the 6th of November that the last of the troops were landed. And under what circumstances was this landing made? The army was without money; they were obliged to send to Lisbon for it. They were without instructions; they were obliged to send to Lisbon to Sir J. Moore to know what they were to do. That officer in the mean time had arrived at Salamanca, and there he remained until the 21st of November, with the French patroles close to his lines. The effect of this precious disposition of our force was, that he could neither assist Sir D. Baird on his Jeft, or General Hope on his right. If he advanced to support the latter, he endangered the possibility of a junction with Sir D. Baird. If he proceeded to join the army on his left, he exposed the detachment under General Hope to almost certain destruction. In this situation the army continued for some days, without any direct communication between the several corps, one day retreating, another advancing. Fortunately General Hope, whom he firmly believed to be one of the best officers in the service, was able to effect a junction with Sir John Moore. Nothing could have been more creditable to the talents and activity of that officer than the manner of effecting that junction, bringing along with him the whole of his artillery. About the time that this was effected, the French reached Madrid. The noble lord has stated that there was nothing strange in the rapidity with which the French army advanced. He has accounted for it by saying, that they were amply provided with bullocks and mules. If they who were in a hostile country were thus provided, why was not the British army equally accommo dated? What was the reason? How was he to ascertain this? Was he to summon the Bishop of Oporto ? Was he to call the Bishop of St. Jago to the bar? No; give him the commissariat; let him put a few questions to them, and then he would be able to discover why the British army was not able to advance with as much expedition as that of Buonaparte. And here he could not avoid adverting to the abominable lies-lies, he would admit, derived from Spain, with which the papers were every day filled during last December. It was said at one time that Buonaparte was at last caught; that he had made a false move; that Sir John Moore had got behind him; but during this time Buonaparte got his own object and defeated ours. He got to Madrid, a movement which

the noble lord denominated an act of folly; and he drove our troops out of Spain, which, in his circumstances, the noble lord must admit to be an act of wisdom. The noble lord might, if he pleased, call the Emperor of the French a tyrant, an atrocions usurper, and a ruffian; but still he must acknowledge that he is a great man, and that he is at least as competent to form a military plan as himself. But it is said, that if the British army did nothing else, that they still formed a powerful diversion, and that it is owing to that diversion that the remains of the Spanish armies have been able to re-assemble to the south of Madrid. But if the producing this diversion was the sole object of ministers, why did they not give Sir John Moore the means of making them effectual? Why was he not reinforced? Why were the 15,000 men, who were embarked not sent to his assistance? Why were they landed instead of being sent to meet him on his retreat to Corunna, if retreat he must. If 10,000 men had been sent to General Moore's support, he might have been alive this day. The men were on board the transports, and the noble lord took them out. But what kind of diversion did the movement of our army operate? The French had no sooner seen them on this side of Lago, than the greater part of them returned to the south of Spain, to do what Buonaparte promised. He told his Senate that he would crown his brother at Madrid in the course of a month; he did so. He said, that in a month, to use his cruel expression, that he would drive the English into the sea; in this respect he did all short of the literal fulfilment of his promise. He compelled them to take to their transports under the fire of his cannon. Was not the cause of all this a prima facie case? Now what has the noble lord been doing? Nothing, absolutely nothing. He says, indeed, that this diversion has done wonders; that it has been completely successful; that it has prevented the French from entering Portugal, or advancing to the south of Spain. Buonaparte is the best judge when to move or stand still; and if he has advanced to neither of these points, it is owing to other considerations than the noble lord's diversion. Was it with the intention of flying from Portugal, that we expelled Junot with his 25,000 men from it? Have we not deserted the Spaniards? Call a Spanish gentleman to your bar, and hear what he will say to you. Will he not say, You have misled us all

through shew me a drop of blood you have shed in defence of Spain. Blood, indeed, you have shed, but it has been in your own protection." If General Moore had been left to act according to his own discretion, he would have fallen back upon Vigo and Portugal. Never was there a situation of such embarrassment as that of that officer. He knew he was acting under an administration that was not friendly to him. For six months he was more to be pitied than any officer ever was. How mortifying must it have been to him, to read the sneers contained in every newspaper that was brought over; to read, "General Moore will at last do something; he has begun to stir at last; we shall soon hear of him." The House would judge what the feelings of a brave officer in such a situation must be, and particularly when he was aware that such was the absurdity of the plan that was formed for the campaign, that he could do nothing. It was known to many persons in the House that General Moore had written home in confidence that it would be madness to remain where he was; that no co-operation was afforded or to be expected. But the noble lord attempts to account for the more rapid and effectual progress of the French in an extraordinary way. He describes it as if it were something out of the usual course of events. All he knew was, that so early as September Buonaparte declared his intention of subjugating Spain, and that he took his measures accordingly; that he selected the force which was to be assigned to this service--that he named his Generals-that he proceeded to meet the Emperor of Russia at Erfurth-hat the seasons went on as usual-that the sun shone, the rain fell in September, and the snow in December-that nothing in fact had occurred which the noble lord might not have discovered from Moore's almanac ; and these are the extraordinary circumstances by which he endeavours to cover and palliate the mischief of his counsels. The ob ject of his honourable friend's motion was not to call upon the House to censure administration, but to participate in the general mortification of the country arising from the failure of the expedition to Spain, and to say they would inquire into it. What proposition could be more moderate? Except the House meant to be a mere caput mortuum, he could not conceive upon what grounds they could dissent from it. The motion asked them to say no more than that they felt like the rest of the country on this.

