climate, it was left at the Cape, where there was nothing whatever for them to do, and the 17th, which was much inferior, as having many old men, was sent out directly to India, where cavalry was really useful. He therefore thought that the 21st dragoons was so employed, as to be lost to the general service of the country. He also wished to know why the expedition to the West Indies had been so long delayed, that the French had time to reinforce their islands? or rather, why such a force had not before been sent out, as would have been sufficient to drive them out of the West Indies altogether? The honourable General then took a review of the campaigns in Portugal and Spain. He blamed ministers extremely, for not sending a body of cavalry with the army to Portugal, and conceived, that for want of it, Sir Arthur Wellesley's army had been exposed to great danger in both of the actions he had fought. He also blamed the convention and the armistice, and conceived, that if Sir Arthur Wellesley had opposed them, they could not have been car ried into effect. As to the campain in Spain, he thought ministers were to blame in their constant system of superseding one officer by another. If Sir John Moore had retired to Portugal, he would have found himself there superseded by Sir John Cradock. He did not believe that such a circumstance would have weighed on the mind of Sir John Moore; but he thought ministers should not have arranged it so, that if Sir John Moore retired upon Portugal, which was decidedly the most advisable course, he should immediately find himself superseded

in his command.

The Secretary at War could not see that the country was deprived of the services of any one regiment by the arrangement alluded to, for if the 21st regiment had gone to India, the 17th would have been now at the Cape of Good Hope.

Sir A. Wellesley said, that he supposed the reason why the expedition to the West Indies did not sooner arrive. at its destination was, that they could not attempt any military operation there till after the rains, which lasted till the month of October. As to the campaign in Portugal, he could assign this reason why ministers did not think it necessary to send a large body of cavalry with his army. The expedition was originally intended for an attack of the forts upon the Tagus, in which attack

cavalry could be of little use. It was he who, upon his own reponsibility, changed that plan. The board of general officers had not thought his conduct censurable in that respect, but still he owed it to the House to assign his reasons, when called on, for taking the field without cavalry. He had relied upon being joined by a considerable body of Portuguese cavalry, but in that hope he had been disappointed. He denied, however, that his army had ever been in that danger which the honourable General supposed. He knew that the French could not have brought more than half their army against him, as part of them were on the other side of the Tagus, and a considerable proportion of them must necessarily be left for the defence of Lisbon, and the adjoining forts. He denied that any cavalry which the enemy could have brought up, would have turned the battle of Vimiera; or even if they had forced the front line there were no less than five brigades to resist them, half of which had not fired a single shot during the whole action. As to the supposition that his influence would have been sufficient to have prevented the armistice and the convention, he should only repeat what was in evidence before the board of inquiry, that he soon found that he had not the confidence of either Sir Harry Burrard or of Sir Hew Dalrymple. That to Sir Harry Burrard he recommended two distinct measures, which he was convinced would have been attended with the most important advantages, and that Sir Harry Burrard did not attend to his advice. It was true he approved of the principle of the armistice and convention, but he never approved of the terms or the tone of it, which he thought unsuitable to the actual situation of the two parties. Sir Hew Dalrymple, however, had decided on the terms of the armistice, and it was not his business to set himself up against his commanding officer. He could not do so as a gentleman, nor ought he to do so as an officer. The honourable General had certainly blamed ministers for what they were not all at responsible. His majesty's ministers were not to blame for what measures had been adopted and pursued by the several governments in Spain, nor were they answerable for the conduct of general officers whom they employed, and who, of course from the time they a cepted a command, acted on their own responsibility; mi nisters therefore were not blameable, because the British

army did not arrive in Spain before the Spanish armies were defeated, that being a circumstance which did not depend on them. The next he had to observe on was, the line of retreat the British army took; the honourable General had argued in favour of a retreat on Portugal. He (Sir Arthur Wellesley) did not know the reason why Sir J. Moore had preferred retreating to Corunna; but he had no doubt ihat gallant officer had a very good Generally speaking, a short line of retreat was preferable to a long one; but it must rest greatly on matter of opinion which of these was the best, in the case alluded to, and it could not be so well ascertained by any one as by those who had the conduct of it.

