644-655] Othman 355 candidates, all of whom were more or less incompetent. He therefore nominated a Board of Election (Shūrā), composed of six of the most respected of his colleagues, with the instruction to select from their midst the new Caliph. Ali, Othman, Zubair, Talḥa, Sa'd ibn Abi Wakķāṣ and 'Abd-ar-Rahman ibn 'Auf had now to decide the fate of Islam. After long hesitation they agreed on Othman, probably because he appeared to be the weakest and most pliable, and each of them hoped to rule, first through him and afterwards in succession to him. This choice looks like a reaction; they had had enough of Omar's energetic and austere government-for he upheld the autocratic power of the representative of the prophet, even as against the proudest and most successful generals, probably less from personal ambition than from religious and political conviction. They speculated correctly, but they overlooked the fact that in a race to profit by the weakness of Othman his own family had a start which could not be overtaken. Othman was however an Umayyad, i.e. he belonged to the old Mecca aristocracy, who for a long time were the chief opponents of the prophet, but who, after his victory, had with fine political instinct seceded to his camp and had even migrated to Medina, in order to emulate the new religious aristocracy created by Mahomet. In this they succeeded only too well, for they counted among them men of remarkable intelligence, with whom the short-sighted intriguers, the honest blusterers and the pious unpolitical members of the circle of Companions could not keep up. They now induced Othman, who had at once nominated his cousin Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam to be the omnipotent Secretary of State, to fill all the positions of any importance or of any value with Umayyads or their partisans. Later on Othman was reproached on all sides with this nepotism, which caused great discontent throughout the entire empire. To this discontent there was added an increasing reaction against the system of finance, founded by Omar and carried on without alteration by Othman. The lust of booty had led the Arabs out to battle, and the spoils belonged to them after deduction of the so-called prophet's fifth. But what was to be done with the enormous landed property which victors in such small numbers had acquired, and who was to receive the tribute paid yearly by the subjected peoples? Payment of this money to the respective conquerors of the individual territories would have been the most logical method of dealing with it, but with the fluctuations in the Arabian population this plan would have caused insuperable difficulties, apart from which it would have been from a statesman's point of view extremely unwise. Omar therefore founded a state treasury. The residents of the newly formed military camps received a fixed stipend; the surplus of the receipts flowed to Medina, where it was not indeed capitalised but utilised for state pensions, which the Caliph decreed according to his own judgment to the members of the theocracy, graduated according to rank and dignity. Under the impartial Omar 356 Death of Othman [655-656 this was not disagreeable to any, the more especially as at that time the gains from the booty were still very large. But when under Othman these gains dwindled and became ever smaller, this state treasury appeared to the Arabian provincial tribes as an oppression of the provinces. The nepotism of Othman increased the opposition, and it finally found expression in open revolt. These fanatical partisans were of opinion that Othman was the man against whom the real holy war should be waged. The Kufa men were first to rebel against the governor nominated by Othman (655); with unaccountable weakness Othman immediately abandoned his representative. The Egyptians were the most energetic in their protest, and started for Medina in April 655 to the number of about 500. The disquiet which was simmering on all sides was secretly fomented by the disappointed Companions in Medina ; they were the real plotters who made use of the discontent of the provincials. When after long discussion the Egyptians besieged Othman in his own house these Companions looked on inactively, or at the most excused themselves by a few pretended manœuvres, but in fact they were not displeased when the rebels stormed the house and slew the defenceless old Caliph whilst at prayer (17 June 655). From this time onward fate took its own course. Among the Medina Companions Ali was now doubtless the nearest claimant to the Caliphate, and some even went so far as to render him homage. On the other hand, would he not certainly appear to all the Umayyads, and especially to the powerful governor of Syria, as the murderer of Othman? Mu'awiya was firmly established in Syria, and