Webb, the United States minister at Rio, by a Mr. Grebert, an "intelligent German gentlemen," that the Mohican had been in sight of the Georgia off St. Vincent, but it would not appear that she followed her up. Mr. Grebert stated, "We were informed at Saint Vincent, Cape de Verds, that a few days before our arrival, a steamer had appeared in sight of the port, but had immediately disappeared. It is supposed that this steamer must have been a secessionist privateer." Mr. Grebert had previously said that the Mohican was at Saint Vincent, and that he "there gathered information that in the neighboring waters another vessel of war was cruising, supposed to be the Vanderbilt ;" but at that time the Vanderbilt was Admiral Wilkes's flag-ship in the West Indies. Mr. Grebert arrived at Bahia on 14th May, and there "an officer of the Georgia told me that the Georgia had been seen at Saint Vincent; but went higher up, (qy. to a higher latitude?) when she discovered the Mohican in the port of Saint Vincent."

It is, therefore, very probable that the steamer supposed to have been the Vanderbilt was the Georgia, and that the Georgia made out the Mohican in the harbor, although the latter failed to see the Georgia.

Mr. Webb, in a letter to Mr. Seward of 23d June, 1863, showed evidently that he was not satisfied with the zeal shown on another occasion by the Mohican, though he suggested that her commander "may have been misled by some cunningly devised report." He indulged in the hope that the converted merchant sailing-vessel Onward might be more successful than the Mohican had been in the search for the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, all then on the coast of Brazil.

SHENANDOAH.

"The United States, as to the Shenandoah, make the same statement which they have already made in reply to the statements of Her Majesty's Government touching attempts to intercept or capture the Georgia."-United States Counter Case, sec. viii, par. 5.

No mention is made, in the Synopsis of Orders, of this ship; and it is nowhere stated that any United States vessel was ever sent in search of her.

Without again going over the same ground with regard to the Niag ara, Sacramento, &c., it may be confidently stated that the Iroquois was the only vessel which, it could possibly be suggested, was ever in pursuit of the Shenandoah.

Putting aside, for the moment, the fact of her orders referring to "rebel privateers" generally, a comparison of dates and a slight examination of facts will show that this ship's actual proceedings had no reference whatever to the Shanandoah.

TheIroquois received her orders "to leave European waters, and cruise off Madeiras, Brazil, Cape of Good Hope, and to Batavia, East Indies, for rebel privateers," about the middle of September, 1864.

These orders from the Secretary of the Navy would, therefore, probably have been dated about the 1st September. It was then known at Washington that the only Confederate cruiser at sea was the Florida, the fate of the Alabama, and the sale as a merchant-ship, though not the capture, of the Georgia, being also known to the Navy Department; her capture must, however, have been known to the Iroquois when the

orders reached her.

The Iroquois left Portsmouth on the 17th September, 1864, and finally Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 282. 2 Ibid., p. 287.

quitted England on the 23d September, having gone to Dover to provision.1

She was then stated by her Captain to be "about to sail for a station remote from the shores of Europe." 2

At this time nothing was known of the Sea King, or Shenandoah; no mention was made of her until six weeks afterward, when Mr. Dayton, writing from Paris, informed Mr. Seward that he had advised Captain Craven, of the Niagara, not to follow the Sea King, as he had "little confidence" in the reliability of the reports from Mr. Morse, the consul in London; this was ten days before any communication was made respecting her by the United States Legation to Earl Russell.

3

The Shenandoah was commissioned at Desertas on the 20th October, made several prizes off the Coast of Brazil, then proceeded to Melbourne without touching at any port en route, and arrived there on the 25th January, 1865; she, however, called off the Island of Tristan d'Acunha, and landed some crews of prizes she had taken and destroyed.1

On the day following her arrival at Melbourne the Mail left for Europe, taking without doubt newspapers giving accounts of her arrival, as well as the reports to that effect which the United States Consul stated he then sent to Mr. Adams, and to the United States Consul at Hong-Kong.

The Iroquois, following out her orders, was at Table Bay 9th January, 1865, and at Mauritius 29th January, 1865.6

As it could not have been known at either of these ports at the respective dates that the Shenandoah had gone to the eastward of the Cape, it is clear that, not only could the Iroquois' orders have had up to this date no reference to the Shenandoah, but that her movements could not have been influenced by any tidings she could have heard at either of these places of that vessel's movements.

