the rest of Europe. By doing so, he reduced Britain very nearly, if not altogether, to a level, in the Imperial eyes, with the Court and Cabinet of Austria, which might indeed attempt to counsel the Autocrat against the perpetration of any act which he meditated, but which hardly could be supposed presumptuous enough to offer a remonstrance that, if neglected, should be followed by defiance and by war. So much for the regular despatches forwarded from London to our representative at St Petersburg; but there is even more than this. Sir Hamilton Seymour stated, we are convinced with perfect accuracy, that little attention was paid at St Petersburg to the views expressed by the British ambassador, but that the Russian Cabinet depended mainly upon the information received from the Russian embassy and the Russian agents in London. This is entirely in accordance with the system which Russia has pursued throughout. False in herself, she invariably suspects falsity on the part of others; and it is by no means an unimportant circumstance to remark that the youngest and least civilised of the great European States should have produced the most able, subtle, and indefatigable diplomatists. Cunning and duplicity are among the highest of the intellectual qualities of a savage people, and they are, even yet, the leading features of the Russian character. In Baron Brunow, the ambassador at the Court of St James's, Russia had a diplomatist of the first class. How was it that, to him at least, our Ministers did not use such peremptory and decided language as could have left no doubt in his mind of what the issue must be, if his master should persevere in the aggressive designs against Turkey which he had so plainly indicated to the British representative at St Petersburg? Was it not their duty to have done so; that is, if they had made up their minds as to the course of action to be pursued in the event of the Czar proceeding to the occupation of the Turkish territory? They may possibly have done so; but it now seems to be conceded on all hands that, in acting as he did, the Emperor Nicholas was mainly influenced by the representations which he received

from the ambassador in London as to the disposition of the British Cabinet. The tenor of his memorable conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour goes far to establish this. It is hardly credible that he would have ventured to say what he did say on these occasions, without having some hint from Brunow that he might safely broach the topic; for the Czar is not a man who would take any important step, or make any important revelation, without due deliberation and foresight; and it seems to us almost an irresistible conclusion that very careful soundings had been taken by the Russian agents (by no means confined to the embassy) in London, before Nicholas ventured to commit himself by so perilous a proposal. At any rate, those early communications must or ought to have satisfied the Aberdeen Cabinet that the ambition of Russia was likely, unless resolutely counteracted and countermanded, to force on an immediate European crisis; for it was utterly out of the question to suppose that either Britain or France could tamely submit to see the keys of the Bosphorus wrenched by the Czar from the hands of the Sultan, and the Black Sea converted into an exclusive Russian lake. Russia, however, does not seem to have taken that view. She believes not in public honour; and we have no doubt that the Czar considered the proffered bribe of Egypt and Candia, in the partition of the spoils of Turkey, as an almost irresistible bait. In bygone years, Austria and Prussia had, for less desirable possessions, connived and assisted at the extinguishment of Poland as a kingdom, and at its partition; and the Calmuck mind, faithful to its own traditions, saw no reason whatever why Britain should be less scrupulous. Even the Czar, however, could not expect that Britain was to take an active part in the aggression. All that was required of her was to remain neutral—to protest, of course, if she pleased, and to take any diplomatic steps in the way of issue of protocols, which might be necessary for the sake of keeping up appearances

not to interfere with the struggle, if France should happen to make common cause with Turkey, but to wait for the fall of Constantinople,

when her patience and forbearance would be adequately rewarded without the appearance of a tarnish upon her name. Such were, in fact, the propositions of the Czar, communicated without any reserve, and they form a most important chapter of the history of this century.

