any truth established by the universal experience of nations, it is this-that to carry the spirit of peace into war is a weak and cruel policy. The time for negotiation is the time for deliberation and delay; but when an extreme case calls for that remedy, which is in its own nature most violent, and which in such cases is a remedy only because it is violent, it is idle to think of mitigating and diluting. Languid war can do nothing which negotiation or submission will not do better; and to act on any other principle is not to save blood and money, but to squander

them."

It is natural enough, perhaps, that people at home should have felt some disappointment at the apparent inaction of our fleets after they had entered the Black Sea, and even after the affair of Sinope. This is a subject upon which we are hardly competent to offer an opinion; and it would be very unfair towards those in command, to tax them, upon the strength of rumour, with having neglected opportunities which possibly may never have occurred. The service upon which they were engaged imperiously required forethought, coolness, and cau

t

With the Russian fleet lying in

the inner harbour of Sebastopol, under cover of the countless guns of its batteries, it would have been a very rash and hazardous experiment to have attempted an attack by sea, unsupported by a land force. Military men of experience say, that it would have been madness; at all events, it was such a risk as no prudent admiral would have undertaken. That the place was most minutely reconnoitred, under circumstances of peculiar daring, we know; and it also appears that a most searching examination was made all along the shores of the Black Sea. The detention of our troops at Gallipoli and Varna, where so many brave men fell victims to the raging pestilence, has been also made the subject of comment. We cannot see the force of the criticism. In order to secure the occupation of the Crimea, it was necessary, in the first place, to concentrate the requisite number of men at some convenient spot for embarkation; and, in the second place, to provide unusual means of transport. Some considerable time must elapse before all these arrangements can be perfected, and the successful conduct of the expedition is the best proof of the manner in which the arrangements were made. Furthermore, it might have been highly perilous to remove our troops from Gallipoli or Varna to the Crimea, until the retrograde movement of the Russians from the Danubian provinces had begun, and until the Austrian army of occupation had advanced. The scourge of the pestilence was terrible; but in the time of war the soldier dies not always on the field of battle. Death comes from other causes; and however deeply we may mourn the fate of those gallant men who lie beneath the foreign turf, without having been permitted to strike one blow under their country's colours, we must remember they are not less entitled to the meed of heroism, or less martyrs in their country's cause, than their more fortunate brethren who fell, sword in hand, the day when the Russian standards were driven in utter rout from the intrenched heights of the Alma. At the moment we are writing, no intelligence has reached this country of the issue of the investiture of Sebastopol. Whether the defence may be a short or a prolonged

one, we know not-we can only wait, and hope, and pray, that our anticipations may be realised, and that the fall of Russia's greatest and most vaunted fortress may show that so much gallant blood, and so many tears for those who have perished before their time, by disease and by the sword, have not been shed in vain.

Therefore, while we feel ourselves compelled to censure the course which Ministers pursued, both at that very early stage when the designs of the Czar, as detected in the East, were communicated to them in so extraordinary and unreserved a manner, and afterwards when the conduct of Menschikoff, at Constantinople, showed how thoroughly determined his Imperial master was in the prosecution of his aim-while we declare our conviction that they showed themselves deficient in moral courage and determination, and did not, on the symptoms of aggression, take such active measures as must have convinced the Czar that he had to deal with more powerful opponents than the Sultan-while we charge them with evident lukewarmness at a time when they should have strengthened the hands of Turkey by every means in their power-we are bound to say that we can discern no lack, either of spirit, promptitude, or ability, in the more recent operations in the East. That our Ministers were tardy -very tardy indeed-is not only our opinion, but that of the great majority of our countrymen. That they might have been tardy still, but for the unmistakable voice of the nation, is possible; but not on that account let us withhold from them the credit to which they are entitled. So soon as they set to work in earnest, they appear to have done their work well, in so far as the Eastern contest is concerned; and if there have been some omissions, some things that might, and perhaps ought, to have been provided for with greater liberality and foresight, let it be remembered, that where so very much has to be done, and at such a distance, it is inevitable that deficiencies must occur. The length of time which has elapsed since we have been seriously engaged in war, must also be taken into consideration before officials can be justly

charged with neglect in the performance of those manifold and perplexing duties which an exigency like the present demands; and we, at least, have anything but a desire to find fault, when we have reason to believe that such duties are conscientiously and anxiously discharged.

