said officers shall pass through France, in order the more expeditiously to arrive at their destination. 7. his Catholic majesty and the Batavian republic are included in the present armistice.

No. 19.---NOTE from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 5th, 1800.

tiations for peace, dependent on the conclusion of an armistice with this country; it is judged proper, in order that the ultimate decision on so important and extensive a question may be taken with the fullest knowledge of all the considerations by which it ought to be governed, that you should see M. Otto, and inquire of him, whether (as his note of the 30th ultimo appears to intimate) he is furnished with a projet of a treaty of naval. truce? And in that case, whether he is will ing to communicate it to you for the information of his majesty's government?--You will further inquire, whether he is empowered and instructed to include in such treaty, his majesty's allies ?---And, lastly, if his projet should contain no article applicable to the question of moving the French and Spanish ships now in Brest to any other station in or out of Europe, you will mquire, whether M. Otto is authorized to enter into negotiation for the purpose of including proper stipulations on that subject in any treaty of the nature which his government has proposed? I am, &c. GRENVILLE.

No. 17.--LETTER from Evan Nepean, esq. to Lord Grenville, dated London, Sep

tember 4th, 1800.

My Lord;--Since I had the honour of communicating to your lordship the conversation that had passed between me and M. Otto on the subject of the proposal for a naval armistice, and the readiness he had expressed of furnishing me with a copy of the projet, I have received from him the enclosed note and the projet therein referred to. I have, &c. EVAN NEPEAN.

No. 18.---TRANSLATION of a Projet---in M. Otto's, 4th September.

PROJET 1.---There shall be a suspension of hostilities between the fleets and armies of the French republic and those of Great Britain. 2. The ships of war and merchant vessels of each nation shall enjoy a free navigation without being subject to any search, and shall observe the usage established previous to the war. 3. All vessels, of either nation, captured after the of Fructidor, shall be restored. 4. The places of Malta, Alexandria, Belleisle,shall be assimilated to the places of Ulm, of Philipsburgh, and of Ingolstadt; that is to say all neutral or French vessels shall have permission freely to enter them in order to furnish them with provisions. 5. The squadrons which blockade Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, Flushing, shall return into their own harbours, or at least shall keep out of sight of the coast. 6. Three English officers shall be dispatched, one directly to the admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, another to the commander of the squadron before Malta, the third to the commander of the blockade of Alexandria, to notify to them the present armistice, and to convey to them orders to conform themselves thereunto. The

The only motive which could lead this court to entertain the discussion of a proposal so unusual in itself, and so disadvantageous to the interests of Great Britain, as that of a maritime truce to precede negotiation, is the desire of contributing to facilitate the conclusion of a general peace; and the termination of the armistice on the continent, by the act of the French government, would put an end to all inducements to such a measure on the part of this country.---The necessity of receiving the king's commands, on the projet communicated by M. Otto, must prevent the undersigned from transmitting any reply to that paper before Sunday next. It is therefore for M. Otto to determine whether he will his government, to remark, that if France has not think it proper immediately to write to proposed an armistice with Great Britain for the purpose of its leading to general negotiation and peace, that object can only be attained by at least such a prolongation of the continental armistice as will allow the time required for receiving the answer to the proposal made here. GRENVILLE.

No. 20. NOTE from M. Otto to Mr. Nepean, dated Thursday evening September 4th, 1800.

Citizen Otto presents his compliments to Mr. Nepean, and, according to his desire, incloses a sketch of the treaty proposed by his government.

No. 21.-TRANSLATION of a Letter from M. Otto to Captain George, dated London, 18th Fructidor, 8th year, September 5th, 1800.