Did Brunow, the representative of Russia in London, really believe that our Cabinet would have acted on this hint? We think not. He has been too long among us, and knows us too well, to suppose that any section of our public men would accept a national bribe for the betrayal of the nation's honour; or that the course which Britain was to pursue could be directly influenced by the prospect of territorial acquisition, even although the possession of Egypt would give us undisputed control of the high-road to our eastern dominions in Hindostan. But he may have supposed, and, we think, very likely did, that the mention of such an arrangement would not be without some effect upon the councils of a Cabinet, the head of which had been long connected with the Russian Court by the ties of peculiar intimacy. At any rate, it might serve to show that Russia, if she wanted to have the Black Sea to herself, and an unrestricted access for her navy to the Mediterranean, was so far from anxious to damage the present position of Britain, that she was willing to concede, from the spoils conquered by her own arms, whatever might be most acceptable and convenient to the latter power; and that, from a frigid neutrality, there might arise as much advantage as if we had joined her in her robber scheme. Nor must we overlook, in our review of this matter, various considerations arising from our internal policy, position, and proceedings, which must have entered into the Russian calculations while weighing. the probability of our offering a decided resistance and armed opposition to the designs of the Czar upon Turkey. Opposed as we are in many respects to the policy of the Cabinet of which Lord Aberdeen is the head, we must say that an unfair application has been made, by a considerable portion of the public press, of an expression used by the Czar

towards his Lordship, that he was "a friend of nearly forty years' standing." He was so, and very properly so. Lord Aberdeen's diplomatic career dates back from the Congress of Vienna; and it is no wonder if the relations then formed, which have at all events secured the peace of Europe for a longer uninterrupted period than can be shown in history since the dissipation of the mist of the dark ages, should have the effect of rendering him most reluctant to abandon the former alliance. Ties of this kind

are not easily broken; and although it may have been, and we think was, a vast misfortune for Britain and for Europe that Lord Aberdeen should have occupied the position of Premier at this momentous crisis, it is not fair to assume that his political antecedents had the effect of warping his judgment or of unduly influencing his conduct. The plain fact is that the Czar beheld in the Premier of the British Cabinet a man with whom he had been long connected by terms of political relationship; whom he knew to be perfectly honest in his views, though his abilities did not rise beyond the point of mediocrity; whose weaknesses and predilections he knew, and upon whose general sympathy he thought he could safely calculate. He believed also that the cordial relations with France under its new ruler, which had been so successfully established by Lord Malmesbury, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were not likely to be maintained; and it is undeniable that the reckless and reprehensible language which both Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Wood chose to apply to the conduct of Napoleon III. was more than sufficient for such an assumption. It is therefore no wonder if, to the acute and unscrupulous mind of the Czar, it appeared that the moment for carrying into execution his long-cherished designs against Turkey had arrived. He was prepared to encounter the opposition of France, if Britain would but remain neutral; and he grounded his hopes of such neutrality, first, upon the personal relations which he had so long maintained with the British Premier, and, secondly, on the undisguised hostility and mistrust which other

members of the Cabinet had evinced towards the Emperor of the French. There was also another consideration which must have had much weight with the Czar. In consequence of the repeal of the corn-laws, a vast quantity of the grain annually consumed in Britain had come to be imported from the Euxine; and the prevalent idea throughout the Continent was, that for the future Great Britain must depend upon foreign nations for her supplies. This idea was further encouraged by various foolish speeches which were made in Parliament by the more zealous and least honest of the Free-traders, to the effect that our national prosperity would continue undiminished if not a single quarter of wheat were grown upon British soil, and a great deal to the like effect. The largeness of imports, compared with those of previous years, was assumed as satisfactory evidence that we had entered into that state of dependence, and that, like the sons of Jacob, we were now compelled to traverse vast distances for our corn. By the occupation of the Danubian provinces, the Czar would gain possession of the keys of a vast and prolific granary, which in the case of war would of course remain resolutely shut; and he no doubt calculated on this as a material element in the question of our neutrality. It is rather curious to observe that even at the present time the Russian journals are harping upon this idea, and that one of the statements which they perpetually and emphatically repeat is, that in consequence of the stoppage of supplies from the Euxine, bread is with us at more than a famine price, and a large portion of our population are literally perishing from hunger. This is significant enough-showing as it does the foregone conclusion, and the view which the Russians entertained of the result of our altered policy.

