which had been under sailing orders since November, was still at Philadelphia, being detained by a defect in her machinery, (New York Herald, January 26, 1863.) She went to Fortress Monroe on the 17th March, and sailed for the Havana on the 25th April, 1863, (see New York Herald of that date.) The United States Navy Register for 1863 shows that on the 1st February, 1863, she was in Hampton Roads, and not with the West India squadron. (e.) The Connecticut.-To cruise between Bermuda and Nassau to watch for the Sumter from 3d August, 1863, to 7th September, 1863. This claim is made for a period when the Sumter, as admitted in the United States Case, p. SS, had changed her character, and become the Gibraltar. She sailed from Liverpool on the 3d July, 1863, as a merchant-vessel without armament, with a cargo of warlike stores for Charleston, and the Connecticut was doubtless employed to look out for her; but as she was then simply a blockade-runner, or a merchantship, with contraband of war on board, or both, it is clear that under no circumstances could this claim be admissible under the treaty. (f.) Ticonderoga.-In a note in the appendix to the report of the admiralty committee, attention is called to the fact that between May, 1863, and June, 1864, although her cost is claimed, no service is given in the synopsis of orders for the period. This was not an omission to specify the service, but an error in the dates and charges; as within the period, for which it would otherwise be inferred she was in pursuit of Confederate cruisers, she was actually under repairs (had "work done") at the navy-yards of Brooklyn; Charlestown, Massachusetts; Philadelphia, and Norfolk, respectively; and she is shown in the Navy Register for 1864 as being on the 12th of March of that year "ready for sea at Philadelphia." Again, it is obvious that she could not have been employed in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence protecting the fisheriesduring the winter. 3 (g.) Niagara.-The claims on account of this ship and the Sacramento have been already dealt with in the admiralty report and its postscript on the grounds 1. That they are generally inadmissible. 2. That they extend far beyond the existence, as confederate cruisers, of the vessels on account of which the claims are made. 3. That they extend to periods long after the cessation of hostilities. But in addition to these fatal errors or objections to the claims, the following are also obvious errors: 4. Mr. Adams stated that the Niagara had left France for the United States on the 8th August, 1865; the claim, however, embraces a period forty-four days beyond that date, although a vessel of her speed could hardly have occupied that time in making the passage across the Atlantic. 5. The Niagara accompanied the Russian squadron, which convoyed the remains of the Czarovitch from Lisbon to the North Sea, and for which act of courtesy the Russian government expressed itself deeply sensible and grateful to that of the United States; but, through a manifest error in the synopsis and in the claims, the cost of the ship for this period is claimed against the British Government. 5 (h.) Nereus.-The claims for this ship on convoy service embrace a 1 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 203. 2 Appendix to British Case, vol. vii, p. 75. 3 United States Navy Report, December, 1864, pp. 1,005 et seq. Ibid., part iii, p. 127. period during which she was employed with the fleet at the attacks on and final capture of Fort Fisher between 24th December, 1864, and 15th January, 1865. She may have been employed on this service for a much longer period, and she, as well as her consorts in convoying duty, may have been often similarly withdrawn during the periods embraced in the claims, as it is only incidentally that errors of this character can, in the absence of complete information as to the orders and the movements of the United States cruisers, be discovered. It is thus shown that there is a sufficiently large number of patent errors in the synopsis of orders to warrant its authority on matters of fact being questioned, when other data, generally derived from United States official documents, point to different conclusions. They are adduced with this sole object, as they generally refer to claims which have not been regarded as admissible (on the hypothesis explained in the admiralty report) under the treaty, and consequently it has not been thought necessary to give their money value. ADMIRAL WILKES'S FLYING SQUADRON. The total amount claimed for the services of this flying squadron, which originally consisted of one converted merchant-steamer, four second-class steam sloops, three paddle-wheel steamers, one sailing-ship, one sailing store-ship, and one sailing ship occasionally, if not always, used as a coal-ship, is so large ($1,457,130) that it may not be thought an abundance of caution to add to the reasons which the admiralty committee justly looked on as conclusive why these claims should be considered wholly inadmissible: 1. The accounts of prizes captured by United States cruisers, which have been carefully examined, the returns of visits of United States ships-of-war to British West India Islands, and the incidental notices scattered here and there in the reports of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress, in other official papers, and in the newspapers of the day, abundantly prove that for the periods respectively claimed none of these ships, though the squadron is called "flying," proceeded beyond the limits officially designated by Mr. Welles as the "West Indies." When finally broken up under the command of Admiral Lardner, Admiral Wilkes's successor, Mr. Welles spoke of it as the "West India squadron;” the term "flying" is an ex post facto designation. 