subject, and that they would inquire into it as they had the means. If he were to rely upon the reports of officers who had been engaged in that disastrous expedition, he would say, that our loss was not less than from eight to ten thousand men. The noble lord said, that not a single piece of artillery had fallen into possession of the enemy. But he would ask the noble lord what had become of the second brigade of nine-pounders? Was it not left behind? He meant that under the command of Captain Downman. [Here Lord Castlereagh said, across the table, that it was come home.] It was, however, of little conse quence. The result of the expedition was sufficiently dis astrous without this misfortune. The first dispatch of Sir John Moore was dated the 28th of December. In that he states, that he found he had no time to lose in mak ing his retreat; he wished to know what took place from that day to the battle of Corunna; he wished to have that scene of woe before the House. Let them think of the blowing up of ammunition-of their attempting to destroy 3 or 400 waggons-of their staving casks of dollars

of their leaving behind them quantities of Shrapnell shells, an acquisition of immense importance to the enemy, as it would probably enable them to discover the means of constructing an instrument of destruction, the effects of which they had fatally felt. All these calamities might have been avoided, if only 10,000 men had been sent to the support of Sir J. Moore. The noble lord had vapoured a great deal about being the saviour of Spain, and in a triumphant tone asks us, why do you call upon the administration to abandon the Spanish cause? But it is not we who propose to abandon Spain; it is the noble lord who has done it. As a kind of set-off, however, he understood that Por tugal was to be assisted; that General Beresford and some officers were to be sent out there to discipline the Portuguese. They were to say to them, "Now, my boys, is the time to exert yourselves. Let us but discipline you, and then you will be able to defend yourselves." And this was the mode in which it was proposed to protect an ally, to whose assistance we thought it necessary to send thirty thousand men a few months back. He trusted the House would not be of opinion that the motion was to be treated as lightly as the noble lord seemed disposed to "treat it. The situation of the country was becoming more critical every day. The time must come when their VOL. II.-1809. 2 G

main hope was to rest on the army. It was for that House to revenge the wrongs of the army. There was not an officer who came home from the expedition to Spain, that did not vent execrations against the authors of it. - From Lugo until they reached Corunna, there was not a man engaged in that retreat of unparalleled danger and hardship who did not vent curses against those who placed them in that situation. If he knew any thing of gesture, he could perceive from the agitation of a right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Canning), that he was waxing wroth, and he anticipated a most splendid tirade from him, in condemnation of the effect which the sentiments uttered by him might have upon the army. But in what he had said, he had stated nothing more than the fact. He had heard it from officers whom he had met in certain circles of society, and it was these he meant when he spoke of the army. The noble lord called for confidence in the head of the administration; but who was the head? He had a high respect for the private virtues, and many amiable and excellent qualities of the Duke of Portland, but he could not consider him as the head of the government. Was it then the Chancellor of the Exchequer? He had already disclaimed it. Was it the right honourable gentleman (Mr. Canning) who he could perceive, was meditating some vehement bursts of eloquence against him? Was it the noble lord himself? Was it the Earl of Liverpool? That surely could not be the case, as that noble lord was put upon record as being totally disqualified. Whom, then, were they to give confidence to? He had heard much in that House of confidence. Mr. Pitt's friends called for it over and over again. It was his misfortune not to agree with them, but Mr. Pitt had some claims to confidence. There was something in the greatness of his character, in the boldness and magnitude of his views, and in the splendour and fascination of his eloquence, that might have warranted confidence. But to give it to the present government, they gave confidence, not to Mr. Pitt, but to a thing called an 66 administration." This conclusion must necessarily follow, if they went to vote upon the principles recommended by the noble lord.

General Stewart, in reply to some observations that had fallen from the honourable mover of the question, stated, that the march of the army from Portugal in three columns,