It is true that the Iroquois is reported to have called at Tristan d'Acunha on her way from the Brazils, and taken the crews of the prizes, who had been left there by the Shenandoah, to the Cape, but it is hardly probable they were able to give the commander of the Iroquois any clue to the Shenandoah's future proceedings, and, in fact, the Iroquois was officially reported as having left the Cape for Batavia, showing that no deviation from her orders was then contemplated in consequence of any such clue. She coaled neither at the Cape nor at the Mauritius, although three months had elapsed since she had been to a British port; hence it may be inferred she was not pressing on in actual pursuit of any particular ship, but was making her passages leisurely under sail. It is not probable that the Iroquois, on arrival at Ceylon on the 17th February, received any special orders from the Navy Department relative to the Shenandoah, as on the 14th of the previous month Mr. Seward had officially informed Her Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires at Washington that "a reliable representation" had been made to the Department "that the Shenandoah will be found in the neighborhood of Bermuda."7 Again, Mr. Seward, in writing to Mr. Adams nearly a fortnight later (on the 27th) upon the subject of the Shenandoah's captures off the coast of Brazil, made no reference to special orders being sent to any cruisers,

8

nor is any mention made in the synopsis of further orders being sent to the Iroquois, as in other cases when the cruisers received fresh in structions.

Had she obtained any inkling from the crews of the prizes taken from Tristan d'Acunha that the Shenandoah was likely to have made the Straits of Malacca and their neighborhood her cruising-ground, it would seem to have been at once the proper and the natural course of the Commander of the Iroquois to have filled up with coals at the Cape, and pushed on forthwith to Batavia, replenished coal, and then to have proceeded to the Confederate cruiser's expected cruising-ground, within which, in three months from leaving the Cape, he could again have coaled either at Singapore or Penang.

It will have been seen that, on arriving at Ceylon, the Iroquois would probably have heard through the newspapers of the arrival of the Shenandoah at Melbourne. It would, however, seem that she staid there eight days to take in but 150 tons of coal; and, instead of proceeding at once to Melbourne, to endeavor, through personal communication with the United States Consul, to get on her track, the Iroquois went to Penang, from whence, on or about the 2d March, 1865, the senior British naval officer in the Straits of Malacca reported to his commander-inchief, Vice-Admiral Kuper, then in China, that "the United States sloop Iroquois has appeared at Penang, with the avowed intention of endeav oring to intercept the Confederate cruiser Shenandoah."

On the 29th May, 1865, she is reported to have been at Singapore, and still in search of the Confederate steamer Shenandoah.

She was thus probably for nearly three months in the Straits of Malacca and its neighborhood-in fact, near Batavia-the destination indicated in, and therefore it may be presumed obeying, her original orders, which, as before stated, could have had no reference to the Shenandoah.

In June or July she must have quitted her station, for on the 12th August, 1865, she was at the Cape on her way back to the United States. This step of returning homeward could have had no reference to the Shenandoah.

She called at St. Helena on the 25th August, 1865. While there, her commander informed the Governor that he had taken off from Tristan d'Acunha the people landed from the Shenandoah and conveyed them to the Cape of Good Hope in the early part of that year; and, also, that "he had been to the eastward in search of the Shenandoah, and believed she had proceeded to the Pacific, where it was to be apprehended she might do some mischief among the American whalers in those regions."

On a full review of these facts, and with the light thrown on the Iroquois's proceedings by this conversation of her commander with the Governor of St. Helena, it cannot be seriously contended she was ever in actual or even constructive pursuit of the Shenandoah. She left England with no such orders; it is not averred in terms that she or any other United States cruiser ever had such orders; she never deviated substantially from the orders laid down for her guidance before proceeding to her "distant station;" while on that distant station she never went far from Batavia, the final point named in her orders; and her commander avowed that he quitted the station with the belief (as was the fact) that the Shenandoah was destroying whalers in the Arctic seas. Surely no proceedings can be less unlike "pursuit" than those of the Iroquois; that her officers should, while in the Straits of Malacca, have named the Shenandoah as the then special object of their quest,

1

Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 229.

2 Ibid., vol. v, p. 229.

was natural, since she was then the only "rebel privateer" known to be in existence, and they would have said so in good faith, but of course with no notion that the whole cost of their cruise was to be eventually claimed from Great Britain. If such a claim were admissible, a similar claim would be equally admissible on account of every United States ship of war of sufficient force then in commission, since, if the Shenandoah had fallen in the way of any such ship, it would have been the duty of that ship, as it was that of the Iroquois, to capture her; but this is not, cannot be, "pursuit." It is therefore obvious, from this further investigation, that the Admiralty Committee were fully justified, on every ground, in considering as inadmissible the claim made on her account. The claim made in the United States Case for the pursuit of the Shenandoah, the asseveration in their Counter Case that "Her Majesty's Government is mistaken in its belief that no endeavor to intercept or capture the Shenandoah appeared to have been made by the Government of the United States," and the large sum involved in this claim, amounting, without interest, to no less than $329,865.08, will, it is hoped, afford good and substantial grounds for thinking that the labor and research expended in the investigation of this particular case have not been fruitless.

