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such a critical moment the vacillating character of Frederick-William strongly contrasted with the firmness of the young emperor Francis Joseph. When informed of what was passing at Berlin, his Majesty observed that the treaty was signed; that it was duly ratified by the two sovereigns; and that all that remained now was, to execute it that if any demur arose on that head, and if Prussia meant by her objections the non-recognition of the engagements she had knowingly, and of her own accord, bound herself to, Austria could not but regard such refusal as a casus belli,-for most assuredly Austria would make no concession. This firmness of the youthful sovereign produced the desired effect. It put an end to the ministerial crisis ; and the good understanding which the treaty, and which one of the contracting parties appeared desirous of interrupting, was once more, and, we trust, permanently established. One of the first consequences of that restored good-feeling was, the signing of the protocol by the representatives of the four Powers, which annexes the Austro-Prussian treaty to the AngloFrench convention. The object of the Berlin treaty was, the protection of the political, moral, and material interests of the great German Confederation, which have been seriously injured, and would be seriously menaced in future by the continued and indefinite occupation of the Danubian Principalities, and the farther advance into the Ottoman territory of the Russian armies. That fact is expressly stated in the additional article of the treaty; and in the instrument itself the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia declare that "it appertains to Germany to fulfil a high mission at the close of the present war, in order to provide against a future which could not be otherwise than fatal to the general wellbeing of Europe." The adhesion of the German Confederation to this treaty would complete the grand alliance which the grasping ambition of Russia has raised up against
most assuredly coincides with her interests. Austria has once more taken the lead in the political affairs of Germany. It was at Vienna that the conference of the four Powers was established; it was at Vienna that these schemes were adopted, which emanated from the desire, and the necessity, of maintaining the peace of Europe; and it was there also that the important treaty of Berlin and the additional articles were drawn up. We have little doubt that if Austria carries out with the same firmness the obligations she has contracted in her own interest and that of Europe, she will derive the greatest benefit from them, and that, even in a more selfish point of view, she will find that, on this as on all occasions, honesty is the best policy. It has been the fashion among a certain class of French politicians for the last forty or fifty years, to predict, at no very distant period, the fall of the British empire; and even the wretched Ledru Rollin has written two or three stupid volumes with the object of proving, no doubt to his own satisfaction, and to that of people of his calibre, that the hour of England's decline had long ago arrived, that her wonderful career of prosperity was arrested, and that the only thing she had to do was, to prepare herself as decently as possible for her final fall. It was, however, some security that M. Ledru Rollin continued to stay in our doomed country, as it showed that we were safe, at all events, for another year or so. Similar predictions have been made over and over again about the Austrian empire; and, in truth, there was a period within the last few years when its dismemberment was, even by the most incredulous, deemed inevitable. Many a time during the five-and-twenty years spent in the great struggle of the republican and imperial period of France, it was believed that the last hour of Austria had sounded, and that she had long lost her place among the great powers of Europe. She has nevertheless struggled through the tempest; and when she recovered her authority, she recovered it without serious loss, and without a rival over all Germany. The empire that, to all appearance, had been solidly established in 1814,
We have dwelt at some length on the line adopted by Austria in this matter, because we cannot help feeling that it redounds to her honour, as it
was again shaken to its foundation in 1848. Its capital and its provinces were ravaged at the same time by civil and by external war; the imperial family had to fly from Vienna, and seek refuge in the depths of the Tyrolese mountains. All Germany seemed to rise and make a last effort to shake off her domination, to form one compact body, to cast loose Austria, and to confer the supreme and united power on Prussia. Not much more than a year has gone by since Austria sustained against Prussia a lengthened struggle on the commercial constitution of Germany; and in that struggle Austria certainly had not the best part. Yet she again issued safe out of her trials; and on the occasion to which we have just referred, she succeeded in regaining all her preponderance. The revolution is no longer visible on the theatre where it was triumphant; the coolness which existed between her and England has disappeared, and she is once more united to her ancient and faithful ally by an obligation of the noblest kind the maintenance of the independence of Western Europe against an overgrown and unscrupulous Power.