Besides this, there prevailed on the Continent a firm belief that Britain was no longer in the condition or in the mood to draw the sword in any cause which did not materially or directly affect her own interests. So far from ours being a military nation, the amount of our standing army seemed ludicrously inadequate for the vast extent of territory attached to

the crown of Britain. Viewed in comparison with the Continental military establishments, ours were altogether insignificant; and yet there were men among us who clamorously maintained that our forces were by far too great, and statesmen who were weak or wicked enough to purchase popularity by proposing and effecting a reduction. Our young men generally were not trained to the use of arms; our militia had become a mere name; our navy, maintained at a great expense, was made their favourite subject of attack by a class of persons who called themselves economical reformers, and who possessed considerable influence, especially in the larger towns. Foremost amongst these was the school of Manchester politicians, who commenced a regularly organised crusade against military and naval establishments. As usual, those gentlemen were by no means scrupulous in their selection of arguments. They appealed to interest by showing that a very considerable portion of our annual revenue was expended upon these objects, and they urged that by gradual and judicious curtailment a large saving might be effected. They insisted that the newly-inaugurated system of Free-trade had eclipsed the Christian revelation, by abolishing all possibility of war among the nations, and they implored their countrymen to show a noble example to the world by relinquishing all means of defence, promising, on their own substantial security, that there would be no aggression. Their leader, Mr Cobden, volunteered, if the country would only disarm, to be answerable for all the consequences. They told us that, instead of regarding with pride the military annals of our country, we ought to humiliate ourselves for having participated in so much bloodshed; and even while our great hero, the Duke of Wellington, was alive, they dared to brand him as a homicide. They reviled, and took every occasion of traducing, the British army as a nursery of profligacy and crime-a base and scurrilous calumny which we are sorry to see has been repeated even since the war has been declared. They established Olive - branches, Peace Societies, and what not, to work upon the feeble minds of women, and those

who were feebler than women; and, under the direct instigation of baffled insurgents and conspirators, they established a Peace Congress, which, for a year or two, made itself ridiculous throughout Europe. There, upon platforms filled by hypocritical manufacturers and owlish Quakers, did their apostles rant and rave, reviling all manner of men except themselves, and volunteering to crumple up Russia at a moment's notice, like one of their own contemptible circulars! And to this kind of exhibition, worthy only of a community of besotted lunatics, did thousands of estimable idiots repair; and to the disgrace of the British press be it admitted, that they were not without organs to give vent and publicity to their ideas.

This is not a time for disguising the truth, however unpalatable it may be to many who now acknowledge and feel the enormity and extent of their error. It is undeniable that the crotchets of the Peace Society were widely spread through the municipalities bodies which of late years have exhibited a decided but dangerous tendency to thrust forward their opinions in matters which were never meant to be submitted to their cognisance, and to supplement their proper functions by expressions of political opinion. Town-councils are excellent things in their way; but it seldom happens that they represent either the intelligence or the sentiments of the body whose local affairs they are chosen to administer. Men of refined and cultivated minds would as soon aspire to the office of bear-warden as to that of mayor or provost, and the result is that the municipalities are composed of men, for the most part respectable in their walk of life, but certainly not such as constitute the élite of the society. But the nature of our municipal institutions, however well known to ourselves, is not appreciated abroad; and when it goes forth to all the world, on the wings of the press, that the Mayor of this city, and the Lord Provost of that, have been assisting at a Peace Congress, and have been advocating the immediate disbanding of armies within their own country, as an incentive to the rest of the world to turn their swords into pruninghooks, it is difficult to persuade fo

reigners that the whole nation is not possessed with a similar insanity. They very naturally ask why, if the opinions of the people be different, these men have been elected to such high municipal situations- never dreaming that the men in question are overstepping their proper functions, and using an authority, which is limited by law to matters of sewerage and such-like, as a pretext for enunciating their opinions upon all subjects human and divine. We can afford to laugh at such folly; but the matter becomes serious, when the parties acting in the name of a muncipality are understood by strangers to represent the general opinion of the constituency. Upon this subject we may have more to say hereafter; because, as municipalities are presently conducted and constituted, they seem to us more likely to be productive of mischief than of substantial benefit to the community.