Sir;—I have received the letter which you have done me the honour to address to me, acquainting me that his majesty had thought proper provisionally to appoint Mr. Grenville to take part in the eventual negotiations at Luneville. That choice cannot fail to be very agreeable to the French government. As soon as the result of the present communication shall have rendered the journey of Mr. Grenville necessary, I shall deliver to him the passport for which I had previously applied; and I am directed to give, in the name of my government, every assurance which Mr. Grenville can desire respecting the promptitude and the inviolability of his correspondence. With respect to Mr. Garlike, it will be very easy to send to him directly to Berlin the passport necessary for him, and I shall request it of my government.-The arrangements to be taken in the case of an

eventual congress, in order that the respective ministers may arrive about the same time at the place of the conferences, are so conformable to the ordinary proceedings in similar cases, that they will not be neglected. The proximity of Paris will afford me the facility of giving to the British ministry every information which it may desire upon that subject, long before it could procure it from Vienna, I have, &c. Отто.

No. 22.-TRANSLATION of a Note from M. Otto to Lord Grenville; dated Herefordstreet, 19 Fructidor, 8th Year, September 6th, 1800.

The undersigned received yesterday, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the note which his excellency lord Grenville did him the honour to address to him. It appeared to him to be of such high importance, that at the same hour he transmitted it by an extraordinary messenger to his government. He hopes that it may arrive in time to produce the effect which his excellency has had in view; and if it serves to prolong for a few days the continental armistices, he will congratulate himself very much on having had it in his power to contribute thereunto. He begs, &c.

Отто.

The spirit of that answer is unhappily but little consonant with those appearances of a conciliatory disposition which had before been manifested. If it be really practicable in the present moment to restore permanent tranquillity to Europe, this object must be effected by very different means than those of such a controversy as that paper is calculated to produce.

Some reply is however indispensably necessary to the assertions there advanced, which if now passed over might hereafter be -considered as admitted.

The articles which an Austrian officer, charged with no such commission, was persuaded to sign at Paris, do indeed appear to his majesty little calculated to terminate the calamities of Europe.

But whatever be the tendency of the conditions which the French government has there specified, there can be no pretence for representing them as preliminaries concluded by Austria, or annulled by the intervention of his majesty.

The engagements by which the courts of London and Vienna have agreed not to treat except in concert with each other, were concluded before there was any question of these pretended preliminaries of peace. And the first intimations which his majesty received of their signature were accompanied by the express declarations of his ally, that they were wholly unauthorized, and must be considered as absolutely null."

The French government could indeed expect no other determination to be taken by his imperial majesty. The want of all powers or instructions for such a treaty, on the part of the Austrian officer, was, at the time, distinctly notified by him to those who treated with him, and is declared even on the very face of the paper which he signed.

demand of his majesty to be admitted to those With respect therefore to the supposed negotiations, nothing more is necessary to be said. The note delivered to M. de Thugut by lord Minto sufficiently explains the part which his majesty is really disposed to take in any negotiation which may be regularly set on foot for general peace.

The king has always been persuaded that the result of such a negotiation can alone effectually re-establish the tranquillity of Europe.

Experience has confirmed this opinion; and it is only from the conviction of its truth, that his majesty has now been induced to waive his strong objections to the first proposal of a naval armistice, and to enter into

the discussion of the conditions on which it may be established.

His majesty, judging from the experience of so many former negotiations, considers such an armistice as in no degree likely either to expedite or to facilitate an arrangement of the direct interests of Great Britain and France.

He views it in no other light than as a temporary advantage which it is proposed to him to yield to his enemy, in order to prevent the renewal of continental hostilities, and thereby to contribute to the conclusion of a general peace.

And on this ground, notwithstanding the many disadvantages which he is sensible must result to this country from such a measure, he is resolved to give to his allies and to all Europe this new pledge of the sentiments by which he is actuated; provided that his enemies are disposed to regulate the conditions of such an armistice, as far as the nature of the case will allow, in conformity to the obvious and established principle of such arrangements.

