SOLDIERY-NOBILITY-REPRESENTATIVE PARLIAMENTS. 13

ever be interposed for the benefit of the nation, and will merely operate to prevent the king from doing any thing to the prejudice or oppression of the soldiery themselves. When civilization has made a little further progress, a number of the leaders of the army, or their descendants, acquire landed property, and associate together, not merely in their military capacity, but as guardians of their new acquisitions and hereditary dignities. Their soldiers become their vassals in time of peace; and the real power of the State is gradually transferred from the hands of detached and mercenary battalions, to those of a Feudal Nobility. The check on the royal authority comes then to lie in the refusal of this body to co-operate in such of his measures as do not meet with their approbation; and the king can now do nothing to the prejudice of the order of Nobility. The body of the people fare a little better under the operation of this check; because their interest is much more identified with that of their feudal lords, than with that of a standing army of regular or disorderly forces.

As society advances in refinement, and the arts of peace are developed, men of the lower orders assemble, and fortify themselves in Towns and Cities, and thus come to acquire a power independent of their patrons. Their consent also accordingly becomes necessary to the development of the public authority within their communities; and hence another check to what is called the power of the sovereign. And, finally, to pass over some intermediate stages, when society has attained its full measure of civility and intelligence, and is filled from top to bottom with wealth and industry, and reflection ; when every thing that is done or felt by any one class, is communicated on the instant to all the rest,-and a vast proportion of the whole population takes an interest in the fortunes of the country, and possesses a certain intelligence as to the public conduct of its rulers, then the substantial power of the nation may be said to be vested in the Nation at large; or at least in those individuals who can habitually command the good-will and support of the greater part of them;-and

14

GREAT PROBLEM, TO MAKE VIRTUAL POWER

the ultimate check to the power of the sovereign comes to consist in the general unwillingness of The People to comply with those orders, which, if at all united in their resolution, they may now effectually disobey and resist. This check, when applied at all, is likely, of course, to be applied for the general good; and, though the same in substance with those which have been already considered, namely, the refusal of those in whom the real power is vested, to lend it to the monarch for purposes which they do not approve, is yet infinitely more beneficial in its operation, in consequence of the more fortunate position of those to whom that power now belongs.

Thus we see that Kings have no power of their own; and that, even in the purest despotisms, they are the mere organs or directors of that power which they who truly possess the physical and intellectual force of the nation may choose to put at their disposal; and are at all times, and under every form of monarchy, entirely under the control of that only virtual and effective power. There is at bottom, therefore, no such thing, as an unlimited monarchy; or indeed as a monarchy that is potentially either more or less limited than every other. other. All kings must act by the consent of that order or portion of the nation which can really command all the rest, and may generally do whatever these substantial masters do not disapprove of: But as it is their power which is truly exerted in the name of the sovereign, so, it is not so much a necessary consequence as an identical proposition to say, that where they are clearly opposed to the exercise of that power, the king has no means whatever of asserting the slightest authority. This is the universal law indeed of all governments; and though the different constitution of society, in the various stages of its gress, may give a different character to the controlling power, the principles which regulate its operation are substantially the same in all. There is no room, therefore, for the question, whether there should be any control on the power of a king, or what that control should be; because, as the power really is not the king's, but belongs in

pro

ACT READILY ON EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES.

15

alienably to the stronger part of the nation itself, whether it derive that strength from discipline, talents, numbers, or situation, it is impossible that it should be exercised at his instigation, without the concurrence, or acquiescence at least, of those in whom it is substantially vested.