In short, the impression abroad seems to have been that we were so enervated with wealth, and so absorbed in money-getting, that nothing short of an absolute invasion would revive the British spirit, or cause it to kindle as of old. We need take no pains to expose the fallacy of that idea. The present war, because it was felt to be undertaken in a just and righteous cause, was commenced with the almost unanimous approbation of the people; and the more than heroic valour and calm determination exhibited by our troops, in that desperate conflict on the heights of the Alma, proves that the British soldier of the present day has not degenerated from those whom Wellington led to victory.

It has been said, in answer to some hostile criticisms upon the conduct of Ministers with regard to the war, that this is no time for finding fault, or for indulging in censure; that we ought all of us to trust implicitly to the good faith, zeal, and discretion of the Cabinet, and that we should not presume to comment upon movements the result of which we cannot foresee. We do not admit in any way the propriety of such a pleading. We are now approaching the close of the first campaign, for it is evident that when winter sets in there must

be a general cessation of warfare. We have therefore a breathing time, during which it is not only fair, but expedient, that we should carefully review the past, for the purpose of ascertaining whether any errors have been committed, and if so, of tracing these to their source. As we do not pretend to be skilled in strategy, we shall not follow the example of some journalists, who have discussed military movements as confidently as if they had been possessed of the science and experience of a Jomini. We shall confine ourselves simply to what is open and patent to every understanding, and shall rather seek to avoid than to discover occasion for censure.

If our Ministers failed, as we think they did, in indicating to the Czar and his representative in London the part which Britain was bound to take in the event of actual aggression, it seems to us that they erred still more in not making a sufficient physical demonstration so soon as the Russian forces had crossed the Pruth. We think there can be no doubt that our fleet was kept too long at Malta; and that the delay in ordering it to the Black Sea tended very much to strengthen the impression of the Russians that we did not intend seriously to interfere. It must have been so; because even among ourselves the unaccountable dilatoriness created an uncomfortable impression that the Ministry were not in earnest; and had the delay continued much longer, there would have arisen such a burst of public indignation as no Ministry could have faced. The explanation offered is to the purport that, during this time, diplomacy was doing its utmost to effect a peaceable arrangement. Now it was very right and praiseworthy that no means should be left untried for making a peaceable arrangement, and it was highly proper to invoke the mediation of Prussia and Austria; but we cannot forget that by this time the Rubicon had been crossed, that Russian troops were trampling upon Turkish soil, that their cannon were upon the Danube, and that the Turkish forces were drawn out to resist them. With this state of things diplomacy had nothing to do. As an invader, Nicholas entered a territory not his

own, and it was our obvious policy then, in conjunction with France, to make such a demonstration as might assure the Czar that, even if he should be successful in his earlier attempts, it was the fixed resolve of the Western Powers to compel him to disgorge the spoil. A decided attitude at the beginning might have saved us from all this bloodshed; for, headstrong as the Czar is, he can still calculate chances, and he must have known that, in the event of absolute war, he could not, by possibility, be a gainer. He must have been conscious that his fleets were unable to contend with those of Britain and France in either of the seas in which they are enclosed; and that these two powers, if once provoked and combined, would never sheathe the sword until Russia had undergone such humiliation as she has never yet experienced. He must have known that the financial state of his empire, more especially under a strict blockade both in the north and in the south, rendered the protraction of the struggle almost desperate; and he must have felt that the embarrassment arising therefrom was likely to be fraught with consequences dangerous to himself individually. He had no allies upon whom he could depend; for Austria, though she secretly may incline towards him, dares not make any demonstration of the kind, as she is conscious that the first overt act of Russian adhesion would be followed by insurrection in Italy, Hungary, and Gallicia. Prussia dare not join him, for she trembles for the Rhenish provinces. It is a gross mistake to suppose that Nicholas, like Paul, is an absolute madman. We grant him to be headstrong, ambitious, iron-willed, and obstinate; but at the same time he is endowed with no common share of sagacity. Those who know him best bear testimony to the practical shrewdness with which he weighs conclusions; indeed, the whole tenor of his history shows that he is eminently skilful in calculating chances, and in availing himself of opportunities. And we cannot believe that, if he had foreseen the course of action which Britain and France have subsequently adopted, or contemplated the possibility of his