INADEQUACY AND WANT OF CONCERT OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE ABROAD, ETC.

The United States ministers abroad were constantly calling the attention of their Government to the inadequacy of their naval forces to arrest the career of the Confederate cruisers. Messrs. Adams, Dayton, Pike, Perry, Webb, Harvey,1 one and all at different times dwell on this theme; but when the letters on the subject (and many of the consuls made similar representations) were referred to Mr. Welles, he may be said to have acted always as if he regarded this question as wholly subordinate to that of the blockades; hence it is seen that the most suitable vessels were taken from the pursuit to re-enforce the blockading squadrons, without regard to the injury which the depredations of the Confederate cruisers were inflicting on the United States commerce. Sometimes he explained that it was want of men which prevented him from sending a greater force in pursuit;2 but with the number of seamen at his disposal, 28,000 in 1862 and 36,000 in 1863, exclusive of officers, this excuse would seem to be of little avail when the facts are sifted. However, besides this notorious inadequacy of force to compass the ends which it is submitted the United States Government ought to have had in view, and to have considered a necessary, if not the first, duty, there were other causes in operation which are disclosed sufficiently in the correspondence laid before Congress and the House of Representatives, and which tended to impair the efficiency of the small force detailed for this special service; they were

(A.) The absence of any communication to many of the different legations of the movements of the several men-of-war in European waters, of which there are many complaints.

(B.) The fact that there was no naval head or senior officer in European waters; each ship appeared to act independently and for itself; there was a consequent absence of all concerted action.

1 For instances, see Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862-'63, part ii, pp. 902, 980, 1278; 1864-'65, part iii, p. 323; part iv, pp. 275, 302, 319, 325; 1865-'66, part iii, p. 102. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864-'65, part iii, p. 42.

From these causes combined, which may be abundantly proved from the United States documents, and which were—

(a.) Insufficiency of force;

(b.) Ignorance of movements of the ships on the part of United States Ministers;

(c.) Independence of action on the part of each ship;

it may fairly be inferred that the United States Government did not "actively and diligently exert their naval power" to arrest the course of the Alabama or the other Confederate cruisers.

ERRORS IN THE SYNOPSIS OF ORDERS.

Frequent reference is made in the Report of the Admiralty Committee and its Appendices, as well as in this paper, to errors in the synopsis of orders; a few fresh illustrations may not be inapt:

(a.) The Chippewa is stated to have been watching the Sumter at Algeciras to the 30th May, 1863. Now not only, as is well known, had the Sumter left Gibraltar as an unarmed ship on the previous 8th of February,' but the Chippewa was herself with some of Admiral Wilkes's ships in the West Indies, at Cape Haytien, on the 21st May, 1863, and at Nassau, "from St. Thomas," on the 26th May.2 She had been at Cadiz on the 12th February, and again in March, and she was at Madeira in April; hence the synopsis must be in error in stating that she was watching the Sumter at Algeciras to the 30th May, 1863.

(b.) The Kearsarge.-In the admiralty report it has been noticed with reference to this ship's orders of 30th September, 1862, "to capture the Rappahannock or other rebel privateers in European waters," that the synopsis must be in error.

Mr. Welles, in his report of the 1st December, 1862, stated, at "last advices (she) was also in pursuit of the 290," (page 23.)

In the United States Case she is stated to have been at Gibraltar with the Tuscarora, watching the Sumter, and it is implied that this was continued till that vessel's sale.

3

The Kearsarge was, in fact, about the time to which Mr. Welles must have referred to, viz, on the 30th September and on 3d November, watching the Sumter at Gibraltar, and on the 4th November she was at Cadiz; she was certainly not in pursuit of the Alabama, which vessel was then in the West Indies.

(c.) Ino.-There is a claim on behalf of this sailing-ship for fifteen months for convoying the Aquila with the monitor Camanche on board. Now the Camanche, on the 1st February, 1863, was building at Jersey City, and on the 14th March of the following year, was at San Fran cisco, California. 4 It seems more probable that there is a further errror in the synopsis than that this service should have taken fifteen months to perform.

-

(d.) Juniata. From the synopsis of orders, the dates given, and the amount of the claim on her behalf, it would be inferred that this ship commenced her service with Admiral Wilkes's squadron on the 4th December, 1862; whereas she did not leave the United States for nearly five months after that date. A correspondent of the New York Herald, writing on the 22d January, 1863, says that the Juniata,

1 Appendix to British Case, vol. ii, p. 57.

2United States Navy Report, December, 1863, p. 557; Appendix to British Case, vol. V, p. 225. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 229.

3

4 United States Navy Registers for 1863 and 1864.