presumed to sally; my horse, headed by my gallant friend, Mir Zemaun Khan, fell upon them in beautiful style, and drove them pall mall back into the fort with great slaughter. So hot was the onset, that the fort itself might have been captured; but that the chief, in affectionate reverence for my commands, halted at the town, to prevent the plunder of the shop-keepers. From this brief, but correct sketch, of actual circumstances, the reader will be able to judge whether Sir Charles Napier has greatly exaggerated in saying that I held Huzara in complete subjection throughout the war. If a garrison, prisoners to their own glacis, be an exception sufficient to nullify his general assertion : it surely does not justify his Reviewer in saying, that nearly the whole of Huzara was subject to the enemy. Had such been the case, the Sikhs had never met us on the nearly level plains of Chilianwala and Goojrat but would have opposed us on the very strong ground of the Sind Sagur Doab; where, with such generalship as we could command, the result must have been very uncertain. But they dared not fight, with Huzara hostile to them in their rear: for in case of defeat, that fierce people would have exterminated the relics of their army. Some true and many false views have been given to the world, relative to those eight troublous months. A powerful party is concerned in taking a particular view of the origin and nature of that struggle, and at the head of this party is a high functionary of the state, who lately held vice-regal authority in India. Reverence for him might have kept me silent, had he not condescended to challenge me in the senate of my country. The honor of breaking a lance with so noble an opponent, is irresistible. If I have been so long silent, it has not been for want of matter ; nor, as I trust, of argument, to bear along with me the judgment of my countrymen. In the confidence of the people I ruled, I had means of intelligence seldom, if ever before possessed by any European in India; but I have in fact been overwhelmed with the duties, civil, military, and political, of a large border district. If it be reserved for my pen to remove the invidious cloak of silence which has fallen upon his actions, who, next to Edwardes, was undoubtedly the hero of that campaign; I mean, of course, Major John Nicholson; I shall have rendered history and my country acceptable service; I shall have set before the rising generation an example of devotion, promptitude and daring, which will incite them to great deeds when opportunity occurs; and shall have enriched the roll of my country's worthies, with one more noble name. I am, Sir, Ishapoor, August 5, 1854. J. ABBOTT. a All this may be very true, and we doubt not that what Major Abbott narrates, of his own personal knowledge, is strictly so, and yet the portion of Sir Henry Lawrence's statement that regards him and Sir Charles Napier, may be equally correct. We make thus much reservation, for it is clear from the above letter, that "almost the whole of Huzara was not in the enemy's hands ;" as in the hurry of writing a paper he had no opportunity of revising, Sir Henry Lawrence asserted; but it is equally certain, on Major Abbott's own shewing, that Huzara was not held by him " in perfect subjection during the war," which is the question at issue. Major Abbott's letter, therefore, leaves the question, as regards himself, much where he found it. He did his duty nobly, but he did not hold, and could not possibly have held, all Huzara during the insurrection. Major Abbott promises to give to the world a full account of the transactions in which he bore so distinguished a part, and we, with many others, probably including Sir Henry Lawrence, will welcome a volume on Huzara, from Major Abbott's pen. With the double purpose of showing what Sir Henry Lawrence did say, and what he omitted to say, we republish his remarks in full :— "Sir Charles Napier has recorded that Major Abbott held Huzara in perfect subjection during the war, and without any troops.' This is, like most of Sir Charles' assertions, wholly incorrect; the fact being, that almost the whole of Huzara was in the enemy's hands. Abbott is, however, a most gallant and scientific soldier. 