was in a position to venture, under this pretext to him probably more than a pretext - to dispute the Caliphate even with the son-in-law of the prophet. The Umayyads moreover were not the only enemies that Ali had to contend with. His former allies, Zubair and Talḥa, who were at least as much to blame as he, roused the people against him, and this was done even more determinedly by the prophet's widow 'A'isha, who had always been opposed to him. They were supported by the Başra tribes, whilst Ali sought support with the Kufa people. Near Başra the quarrel came to a decision, in the socalled Camel battle, which takes its name from the fact that ‘Ã’isha, in accordance with old Arabian custom, was present at the battle in a camel-palanquin, as a sacred sign of war. Ali conquered and 'A'isha's part was played out. Talha and Zubair were killed in the fight (9 Dec. 656). Ali was thus master of 'Irak, and Kufa became his residence. Hereupon Arabia ceased to be the centre of the empire, and Medina sank to the status of a provincial town, in which piety and easy-going elegance had the necessary quiet for development. The history of Nearer Asia however again resolved itself, as it did before Islām, into the opposition between 'Irāk and Syria. The two halves of the empire armed themselves for the fight for supremacy, Muslims against Muslims. At first the better discipline of the Syrians and their higher culture 656-658] Ali and Mu'awiya 357 carried the day. The recollection however of the brief political splendour of Irāk formed the basis for a movement which was destined to gain strength, which a century later swept away the rule of the Umayyads. Once more was the capital of the latest Asiatic worldpower transferred to Babylon. After the Camel battle Ali's position was thoroughly favourable, as Mu'awiya could not take any energetic steps against him so long as Egypt remained on Ali's side, Mu'awiya's main attention was therefore fixed on Egypt; and in this view he was aided and abetted by 'Amr, the first conqueror of Egypt, who had allied himself with Mu'awiya in the hope of attaining through him the governorship of Egypt. For that reason he rendered Mu'awiya most important services in the war against Ali, and as Ali at this juncture advanced against Mu'awiya a battle extending over several days ensued, after long delay, at Şiffin on the Syrian border, not far distant from Rakka (26-27 July 657). Ali's victory appeared certain, when 'Amr conceived the idea of fastening copies of the Koran to the points of the lances and calling on the holy book for a decision. This trick succeeded, and much against his will Ali was forced to yield to the pressure of the pious members of his army. A court of arbitration was thereupon agreed on. Mu'awiya's confidential representative was of course 'Amr, whilst Ali had forced upon him in a like capacity Mūsā al-Ash'ari, a man by no means thoroughly devoted to him. They had scarcely parted when those same pious members of his army altered their views, and now blamed Ali for having placed men, instead of God and the sword, as judges over him. Several thousand men separated from Ali and entered into a separate camp at Ḥarūrā, whence they were called Ḥarurites, or secessionists, Khārijites. They resisted Ali by force, and he was compelled to cut down most of them at Nahrawan (7 July 658). Later on they split into innumerable small sects and still gave much trouble to Ali and the Umayyads. The sense of independence and the robber-knight ideas of the ancient Arabians lived still in them, but under a religious cloak. Offshoots from these people, the so-called Ibāḍites, exist even to-day in South Arabia and in East and North Africa. The information we have as to the result of the court of arbitration is untrustworthy. In any case the clever 'Amr outwitted his coadjudicator by persuading him also to deal with Ali and Mu'awiya as being on the same footing, whilst of course Ali was the only one who had a Caliphate to lose. Ali appears actually to have been divested of this dignity by decree of the arbitration, but this decision did not induce him to abdicate. This arbitration court was held at Adhruḥ in the year 658. Even more painful for Ali than this failure was the loss of Egypt, which ‘Amr shortly afterwards reconquered for himself, and administered until his death more as a viceroy than a governor. No definite decision was brought about between Ali and Mu'awiya, as their forces were about equally 358 Mu'awiya Caliph [660-680 balanced. It was not until July 660 that Mu'awiya caused himself to be proclaimed Caliph at Jerusalem. Six months later Ali succumbed to the dagger of an assassin (24 Jan. 661). Mu'awiya had to thank this circumstance for his victory, for Ali's son and successor Hasan came to terms with him in return for an