While the gratitude of Austria towards Russia for her powerful aid in 1849, is alleged as a powerful reason againt a community of action with the maritime powers, the ties of relationship existing between King Frederick-William and the Emperor Nicholas-the Czarina being the sister of the former-are regarded as rendering impossible the co-operation of Prussia with England and France. We admit the full force of such a circumstance, particularly on a mind like that of the King of Prussia. But these influences are merely personal. The Prussian monarchy is not any longer a pure despotism, where the will of the Sovereign is the law of the nation. Prussia enjoys, in a more or less imperfect form, a representative regime; the press is, to a certain extent, free; and there are sufficient means to ascertain the direction, and estimate the force, of public opinion. On other and equally important occasions, the king, whose weakness and infirmity of purpose are proverbial, ran counter to public opinion, and the king was
forced to succumb. Those family influences are, as we have said, purely personal, and do not affect the nation at large, who will not allow their country to be degraded into a satellite of Russia. Prussia, the most important member of the Germanic confederation after Austria, will not suffer that confederation to descend to the rôle of a commission charged with Russian interests, and established in the very heart of Germany. The Prussian nation will not tolerate it, merely because the sister of the king happens to be the Empress of Russia. It is true that other titles and other honours have been lavishly scattered by the Czar among the officers of the Prussian army, with the view of purchasing their goodwill, and seducing them from their duty as Germans. In many instances this has been successful; but we have heard that the success is principally confined to what may be termed the more aristocratic classes of the army, and that among the cavalry, for instance, a decidedly strong feeling exists at this moment in favour of Russia. The officers who have been decorated by the Emperor of Russia, take particular care to exhibit in public their stars and ribbons, as if in contempt of public opinion, and as an indication of their sympathy for the Russian cause. This is not, however, the only motive for their conduct. They see in the Emperor of Russia a protection against revolution; and this, considering the class to which the cavalry officers generally belong, is not very extraordinary. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the disclosures in the correspondence of Sir Hamilton Seymour must have produced, even upon the persons of whom we speak, a great effect; their partialities must have received a rude shock on the perusal of these letters, and have singularly cooled down their zeal. The most ardent admirers of the Emperor Nicholas must have felt his face burn with shame and indignation at the contemptuous manner in which he affected to ignore the existence of Prussia as one of the states of Europe; and it is impossible to doubt that, in the event of the success of Russia, her acts, so far as Prussia is concerned, would be in conformity
with her words, or rather with her silence. But Prussia, as well as Austria, has approved and sanctioned, in as solemn a manner as such an act is capable of, the measures adopted by the maritime powers. She has, in common with her sister of the Germanic confederation, declared that England and France acted right in supporting Turkey against the pretensions of Russia. The ultimatum, presented in the name of the powers to Russia, was approved by her, as also the subsequent declaration of war by the English and French governments. In fact, every step successively adopted by these two powers in defence of the integrity of Turkey, and consequently against Russia, has been repeatedly sanctioned, including that which annexes the Anglo-French convention, and the Austro-Prussian treaty, to the engagements comprised in the protocol of the 9th April. We have already observed that we do not set much importance on the delay of Prussia and Austria in commencing hostilities in the field. In the present instance, the priority of the declaration of war belongs properly to the powers that have already made it. With respect to France in particular, her geographical position enabled her to do so without loss of time. But had Prussia drawn the sword two months ago, as was so often demanded by the public, with her troops not yet organised nor concentrated, and Russia with her one hundred thousand men in Poland, the Prussian territory would have been at once invaded at a moment it was most unprepared. Those who believed that it was by negotiation, and by temporising, that the great German powers would be induced to assume the same active attitudes as France and England, were in error. It is rather our own determination of purpose, our vigour and energy of action, and our success, that will lead them into co-operation. When they find that they have not to deal with Russia single-handed, that they have not the undivided burden of the war to support, they will then join us in the field; and we have little doubt that the thunder of the cannon so near their frontier will be itself an appeal to which the nation will not be deaf, and
that it will inspire the army and the people with patriotic ardour.
In this alliance against barbarism— on the triumph of which the safety of Western Europe, as well as of Turkey depends-in this great league which does honour to our times, two of the most powerful nations of the earth, great in the arts of peace and war, have laid aside their rivalries and jealousies, have forgotten or forgiven past hatreds and wrongs, and with sincerity of purpose have sacrificed on the altar of the public good the animosities of centuries. Nothing can be more exciting, and at the same time more noble, than that glorious fraternisation of France and England by sea and land;-the Zouave and the British grenadier fighting side by side, and the union-jack and the tricolor, with all the stirring memories they call up, waving over the same sea, and meeting as they never yet have met. The cause is not exclusively French or English, it is that of Europe; and no state, however small, and with the slightest pretensions to civilisation, can hesitate to lend a hand to the good work. If there be any, however, which, owing to its circumscribed territory, or acting under the influence of a servile Prince, or from any other motive, shall draw back from the common cause, that state should be placed under the ban of Europe. Whatever be its form of government, whatever be its creed-Catholic, Protestant, or Greek, if it refuse to respond to the call, it should be excluded from the society of Europe; and the law of the Greek legislator, which pronounced degradation and death on the citizen who, when his country was in peril, did not fly to its aid, should be applied to it. In such circumstances, each state ought to be regarded as a citizen of the great European commonwealth; the useless or the renagade member has no claim to protection, and cannot expect to be maintained in the rights which it has forfeited by cowardice or treachery.
