jesty is not well advised on the naval and military interests of the country. But to return to the subject: I have stated that, in the opinion I entertain respecting an unnecessary expense of naval establishment, I am not urging an opinion which I have lightly or lately adopted. Immediately after the glorious and unparalleled victory of Trafalgar, I had occasion, in answer to a communication from Mr. Pitt, to write two letters to him; in both of which, but more especially in the latter, I took occasion to express opinions similar to those I am now pressing upon your lordships. After stating the ideas which I entertained upon the pleasing and essential change in our naval affairs, arising out of the glorious victory of Trafalgar, and the brilliant success of the squadron under sir Richard Strachan, I represented to him that I hoped the reports then given in the daily papers, of an intention, on the part of the board of admiralty, to repair forthwith and to put into commission the ships taken by sir Richard's squadron were unfounded, as I entertained a belief that the results of those victories were so decisive as to render the naval force of the enemy incapable of making any stand against the fleet of this country during the remainder of the war. I therefore suggested that, instead of putting the captured ships into commission, they should receive such repairs as they might be in need of, and be laid up; that such of our own ships as could be spared should be gradually paid off, repaired, and laid up, and that no more new ships should be commissioned, but that, as soon as they were launched, they should be laid up, conceiving it to be the best policy that measures should be taken to preserve our ships, so as to enable us to bring forward such a fleet as might, eventually, be capable of meeting and of vanquishing all the naval powers of Europe. I likewise recommended that, under the existing circumstances, more time should be given to the merchant builders than had been allowed by the conditions of their contracts, in order that the timber might be better seasoned, and that the ships which they were then building might thereby be rendered more durable and efficient; and I added that, considering the scarcity and consequent difficulty of procuring an adequate supply of naval timber, no ship should be allowed to be broken up until it should be clearly as certained that she was totally unfit for any farther service whatever.* *The following are copies of these let ters: Copy of a LETTER from Lord Melville to My dear Sir; The guardian angel of Great Britain never fails to interpose at moments the most critical, and where such interposition is least looked for. Never was that observation more verified than in the communications which were accompanied by your note of last night; the disasters on the Danube required some antidote more powerful than we had almost ever required at any former period, and the one which has arrived exceeds what the most sanguine wish could have almost hoped for. The effects to Europe in general, and in Europe, I hope will be great; but, to the separate interests of our own country, the consequences are beyond calculation. The fleets of our enemies were advancing faster than they ought to have done, consistently with our maintaining a superiority such as we possessed during the later periods of the last war, indeed from the time of lord Howe's victory. That victory had the effect of baffling all the naval exertions of our enemies during the remainder of the war; this victory will have precisely the same effect: they cannot recover it; indeed, unless they have got great supplies of naval stores in the ports of Spain, since the time I left the admiralty, I do not see how they can repair the crippled ships that have made their escape to Cadiz. In such a moment you will not think me a croaker if I most earnestly recommend to you not to allow any diminution of our naval exertions to take place in consequence of this great event; and, although new ships must be progressively coming, forward, I am sure you will feel the necessity of resisting every attempt to break up any of our ships of war, however old, while they can, at any expence not immoderate, be kept in a state fit for any service. The scarcity of naval timber renders this at present, more than at any former period, a consideration of deep importance; and, if it was possible to allow the indulgence of any sentiment of regret in the contemplation of such brilliant success, it would be on account of the necessity there was for destroying or abandoning so many of our prizes. They would Some weeks after this correspondence I joined Mr. Pitt at Bath, and had many conversations with him upon those points; have made a most splendid and important addition to our strength in large ships of war. "I meant you a short letter of thanks and congratulation, and I find I have inadvertently got into a naval dissertation; but, before I lay down my pen, I must add a few lines more, again to entreat you not to think me a croaker, if I suggest to you, even at this moment, the precaution of adding, as far as practicable to the numbers of our gun-brigs and other vessels of that description between this and the month