Majesty's Government, and these claims are refused to be made the subject of friendly but impartial examination." 1 The Stanley-John son convention. (e) In the summer of 1866 a change of Ministry took place in England, and Lord Stanley became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the place of Lord Clarendon. He took an early opportunity to give an intimation in the House of Commons that should the rejected claims be revived, the new Cabinet was not prepared to say what answer might be given them; in other words, that, should an opportunity be offered, Lord Russell's refusal might possibly be reconsidered. Mr. Seward met these overtures by instructing Mr. Adams, on the 27th of August, 1866, "to call Lord Stanley's attention, in a respectful but earnest manner," to "a summary of claims of citizens of the United States, for damages which were suffered by them during the period of the civil war," and to say that the Government of the United States, "while it thus insists upon these particular claims, is neither desirous nor willing to assume an attitude unkind and unconciliatory toward Great Britain." He also said that he thought that Her Majesty's Government could not reasonably object to acknowledge the claims.2 Lord Stanley met this overture by a communication to Sir Frederick Bruce, in which he denied the liability of Great Britain, and assented to a reference, "provided that a fitting Arbitrator can be found, and that an agreement can be come to as to the points to which the arbitration shall apply.3 A long negotiation ensued. In the course of it Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams thus, on the 22d of May, 1867: As the case now stands, the injuries by which the United States are aggrieved are not chiefly the actual losses sustained in the several depredations, but the first unfriendly or wrongful proceeding of which they are but the consequences. (f) These negotiations were conducted in London, partly by Lord Stanley and partly by Lord Clarendon, on the British side, and partly by Mr. Adams and partly by Mr. Reverdy Johnson, on the American side. In Washington Mr. Seward remained the Secretary of State. Great Britain was there represented, first by Sir Frederick Bruce, and afterward by Sir Edward Thornton. (g) As the first result of these negotiations, a convention known as the Stanley-Johnson convention was signed at London on the 10th of November, 1868. It proved to be unacceptable to the Government of the United States. Negotiations were at once resumed, and resulted on the 14th of January, 1869, in the Treaty known as the John- The Johnson-Clarson-Clarendon convention. endon convention. (h) This latter convention provided for the organization of a mixed commission with jurisdiction over "all claims on the part of citizens of the United States upon the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, including the so-called Alabama claims, and all claims on the part of subjects of Her Britannic Majesty upon the Government of the United States which may have been presented to either Government for its interposition with the other since the 26th July, 1853, and which yet remain unsettled.” 4 Lord Granville subsequently said, in the House of Lords, of these two conventions, "the former convention provided (Article IV) that the Commissioners shall have the power to adjudicate upon the class of claims referred to in the official corre- to the extent of Alaspondence between the two Governments as the Alabama Lord Ganville thinks it admits unlimited argument as bama claims. Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, Feb. 14, 1866, vol. iii, Am. App., p. 628. 3 Ibid., p. 652. 2 Am. App., vol. iii, pp. 632-636. Am. App. vol. iii, pp. 752, 753. claims. The latter (Article I) provided that all claims on the part of subjects of Her Britannic Majesty upon the Government of the United States, and all claims on the part of the citizens of the United States upon the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, including the so-called Alabama claims, shall be referred to commissioners, &c. Both conventions purposely avoided defining what constituted the Alabama claims, and admitted almost unlimited argument as to what the Alabama claims were. Both conventions were also open to the objection (at that time unavoidable) that there was no check on the award of the final Arbitrator, who might have given damages to any amount." It is clear, therefore, that up to the conclusion of the JohnsonClarendon treaty in January, 1869, there was no doubt in England that the term "Alabama claims" was understood as including the claims for the national injuries. The convention not United States. (i) It was supposed in America that it was not stated in sufficiently unequivocal terms in the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty that the acceptable to the national claims should be considered by the Arbitrators; and there were