submittsd now, he believed, at all events, the graveness of the authority would not be disputed. We now come to the point, as to whether proper means were taken for the disembarkation of the troops at Corunna, who arrived there on the 9th of October, and did not land till the 23d. The delay could not be attributed to the British government. He wrote in the first place to General Broderick, telling him of the arrangement which had taken place with respect to Sir John Moore's army, and desiring him to acquaint the Junta of Gallicia therewith. He had also written to General Leith on the same day, desiring him to furnish mules aud other necessaries for Sir D. Baird's force. Now it so happened that Lord W. Bentinck, who had been at Aranjuez on the 24 h of September, had, on his own consideration, told the Junta, of the probability of the arrival of a British army, either at Corunna, or St. ́ Andero, and desiring them to make the necessary accommodations. He (Lord Castlereagh) had not been forgetful to consult upon the propriety of choosing St. Andero as the proper point, but he was convinced of the incon venience of it. The Marquis de Romana had advised that no troops should be sent to the north of Spain, as they would infallibly be starved there, but had recommended their direction to Corunna, from whence they might proceed to the open country. It was then, he hoped, pretty evident to the House, that there had been no delay or negligence on the part of ministers, either as to the plan or acceleration of the expedition. The right honourable gentleman seemed very much surprized at our delay, when contrasted with the dispatch of the French; but his surprize would cease if he investigated the difference of an army equipped, and one in a state of preparation-the dif ference between a well-regulated force, and one which was ready to seize upon every facility, no matter how unjustlythe difference also between a march upon the roads of France and those of Portugal. This march had been'conducted no doubt, as well as possible, by Sir John Moore.. Now, let the situation of our army, when it arrived in front of Salamanca, be considered. The force of Romana had been destroyed; the armies of Estremadura and of the centre had shared the same fate. He did not mean to criticise the military plans of any country, which perhaps were regulated by local circumstances, of which he was ignorant; but he must say, that it appeared to him a grand VOL. IL-1809. 2 F

fault on the part of Spain, that she had not appointed a commander-in-chief of her forces, who could have wielded the entire machine whole and concentrated. Even, however, when General Moore did arrive at Salamanca, we were not without hope: the armies of Castanos and Palafox amounted to 60,000 men, and though in some degree destitute, still many officers formed sanguine hopes of them. After the defeat at Tudela, however, these hopes were at an end, and the impossibility of supporting the campaign in the open country evident. Natural enough was it for General Moore to expect the immediate advance of Buonaparte upon the British army; but in this he was deceived, the French hastening to Madrid. The spirit of the capital at first gave some assurance to the friends of Spain of ultimate success. The spirit of Saragossa was also undiminished; but it could not be denied that in the North, the immediate scene of the British army's operations, a great degree of languor prevailed. This was always the case in Castile, and from the nature and situation of that province, perhaps the reason might be drawn. It was right then in General Moore to give as much scope to the spirit in the South as he could, and as much time for its expansion; he would do that gentleman the justice to say, he was convinced no appeal whatever to him would have made him swerve from what he thought the proper course. To assist the Spaniards in the South, then, and to draw off the attention of the French from the retreating armies, General Moore advanced to Sahagan; and although he did so with some danger to himself, yet, perhaps, it is to that circumstance we are to attribute the Spaniards having more effective armies in the South of Spain. The design of the French to march direct to Portugal, General Moore learned from the very best authori'y an intercepted letter of General Berthier. Now as to the danger the British army would be in, had it remained twenty-four hours longer in Sahagan, that very circumstance proves the effect of General Moore's design, turning the attention of the French from the retreating Spaniards to himself. The further design of General Moore was to have retreated on Portugal; but this he found from the deficiency of equipment in his army impracticable, and so judged it better to return home to refit. As to the loss which we had suffered in Spain, he flattered himself, that on inquiry, the statement of his gallant relation would be

found correct. The loss of our artillery, he was happy to have it in his power to contradict, not one single piece had fallen perfect into the hands of the French belonging to the British army. A few field-picces, indeed, which had been sent under a very weak escort to the aid of Romana, had been taken. Now after what we had seen of the privations, the patience, and the heroism of the British force in Spain, he was convinced there was not a general living who could not say to himself" These are men on whom I can depend."-After such instances of discipline and bravery, he could not but think that the honourable gentleman went a little too far, in saying, that the military character of the country was gone for ages, that the British army had returned home bankrupt in reputation. The House would soon be in possession of documents which would enable it to come to a fair and full decision of the conduct of the government respecting Spain. He would leave it to them, in the mean time, to determine, whether a proper case had been made out, or whether the mode proposed was the most likely and best adapted to attain the object professed in the motion. In the course of his experience in parliament, he had seen, that those who were most clamorous and apparently anxious to institute inquiry, were the least sincere in their endeavours to obtain it. The mode they wished to have adopted was always calculated to defeat the ostensible object of their zeal and labour. Should the House go into a committee, they would not he able to get out of it for these three months. He trusted that they would agree with him, wait for the information which government was anxious to lay before them, and upon that form their decision.

