tion his proceedings. Would it not be also prudent to look into the state of the country, before she was plunged in new and extended warfare? The language of the hon. mover of the amendment was that of caution and circumspection, not of pusillanimity or intimidation. It was the policy of the military despot who now wielded the power of France, to conciliate the northern powers; he had been straining and distorting his navigation laws, in order to their accommodation, and had succeeded in obtaining their friendship. Should this confederacy be driven by the irritation of ministers, to unite with him, how dangerous would he become to this country! He therefore conjured the House to consider whether war could be avoided before they recommended it. He did not advise government to abandon the right of searching neutral bottoms; the right was recognised in our treaties with several other states; but let us not cut with the sword of war, the knot which connected us with those states, and all would be well again. Let us forbear for the present. In times less critical, forbearance had been the policy: it was the policy of the magnanimous Elizabeth, who claimed and exercised that right-of Charles 2nd, and of the administration of 1780. The matter could be best adjusted by negotiation: it was folly to put it to the issue of war; for, should the northern powers be forced to submit to the claims of England on this contest, they would, on the first opportunity, start the pretension again. Force could never satisfactorily decide a question of right upon a general law. The northern powers denied that there was any thing in the convention recently signed at Petersburgh contrary to existing treaties with England. So expressly declared the minister of Copenhagen. Denmark and Sweden he regarded as subject to the domineering influence of Russia. What was the nature of the convention? It embraced three points; 1st, free bottoms making free goods; 2nd, the permission to search and detain contraband goods; 3rd, the nature and difference of blockade. On the two first points various decisions had been pronounced, highly calculated to provoke and irritate the northern powers, particularly some within the last three years in the West Indies, which could not be vindicated. It was a little too much, on the mere signature of a convention for common protection, at once to commence

hostilities against nations much injured by this country. Let us look to ourselves for that conduct that we demand from others. We complained of the violent arrest of our vessels by Russia, and committed an act as violent and unjustifiable toward Sweden and Denmark. Russia at the commencement of the war, resisted any commerce whatever with France by any neutral state; we interfered and moderated her pretensions; it was wise to do so: let the same spirit of moderation restrain the rashness of ministers now. The basis of that interference was to respect the treaties of neutral powers. The Dane now asserts, that his convention is in connec. tion with, and in conformity to, his treaties with this country: let us then inquire into the truth of that assertion, before we go to war with him ?-With regard to the exemption of convoys from search, the claim of the northern powers, he contended was just; as vessels of the state, they were protected from examination; the state was pledged for them; he could find no precedent, political, historical, or jucicial, to justify the pretension to search them. Suppose even all the claims of this country were clear in the abstract, was it prudent, in the present state of Europe, when France had absorbed all the smaller states, to drive Sweden and Denmark into her arms by these claims, when they were not disposed to go to war with us? What we could gain from them was not worth wishing for. Some petty islands in the West Indies, and factories in the East, which were scarce worth retaining by us: for such a purpose, he advised him not to dissipate the force of the country, which required to be concentrated against a formidable enemy. Some persons thought it was the wish of Buonaparté to conclude a peace with us: but what an excitement to continue the war would be furnished to his ambition, by provoking a contest with the northern confederacy! His great objects had been, to weaken the power of Austria, and to humble the naval ascendancy of England: the one he had completely accomplished; and what prospect would be held to him of approaching the latter, should the House encourage ministers to plunge us in a war with the maritime powers of the north! With such assist ance, Buonaparté having now nothing to employ his attention but England, what consequences must not be apprehended by even the most sanguine admirers of our courage and resources! Upon every

Mansfield. When we, by express stipulation, allowed such an exception in favour of Holland, it was to detach that power from France, and from a consideration that it was not very probable the Dutch would be neutral while we should be at war-then reckoning upon her as our friend, though now, more unfortunately for her own interest than for ours, she happens to be acting against us. We also granted this exception to France in the days of Charles 2nd, and, by the treaty of 1787, calculated rightly that France was not likely to be in a state of neutrality while we should be at war; but these considerations should not influence us to grant a similar privilege to the powers of the northern confederacy, because they might become the carriers of the whole commerce of our enemy. We exercised this right of maritime capture for time almost immemorial, and have continued to exercise it with the utmost moderation; certainly, when compared to the practice of France, our conduct has been highly moderate indeed. That country exercised their power in a manner not less extraordinary than unjust; they took in a two-fold point of view: they confiscated the ship of their friend, if it happened to be loaded with enemy's goods; and not merely that, but if the goods happened to be of English manufacture, or if any part of them were so, the whole ship and cargo were condemned. France then was equally severe towards the property of friends and foes-how much worse, then, have neutral powers been treated by France than by this country! Yet all the outcry is raised against England, whose pretensions are a temperate use of the general custom of belligerent powers, and a material qualification of the extravagant practices of France and Spain. But France is now an advocate for the freedom of the sea, and, to assert that freedom, has joined Denmark and Sweden, and become a leading friend to the unmolested navigation of neutral ships. Let us inquire into the causes. After the complete defeat of the French navy by lord Nelson, they recalled the neutral ships to their ports. When, then, you consider the arguments advanced in a recent publication from a celebrated Danish professor, which my learned friend has alluded to, and the intimate connexion between the destruction of the French navy, and the recall of neutral vessels to the French ports, the purpose