This principle is, that the respective posi

footing as those places which, though comprised within the demarcation of the French army in Germany, are occupied by the Austrian troops; consequently nothing shall be admitted by sea which can give additional means of defence; and provisions only for fourteen days at a time, in proportion to the consumption, as it shall be ascertained by commissaries to be named for the purpose, who shall have power to establish the neces sary regulations for giving effect to this stipulation, conformably to the principles of the 4th article of the convention concluded between the Austrian and French generals in Germany.

Art. 5. The blockade of Brest, Toulon, and any other of the ports of France by his majesty's fleets, shall be discontinued; and all British ships shall be instructed not to interrupt or obstruct the trade or navigation of any ships sailing to or from the coasts of France, except in the article of naval or military stores, which are not to be brought thither by sea during the present armistice. None of the ships of war now stationed in the said ports respectively shall, before the renewal of hostilities, be removed to any other

station.

Art. 6.---The allies of the two parties shall severally be at liberty to accede to this armistice, if they so think fit; provided that they also engage to observe a like armistice, on conditions similar to those here specified, towards such of the allies on the other side as shall also accede to it.---The periods or terms to be fixed for the commencement of the armistice in the different quarters of the world as with respect to each of the said allies, are to be regulated in conformity to the stipulations contained in the third article of this convention as between Great Britain and France; and the said periods or terms are to be reckoned from the day on which the accession of such power to the armistice shall have been duly notified by such power to the party with whom it is at war. Such notification, duly authenticated by the government on whose part it is made, may either be transmitted directly by couriers or flags of truce, or through the channel of the two contracting parties, to each other reciprocally. The naval ports and arsenals of the allies of France are, during such armistice, to be placed on the same footing with those of France; and the notices which are to precede the renewal of hostilities, as well as all other matters relating to such armistice, are to be regulated according to the terms of this con

vention.

My Lord;-I received yesterday at eleven o'clock at night the note and the counterprojet which your excellency did me the bonour to address to me. The principles contained in these two pieces are in several respects so little analogous to the proposals which I have been directed to make, and the object of which was to compensate by a British armistice the inconveniences which might result to France from the eventual prolongation of the German armistice, that I cannot take upon myself to admit them without previously receiving farther instructions. I have therefore complied with your excellency's intentions, by transmitting to my government those two pieces with as little delay as possible. I have, &c.

Отто.

No. 27.-TRANSLATION of a Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Herefordstreet, 29 Fructidor, 8th year, September 16th, 1800.

My lord;-I have the honour to address to your excellency the answer which my government has directed me to make to the note which you did me the honour to address to me.-The first consul, hoping that it is still possible to approximate the interests of the two governments, and their wishes for a speedy and solid peace, and being willing to give, on his part, a fresh proof of his pacific dispositions, has dispatched orders for deferring for some days longer, the attack which the French army had been directed to make upon the whole line.-I shall give verbally either to your excellency yourself, or to such person as you shall judge proper to appoint for that purpose, satisfactory explanations respecting the principal objections contained in your note of the seventh of this month; and I flatter myself that they will produce the effect which your excellency had in view by making known to me the intentions of his majesty. The high importance of those communications authorizes me to entreat that you would give them every facility in your power. I have, &c.

Отто.

No. 28. TRANSLATION of a Note from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Herefordstreet, 29 Fructidor, 8th year, September 16, 1800.

The undersigned has transmitted to his government the note of his excellency lord Grenville, dated the seventh of September. The counter-projet which accompanied it having been laid before the first consul, he has observed that the armistice, such as it was proposed, did not offer any advantage to the French republic, and consequently could not compensate to it for the serious inconve

No. 26.-TRANSLATION of a Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Herefordstreet, 21 Fructidor, 8th year, September, 8th, 1800.

France and England by a truce alike particular to the two states; but the effect of the proposed maritime truce being intended to serve as a compensation to the French republic for the continental truce, the former ought to afford to it advantages equal to the inconveniences which it experiences from the latter.

