indignation which pervaded the middle of it, and the reprehension with which it ended. But there was one point more to which the right honourable gentleman had adverted, when he asked why Sir David Baird had been sent out without instructions? Sir David Baird's force had been sent as part of Sir John Moore's army; and consequently he was to take his instructions from that officer. As to the question why a force had not been sent out to meet the British army on its return to Corunna, it would be a sufficient reply to state that the dispatches from Sir John Moore mentioned his intention to retreat upon Corunna or Vigo; the transports, too, had been ordered from Corunna to Vigo, and the distance between these places is considerable, so that his majesty's ministers could not know whither to send a force to meet them. With

out the smallest disrespect to the right honourable gen tleman (Mr. Tierney) he should here quit his rougher draft, and pass to the more compressive statement of the right honourable gentleman who preceded him, which, if it had only the quality of truth, he meant of foundation in fact, would have been a most distinguished specimen of eloquence. But that right honourable gentleman had employed the same guide as his right honourable friend, the misrepresentation of facts, to describe the conduct of this country to Spain. It would be recollected that the feeling of that House, and the of world, upon the first ebullition of the national spirit in Spain was, that the government of this country had but one course to pursue. It had been argued by the right honourable gentleman, that before the assistance of this country had been given to Spain, it ought to have been ascertained whether or not the Spaniards were instigated by the monks; whether they were encouraged by the higher ranks, or animated by popery; whether they were wedded to their ancient institutions, or disposed to shake off the oppression of their former government; to abjure the errors of a delusive religion, or prepared to forswear the pope and the grand inquisitor. These were questions better suited for the employment of a period of learned leisure, than for the hours of action. The right honourable gentleman, in tracing the limit which he pointed out, had drawn a line of insularity round us, which would insulate us from the rest of Europe, and leave us to defend ourselves. The policy of his majesty's government was different: they

felt that the Spanish nation wanted other and more aids," than lectures or municipal institutions: they were content that a British army should act in Spain, though the grand inquisitor may have been at the head of the Spanish armies; though the people may have been attached to their ancient monarchy, and with one hand upheld Ferdinand VII. whilst with the other, they worshipped the Lady of the Pillar. To assist the patriotic efforts of the Spanish nation was the sole object, and they did not wish to inflict upon that country any charge as the price of that assistance. If the principle upon which government had acted was not sound-if the measures resorted to had only paralyzed the efforts of the Spanish nation, for God's sake, let the administration of the government be trusted to more enthusiastic and abler hands. But the enthusiasm in Spain was not pretended; what they had in their mouths, they felt in their hearts they were enthusiastically determined to defend their country to the last extremity, or to perish under its ruins. The language held to Spain was not, that no assistance should be afforded till a supreme government should be established; but whilst the assistance was sent to every part of Spain, we called upon that country to collect its authority in one supreme government, not in order to obtain our assistance, but to induce other nations of Europe to join in assisting their exertions. Until this supreme government had been established, no accredited minister could be sent to Spain; but at an early period of the national ebullition, agents had been sent by his majesty's ministers to all parts of Spain, and from the information collected from these gentlemen, they were cnabled to judge for themselves. The right honourable gentleman-had objected to the appoint ment of any other than a military man in a mission to Spain; but as the objects of the right honourable gentleman are of a philosophical nature, military men would not have been the most proper persons to be employed to accomplish them. But was there no other way of knowing the state of the country than by the barren reports of the agents, who might be sent thither? If one were desirous of knowing what was passing in England, would he not ask whether such or such a person, who may have been known in Europe to be connected with public affairs, had any share in the passing transactions? This source of information was VOL. II.-1809. 2 II