2. The continuance of this squadron as an organization had no reference whatever to the confederate cruisers, but solely to the duration of the trade at Matamoras. Mr. Welles stated in his report of 7th December, 1863, (page viii,) that "the occupation of Rio Grande and Brownsville (13th November, 1863) has put a final termination to the lately extensive commerce of Matamoras, which is becoming as insignificant as it was before the rebellion." Now at that date the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia were in being as confederate cruisers, and yet so little were their proceedings heeded in reference to this "flying squadron" that, taking the dates from the synopsis of orders, when that report was written the squadron had dwindled down to The Tioga, a paddle-wheel steamer of 809 tons; The sailing vessel Gemsbok, which was frequently, if not always, used as a coal or as a store ship; And the sailing store-ship National Guard. 1 United States Navy Report, December, 1865, pp. 28, 77. 2 Ibid, December, 1864, p. xix. It cannot be supposed the Tioga was ever afterward detached from Admiral Lardner's squadron or sent in the actual pursuit of any of the confederate cruisers, (all then on the other side of the Atlantic,) since on the 24th March, 1864, she was off Elbow Light, (Bahamas,) and it may be assumed she was within the limits assigned to her by her orders until the claim on her account ceased, viz, 27th June, 1864.1 All the other vessels stated to have composed this squadron had, at different times, been previously withdrawn, and were afterward to be found attached to blockading squadrons. The words "stated to have composed" are used intentionally, as it is impossible to reconcile the dates given in the abstract of the claims with those given elsewhere; for instance, in the case of the Juniata, as already shown, there is an error of nearly five months; in the Navy Register for January, 1863, the Gemsbok and the Oneida are shown as attached to blockading squadrons, and in that for January, 1864, the Tioga is named as attached to the East Gulf blockading squadron-duties palpably inconsistent with the pursuit of the confederate cruisers. The claim on account of the Oneida commences on the very day (16th January, 1860) that she allowed the Florida to escape from Mobile. It is believed that after that date she continued to be employed in the blockade of that port, as she is stated in the Navy Register for 1863 to have been attached to the West Gulf squadron on the 1st February, 1863. MISCELLANEOUS CASES, Not affecting the claims considered by the admiralty committee as admissi ble (upon the hypothesis explained by them) for arbitration. VANDERBILT. It should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding her superior speed and armament, the Vanderbilt was an unfit vessel to send in pursuit of the Alabama, since she was wholly dependent on her steam-power; hence, after making a passage, if she could not replenish her coal, she was powerless; this explains parts of her proceedings. On her way to the Cape she, in obedience to her orders, went to Fernando Noronha, Pernambuco, and Rio, there coaled, and notwithstanding she was in pursuit of an enemy remained in port nineteen days." As a matter of fact, if she had staid there about five or six days and sailed on the 20th July direct for the Cape, (as she was ordered,) she would, instead of never meeting the Alabama, have found her in Table Bay. From Rio she, however, went to St. Helena, there took all the coals she could get, (400 tons,) but on her arrival at Simon's Bay (where it was not known that she had been at St. Helena) she was again allowed to coal, taking nearly 1,000 tons.3 After remaining eight days "painting ship," (so Semmes says in "My Adventures," page 668,) she again put to sea and went to Mauritius, where she was again allowed to coal, (though under what circumstances, or what representations her captain made to the governor, it is nowhere stated,) but there is another unaccountable delay in port of seventeen days; she returned to Table Bay, 4 1 United States Navy Report, December, 1865, p. 485; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 360. 2 United States Navy Report, December, 1863, p. xxiv. 3Appendix to British Case, vol. v, pp. 228, 234. 4 Ibid., p. 233. and made arrangements to coal before obtaining permission; this was of course refused, and her coaling stopped, but not until she had taken nineteen tons on board. Then hearing, doubtless, that there was coal at Angra Pequeña, her captain went there and took possession of it, saying "he must have coal," and with this supply he went to St. Helena and Bahia, where doubtless he obtained a further supply, thence to Barbados and to the United States. These facts prove: 1st. That the Vanderbilt was not fitted for the pursuit to such distant regions, where supplies of coal were limited, owing to her having no sail-power. 