many signs that the Treaty, in consequence of that belief, would not receive the assent of the Senate. Mr. Reverdy Johnson, hearing of this, wrote an elaborate defense of himself, which has been seized upon by Her Majesty's Government as proof that the United States had at no time claimed to receive indemnity for the national injuries which they have suffered. But the foregoing résumé of correspondence between the two Governments shows that, if Mr. Johnson made such a statement, he did it under a misapprehension. The error was never communicated to Her Majesty's Governforms Lord Claren- ment. On the contrary, only a few days later he wrote to States have claims of Lord Clarendon in exactly the opposite sense. He said, referring to a claims convention between the two Governments in 1853, "At that time neither Government, as such, made a demand upon the other; but that, as my proposition assumes, is not the case now. The Government of the United States believes that it has in its own right a claim upon the Government of Great Britain."2 Mr. Johnson in don that the United their own on Great Britain (j) Her Majesty's Government also received the same intelligence about that time from other sources. ton advises Lord Clarendon that the "3 Its Minister at Washington, on the 2d of February, 1869, communicated to it the action of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Mr. Sumner," he said, "brought forward the above-mentioned convention, and after making a short comment upon its contents, and stating that it covered none of the principles for which the United States had always contended, recommended that the committee should advise the Senate to refuse their sanction to its ratification. Mr. Sumner was authorized to report in that sense to the Senate." On the 19th of Sir Edward Thorn April Mr. Thornton also advised Lord Clarendon of the rejection of the Treaty. "Your Lordship perceives," he said, convention is reject that the sum of Mr. Sumner's assertion is that England * is responsible for the property destroyed by the Alabama and other Confederate cruisers, and even for the remote damage to American shipping interests, including the increase in the rate of insurance; that the Confederates were so much assisted by being able to get arms and ammunition from England, and so much encouraged by the Queen's Proclamation, that the war lasted much longer than it would otherwise have done, and that we ought therefore to pay imaginary additional expenses imposed upon the United States by the prolongation of the war."4 ed because it is thought that it does * not include the indirect claims. 1 Hansard, ubi supra. 2 Am. App., vol. iii, p. 780. 3 Ibid., p. 772. (k.) This may be called the end of the second stage of the history of the negotiations. It commenced with an intimation from Great Britain that a proposal from the United States would be listened to. In its progress negotiations were opened, which ended in a convention provid-ing for the submission of claims of citizens of the United States against Great Britain, including the Alabama claims. This convention, in the opinion of Lord Granville, admitted unlimited argument as to what the Alabama claims were. The Treaty was rejected by the Senate of the United States, because, although it made provision for the part of the Alabama claims which consisted of claims for individual losses, the provision for the more extensive national losses was not satisfactory to the Senate. It is clear that, by this time, if not before, the phrase "Alabama claims" was understood on both sides as representing all the claims against Great Britain, "growing out of" its conduct toward the United States during the insurrection. A portion of these claims had been, throughout the discussions by Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams, grounded on the unnecessary Proclamation recognizing the insurgents as belligerents. The remainder rested on the acts of the cruisers. All were alike known as Alabama claims. Mr. Motley informs the United States do not abandon the national claims. Lord Clarendon that which At this stage of the history, General Grant became President. On the 15th of May following Mr. Fish instructed Mr. Motley to say to Lord Clarendon that the United States in rejecting the Treaty abandoned neither its own claims nor those of its citizens." Again, on the 25th of the following September, Mr. Motley was instructed by Mr. Fish in a dispatch, of which a copy was to be given to Lord Clarendon, to say that the Presi dent concurred with the Senate in disapproving the convention had been rejected; that "he thought the provisions of that convention were inadequate to provide reparation for the United States, in the manner and to the degree to which he considered the United States were entitled to redress;" but that "he was not prepared to pronounce on the question of the indemnities which he thought due to individual citizens of the United States nor of the reparation which he thought due by the British Government for the larger account of the vast national injuries it had inflicted on the United States." 