General Tarleton expressed his surprize that the gallant General opposite to him should have expected to have found any cavalry in Portugal that could be ser viceable. He (General Tarleton) had, about nine years ago, been sent to Portugal, not with any body of cavalry, but for the purpose of drilling the Portuguese cavalry, so that they might be able to act with the British. He could not, however, do any thing with them; when he spoke to the captains, they told him a company of cavalry was a very good thing, but not to fight. It brought each of them in a provision of 5001. a year-but how? not by fighting, but by letting their horses out to all the hackney coaches in Lisbon. Cavalry thus trained, and used only to harness in the streets of Lisbon, could not have proved of great service to the gallant General; and he was surprized he had not been better acquainted with them.

Mr. Whitbread said, the honourable General had twice. asserted in the House that Sir Harry Burrard ought to have taken his advice, that is, he ought to have followed up the battle of Vimiera by a pursuit. He thought Sir H. Burrard's situation a very hard one. All the responsibility was on him, if we had failed, and he would not have been entitled to any of the glory if we had succeeded." He hoped, therefore, the gallant General would not let such an assertion go forth without some qualification.

Sir A. Wellesley said, he never did accuse Sir H. Burrard, and he never would. He gave him his advice, and Sir H. Burrard chose to act on his own opinion, which, as the commanding officer, he had an undoubted right to do. He should not have mentioned it, had not the ho

nourable General said, that if he had offered the slightest opinion to the contrary, the other Generals would not have signed the convention.

Mr. Caleraft said, there was a charge of 197,000l. for small arms sent to Spain. He should be glad to know how many small armis had been sent thither, and where they were sent to, for the general complaint of our army was, that wherever they went in Spain they found no persons in arms, either with English small arms, or any

other.

Mr. A. Cooper answered there were about 200,000 stand of arms sent to different parts of Spain.

Lord Castlereagh said there had been 200,000 stand of arms sent to Spain, and 170,000 had been received there in the different parts. In short, there was no one point of the peninsula to which arms had not been sent.

Mr. Calcraft said, as so many arms had been sent, he should have been glad to have heard that our army had met with them in the hands of Spaniards who would have used them. He had heard, that the greatest part of them never got any further into Spain than Corunna. He had also understood, there was a depot of ammunition which had exploded near Corunna, so that neither arms nor ammunition had been employed by the Spaniards, and our army had arrived there only to be compelled

to retreat.

Lord Castlereagh said, the arms and ammunition had been sent, and if they had not been properly employed, this government was not to blame for it.

Mr. Freemantle insisted, that this government was to blame, if the arms and ammunition sent into Spain were not properly employed: they had officers in Spain to whom they sent the arms, and it was their duty to see they were so distributed, as to be properly employed. He had heard that 40,000 stand had been found in Elvas.

Lord Castlereagh answered, it was impossible, in his opinion, that any arms sent from this country could have found their way to Elvas.

The following sums were then voted in the Committee: 450,000l. for ordnance stores not provided for in 1807.594,000/. for ordnance stores for Ireland for 1809.34,5617. 11s. 7d. for ordnance stores for Ireland for 1808.4,075,000/. for ordance stores for Great Britain for 1809.

-159,7687. for ordnance stores for Great Britain for 1808.163,000l. for American loyalists for 1809- and a string of other resolutions for the miscellaneous services of the present year. The report was ordered to be received on Monday.

Adjourned to Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, MARCH 6.

The House resolved into a committee upon Basset's divorce bill, from the Lords. Heard evidence, and went through the same. Ordered to be reported to-morrow.

Read the third time the Irish flax seed importation bounty bill. Passed, and ordered to the Lords.

Lord Folkestone moved for a copy of the letter of service, appointing Brigadier-general French to the station he fills in the staff at Jamaica, with the date of his departure thither, as nearly as the same can be ascertained. Also copies of all correspondence that may have passed between that officer and the war-office, or the office of the Commander in Chief, on the subject of the period of his departure. Ordered.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer rose to move for the printing of another paper, small certainly in size, but great in importance, and which, though ordered to be printed with the other papers adduced in evidence in the course of the inquiry respecting the Commander in Chief, did not appear amongst the printed papers. It was the cover of a letter with the Dover post mark, but more properly from Essex, and which Mr. Sandon in his evidence stated to have contained the letter to Mrs. Clarke, respecting Major Tonyn's appointment. The omission of it from the printed papers had excited some conversation out of doors; and as he conceived that omission was merely they effect of mistake, he now moved that the paper be printed.

Mr. Whitbread wished that the paper itself should be laid on the table, and that also all the other original letters taken on the minutes, might be within the reach of members, as it might be necessary to refer to them identi cally in the course of the discussion.

The Speaker said, the omission of printing the particu lar paper alluded to, had been the mere effect of acci VOL. II-1809.

20