OR A REVIEW OF THE NEW HAVEN THEOLOGY. [ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE NEW-ENGLAND TELEGRAPH.] BY REV. TYLER THACHER. NORTH WRENTHAM: Telegraph press. 629 TAYLORISM EXAMINED. NUMBER I. GOD IS ABLE TO PREVENT SIN IN A MORAL SYSTEM. THAT God is able to prevent sin in a moral system, has, I believe, till recently, been universally maintained by professed Calvinists. Rev. NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D., of New Haven, though professedly a strict Calvinist, has questioned the truth of this position, called it "a groundless assumption," and undertaken to disprove it. It is not my design in this number, to inquire whether Dr. Taylor is a Calvinist or an Arminian. Although I like to have things called by their right names, yet names, in my view, are of far less importance than things. It is my present object to show, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, if he had chosen to do it; or that he could have prevented all his creatures from sinning without destroying their moral agency. I mean first to prove this position by direct arguments; and then to answer objections. And here I would observe, 1. That creatures do not sin by chance. If they sinned by chance, it would be impossible for God to prevent them from sinning, without annihilating them. On the supposition that sin could come into existence by chance, it would be impossible to prove, that God could prevent sin in a moral system. But sin cannot come into existence by chance. Chance will as easily account for one thing as another. If it will account for the existence of sin, it will account for the existence of the world. If it will account for any thing, it will account for every thing. On the supposition that sin could come into existence by chance, it would be impossible to prove the existence of God, from those things which are made. The doctrine of chance leads to Atheism and the grossest absurdities. We may lay it down then as a settled point, that chance could not render it impossible for God to prevent sin in a moral system. For there is no such thing as chance. 2. Creatures do not sin by the necessity of their natures. There is but one being in the universe who exists and acts by the necessity of his own nature. Necessary existence and action are applicable solely to the self-existent and eternal Jehovah. Creatures are not eternal, and therefore they do not exist by the necessity of their own natures. And if they do not even exist by the necessity of their own natures, then they cannot move and act by any such necessity. It is absurd to suppose that any being in the universe, whether created or uncreated, can sin by the necessity of his own nature. The supposition implies, that there may be something in the nature of a moral being which would set his heart and understanding and conscience, necessarily, and immutably, and eternally at variance with each other. Every sinner is inconsistent with himself. And to suppose that he sins by the necessity of his own nature, is to suppose that he must necessarily sin to all eternity, and that his conduct must be necessarily and eternally inconsistent with his reason and conscience, duty and happiness. The supposition, therefore, that a moral being commits sin by the necessity of his own nature, implies, that the principles of moral action are necessarily inconsistent with duty and happiness; which is evidently false and absurd. If moral beings sinned by the necessity of their own natures, it is readily granted, that God could not prevent them from sinning, without destroying their moral agency. But the supposition of sinning by a necessity of nature has been shown to be absurd, as applied even to an uncreated being; and much more, as applied to a dependent creature. It is plain, then, that God cannot be hindered from preventing sin in a moral system, by any necessity of its existence, arising from the nature of moral agents. 3. Sin is not produced by fate. Some suppose that every thing depends upon a certain kind of necessity which is independent of the Divine will, and every other cause in the universe; and which even God himself cannot control. And this they call fate. Now if sin came into existence by a blind undesigning fatality, it is true, it would be impossible in this case for God to prevent sin in a moral system. But there is no such thing as fate. Fatalism is infidelity, and delusion, and a gross absurdity. God could not be hindered from preventing sin, then, by fate; for there is no such thing in existence. 4. Creatures do not sin independently of God. It is supposed by Arminians, that men have a self-determining or independent power of acting; and that this is absolutely necessary to moral agency. Now if a self-determining or independent power of acting were nccessary to moral agency, it is very true, that God could not prevent his creatures from sinning, without destroying their moral agency. But such a selfdetermining, or independent power of acting, is absurd. It must mean one of three things: first, that men choose by the necessity of their own natures; or secondly, that they choose by chance; or thirdly, that they cause their own choices. The absurdity of the two first suppositions, has been already exposed. Will it be said then, that men must cause their own choices in order to be moral agents? If sinners must cause their own choices in order to be moral agents, it is readily granted, that God could not prevent them from sinning, without taking their moral agency away. But is it true that mor |