and policy of that gentleman will be easily perceived. If you wish to defeat that policy, if you wish to prevent the restoration of their navy and commerce, you must insist upon maintaining the right of searching neutral ships. If you permit the free navigation demanded, the French will soon recruit their marine-you may destroy it again and again, they will weary you by expense. If the northern powers are suffered to furnish them with stores, they can, year after year, easily bring out fresh fleets. Should such a system be tolerated, our maritime superiority would be reduced to complete insignificance.-My learned friend made some allusions to the laws as set down by treaties between this country and Denmark and Sweden: by the existing treaties it would be fraud in them to convey enemies goods. The convention which Denmark avows to have signed, asserts that right. This, therefore, is a departure from treaty, and to all intents an act of hostility. The convention, I assert, cannot exist with the treaty. The Danish professor, to whom I have before alluded, in laying down the law, takes scarcely any notice of treaties; he relies on what he supposes the reason and equity of the case. He pretends to conceive that nations should never enter into treaty, or, if they should, that it ought not to restrain them from the assumption of a right; he pushes his opinions to nearly the amount of that maxim which Brissot and Le Brun endeavoured to establish-that the law of nature superseded all treaties. My learned friend said, the convention between the northern powers was consistent with their treaties with this country[Dr. L. said, "No."] Then, that to enter into the confederacy was no departure from treaty [Dr. L. again said— No.]-Then he was unintelligible [a laugh.]—I shall not press this point further; but there is another part of the convention to which I wish to call your attention-it is that which allows the right of search, and confiscation of what it calls contraband goods, though the advocates of that convention contend against any search whatever. If we should consent to any modification of our rights, the next step of the powers engaged in that convention, in obedience to the advice of their philosophical friends, will be to insist that all kinds of property on board merchant ships should be protected.from detention-should be free from search.

The whole of this pretension will be most assuredly put forward; for the present distinction of contraband is artificial; there is no such distinction, correctly speaking; all articles designed for and conducive to the advantage of our enemy are inadmissible to be freely conveyed, and therefore contraband. If these preposterous distinctions are admitted, the next step will be, that we cannot take our enemy's goods-that the intercourse of merchants ought not to be interrupted. Against whom, then, are we to make war? Why, against a metaphysical being called the state, as if the state was any thing but the aggregate of the people; and we attack their property in order to reduce the resources of the state, which derives all its vigour from them. So much for the learned professor's sophistry! He compares a neutral ship to a neutral character; but how does the comparison stand? A neutral character does not interfere with you; nor do Denmark and Sweden when they remain at home; but when employed in transporting certain goods to our enemy, or in promoting their commerce, they contribute to the resources, the convenience, and accommodation of our enemies, in such a way as is injurious to our interests; and we are justified in interrupting them: the comparison therefore does not hold it is extremely absurd. These arguments have no novelty; they have been often advanced, and as often refuted and ridiculed; but in the present day, so favourable to extravagant doctrines, they are urged with increased violence. If it is allowed, that we have a right to capture the enemy's property at all, why should that right be done away, and the property be protected, because it is inclosed in a piece of wood? Grotius did not conceive that any doubt could arise upon the interpretation of this principle. My learned friend said, that if the northern powers had entered into a confederacy against England, they had much provocation. I do not, Sir, so well understand the principles upon which the Admiralty courts, particularly those in the colonies, generally act, therefore I will not enter into any controversy with him on that subject; but I will say, that if such cases of grievance as my learned friend mentioned had existed in the inferior courts, the parties could be redressed by an appeal to the proper tribunal, and they had the security of the British character for a