Such, then, is the abstract and fundamental doctrine as to the true nature of Monarchical, and indeed of every other species of Political power; and, abstract as it is, we cannot help thinking that it goes far to settle all controversies as to the rights of sovereigns, and ought to be kept clearly in mind in proceeding to the more practical views of the subject. For, though what we have now said as to all actual power belonging to the predominant mass of physical and intellectual force in every community, and the certainty of its ultimately impelling the public authority in the direction of its interests and inclinations, be unquestionably true in itself; it is still of infinite importance to consider what provisions are made by the form of the government, or what is called its Constitution, for the ready operation of those interests and inclinations upon the immediate agents of the public authority. That they will operate with full effect in the long-run, whether those provisions be good or bad, or whether there be any such provision formally recognised in the government or not, we take to be altogether indisputable: But, in the one case, they will operate only after long intervals of suffering,—and by means of much suffering; while, on the other, they will be constantly and almost insensibly in action, and will correct the first declination of the visible index of public authority, from the natural line of action of the radical power of which it should be the exponent, or rather will prevent any sensible variation or disconformity in their respective movements. The whole difference, indeed, between a good and a bad government, appears to us to consist in this particular, viz. in the greater or the less facility which it affords for the early, the gradual and steady operation of the substantial Power of the community upon its constituted Authorities; while the freedom, again, and ultimate happiness of the nation depend on the degree in which this substantial

16

REAL EVIL OF DESPOTISM, WHAT;

power is possessed by a greater or a smaller, and a more or less moral and instructed part of the whole society. a matter almost independent of the form or name of the government, and determined in a great degree by the progress which the society itself has made in civilisation and refinement.

Thus, to take the most abominable of all governments -a ferocious despotism, such as that of Morocco-where an Emperor, in concert with a banditti of armed ruffians, butchers, plunders, and oppresses the whole unarmed population,the check to the monarchical power is complete, even there, in the disobedience or dissatisfaction of the banditti; although, from the character of that body, it affords but little protection to the community, and, from the want of any contrivance for its early or systematic operation, can scarcely ever be applied, even for its own objects, but with irreparable injury to both the parties concerned. As there is no arrangement by which the general sense of this lawless soldiery can be collected, upon any proposed measures of their leader, or the moment ascertained when the degree of his oppression exceeds that of their patience, they never begin to act till his outrages have gone far beyond what was necessary to decide their resistance; and accordingly, he on the one hand, goes on decapitating and torturing, for months after all the individuals, by whose consent alone he was enabled to take this amusement, were truly of opinion that it should have been discontinued; and, on the other, receives the intimation at last, not in the form of a remonstrance, upon which he might amend, but in the shape of a bowstring, a dose of poison, or a stroke of the dagger. Thus, from the mere want of any provision for ascertaining the sentiments of the individuals possessing the actual power of the state, or for communicating them to the individual appointed to Administer it, infinite evils result to both parties. The first suffer intolerable oppressions before they feel such confidence in their unanimity as to interfere at all; and then, they do it at last, in the form of brutal violence and vindictive infliction. Every admonition, in short, given to their elected leader is preceded by their suffering, and followed by his death; and every appli

AND OF FEUDAL ARISTOCRACIES.

17

cation of the check which nature itself has provided for the abuse of all delegated power, is accompanied by a total dissolution of the government, and the hazard of a long series of revolutionary tumults.

This is the history of all Military despotisms, in barbarous and uninstructed communities. When they get on to Feudal aristocracies, matters are a little mended; both by the transference of the actual power to a larger and worthier body, and by the introduction of some sort of machinery or contrivance, however rude, to ensure or facilitate the operation of this power upon the ostensible agents of the government. The person of the Sovereign is now surrounded by some kind of Council or parliament; and threats and remonstrances are addressed to him, with considerable energy, by such of its members as take offence at the measures he proposes. Such, however, is the imperfection of the means devised for these communications, and such the difficulty of collecting the sentiments of those who can make them with effect, that this necessary operation is still performed in a very clumsy and hazardous manner. These are the times, accordingly, when Barons enter their protests, by openly waging war on their Sovereign, or each other; and, even when they are tolerably agreed among themselves, can think of no better way of controlling or enlightening their monarch, than by marching down in arms to Runnymede, and compelling him, by main force, and in sight of all his people, to sign a charter of their liberties. The evils, in short, are the same in substance as in the sanguinary revolutions of Morocco. The mischief goes to a dangerous length before any remedy is applied; and the remedy itself is a great mischief: Although, from the improved state of intelligence and civilization, the outrages are not on either side so horrible.

The next stage brings us to commercial and enlightened times, in which the real strength and power of the nation is scattered pretty widely through the whole of its population, and in which, accordingly, the check upon the misapplication of that power must arise from the dissatisfaction of that great body. The check must