2d. That in addition to deviating from her orders she exhibited no haste in quitting some of the ports she touched at to carry on her pursuit. SAN JACINTO. Of this vessel's proceedings there are more full details than of those of any of the other United States cruisers, given in a letter of the Secretary of the Navy of 30th August, 1871, Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 345. Semmes describes her as having a more powerful battery and double the crew, but that the Alabama had the "speed of her;" however, it may be assumed she was not an unsuitable vessel to have been sent in the pursuit; she was, as will be subsequently shown, withdrawn after being about two and one-half months on this service, and was afterward attached to the eastern blockading squadron. If the arbitrators consider that she is proved, as stated at p. 138 of the British Counter Case, to have been remiss in allowing the Alabama to escape from Martinique, a question would then arise whether any portion of the claim made in her behalf was admissible, and whether such claim (if any) could be carried beyond the date of the Alabama's escape. AUGUSTA. Nothing is known of her cruise, which only lasted ten weeks, and consequently, though she was a suitable vessel for the service, she must necessarily have performed it in a very perfunctory manner. She does not appear to have called at Bermuda or any of the British West India Islands. She was afterward employed in the North Atlantic blockading squadron.2 DACOTAH. Also a suitable vessel; was withdrawn after but one month's service, and for the same service. NIAGARA. It may possibly be thought unnecessary to accumulate further proofs as to what was the actual employment of this ship, since the postscript to the admiralty report, and the United States official documents therein mentioned, will, it may be considered, have proved conclusively that she 1 See "Correspondence respecting the capture of the Saxon by the United States ship Vanderbilt," laid before Parliament, (North America, No. 2, 1864,) pp. 1, 7, 12. 2 See Navy Register, 1863; also, Navy report, December, 1863, p. 56, and Synopsis of Orders. was not sent to Europe in pursuit of any of the Confederate vessels named in the United States Case, but to watch the vessels then being constructed for the Confederates in French ports. The claim, however, for this ship is so vast in amount, ($648,234,) that it is thought better, at the risk of being prolix, to give other quotations from United States sources which have been met with, and which are very pertinent to the contention that she never was engaged in pursuing the Alabama or Florida. True it is that on the 28th April, 1864, Mr. Adams informed Mr. Seward that the Alabama was "reported at Cape Town, and about to come to France;" and as the Niagara left the United States the end of the following month, it might be not unnaturally inferred that she was dispatched to Europe in consequence of these tidings, and hence that she was sent in pursuit of the Alabama; but a dispatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams of the 28th May, when that of the 28th April must have been received, effectually disposes of this hypothesis. "The Niagara," Mr. Seward stated, "will go to Europe on Wednesday next. We have adopted this policy, not alone on account of the naval expeditions with which we are threatened from British ports," but also because we have not been able to procure entirely satisfactory assurances from the French Government," &c., about the vessels building at Bordeaux. Mr. Adams had, two days before, (26th,) written to Mr. Seward to this effect: "My impression is that hereafter the base will be substantially transferred to the other side of the Channel," and he also refers to the four vessels in process of construction in France.3 Attention has been already called by the committee to the Niagara being "without orders." Mr. Harvey, the United States minister at Lisbon, writing to Mr. Seward on the 29th November, 1864, confirmed this curious and important fact in these terms: "In saying that I refer to the fact that the Niagara has been practically tied up for several months at Flushing, Antwerp, and the British colonies," (query, Channel,) "and, as is understood, waiting for orders which are to regulate her further movements." 774 Can it still, in the face of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, be seriously contended that from 30th May, 1864, to the 20th September, 1865, the Niagara "was cruising in the North Atlantic in search of the Alabama and Florida?" MONEY CLAIMS-FURTHER ABATEMENTS SUGGESTED. Where none are suggested the cruisers are not named. TUSCARORA. It has been already shown that she never went to the West Indies in pursuit of the Alabama and Florida, and consequently the amounts which were considered admissible, upon the hypothesis of the admiralty report, under the belief that she had carried out her orders, should be abated as follows: 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864-65, Part i, p. 641. 2 Ibid., part ii., p. 60. At this time the only Confederate cruiser in a British port of the whole of those named in the United States Case was the Georgia, then dismantled, and known to be for sale; consequently, the "naval expeditions" which Mr. Seward was apprehensive of could not have consisted of any of the Confederate cruisers, which, by any possibility, could be considered to come within the purview of the treaty of Washington. 3 Ibid., Part ii, p. 29. 4 Ibid., Part iv, p. 325. |