The undersigned is therefore directed to make two proposals, of which his Britannic majesty may choose that which may appear to him most consonant to the interest of his dominions or to his continental relations. The first is, that the projet for an armistice be drawn up and admitted in terms analogous to those which have been proposed by the ministry of his Britannic majesty, but solely under the supposition that this armistice should be independent of the events of the continent, and relative only to a separate negotiation to be immediately opened between the two powers. The second is, that his Britannic majesty should continue to make common cause with the Emperor, but that, in that case, he should consent that the maritime truce may offer to the French republic advantages equal to those secured to the House of Austria by the continental truce. And with this view the comparison may be easily settled.

By the continental armistice the court of Vienna acquires the means of re-organizing its armies, of converting into men, arms, ammunition of every kind, the subsidies paid to it by England; of fortifying and victualling its places of the second and third line which were in a bad state, in consequence of the rapid march of the French armies having not been foreseen. Thus Asoppo, Palmanova, Venice, Verona and Lintz, had been neglected; every day their fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingolstadt, although blockaded, are improving their means of defence; and it is the armistice which procures to them this advantage; for at the moment when those places were invested the enemy thought only of besieging ours, and consequently their own were not prepared for so early an attack.

By the continental armistice, the impression made by the victories of the French armies diminish, their effects are weakened. Six months of repose would suffice to restore the moral and physical strength of the Austrian armies; to allow the conquered to recover from the impression of ascendancy acquired by the conquerors, and to make it necessary once more to regain that contingent superiority so well earned by the republic.

It would also follow as a consequence of the continental armistice, that the kingdom of Naples, now a prey to every kind of calamity, and containing all the seeds of insurrection, might be re-organized, and furnish fresh resources to the enemies of France. It is by means of the armistice, in a word, that men are raising in Tuscany and in the marshes of Ancona: that Austria is every where prepar

ing new means of defence; that every where she is ameliorating her position, which perhaps was desperate, whilst the advantages of the republic are diminishing or disappearing. The first consul has already made to the love of peace a sufficiently great sacrifice of those advantages; If he should continue to derive no benefit from them, it would no longer be moderation, but weakness; it would no longer be the means of arriving at the conclusion of peace, but that of perpetuating the war. Perhaps in the judgment of statesmen the French government may have already too long delayed to avail itself of the contingency which was favourable to it; but it has only done so upon the positive assurances which had been given to it of a speedy and separate peace.

At this moment, when the two allied courts insist upon a joint negotiation and a general peace, the French government is too well aware that so complicated a work is not to be accomplished in a few days, and it ought to avoid putting itself in a position which would be diametrically opposite to the acceleration of the negotiations, by giving to the inimical powers, and principally to Austria, a real interest to prolong the discussions, in order daily to acquire the means of appearing with greater advantage in the field of battle, and consequently with greater pretensions at the congress.

It is with a view of avoiding, in part, so manifest an inconvenience, that France requires that the maritime armistice should be stipulated in such a manner as to be equivalent to the continental armistice, and as to place England on its side, in the situation of being desirous of the conclusion of peace. The advantages which the republic can and ought to expect from the naval armistice, are the free navigation of her ships, and the facilities necessary for her communications with the islands of France and Reunion, and with her American colonies; and although she should make use of it to send a few thousand men more to Egypt, do not the places belonging to the Emperor daily acquire, in like manner, fresh strength upon the continent?

With respect to the victualling the harbours of the French republic itself, internal means of circulation are not wanting; and this object is but of small importance to it When the British government proposes that the harbours and places blockaded should only receive provisions for fourteen days, is it aware that the greater part of those establishments are still far from wanting provisions? And besides that, the season is drawing near which, by rendering a naval blockade almost always illusory, makes the proposed favour quite useless.

That if, besides, it be considered how little it is the interest of Great Britain, if it be sincerely desirous of peace, to prevent France from preserving and consolidating the small number which remain to her of foreign settle

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