the Mother Country by reason of its wider choice can afford to be generous in these maters. In conclusion, here is yet another point. We are taking it for granted that there is a general expectation that the forthcoming series of matches will be played under the fairest conditions possible. In any case the home side is likely to start with not a little in its favour. As we-maugre our good intentions have found it impossible to send our absolutely best side to Australia, so it is only reasonable to expect that one more of the pick of the market both in Australia and South Africa will be unable to cross the seas in 1912. In our home-and-home matches with Australia we have been ac or customed both to give and to take in the matter of permitting the home side to avail itself of the services of an indefinite number of players for the series of matches. We have not gone into the figures very carefully, but are prepared to wager that thirty men at the least played for England against Australia in 1909. But if this triangular contest for what may be called the Empire Championship is to be fought out on anything like equal terms, obviously we shall have to make our final selection of our fifteen-this is a mere guess at the numberrepresentative cricketers before the first match is played, and to make the particular selection for each match from that number only. THE ITALIANS AT TRIPOLI. WITHOUT labouring the reasons which prompted Italy to engage in a little adventure of "High-Tobyism" in the Mediterranean, it is impossible to discuss her campaign in the Tripolitaine without making reference to the passions which prompted the declaration of war. Italy has nursed a sentimental claim upon the northern coast-line of Africa for more than a generation. Her claim has mainly rested upon propinquity and the tradition of Roman conquest. The poignancy of this claim has been enhanced by the episodes in Mediterranean history that have narrowed its scope. Egypt on the one hand, Tunisia on the other, have passed to England and France, leaving to Italy only the Tripolitaine oasis ports and the ghosts of a civilisation in Cyrenaica. There was also another impetus to Italian military energy. For fifteen years there has hung over the Italian nation a great shadow,-the shadow of a miserable defeat and national degradation suffered without remonstrance. Civilians may forget these things, but an army never forgets. For fifteen years the "skeleton in the cupboard" of Italy's army has been Adowa.1 No amount of gay cavalry cloaks or skilful military horseman TRIPOLI, BARBARY, November. ship could eradicate it. No peace excellence in embarkation duties could dislodge it. Nothing but a victory in blood could destroy it. It will be seen later in this article how the influence of Adowa was to dominate the campaign in the Tripolitaine. Once a powerful country has turned covetous eyes upon a weaker land there is one royal road that leads to annexation. The covetous Power schemes to lay a railway, open a bank, or build harbour works in the poorer land. As sure as a sleeper is laid, a counter opened, or crane erected, the independence of the weaker country is doomed. In Tripoli it has been the Banca di Roma that has furnished the necessary casus belli to precede annexation. Again we have the shadow of Adowa pervading Italy's African adventure. Ever since that that memorable reverse the Porte has treated Italy, if not as a negligible quantity, at least as a thirdrate fighting Power. Though unable to prevent the establishment of the bank, yet each Vali of Tripoli has had orders to thwart its development. Only those who have knowledge of Turkish passive resistance can fully appreciate what these orders meant to the sovereign dignity of a great 1 The Italians were crushingly defeated by the Abyssinians at Adowa, and the prisoners of war were said to have been mutilated. European Power. Nor was the cause of complaint shadowy. Even though the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs only four months ago made a public statement to the effect that there were no difficulties between the Italian Government and the Porte, yet the world knows that this was not the truth, and that the Italian Consul-General in Tripoli was smarting under a campaign of pin - pricks that became unbearable. To be fair we must admit this, especially when we know that one Vali who was suddenly recalled as the result of Italian insistence complained bitterly that he should be publicly degraded for carrying out the policy with which he was provided by his own Foreign Minister. THE DIRECT CAUSE. Without a doubt, ever since the Young Turk revolution, Italy has had in contemplation a sudden descent upon Tripoli at the first favourable opportunity. It was only the fear of European objections that prevented her from falling upon Tripoli when Austria mulcted the Ottoman empire of BosniaHerzegovina and Ferdinand established the complete independence of Rumelia. Matters had therefore to remain in abeyance until a more favourable opportunity presented itself. The opportunity, strangely enough, came to the present Italian Ministry. I say "strangely enough," be cause it 80 happens that members of the present Ministry are not unconnected with the financial fortunes of the Banca di Roma. It was the trend of events in Morocco this summer that gave to Italy the cue. In spite of Socialism and its dwarfing influences, Italy