But the struggle has been maintained by Britain and France in another and nearer locality than the Black Sea. Powerful fleets have been sent to the Baltic, and we believe we are justified in saying that, for a considerable period, the operations of these excited more interest and expectation among us than the movements of the other division. This may be attributed in some degree to the unfortunate convivial speech delivered by Sir James Graham, the first Lord of the Admiralty, on the occasion of the banquet given at the Reform Club, in honour of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, before he sailed, in which that most indiscreet Minister rehearsed the part of the boaster, who sold the hide of the bear before he had encountered the animal. It is to be hoped that the exhibition made on that occasion will convince the Committees of Clubs of the absolute necessity of excluding reporters when such patriotic festivities recur. We are all justly proud of Sir Charles Napier. His gallantry and fearless intrepidity have won him a very high name and reputation, but, like almost all men who have performed feats of extraordinary daring, however successful, he has been suspected of rashness. The banquet at the Reform Club was an unfelicitous inauguration for the enterprise which was intrusted to him. Convivial Ministers and Ministerialists, with a kind of jealous regard for the honour of the roof-tree under which the champagne was rendering up its corks, boasted that the admirals, both in the Euxine and Baltic, were members of that respectable establishment. Then, after the cordials and claret had done their duty, there were shouts of, "Go it, Charley," and various other exhortations to conquest which we decline to particularise. Now, we by no means object to patriotic meetings of this kind, so long as they are kept private, and so long as the memory of the preceding night's bacchanalian eloquence

can only call forth a slight blush upon the morrow for a very pardonable folly. But it is different when nonsense of this kind receives the imprimatur of the press, and when the orgies of public men are printed as serious realities. The effect of the report of this unlucky symposium upon the minds of many was, that Sir Charles Napier was sent forth not only at liberty but pledged to conquer-that he was expected to knock down Cronstadt like a castle of cards, and even to take St Petersburg. Nothing could have been more unfair to, or more unfortunate for, a man of his high reputation. He was expected to do something tremendous, notwithstanding any amount of obstacles; and now, when the sum of his achievements in the Baltic for the season is found to be the demolition of Bomarsund, of the existence of which fortress few people were previously aware, there is a murmur of dissatisfaction in certain quarters, as if he ought to have accomplished more. We have said already that we cannot presume to express decided opinions upon matters of naval or military tactics, but so far as we are able to judge, it appears to us that Sir Charles Napier has acted with prudence and discretion. With the absurd shouts of the Reform Club revellers ringing in his ears, and bearing within him a heart which pants for still further opportunities of distinction, he has contented himself with attempting nothing more than appeared practicable, and thereby may have done better service to his country than if he had rashly attacked the strongholds of the Russians at the imminent risk of defeat, and with the certainty of serious loss. He has established, as much as lay in his power, an efficient blockade of the Russian mercantile marine in the Baltic;-for it is of the utmost consequence that Russia should be made to feel internally the effects of war, and by crippling her trade effectually, more can be done than by the reduction of her commercial ports. We shall immediately have occasion to review the conduct of Ministers with regard to this important matter, and to inquire whether they have equally done their duty, by preventing the issue of Russian exports. Besides, this campaign has given us a full

knowledge of the Russian strength in the Baltic, and will in all probability lead to most important results hereafter. The intricate passages of those shallow seas have been sounded, and such observations taken as may enable an expedition next year to perform, with comparative safety, exploits which this year would have been attended with the extremest hazard. It would appear also that this service requires extraordinary preparation; and that without gun-boats and floating-batteries, the reduction of Cronstadt or Helsingfors would be difficult. If this really is the case, the nation can have no ground for complaint, more especially as the Russian fleet is confined in the Baltic, and must sooner or later fall into our hands.

