ENGLISH LINE OF BATTLE ON THE 22D OF JULY, 1805.

After a sharp contest against a superior force, with the weather gage in their favour, which continued until dark, two sail of the line, the Rafael of eighty-four, and the Firme of seventy-four, guns, were both captured. Here follows an account of the engagement, as contained in the official letter, addressed to Admiral Cornwallis: the paragraphs suppressed in the Gazette will be found marked in italics.

"Sir,

"Prince of Wales, 23d July, Ferrol bearing E. distance forty-nine leagues, Cape Finisterre S. fifty-two E. distance thirty-nine leagues.

25th July.

"Yesterday, at noon, I was favoured with a view of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of twenty sail of the line, also three large ships armed en flute, of about fifty guns each, with five frigates, and three brigs.

"The force under my direction, at this time, consisting of fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger; I

immediately stood towards the enemy with the squadron, making the needful signals for battle in the closest order; and on closing with them, I made the signal for attacking their centre. When I had reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession; this brought us close up under their lee: and when our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession: this obliged me again to make the same manœuvre, by which I brought on a very decisive action, which lasted upwards of four hours, when I found it necessary to bring the squadron to, to cover the captured ships, whose names are in the margin.

"I have to observe, the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather. During the whole day the weather had been foggy at times: a great part of the morning, and very soon after we had brought them to action, the fog was so thick, at intervals, that we could with great difficulty see the ship ahead or astern of us. This rendered it impossible to take the advantage of the enemy by signals, as I could wish to have done. Had the weather been more favourable, I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete.

"I have very great pleasure in saying every ship exerted itself, and was conducted in the most masterly style; and I beg leave here publicly to return to rear-admiral Stirling, and every captain, officer, and man, whom I had the honour to command on that day, my most grateful thanks for their very conspicuous, gallant, and very judicious good conduct. The honourable captain Gardner, of the Hero, led the van squadron in a most masterly and officer-like manner: to whom I feel myself particularly indebted, as also to captain Cuming for his assistance during the action. Inclosed is a list of the killed and wounded on board the different ships. If I may judge from the great slaughter on board the captured ships, the enemy must have suffered greatly. They are now in sight to windward; and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any opportunity. that may offer to give you some further account of these combined squadrons. At the same time, it will behove me to be upon

my guard against the combined squadrons at Ferrol, as I am led to believe they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron. I have the honour to be, with great respect and regard, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

“The Hon. Admiral Cornwallis, &c."

"ROBERT CALDER.

"P.S. I am under the necessity of sending the Windsor Castle to you, in consequence of the damage she sustained in the action. Captain Buller has acquainted me, that the prisoners on board the prizes assert Ferrol to be the port to which the enemy's squadron are bound, as you will perceive by letters inclosed with my original dispatch, together with other private information."

The conduct of Sir Robert Calder on this occasion, appears to have obtained the full approbation of his commander in chief, for he soon after dispatched him on purpose to cruize off Cadiz, with a considerable squadron, in order to watch the motions of the enemy. But the success did not appear sufficiently brilliant to the Lords of the Admiralty of that day, who had been accustomed to the most fortunate and decisive results, although the nation appeared to be perfectly satisfied with an action which had deprived a superior fleet of two sail of line of battle ships, and discomfited all further attempts on the part of the enemy.

However, on learning that he had been attacked in the most cruel and unmerited manner by some of the English newspapers, Sir Robert Calder, in a dispatch to the Admiralty, dated October 2, 1805, requested that an enquiry might immediately take place, respecting his conduct during the late action, "for the purpose," observes he, "of enabling me to give my reasons publicly for my conduct at that time, and to refute all unjust, illiberal, and unfounded assertions; when I trust," it is added, "I shall make it appear to the satisfaction

of my king, country, and friends, that no part of my conduct and character will be found deserving of those illiberal impressions, which at present occupy the public mind; being conscious that every thing in my power, was done for the honour and welfare of my king and country, after a very minute investigation of all the existing circumstances, and the critical situation I was placed in with the squadron I had the honour to command at the time alluded to."

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This request having been acceded to by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a court martial assembled on board the Prince of Wales, in Portsmouth Harbour, on Monday, December 23, 1805. Admiral Montague having been nominated President, the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution were called in, sworn, and examined; after which Sir Robert Calder's defence was read. In the course of this, he contended, that he was fully justifiable in not renewing the action, even had he been able so to do, as this might not only have endangered the safety of his own fleet, but eventually that of the country itself. "I am ready to admit," adds he, "that it is so much the duty of an officer to engage the enemy wherever he meets with them, that it is incumbent upon him to explain, satisfactorily, why he does not; but in making that explanation, it is not necessary for him to prove the physical impossibility of doing so. It may be possible, and yet there may be very many reasons why he should not. Indeed, the absurdity of a contrary opinion is such, that it would be an idle waste of time to trouble the court with any observations upon it.

"It will, however, be permitted to observe that mine is not the only instance where a British fleet has laid in sight of that of the enemy without renewing an engagement.

"In proof of this assertion, if it be necessary, I need only recal to your memory, out of many others, the example of two very great and gallant officers, who, after having obtained most brilliant victories over the enemy, did not think themselves justified in bringing them a second time to action, although they were in sight of them fully as long as I was. The two meritorious officers to whom I allude are Earl Howe,

in the action of the 1st of June, 1794; and Earl St. Vincent, in that of the 27th of February, 1797. Of the latter I am competent to speak from my own knowledge, having had the honour to serve under his lordship as captain of the fleet in that engagement.

"Of the propriety of the conduct of these noble lords, in both instances, no doubt has at any moment been entertained by any body. They certainly exercised a sound discretion upon the occasion; but it may not be improper for me to remark, that although the advantages they had acquired were certainly superior to mine, that mine was a situation in which it was in every respect more necessary to exercise that discretion, which, in every case, must be vested in the commander of a squadron, to judge of the propriety or impropriety of offering battle to a superior fleet. In the instances abovementioned there was no other force to contend with, no other quarter from which an attack was to be apprehended, than the fleets which had been already engaged. In mine, it behoved me to be particularly on my guard against the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, consisting of twenty-one sail of the line, both which I had reason to believe were out, one of which appears to have been actually on the sea, and to which the squadron opposed to me might easily have given notice of their situation, as will be hereafter more fully stated."

The admiral then alluded to the action of the 22d, respecting which he observed, "that the victory certainly was ours, and most decisively so; and that he had only to lament that the weather did not afford an opportunity of making it more complete." The firing, he added, did not cease until half past nine o'clock, and before this his night signals were hoisted, it being then dark. The enemy were to windward a long cannon-shot, the evening was "foggy and dirty," the foretopmast of the Windsor Castle was shot away, and the other vessels were employed in repairing their losses, "and being then unacquainted," adds Sir Robert," with the state of the damages which the several ships had received, I did flatter myself that I should, the next morning, have been in a con