of May next. I hope in God our allies, if Prussia comes forward, may af ford us rational ground of confidence from their exertions; but, after what has happened at Ulm, whether proceeding from pusillanimity or treachery, it is impossible not to be diffident, and to foresee the possibility of our being again to contend single-handed. If that moment shall come, let us not be unprepared with the means which can alone give confidence to the feelings of the country under such circumstances. These means are the possession of such numbers of strong armed vessels as may be sufficient to blockade and annoy every place where they shall attempt an assemblage of menacing vessels of that description. You know well my sentiments of invasion, and nothing has ever occurred to shake the opinion I have long entertained, that nothing but frenzy could imagine the possibility of a successful invasion of this country against a decided naval superiority. But if we are again during the present war to be reduced to single combat, it must be a naval war; and unless, by a naval force adapted to the purpose of security at home, the minds of the country shall be set at ease, you will never be able to achieve those great naval operations against the distant possessions of our enemies, which will be necessary to cut off their commerce, and consequently their naval resources, and yet it is by these means only we can expect to retard the progress as a naval power, which France will naturally attempt to make, in the prosecution of the resentment and jealousy which she entertains against Great Britain. It is full time however I was relieving you from my lucubrations. I remain, &c. (Signed) MELVILLE." "P. S. It is impossible not to mourn the and I have a firm belief that, if his valuable life had been spared, the suggestions I offered to him would not have been death of so distinguished and illustrious a character as lord Nelson; but I cannot for a moment participate in the mode of regret which is expressed on the occasion. In so far as we lament him on account of the great loss the public has sustained by the fall of so able, so popular, and so beloved, an admiral, I heartily join; but, with regard to himself, his death is enviable beyond expression. Accidents might have lowered his name in a fickle country, but such a brilliant end, following such a series of brilliant service, places his fair fame beyond the reach of caprice, envy, or malevolence." Copy of a LETTER from Lord Melville to Mr. Pitt, dated Melville Castle, November 30, 1805. " My Dear Sir; I have received, under your cover, this morning, the additional Extraordinary Gazette; which certainly places the splendour of our naval success in a view even more forcible than before. There seems just three ships, out of the thirty-three which formed the combined fleet, left fit for service. In the course of my rides, these few days past, I have been thinking a great deal on the most expedient line of conduct to be adopted with regard to our naval affairs, in consequence of the essential change created by our late successes. The Gazette of this morning strongly confirms me in the train of thinking I had entertained on the subject. I was led to it from observing in the newspapers that the Admiralty intended immediately to repair and put into commission the ships taken by Sir Richard Strachan. I shall shortly state to you my reasons for thinking this would be very injudicious. It is so clear that I need not say any thing to prove a proposition which is indisputable; viz. that for the remainder of this war, be it longer or shorter, the naval power of the enemy cannot make head against the fleet of this country, and that consequently such arrangements may be made respecting our fleet as if the war were actually at an end. Under such circumstances it would be wisdom in this country to lay the foundation of, and unremittingly persevere in, such measures as would enable us, in case of a new war, to produce a great fleet, consisting not of worn-out and overlooked; but he was never able again | to take part in any public business. It may be proper here to remark that, since the memorable victory of Trafalgar, the naval force of the enemy has been diminished by the capture and destruction of many ships of the line, frigates, and inferior vessels of war. Let me then entreat your lordships, but more especially his Majesty's advisers, to give a serious consideration to what I have urged; and I persuade myself that, if decayed ships, but of ships in good repair, and fit to encounter the fleets of any supposable combination of enemies. I say you have it in your power now to adopt this system; and, therefore, in place of rapidly and ostentatiously putting the new captured ships into commission, (taking it for granted, as I do, that they are excellent ships,) I would put them in the best possible state, to be laid up, to make part of a future fleet, when the exigencies of the country may require it. I would do the same with the best of our own ships, as they required to be docked or refitted. I would reserve for the same purpose all the ships now building, either in the king's or merchants' yards, and I would give the contractors who are building them some