2 And that the John so-Clarendon con vention did not afford sufficient redress tor the national injuries. The indirect claims as considered by Lord Clarendon. In an elaborate paper styled "Observations" upon Mr. Fish's dispatch to Mr. Motley, of the 25th of September, 1869, which was appended to Lord Clarendon's dispatches of November 6, 1869, to Sir Edward Thornton, the subject of the national, now called indirect, claims was fully considered in a way which must satisfy the Arbitrators that the British Government understood the nature, character, and extent of those claims. It is difficult when reading these observations, and the dispatch which called them out, to understand how Lord Granville could commit himself to the statement, in one of his recent dispatches, that "There was not a word in any letter_preceding the Treaty to suggest any indirect or constructive claims; and the only intimation the British Government had had was from the speech of Mr. Sumner.”3 It seems to us that these incidents are decisive of the whole controversy. (1) In the following December the President thus alluded to the subjeet in his annual message to Congress : Am. App., vol. vi, p. 1. Appendix to British Case, vol. iv, No. 1, p. 19. 2 Ibid., p. 13. заде December, 1869. The provisions [of the Treaty] were wholly inadequate for the settlement of the grave wrongs that have been sustained by this Government as well as President's mes- by its citizens. The injuries resulting to the United States by reason of ber, Congress, the course adopted by Great Britain during our late civil war; in the increased rates of insurance, in the diminution of exports and imports, and other obstructions to domestic industry and production; in its effects upon the foreign commerce of the country; in the decrease of the transfer to Great Britain of our commercial marine; in the prolongation of the war; and the increased cost (both in treasure and lives) of its suppression; could not be adjusted and satisfied as ordinary commercial claims which continually arise between commercial nations. And yet the convention treated them simply as such ordinary claims, from which they differ more widely in the gravity of their character than in the magnitude of their amount, great as is that difference. Same in 1870. And still again, in his annual message to Congress in December, 1870, the President referred to the subject with similar precision and particularity of statement, as cited in a previous part of the present Argument.1 claims were under stood to include all Britain, both national It cannot, therefore, be doubted that, in the beginning of the year In January, 1871, 1871, it was well understood by both Governments that the the words Alabama United States maintained that Her Majesty's Government claims of the United Ought, under the laws of nations, to make good to them the States against Great losses which they had suffered by reason of the acts of all and individual. thecruisers, typically represented by the Alabama-whether those losses were caused by the destruction of vessels and their cargoes; by the prolongation of the war; by the transfer of the commerce of the United States to the British flag; by the increased rates of insurance during the war; by the expense of the pursuit of the cruisers; or by any other of the causes enumerated in the President's message to Congress in 1869. Nor can it be doubted that they intended to reserve the right to maintain the justice of all these claims when opportunity should offer, nor that they regarded all these several classes of losses as embraced within the terms of the general generic phrase "Alabama claims." It is also equally clear that, the claims for compensation founded upon the Queen's Proclamation were abandoned by President Grant. Negotiations open (m) At that time, the condition of Europe induced Her Majesty's Ministers to consider the condition of the foreign relations of ed at Washington.. the Empire. They found that their relations with the United States were not such as they would desire to have them; and they induced a gentleman, who enjoyed the confidence of both Cabinets, to visit Washington for the purpose, in a confidential inquiry, of deter mining whether those relations could be improved. 