of mere irresponsible fancy; every image is tempered into truth, and subjected to the law of reason, but it spurs and urges on the reader's mind. Page after page passes before us, and by some fascination like that which draws the eye from arch and spire of a great cathedral to view from within "storied window and fretted vault," we feel ourselves seized upon by the passion of the orator, and swept out of our common mood into new relations to his theme. We share his reverence for the subject, his love of justice and the constitution, his faith in clemency, and his hatred of tyranny and fraud.

But the speech is by no means all in this lofty vein. Mr. Bliss Perry says, "Burke could always be gorgeous when he chose, and severe when he must." There is little of the Speech on Conciliation that may justly be called gorgeous in style; but there is no dearth of passages of severe prose. The oration is of the class argumentative or deliberative. There are few words in the whole speech which do not, directly or indirectly, lead towards conciliation and away from tyranny. The tone of the speech is conciliatory. The Speech on Taxation in America which Burke delivered almost a year earlier, is quite of another type in this respect. That, says Goodrich, "was in a strain of incessant attack, full of the keenest sarcasm, and shaped from beginning to end for the purpose of putting down the ministry." But in the present oration we have balanced judgment, nice attention to the means of persuasion, a spirit of philanthropic administration of colonial affairs as a 'rust reposed in Parliament. Combined with all these traits, is a body of argument which is at the same time detailed and extensive, systematic and powerful.

The purpose is twofold. It consists in general of an effort to convince the House of the need of serious and just treatment of the American colonists, by emphasizing the magnitude of American commerce, and the dignity and energy of American character. His thought runs in this channel: "The abuse of America arises from carelessness and ignorance; if I can prove that America is great and respectable in material importance and in character, I shall gain at least a new and earnest attitude from the House." It is here that he introduces his elaborate exposition of American commerce, agriculture, and fisheries, and of the American spirit of liberty arising from six causes, every one of which is separately defined and argued.

Following this effort to produce a just attitude of mind towards the American question, Burke introduces what is called an argument by exclusion, to show that in the light of the facts just adduced, there is only one proper way in which to treat America. An enumeration of all the proposed courses of action is made; one after the other the various modes of procedure are proved im practicable, until only one is left. Then comes the posi tive demonstration of the justice of this conclusion. The great body of the speech, from paragraph sixty-five to paragraph one hundred and seventeen, is devoted to showing how a conciliatory policy would operate favorably upon America. Within these limits, the most noteworthy type of argumentation is the appeal to the examples of four other provinces of England. This is called argument by historical analogy. As an argument by exclusion is of no value unless the enumeration of possibilities be complete, and the cancellation of the un

wise, just; so an argument from historical analogy is misleading unless the cases considered be parallel in their essential conditions, and the conclusion drawn from the one shown to be justly applicable to the other. A study of the arguments of Burke ought to demonstrate both the truth of his inferences and the fulness and ingenuity of reasoning by which he reaches them.

To touch upon Burke's art of reasoning is to open a subject of indefinite research, but it may be well to lay the stress of brief comment upon three of its subdivisions.

The enforcement of an argument is invariably marked by a careful preparation, a graceful introduction, a statement and restatement of the question, and a laying of emphasis upon the essential point. This effect of emphasis is gained in various ways, some of them dependent upon the style of expression and too subtle to be classified; but a favorite method is the denial of the opposite. This may in itself require some amplification, or it may consist in a flash of light thrown upon the absurdity to which his enemy's position is reduced. Other modes of enforcement, such as straightforward illustration, exposition of principles involved, and the hundred arts of style, may form a most interesting topic for original work. Some suggestions appear later in this introduction but the individual insight is the best worker in this field, as in others.

In the art of persuasion, Burke falls far short of most great orators. His temper was too uncompromising and his attitude too impersonal. He was not naturally tactful in expression, and he wearied his audience with the very wealth of his knowledge. His arts were those of a

prophet, a scholar, a lecturer, rather than of a medium. of sympathy between righteousness, intelligence and economy, and the average man. To men already possessed by the spirit of these things he speaks with unmeasured felicity, but character and intelligence were. not his audience; and one of the prime demands upon an orator is to adjust his hearers and his speech. Chatham did it, Fox did it, Sheridan did it—all in that same Parliament of inert and biased minds which the grandest conceptions and the most eloquent periods of the Speech on Conciliation failed to move.

When we observed above Burke's habit of denying the opposite of a position which he wished to sustain, we anticipated one of his very important means of refutation. From beginning to end the speech is characterized by brief pieces of refutation after this fashion, interspersed among the divisions of direct debate. For example, there is that remarkable digression against the use of force, brought in in the midst of a discussion of the circumstances and character of the colonists. In paragraphs sixty-six to seventy-six Burke is occupied with refuting the arguments bearing upon England's legal right to tax the colonies and the danger of further demands if the revenue laws be relaxed. Paragraphs ninety-five, ninety-eight and one hundred and four illustrate the same principle. But the great body of refutation occurs where it would be expected, in paragraphs one hundred and eighteen to one hundred and thirty-six, where the chief object is after all only an elaboration of the principle already cited. Burke cannot in the nature of things extensively devote himself to answering arguments against his own plan, so he follows

the method of attacking the tacit arguments implied in the existence of Lord North's propositions. By downright ridicule, audacious rebuke, or piercing analysis, he exhibits the unstatesmanlike policy of the leading foe to conciliation. Flank movements outwit North's shrewd but unprincipled strategy. While seeming to yield a point gracefully to his opponents, he scores two for himself. Nothing is more characteristic of Burke than a restatement, with apparent liberality, of some tenet of the oppressors, which is no sooner submitted to this test than it appears honeycombed with meanness or with error.

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Thirdly, it does not give satisfaction to the complaint of the colonies. They complain that they are taxed without their consent: you answer that you will fix the sum at which they shall be taxed. That is, you give them the very grievance for the remedy. You tell them, indeed, that you will leave the mode to themselves. I really beg pardon; it gives me pain to mention it; but you must be sensible that you will not perform this part of the compact. For suppose the colonies were to lay the duties which furnished their contingent upon the importation of your manufactures, you know you would never suffer such a tax to be laid. You know, too, that you would not suffer many other modes of taxation. So that when you come to explain yourself, it will be found that you will neither leave to themselves the quantum nor the mode; nor indeed anything. The whole is delusion from one end to the other."

Though this paragraph is the last passage we shall insert here, as means of illustrating Burke's mode of argumentation, let it be remembered that in our discussion of this theme we have touched but upon its very surface. Even if our object has been fully attained, we have only suggested ways of looking into it. No one knows anything of Burke's power in this direction, until he has made the speech, as a whole, part of his own mental life,