relaxation of the time specified in their contracts, because this service is not so pressing as it was, and because, by building more slowly, the timber will be better seasoned. I do not advert to the resources to be expected from India, or any other resources which may be in our power. These, of course, will add to our naval strength; but, circumstanced as the fleet of the enemy is, it appears to me, that, by the means I have already stated, you have it in your power, even during the war, to commence and persevere in a system of naval arrangements, which, in a very few years, would put the country in possession of a numerous fleet, in excellent condition, and ready for any service they may be called upon to undertake; and I am sure I need say nothing to convince you of the comfort such a state of the navy, at the commencement of war, would be to the country, compared with the gloomy prospect which was at one moment felt, in consequence of the measures pursued, under a mistaken idea of economy, by his Majesty's advisers immediately subsequent to the peace of Amiens. You will naturally ask if the suggestions I have offered are compatible with the ministers attend candidly to the suggestions I am now submitting to your lordships, a very material saving may be made in our naval expenditure, and at the same time a fleet maintained which shall be perfectly adequate to every exigencythat may arise. I assure your lordships that I am no advocate for such a system of economy as may tend to impede any great national service, more especially when the object in contemplation may be connected with the interests of the navy; and means of keeping afloat a sufficient fleet, for answering the exigencies of the present war, if it should be of long continuance. I have no doubt on that point; and I am perfectly confident that, by means of the oldest and least serviceable ships in our fleet, a force might with ease be kept up which would outdo, both in numbers and strength, any thing the enemy could bring against us. I am sure you may assume it as a certain proposition that, without commerce, and considering the havock which has been made among their ships and their seamen, it is impossible for our enemies to bring out a fleet that can create the smallest apprehension. Continue, therefore, the system which necessity obliged us to adopt in the month of March. Repair and refit, as occasion may require, but let it not be that thorough repair which requires much time and expence. The experience you have had in the course of this last year must convince you how speedily and efficaciously a naval force may be brought forward for service. The ships so brought forward have borne their full share in the late splendid achievements. Even in giving such temporary repairs, it may perhaps not be necessary. to have recourse to Mr. Snodgrass's plan; but, if it should, the experience we have lately had is decisive as to the reliance to be placed upon it. The Cæsar, which bore the flag of Sir R. Strachan, is one of the doubled ships; and it has been reported to me that Sir Richard had stated that she sailed as well after as before the operation. I have taken up more of your time than I intended; but I was desirous, in a matter of such magnitude, to put either you or lord Barham in possession of my ideas; and, if they are not well grounded, you will of course pay no attention to them.This letter requires no answer; and therefore your only trouble will be that of reading it.-I remain, &c. (Signed) MELVILLE." yet, upon this most important service, no superfluous expenditure should be incurred. The termination of the war in which we are now engaged no human being can foresee; and I have no hesitation in declaring that, so long as France shall retain the sovereignty of the continent of Europe, it is, in my judgment, impossible to make a desirable peace with her; impressed as I am with a belief, that any peace which she might propose would but too probably lead to the subjugation of this country, by presenting to the ruler of France an opportunity of creating a naval force, which, in conjunction with the fleets of the other maritime powers of Europe, (all of whom, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, are now completely under his controul) might dispute with us the sovereignty of the ocean. This is the event to which we must look forward, as then, though perhaps not till then, we should have to contend, not merely for our independence but for our very existence. While we, however, retain the dominion of the sea, and preserve the fabric of our constitution, which is the true and genuine source of our manufactures, of our commerce, of our agriculture, and of our revenue, we have nothing to apprehend from the boasted threats or from the power of France. These may be considered as mere bugbears; let the war be conducted on a rational and practicable system, and we shall find our resources perfectly adequate to the contest, so long as circumstances and the safety of the country may render a continuation of it necessary. long as he retains his present ascendancy over the continent of Europe, it is our duty as I have before said, to make such regulations in our naval expenditure as may be warranted by our