open to us in Spain, and the men connected with the national struggle afforded the best illustration of the prin ciple, and the best comment upon the cause. In Catalonia, Espeleta, who had been governor of South Ame rica, and president of the council of Castile took the lead. In Castile, Cuestas was at the head of the army. In Murcia, the venerable Florida Blanca, the ablest statesman in Europe. Besides these and others, there were Saavera and Jovallanos, the former an able minister for foreign affairs, the latter distinguished in the home department, whose connection with the popular ebullition was a fortunate omen of its success, and a distinct proof of its extent. But these were not all; amongst those who attended their sovereign to Bayonne, and who took the earliest opportunity to join their country, were Don P. Cevallos and the Duke d'Infantado. When the hoary wisdom of age and the distinguished individuals of every rank were associated for the common defence of their country, who could doubt of their cause? This was a state of things which his majesty's ministers could easily discern without the aid of the spectacles presented by the right honourable gentleman. The military part of the transaction may have disappointed expectation, but the cause is not desperate. The soldiers who conquered at Baylen, and those who rallied after the defeat of Rio Seco, those who defended Madrid before they were soldiers, and drove the French out of Castile, are still staunch in the cause. The spirit of the people is unsubdued; the boundaries of French power is confined within the limits of their military ports; the throne of Joseph is erected on sand, and will totter with the first blast; and Buonaparte, even should he succeed, instead of a yielding and unreproaching ally, will have an impatient, revolting, and turbulent nation to keep down. In this state of things he could not admit that the cause of Spain was desperate. Austria and Prussia had sunk under the fortune of Buonaparte; but though his career had not been stopped, it had been interrupted by an unarmed population in Spain. The cause of Spain and of Europe was not desperate, because our army of thirty or forty thousand men had been obliged to withdraw from Spain; and it was not just to the country, or to the army, which he hoped would again prove the stay of Europe, to assert, that its honour was in consequence gone for ever. All the energy

of liberty, and all the sacredness of loyalty still survived, and the Spanish revolution was, he trusted, destined by Providence to stand between posterity and French des potism. The object of the motion of the right honourable gentleman was, to take the administration of the government out of their hands, in which it was at present placed. But he begged that ministers might be judged of by comparison.

The right honourable gentleman concluded his speech, with committing the question to the sober judgment of the House.

Mr. Elliott proposed, that the debate should be adjourned to Monday.

Lord Temple observed, that when the House reflected on the circumstance of the agitation and loss that must be the consequence of the calamity just communicated to an individual member of that House, he had no doubt it would adjouru.

Mr. Sheridan." I beg leave to make one observation. Whatever may be the measure of individual loss or private calamity which may be the consequence of the case alluded to by my noble friend, I do not think the consideration of such a nature as to call for or justify any interruption of the progress of the important business before the House."

Mr. Ponsonby thought the perturbation of the members such as to call for an adjournment of the debate.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke against the adjournment, as did Mr. Wilberforce and Mr. W. Smith, on whose suggestion, General Mathew withdrew a motion made by him for the adjournment of the debate. The debate then proceeded.

Mr. Windham was determined to confine what he had to say to the objects of the inquiry, and in that case should pass by four-fifths of the speech of the right honourable gentleman. However able the speech of that right honourable gentleman, it had been very little to the purpose. It was an odd moment for the right honourable gentleman to express his hopes, and an odd quarter from which such hopes proceeded, when our army had been withdrawn from Spain, when we had left the Spaniards to fight their own battles. This had something so ludicrous in it, that he wondered it did not re

mind the right honourable gentleman of the very pleasant

lines,

"He fled too SOON

On the first of June,

And bid the rest keep fighting."

When we had damned their cause, it was no time for us to give the Spaniards lectures upon national energies and perseverance. But, to go soberly to the consideration of the plan of the campaign; it had been agreed on all hands that the crisis was one of the most important, and that a greater hope had never been opened for the salvation. of Europe. The spirit of the country had been exalted to the highest pitch; every nerve had been braced by truly British feelings; and all classes of the community concurred in encouraging and supporting ministers; yet the event had shewn that there had been an universal failure. When the greatest stake the country ever had was lost, either by ill fortune, or by the mismanagement of ministers, and of those ministers to whom the greatest means were entrusted that were ever entrusted to any ministers, it was full time for inquiry. There were two things to be considered: first the propriety of sending troops to Portugal; secondly, the mode of sending them from Portugal to Spain. It would be necessary to ask ministers why they did not send out any force before the 12th of July? and why, after they knew that Junot's retreat was in a manner cut off, and that he could not join Dupont, they sent troops to Portugal? If they were resolved to send troops to Portugal, it appeared as if it would have been better to have waited till the reinforcements joined; for, as it was managed, it appeared a doubtful thing which of the two armies would have beat. Junot was as confident of success as Sir Arthur Wellesley; and between two such generals, and such armies, there was a glorious uncertainty in war, as well as in law. Although Sir Arthur might feel confident of beating Junot, yet it was not to be calculated that Junot would come down to be beat. It appeared most evidently that he was not under that necessity; for if, after having been beat, he was able to protract, for many months, a defensive war, he could certainly have done that just as well before he was beat. Although we were the victors, yet, from an unfortunate arrangement made by ministers at home, the