'Had he not been a good man, and had he not won the affections of the people, he could not have stood his ground at all. His credit is not in having performed impossibilities, but, in having, as an isolated European, without guns, powder or money, maintained his position throughout the war, in the midst of a race of fanatical Mahommedans, against Dost Mahommed, as well as the Sikhs." Perhaps, had the above paragraph given, in full, all that Sir Charles Napier said, at page 414 of his book, of Major Abbott, the latter would have perceived, that Sir Henry Lawrence's intention was not to insinuate any short-comings on his part, but to offer another proof of the inaccuracy of the Commander-in-Chief, who, with full opportunities of hearing the truth, was publishing to the world that all politicals in the Punjab, except one, had failed to acquire the confidence of the people, and therefore required to be bolstered up by battalions. In his text at page 414, Sir Charles Napier says, "I have seen • Major Abbott, who is in civil charge of the Huzara country, and he is decidedly against any additional troops, whether regular or irregular, being sent into his district." And in a note adds, " Major 'Abbott held this whole district in perfect subjection during the war, and without any troops. He won the confidence of the people, and they stood by him !" This last line, with its note of exclamation, Sir Henry Lawrence failed to quote. Taken with the context, it speaks volumes. It tells that Edwardes, who fought and won two battles at the bead of bands of "the people," had not their confidence, that Nicholson, who for months swept the Sind-Sagur Doab, in the face of two hostile armies, that Taylor, who cleared Derajat of Affghans, as well as of Sikhs, both of them without other soldiers, than the untrained peasants of the soil, had not the confidence of the people. Sir Henry Lawrence might have pointed to those officers, also to Colonel George Lawrence, who, by personal influence, and by his hold on the people, and on the very Sikh soldiers, restrained the latter for six months, after mutiny was among them. He might have quoted the still more notable fact, of the people, that is one tribe, raising the British banner, and, unaccompanied by a single British Officer, or soldier, ejecting the Seikh faction from Dera Ghazi Khan. He could further have shown that such was the state of security in the country, which Sir Charles Napier asserted had risen against its oppressors, that, from first to last of the war, single officers and trains of Commissariat waggons and camels, slightly guarded, and often altogether unattended, traversed in perfect safety the length and breadth of the Sikh country east of the Chenâb. Surely, with such facts to bear out his opinions, Sir Henry Lawrence was moderate in simply denying undue credit to one officer, at the expense of all others who had been employed under him in the Punjab, during the years 1846 and 1847. Like many other passages in Sir Charles Napier's book, an essay might be written in disproof of the possibility of a people* enabling their leaders continuously, during a war of nearly twelve months, to hold their district "in perfect subjection." All history proves the contrary. The Duke of Wellington, the very Napiers themselves, have recorded the fact, that a mob is helpless against disciplined troops. Major Abbott's levies were no exceptions: holding as strong a country as any in the world, they could not prevent two Sikh Regiments, in Puklee, joining Chutter Singh's main body in the plain of Huzara. The less said about the battle the better. Whether it was treachery, or whether it was cowardice, the levies, holding a strong pass, deserted their Officers, and fled before they were hurt, before the Sikhs were within matchlock range. Surely, this fact, with the other now related by Major Abbott, that the Sikhs were able to withdraw their garrison from the top of Gundgurh, (a mountain from time immemorial against them, where they had met many bloody defeats, and where Abbott's staunchest partisans resided,) proves that the people could not hold the country in opposition to the Sikhs. *Sir Charles could not have understood the force of the terms he was using. The fighting people and the working people, especially in Huzara, are perfectly different The very protection given to the latter often obtains, not the confidence, but the ill will of the former, Major Abbott had the singular good fortune to attach both classes, It might further be urged, that the same military means, and ability, that enabled Chutter Singh to bring off his detachment and garrison, and to withdraw out-posts, that, defending nothing, might any day be over-powered or starved out, would have enabled him, from Rawul Pindee, the Indus or Peshawar, at one or other of which his head quarters remained during the war, to work his will in the plains of Huzara and Rawul Pindee. Or Dost Mahomed might at any time, with the 12,000 men Major Abbott assigns him, from his even nearer positions, have done what Major Abbott describes his having done for "about eight days," previous to the battle of Gujrat. Sir Charles Napier talked and wrote a great deal about the affections of the people, and of how he could and would have managed the Punjaub border until he made the Scinde frontier over to Major Jacob, he had little to boast of in his arrangements in that far more manageable quarter. His assertions of the non-necessity of troops, of 15,000 being sufficient for the whole Punjaub, was very fanciful. To imagine that any where in India, in plains, or hills, the people would pay a Rupee without feeling