relative situation, in order to enable us to maintain that superiority for any length of time. I am convinced that, on an accurate investigation, it would be found that reductions might be made, amounting in the aggregate to a large sum. A very material saving would arise from our not keeping in commission a greater establishment of ships of the line than might be requisite for any probable demand: and I am satisfied, that the building of new ships is carried to a most impolitic extent, and much unnecessary expence thereby incurred. Entertaining these opinions, I confess I heard with surprise of a vote of 15,000 additional seamen for the service of the present year. I am aware that any very great diminution of our naval establishment would have the effect of throwing a considerable number of our meritorious officers out of employment: but I cannot suppose that any serious opposition can be fairly grounded on this circumstance, when it is recollected that the same effect would be produced in a much greater degree by the return of peace. officers. But every such act of benevolence ought to flow spontaneously from the sovereign, and a particular suggestion coming from any other quarter would be an impertinent intrusion. I do not overlook, nor am I disposed to underrate, this inconvenience, but I have long foreseen, and am strongly of opinion that a remedy might be found to compensate the service for the hardship to individuals arising out of the unprecedented extent of our naval establishment, and the impossibility at all times of giving emHaving so long intruded on your lord-ployment to a large proportion of its best. ships time, I shall avoid entering in detail upon any of the other considerations which have occurred to me in the course of the investigation I have had occasion to make into the subject now under discussion. I cannot however conclude without expressing my earnest hopes, that those who are entrusted with the naval administration of the country will give a most attentive revital to the subject of our naval expenditure. This war has, in its progress, assumed a character very different from that of any former contest in which we have been engaged; and our naval superiority is so decided that it cannot with propriety be termed a naval contest: but, although the ruler of France cannot pretend to rival us in that respect, still, as we cannot look forward to the termination of the war so I shall now conclude with moving the following Resolution: That it appears to this House, in consideration of the many advantages attending the conveyance of troops in king's ships, fitted up as troop-ships, over the mode of conveyance in hired transports, that it is essential to the interests of this country that an adequate number of king's ships should, without delay, be prepared and held in readiness for the accommodation of such troops as it may be found expedient to embark in furtherance of the public service." 1 ! ships a separate establishment from the regular navy, and enacting for it special regulations by act of parliament. In this view of the question, he was clearly of opinion, that there would be immensely superior advantages in conveying troops in troop ships, instead of hired transports. Earl Stanhope agreed with the noble earl, and observed upon the superior advantages which would be derived from having a class of vessels drawing little depth of water, and which might be employed for the conveyance of troops, and for various other purposes. He had shewn this by an experiment of his own, the result of which was, a vessel 111 feet in length, which drew only seven feet odd inches of water, and outsailed the swiftest vessel in the navy. Lord Mulgrave expressed his surprise, | The Earl of Warwick observed upon the Viscount Melville shortly replied, and observed, that his idea was not the employment of ships of war for the conveyance of troops, as supposed by the noble lord, but of troop ships, as mentioned by his noble friend (the earl of Galloway). With respect to Flushing, he still thought that a force sufficient for the object he had mentioned might have been sent over early in the last year. The Earl of Liverpool observed, that the question as now stated with reference to the establishment of troop ships, with separate regulations, was one of great difficulty, and which required very serious consideration, and which therefore, without giving an opinion upon it, was one that could not be decided upon in the manner now proposed. As to Flushing, he assured his noble friend that troops could not be spared for the object he had mentioned at that time; and supposing it to have been done, all the ulterior objects of the expedition to the Scheldt must have The previous question was agreed to without a division. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Monday, May 21. [PETITION FROM LIVERPOOL FOR REFORM IN PARLIAMENT.] General Tarleton stated, that he had in his hand a petition from certain inhabitants of Liverpool, in favour of parliamentary reform, &c. The mayor had refused to call a meeting, but the petition was signed by 3,000 persons, many of them well known to him as of the most respectable description and of considerable property and influence. I. |