But, constituted as the world now is, success in war does not depend merely upon feats of arms. If it did so depend, we might very well be excused if we felt much apprehension as to the final issue of the contest, seeing that Russia, however often defeated in the field, can find no difficulty in filling up the gaps in her armies, more especially since the battle fields lie within or near the dominions of the Czar. Our men may be better soldiers, but war and pestilence may thin our ranks faster than the deficiency can be supplied; whereas Russia, with a population greater than one-fourth of Europe, can never be in want of levies. But military operations cannot be conducted without money, and in order to strike an effectual blow at Russia, her finance must be crippled, and her commerce utterly destroyed. Too much stress cannot be laid upon this point, for we greatly fear that up to the present moment Lord Aberdeen and some of his colleagues do not perceive the absolute necessity of enforcing, not merely a nominal, but an entire blockade against the issue of the Russian exports. We have heard much in Parliament and elsewhere of war being conducted so as to interfere as little as possible with the mercantile intercourse of the nations. Men who can hold such language as this are absolutely unfitted to conduct public affairs in a crisis like the present. They are squanderers of British blood and British

money, and bitterly indeed will the nation hereafter regret its supineness, if it permits these purblind and pragmatic men to persist in their course of folly. For what reason a blockade was declared against Russia except to interrupt her commerce, we cannot conceive; and yet it appears, on incontestible evidence, that we are still receiving in this country as much Russian produce as before! Instead of Russia being crippled by, she is prospering in spite of the war-prospering so much, that notwithstanding the immense additional issue of paper roubles, their value has materially risen. Lest we should be suspected of exaggeration in so serious a matter, let us refer our readers to the following extract from the leading article of the Economist of 30th September lasta paper which is not likely to entreat the attention of the public to facts, most alarming in themselves, and damaging to the reputation of the government which, in the time of war, has neglected its duty by not enforcing a strict and a thorough blockade.

"There is a fact in connection with the war with Russia, as affecting the commercial interests of that country, and through them, the internal prosperity of the people, so staggering that it requires peculiar notice, and the more so in the particular conjuncture in which we now stand, or are likely very soon to stand, in the arduous contest in which we are engaged. That the exchange at St Petersburg upon London should have risen nearly to par, from the discount of about 20 per cent at which it stood some time since, is a fact which points to important conclusions, and which indicates a state of internal affairs in Russia by no means likely to aid the efforts of our armies and our navies. The exchange at St Petersburg had, under the first influences of the war, fallen to 32d. per rouble. Latterly it has gradually risen, and is now exactly at par, or 38d. the rouble, notwithstanding that in the mean time an enormous forced issue of paper money has been made. A further rise of a single penny, or even less, will so far turn the exchange in favour of St Petersburg, that, spite of all effort or all law, gold will be drained from the vaults of Threadneedle Street to replenish the bullion reserves in the fortresses of St Peter's and St Paul's in the Russian capital."

Those who are familiar with mon

etary and commercial transactions, and the courses of exchange, will be able to draw their own conclusions from this astounding intelligence, and we recommend it especially to the notice of those who, before the war commenced, maintained so strenuously that Russia was a beggared and a bankrupt state. But as there are many general readers who are not familiar with the mysteries of exchange, some explanation may be required, and perhaps we cannot do better than allow the Economist, in which paper the Secretary of the Treasury is popularly believed to have some interest, to be the expositor.

"Let us first understand the real causes of this phenomenon. They may be stated in a few words. Russia imports of British products only to about the amount of £1,200,000 a-year. But we import of

Russian produce to an annual value of not less than six or seven millions sterling. This large balance in favour of Russia has hitherto been settled by the indirect trade of the country. The shipments of British manufactures to the United States, to the foreign West India Islands, and to South America, have in reality been partly paid for by cotton shipped from New Orleans to St Petersburg, by sugar from Havana, and by coffee from Rio Janeiro. Bills drawn in these various markets upon St Petersburg, for shipments of their produce, have been remitted to this country in payment for Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield goods, negotiated upon the Royal Exchange, and have formed the medium by which remittances for the tallow, hemp, grain, and copper of Russia have been made.

But

"So far, all was simple and plain. let us now examine the course which we have pursued, not without good reasons, and we will even say upon the whole, (!!!) the best for our interests up to this point. When war was declared, a strict blockade was no doubt established on the coast of Russia. Direct exports and imports were equally prevented. But by the policy which we adopted, an indirect route for the export of Russian produce through Germany was still left open. Memel became the port of shipment in place of St Petersburg, Riga, and Revel; and the result has been, as we ventured to predict many months since, that, although the trade of Russia has been carried on at a great cost, and although that must have been deeply injurious to the actual producer, yet the actual quantities of Russian produce exported in 1854 have fallen