strictly upright and fair decision; but whatever that decision might be, no nation would be justified in arming in consequence of the decree of an Admiralty court, without previous application to the state, by whom that court is appointed. These cases, then, can form no part of the cause which generated the present difference with the northern powers; the main purport of whose claim is to carry enemy's goods, which they have no right to do by general law or particular treaty; and it is a claim which aims at our maritime existence, and of course at our national existence also. To weaken or to destroy that maritime superiority, has long been the favourite object of French ambition; they declare that the power they have grasped will be insecure, if they cannot accomplish the destruction of your naval ascendancy.-My learned friend has called to your recollection the conduct of queen Elizabeth and of Charles 2nd, and recommends their forbearance as examples for imitation; but I can see no parallel in the circumstances. He also dwelt on the policy of our ministry in the year 1780. We now, however, feel the ill effects of that policy: a similar compromise of our rights at this period would, perhaps, expose us to some still greater evil on a future day. Had the pretension of the armed neutrality been resisted then, we should not now be disturbed by the repetition of it; but the circumstances of the country were different. It was a maxim of that celebrated statesman, John De Witt, that nothing which was palpably unjust, should, under any circumstances, be submitted to; and he was influenced by that obvious precept of common sense, that if a man endures one insult, it will be repeated again and again, until at length he may be obliged to resist, when circumstances shall render his resistance feeble and inefficient. What that great man recommended in his small state, we are now acting upon. So soon as we understand that a convention is signed which we have every reason to think hostile to our rights and interests, we have put ourselves in a posture to be prepared against the consequences; we are only guarding ourselves against the determinations we have observed: they may not push their pretensions to the extent apprehended; if so, hostilities will not ensue at all events, let us take measures to be secure, My learned friend remarked, that a con

voy was not by any means subject to this right of search; the learned professor states it as a practice grown up in the two last wars, for neutral states to send out convoys to protect their trade against privateers. Reasoning on the plainest grounds, what an absurdity is it to suppose that a convoy can preclude your right of search! The faith of the state must pledge itself, that no enemy's goods are on board; the state cannot pledge that: when it grants passports, it can only take the affidavits of the parties; the captor, in his search, may find many articles not specified in these affidavits, yet the convoy is to sail uninterrupted. Consult the citizens of London, and they will tell you, that the papers the captain must have on board, and which describe the goods on board, and the destination of the ship, may enable the captor to come at particulars, seldom communicated to the state which grants the passports; therefore a convoy ought to be no protection. If my learned friend attended to the speech of my right hon. friend, he would have heard that ministers had not taken hostile measures, until an application to the northern courts had produced an explicit avowal of their purposes. That avowal to carry enemy's goods alters the case altogether relative to the protection claimed by convoys. Having thus established the justice of our claims, and the necessity of asserting and maintaining them, I have done enough to justify me in giving my negative to the proposed amendment. But I think it necessary, before I sit down, to make some observations on the general tone and tendency of the speech by which the amendment was introduced. The hon. gentleman has disclaimed all intention of exciting despondency in the country. I am very ready to acquit him of any such intention: I trust no man can be mad or base enough to entertain it. But I must maintain, that the tendency of much of what he has said is to produce the very effect of which he thinks it necessary to disavow the design. If we are in earnest in wishing that the country may display an energy proportioned to the difficulties which it has to surmount, what is the conduct which, as rational and consistent men, we ought to hold? Ought we deliberately to endeavour to disappoint our own wishes-to lay plans for frustrating our own hopes-to labour to dishearten and disunite those on whose union and courage our safety wholly de

pends? And yet, is not this the preposterous course which the hon. gentleman has been pursuing? Has he not held out to our view the most gloomy pictures of our situation and resources? Has he not exaggerated every difficulty, and magnified every danger? Has he not drawn such a comparison between the power of the enemy, and that of this country, as almost to exclude the hope of a successful issue to the contest in which we are engaged? In the name of common sense, what can gentlemen propose or promise to themselves from this strange application of their eloquence? Supposing they should completely succeed in persuading the people to distrust their government, their strength, their re sources, and to admire and dread the enemy with whom we have to contend; I wish to know what advance they think they will have made towards bettering our condition, towards increasing our strength, towards improving our security? What should we think of the commander of an army, who, on the eve of an engagement, should employ all his eloquence to dispirit his men-who should inculcate cowardice and propagate dismay-who, by magnifying the power of the enemy, and the danger of the conflict, should incite his troops to flight, or to submission? We should say that such conduct was the extreme of treachery or of folly. For God's sake, let no part of this community expose itself to either imputation! If we are unwilling to act a manly, let us at least act a consistent part. Let there be a correspondence between the objects we profess, and the means we employ. If we are determined to place our hopes of safety, not in the strength of our arms, but in the humility of our supplications, then these addresses to our fears, these exaggerated representations of our difficulties, have a rational aim, and may answer a salutary purpose. They may be of use in breaking down the stubborn British spirit, and reconciling it to the humiliation and disgrace to which we are prepared to submit. But let us make an election, and shape our conduct according to our choice. If our election be, as I trust it is, to fight to the last extremity in defence of our rights and our independence, do not let us, in the very moment when we are uttering our resolution, throw a doubt on its firmness and sincerity, by breaking out into wailings and lamentations on the necessity we

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