2 Reasons which in (n) It was not the first time that Great Britain had had duced those negotia cause solicitously to ask herself whether she might not have need of the good will of the United States. tions. At the opening of the war between France and Great Britain on the one hand, and Russia on the other, the Emperor Napoleon found himself greatly embarrassed by England's traditional attitude of exigency toward neutrals, so contrary to the traditional policy of France. The Foreign Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, labored in correspondence with the British Government to induce the latter to relinquish her own policy and accept that of France. To effect this object, the great lever em ployed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys was the apprehension entertained in Great Britain of the possible attitude of the United States. He explains the matter as follows: Ce qui touchait particulièrement le gouvernement anglais, c'était la crainte de voir l'Amérique incliner contre nous et prêter à nos ennemis le concours de ses hardis voAnte, p. 18. 2 Statement by Lord Granville, Hansard, vol. cevi, p. 1842. lontaires. La population maritime des Etats-Unis, leur marine entreprenante, pouvaient fournir à la Russie les éléments d'une flotte de corsaires, qui, attachés à son service par des lettres de marque, et couvrant les mers comme d'un résean, harcèleraient et poursuivraient notre commerce jusque dans les parages les plus reculés. Pour prévenir ce danger, le cabinet de Londres tenait beaucoup à se concilier les bonnes dispositions du gouvernement fédéral. Il avait conçu l'idée de lui proposer, en même temps qu'au gouvernement français et à tous les états maritimes, la conclusion d'un arrangement, ayant pour but la suppression de la course et permettant de traiter comme pirate quiconque, en temps de guerre, serait trouvé muni de lettres de marque. Ce projet, qui fut abandonné dans la suite, témoigne de l'inquiétude éprouvée par les Anglais.' How M. Drouyn de Lhuys worked on this state of mind of the British Government appears by the following extract from a dispatch from him to the French Minister at London, M. Walewski: Les Etats-Unis enfin sont prêts, je ne saurais en douter, à revendiquer le rôle que nous déclinerions et à se faire les protecteurs des neutres, qui eux-mêmes recherchent leur appui. Le cabinet de Washington nous propose en ce moment de signer un traité d'amitié, de navigation et de commerce, où il a inséré une série d'articles destinés à affirmer avec une autorité nouvelle les principes qu'il a toujours soutenus et qui ne different pas des nôtres. Le principal secrétaire d'état de sa Majesté britannique comprendra que nous n'aurions aucun moyen de ne pas répondre favorablement à l'ouverture qui nous est faite, si la France et l'Angleterre, bien que se trouvant engagées dans une même entreprise, affichaient publiquement des doctrines opposées. Que les deux gouvernements, au contraire, s'entendent sur les termes d'une déclaration commune, et nous pouvons alors ajourner l'examen des propositions des Etats-Unis. Il me paraît difficile que ces considérations ne frappent pas l'esprit de Lord Clarendon.2 These and like representations on the part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, induced Great Britain to come to an arrangement with France. (0) Not insensible to such motives, Lord Granville, pending the late war between France and Germany, dispatched a confidential agent to America to re-open negotiations with the United States. Preliminary propo ence. This gentleman arrived in Washington early in January, 1871, and found the Government of the United States so disposed to meet the advances of Her Majesty's government that, before sals and correspond the end of the month, Sir Edward Thorton was able to propose to Mr. Fish "the appointment of a Joint High Commission" to "treat of and discuss the mode of settling the different questions which have arisen out of the fisheries," &c.3 the Alabama claims. ,,, Mr. Fish replied, accepting the proposition upon condition that "the differences which arose during the Rebellion in the United The proposed com States, and which have existed since then, growing out of mission to treat of the acts committed by the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generically known as the 'Alabama claims,' should also be "treated of by the proposed Joint High Commission."4 Sir Edward Thornton, on the 1st of February, answered that "it would give Her Majesty's Government great satisfaction if the claims were submitted to the consideration of the same High Commission." The President of the United States, under the provisions of the Constitution, nominated to the Senate for its approval five United States comcommissioners to serve in the Joint High Commission on the missioners appointed part of the United States, and transmitted to the Senate correspondence, and the correspondence between Mr. Fish and Sir Edward by it. Thornton, to explain the proposed duties of the nominees. Upon this explanation the Senate gave its assent to the several appointments; and thereupon the appointees each received a commission authorizing him "to treat and discuss the mode of settlement of the different ques 'Drouyn de Lhuys, Les neutres pendant la guerre d'Orient, p. 14. Ibid., p. 28. 3 Brit. App., vol. iv, paper ii, p. 1. and confirmed on the their powers limited 4 Ibid. |