certain that bayonets were within hail, is somewhat Quixotic. Moderation, mercy, and benevolence, are all most proper, they are excellent auxiliaries, they will do the work admirably when the main body is within reach, but unsupported, would be as useless as are the Bengal Police in a row. Though Major Abbott had a real knowledge of the people, he seems to have fallen somewhat into Sir Charles Napier's error regarding Huzara, or not always to have remembered his own and their peculiar circumstances. He had been the means of conferring immense favors on the district. He had been sent as a messenger of mercy, to rescue a proud and a long persecuted race from tyranny. He carried out his orders admirably, and attached the large majority of the chiefs and people to himself. But in Huzara, as elsewhere, long oppression had begotten treachery, treason and violence. Thus many still remained in the land, who loved not the tranquillity that had been brought about. Some of these, from the first, were with the enemy, others remained to fetter Abbott's hands. With some again the remembrance of kindness had already passed away: they could not appreciate it. They hungered only for the spoliation Abbott prevented. He tells us, too, that he "was so crippled in means as seldom to have even gunpowder for more than two hours' action; further, that his communications were threatened with Cashmere, from whence my treasure was derived." He might have added, that his arms were somewhat worse than those Sir Charles Napier facetiously designated as a bit of a barrel, a bit of a lock, &c. These are surely reasons enough why Major Abbott could not have held Huzara in perfect subjection during the war. According to our information, the Sikhs held the cultivated plain, and the British partisans held the mountains; neither party probably collecting much revenue. The Sikhs helped themselves to what they could get, and Abbott's friends got some compensation for loss of crops in the monthly pay they received from him. We are however open to conviction, and will be glad to acknowledge our error, when we see in the promised book, detailed statements, shewing what treasure was received from Cashmere and elsewhere, and what collections were made in Huzara during the year of insurrection. We shall also require the other indications "of perfect subjection" in communications kept up, &c., &c. We do not altogether understand the allusions Major Abbott makes to a powerful party, headed by a high functionary having an interest in taking a particular view of the nature and origin of the late struggle in the Punjab. But again we say we shall be glad to hear all Major Abbott has to say. Magna est veritas et prevalebit. We are still more at a loss to understand how Major Abbott's partial or entire possession of Huzara prevented the Sikhs making the strong country of Rawul Pindee the seat of the war; or how, if defeated in the latter tract, they were to be at the mercy of the Huzarahs, more than they were after the rout at Gujrat. The fact is, the further they had to fly, after the first rally, the more would have been their disorganization. At Jelum they were in better case to fight than at Rawul Pindee. Panic-stricken as they were, we never heard that Abbott's or any other levies detained them, for an hour, even at the formidable Margulla Pass. Had Major Abbott seen the Sikhs retreat from Gujrat, or had he witnessed the dauntless bearing with which their French Brigade at Sobraon, long after the British troops were in possession of the works, and of the banks of the river, effected their retreat, passing literally through our troops, and receiving the fire of whole regiments on their flanks, as they steadily, with ranks closed up, moved down to the deep and rapid ford, already covered with their comrades' corpses, he would not have supposed that, while a single regiment held together, they would have been at the mercy of any hill-men, especially of tribes miles and miles off their line of retreat. A simpler reason than that assigned by Major Abbott, for Shere Singh and Chutter Singh preferring the Jetchnab to the ScindeSagur Doab was, that there they could better recruit and find supplies. At Chileeanwala the Sikh army were nearly starved, at Rawul Pindee, or in the Huzara, they would have been entirely so If they erred in meeting us in the open plain, their tactics would not have been improved, by removing the war from the neighbourhood of a Rajput and Jaut population, to a Mahomedan country; especially as to the last hour the Sikhs had no strong reasons for knowing which side Dost Mahomed might take; common sense, and his own interests, were against the line he did take. The One word more. Major Abbott's letter seems to imply that Major Nicholson also requires defence against Sir Henry Lawrence. following are the terms in which that officer was mentioned: "Major John Nicholson, at the head of loose bands of militia, |