is still 8 patriotic country. If this patriotism is somewhat of a hysterical order, none the less it proved valuable to the statesmen who were intent upon robbing Turkey of Tripoli. Such an unusual proceeding was quite sufficient to influence journalists in their judgment. It was insidiously suggested that the German occupation of Agadir was but a preliminary to a German campaign of aggrandisement that destined Tobruk as the next probable seizure. Italian public opinion was inflamed by a mysterious statement that negotiations were already on foot by which the Porte was ceding the port to Germany. Having manœuvred public opinion in this way, the Italian Government gave its preliminary orders for the mobilisation of an expeditionary force. Public sentiment waxed strong in their favour, and Italy armed; while neither Europe nor Turkey believed that she was earnest. in It was only about the 25th of October, three days before an ultimatum was sent to Turkey, that Europe woke up to the realisation that she was on the brink of a European war from an altogether unexpected quarter. Since the beginning of September all eyes had been glued upon the Franco-German frontier, looking for that trivial affair of outposts that would have have rocked the whole civilised world to its foundation. There had been no attention left for Italy and Tripolitania. The Ottoman Government, even, had not taken the warnings too seriously until the beginning of October. Then the latter suddenly realised that while the first three Ordus of the Ottoman army had been placed upon an efficient war footing, the Tripoli detached division was hopelessly untended and under strength. To send men in the present juncture was impossible, but it might be practical to send arms and ammunition to the local Arabs. The Derna, an Austrian - Lloyd steamer, was therefore chartered. Her hold was filled with arms and ammunition, and she was cleared for Tripoli. The sailing of the Derna had the effect of "speeding up" the Italian plans, with the result that the declaration of war came just a little too soon. As events were to prove, it would have been far better for the Italian campaign if they had arrested the Derna on the high seas, and let this incident establish the casus belli, than to have chaperoned her with a cruiser all the way from the Dardanelles to Tripoli without action. As a result, she was able to disgorge her dangerous cargo some days before hostilities were begun. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. The Italian ultimatum was presented on October 28, and expired on October 29 at 4 P.M. The document was couched in language which no self-respecting Government, however impotent, could have suffered, and it was, therefore, ipse facto, a declaration of war. This outbreak of war created one of the most curious strategical situations that has ever come before the student. It demonstrated conclusively the impossibility of empire unless it be adequately based upon sea power. Here we had Turkey, with no navy to speak of, yet with a powerful European and Asiatic army, practically powerless before Italy. The latter Power's fleet, while it rendered Turkey's main armies innocuous, enabled the army to throw its weight upon a detached portion of the Ottoman empire. The more curious result from this apparently one-sided affray is the fact that while Italy could not effect any great material damage upon Turkey, beyond the destruction of the Ottoman forces marooned in the Tripolitaine, Turkey is able to effect considerable economic punishments upon her enemy. As the Ottoman subjects have already demonstrated on several notable occasions, they are wonderful agents in the application of a national boycott. The Turkish empire is a great market for Italy's small wares. This market is now completely closed. Over and above the their will upon the Turkish capital, they have as much chance of forcing Turkey to make peace and to pay an indemnity as pretender would have of seizing the English throne. This, be it said by way of parenthesis, is a lesson which we in this country might do well to take to heart. We, like Italy in this war, have the naval power to limit most operations in which we may be engaged without the striking force that alone can make naval force productive. The best of battleships cannot go over land, or, for that matter, force the Dardanelles. financial losses effected by this means, the cost of the war, with its large expeditionary force that has to be fed entirely from Italy, is a heavy drain upon a country that is not noted in Europe for its financial stability. The other belligerent, however, has practically no expenses, as it can do but little to further the fortunes of its tiny army detached in the Tripolitaine. While the war is costing Italy nearly three million sterling a-week, it is not costing the Ottoman Empire as many piastres a-year. If the situation were not so pathetic it would be almost humorous. However brave and expeditious the Italians may be against the handful of Turks opposed to them in the Tripolitaine, they dare not disembark an army either on the Macedonian or Anatolian coast-line. Yet without an army to impress divisions,1 and a cruiser squad 1 Name. The disparity between the navies of the belligerents is such that it is barely necessary to enumerate the "strengths of both countries. Italy entered the campaign with a battleship squadron of two |