Mr. Tierney said, that often as the noble lord had excited his astonishment by the extraordinary assertions which he made in that House, he never heard any thing from him that so strongly called for his admiration as -the speech he had just made. The noble lord had the confidence to state, that no case had been brought forward to induce the House to enter into an inquiry. If the noble lord were to poll all the country through, he did not believe there would be another man found who would have the hardihood to say so. What! was not the House to inquire why fifty-three thousand men, the amount of the force sent into Portugal and Spain, had been compelled to return under the fire of the French carronades ? Was

not the House to inquire why all the brilliant achievements of Sir Arthur Wellesley were in vain? Why Portugal was not our's? for he presumed the noble lord would not venture to state that Buonaparte might, if he pleased, be not in as compleat possession of Portugal now as he was twelve months ago. These are the circumstances which make inquiry necessary; this is the primâ facie case which the noble lord contends has not been made out to justify the investigation proposed by his honourable friend. The calamities arising from the noble lord's counsels compose the prima facie case of which he has said so much in his speech. It was no imputation upon the bravery of the troops, that they had not been able to prevent the disgrace that had fallen upon the military character of the country. (Loud murmurs from the ministerial benches.) It was a very convenient opportnnity for gentlemen to shout disapprobation, but he would repeat, that never had military councils brought such disgrace upon a country. What! was it not a disgrace that an army so equipped should have returned home without doing any thing? The noble lord appeared to have a most singular way of thinking. When things went on pretty well, the noble lord was as staid and grave, as any person could be, who was perfectly indifferent to the great scenes that were acting; but when calamities, such as the British army never before experienced, fell on us, the noble lord was quite sprightly and playful. He talked of his honourable friend being impatient for the contest, because he had brought all his troops together. He wished the noble lord had anticipated the example set by his honourable friend, and brought all his troops together, when so much depended on their being concentrated. The noble lord says, wait for papers. What! was his honourable friend to move from day to day for documents which were to serve as the grounds of inquiry? If this advice were to be followed, it would be impossible for the country ever to obtain satisfaction. He wanted viva voce evidence; to hear the officers who had been engaged in this disastrous campaign, tell their story at the bar of the House, It was not from the speech of the noble lord, but from the companions and survivors of the gallant and unfortunate Sir John Moore, that he wished to know what passed subsequent to the last dispatch of that much-lamented officer. He also wished to inquire into the conduct of the com

missariat; by what he had heard, the worst composed, the most ignorant and incapable that ever was attached to an army. It was owing to the wretched composition of this essential branch of the service, that the army was ab solutely starving with plenty around them. The noble lord says, that nothing could be done until the supreme government was established, an event which did not take place until the end of September. But had the noble lord no means of ascertaining, what would probably be the opinion of that body before it was formally installed? Could he not guess who were likely to be appointed to it? Was there no way by which he could previously obtain a knowledge of their sentiments? But, says the noble lord, Sir David Baird could not have sailed sooner. If that is true, it must have been his lordship's fault. It is but two years ago since an immense draft was made from the militia; and as an argument to induce the House to sanction that measure, the noble lord expressly stated, that if it were granted to him, he would be able to meet any exigency. He also says, that no effort could have been made in the north of Spain until the end of October. In this he differed with him. He knew not who the military advisers of the noble lord were, or upon whose shoulders he intended to shift the responsibility for the plan that was adopted. He had mentioned Marquis Romana as having advised the concentration of the British army, for the purpose of affording a rallying point to the Spaniards. There was much good sense and discretion in this advice; but let the House see what measures were taken by the government to establish this rallying point. General Baird landed at Corunna; Sir John Moore occupied Salamanca, and General Hope was stationed at Aranjuez. So that here was an army occupying a line of full 300 miles, and this was called concentration! It was said that it was in consequence of instructions froin Morla, who was then war secretary, that this plan was adopted, and that the army occupied these paints. Judging from what they had since seen of that person, it was very likely to be so; for such a plan could be only the result of consummate treachery or absolute ignorance. The consequence of this arrangement was, that no part of the British army arrived on the edge of the scene of action until the 2d of December. The first disembarkation of Sir David Baird's army did not Lake place until the 26th of October, and it was not until