It will not be irrelevant if, after noticing the conditions of the larger States, and weighing the reasons which, in our judgment, render their co-operation with the Western governments a matter of peremptory obligation, even
one of regard to their own interest, we say a few words about the secondary States, and the peculiar position of each, both as respects Russia, and the Powers to whom it is expected that they will afford their co-operation. Among those States that enjoy a form of government more or less similar to that of France and England, and who for that reason are particularly obnoxious to Russia, Spain and Portugal, though the most distant from the theatre of war, and therefore less exposed to its effects, are among the first that ought to come forward. It may even be a question whether these countries are not bound by the spirit of the Quadruple Alliance, which has not yet terminated, to lend their co-operation. The Quadruple Alliance was formed with the object of creating and maintaining a system which had for its basis the negation of the principle of legitimacy. This alliance was intended to be in direct opposition to the coalition inspired and protected by the Russian Emperor in his character as champion of legitimacy and absolutism. That coalition was the instrument with which he meant to divide Europe, and intervene in the quarrels of other States in conformity with the traditional policy of Russia; to terminate at some future day what he considers to be a revolutionary system, and to effect the expulsion of their actual occupants from the thrones of Spain and Portugal, and the restoration of Dom Miguel and Don Carlos as the representatives of the legitimist principle, and, in his eyes, the only rightful sovereigns of their countries. The question of religion, too, occupies an important place in this consideration. His treatment of the Catholics of Poland shows that the Czar hates quite as strongly the Christian sects that differ from the Orthodox faith, as he does the Mussulman. Non-orthodox Christians are equally unbelievers in his eyes; and in his twofold character as restorer of absolutism on the thrones of Europe, and defender of Orthodoxy, Spain and Portugal have everything to fear from his success.
Among the secondary states of Europe which would find little mercy at the hands of Russia, in the event
VOL. LXXVI.-NO. CCCCLXV.
of her triumph, Piedmont is, perhaps,
of the shores of the Adriatic, neither
Duke of Tuscany would have reason to feel satisfied in such a neighbourhood; and the former would do well to lose no time in preparing himself for a perpetual vassalage, if he will not avail himself of the present opportunity of winning some credit for his troops by rendering service to the rest of Europe. The principle laid down by Switzerland, up to the moment we write, has been that of strict neutrality. This may be all very fine in words or on paper, but we much doubt the possibility of any State placed so near the theatre of war, or the power that will be engaged in it, to maintain its neutrality. The question, as the Swiss Confederation must well know, is not now one of mere secondary interest. The Swiss are better aware than any one, that the general interest of Europe is at stake, and that there is no country which is more exposed than Switzerland. Such neutrality as she would maintain has been always difficult, and, in the present instance, it is impossible. It is not now for the first time that Switzerland has to learn that her independence is essentially connected with the balance of power in Europe, and that if this balance were destroyed, or seriously disturbed, her independence would not be worth a month's purchase. Her co-operation with the other states of Europe, in a question of such vital importance to all, she is not merely bound in honour to afford, but her existence as an independent Confederation obliges her not to refuse it. We are therefore of opinion that Switzerland may fairly be comprised in the States that will assist, when the time comes for general and armed resistance to Muscovite ambition.
stantinople, would be to seize on that petty kingdom, which, even in times of peace, and under the most favourable circumstances, only subsists by means of the subsidy granted to her by the allies. But the conversations of the Emperor of Russia with our minister have shown pretty clearly the sort of benevolence which Russia feels towards King Otho, and his avowed determination not to tolerate any extension of his territory; but, with the full knowledge of all this, the clear-sighted and clever Otho commenced war against Turkey, and consequently against Turkey's allies, well knowing how that war, so far as he is concerned, must end. It has ended in the occupation of the Greek territory by a few thousands of the allied forces; in the blockade of its coasts, and the consequent interruption of all communication between the insurgent subjects of the Porte and the Hellenic bands; in the absolute submission of the king; his humiliating apology; his promises of amendment for the future, pronounced in presence of the English and French ministers, whose advice he had scornfully rejected; the dismissal of the ministry who were his accomplices in that mad attempt; and the nomination of new advisers long known for their determined resistance to Russian influence, and decidedly friendly to the Western powers. How King Otho, or his queen, who is the fanatical partisan of Russia, or his ministers, could for a moment suppose that Greece would be tolerated in her open partisanship, is what we cannot conceive, unless we presume upon a greater absence of intellect than even that which his Majesty has hitherto got credit for. To declare war against Greece would be absurd; and many motives would prevent us from overthrowing an independence which we have done so much to found. Perhaps, after the occupation of her territory, the severest penalty that we might impose on that ungrateful government would be to demand payment of the debt she owes us; and as it is probable that the answer would be anything but satisfactory to the creditor, to take the best security we might find. Greece has already keenly felt the effects of her conduct to the
Of Greece, or rather the Greek Government, so much has been said recently, that any particular allusion to it is scarcely necessary. Notwithstanding the analogy between the religious faith of Greece and Russia, the merest reflection and the simplest common sense ought to have ranked her in the number of our allies; for even supposing the disclosures of Sir Hamilton Seymour to have been kept secret from the world, there can be little doubt that one of the first acts of Russia, after the conquest of Con