allowance. Herewith began the rule of the Umayyads, and Damascus became the capital of the empire. This has been rightly termed the Arabian Empire, for it was founded on a national basis, in marked contrast to the subsequent State of the Abbasids, for which Islām served as a foundation. The first Caliphs had striven after a theocracy, but, as all the members of the theocracy were Arabs, an Arabian national empire was created. For a time the migration of the tribes had more weight than religion. We see this most clearly by the fact that no longer the pious companions, but the old Arabian aristocracy, no longer Anṣār and Muhājirūn, but the Arabian tribes of Syria and 'Irāk, determined the destinies of the empire. The great expansion however was only able to hold back religion for a time. Religion soon served to give authority to the government in power, but at the same time provided a special motive for all kinds of opposition. That is shewn by the domestic policy of the Umayyad State; in the first place to force the discipline of the State on the ruling class, i.e. the Arabs, without which no successful combined social life was possible, and in the second place it was necessary to regulate their relations with the non-Arabian subordinate class. The fight for the supremacy in the State, which appeared to the 'Irāk after the days of Ali as the rule of the hated Syrians, formed the lifetask of all the great Caliphs of the house of Umayya. Mu'awiya had still most of all the manners of an old Arabian prince; he appeared to the Romaic element simply as the pwrоovußovλos of his governors, ovu Bovλo. In Syria they had been accustomed to such things since the days of the Ghassanids, and to that may be ascribed the better discipline of the Syrian Arabs, who in all respects stood on a higher plane of culture than those of ‘Irāk. Mu'awiya was a clever prince, and ruled. by wisdom over the tribes, whose naturally selfish rivalries supported the structure of his State like the opposing spans of an arch. His rule was so patriarchal, and his advisers had so much voice in the matter, that some have thought to have found traces of parliamentary government under Mu'awiya. Nevertheless Mu'awiya knew quite well how to carry his point for the State, i.e. for himself, though he avoided the absolutist forms and the pomp of later Caliphs. The nepotism of Othman was quite foreign to his rule; although his relatives did not fare badly under him he nevertheless looked after the principles of State in preference to them. He had a brilliant talent for winning important men. On the same principles as the Caliph in Damascus, the Thakifite1 Ziyad, whom he had adopted as a brother, ruled as an independent viceroy 1 I.e. of the tribe of Thakif. See p. 325. 680-683] Murder of Husain at Karbala 359 over the eastern half of the kingdom. Mu'awiya's aspirations in state policy were finally to found a dynasty. He proclaimed his son Yazid as his successor, although this act was opposed not only to the ancient common law based on usage but also to the mode of election of the theocracy. On Mu'awiya's death (18 April 680) Yazid was accordingly recognised in the West and partially also in 'Irāk. At once a double opposition began to foment; that of the Ali party in ‘Irāk, which had already begun to revive under Mu'awiya, and the theocratic opposition of theḤijāz. The endeavour to transfer the central government once more, respectively to 'Irāk and to the Hijaz, probably underlay the opposition in both cases. As regards Irāk that theory is a certainty, for the families of Kūfa and Baṣra had not forgotten that in Ali's time they had been the masters of the empire. Now however Ali's Shi'a (party) was thrust into the background by the Syrians. They looked back to Ali, and their ardent desire was a restoration of that golden period for Kūfa. Their enthusiasm for Ali and his kin is therefore nothing more than a glorification of their own special province, of the one and only 'Irāk Caliph. This brilliant period they hoped after the death of the great Mu'awiya to recover for themselves by selecting Husain, the second son of Ali. Husain complied with the solicitations of the Kufa people. These however, unsteady and undisciplined as ever, shrank from rebellion and failed him at the last moment. Husain and those remaining faithful to him were cut down at Karbala (10 Oct. 680). Ali's son had thereby, like others before him, fallen as a martyr to the cause of Shi'ism. aspirations slowly assumed a religious tinge. grandson in the cause of the Kufa people, their remorse on that account, their faded hopes, their hatred of the Syrians, and, last but not least, heterodox currents which now began to shew themselves, prepared the way for the great Shiite insurrection a few years later under Mukhtār. Ali is now no longer simply the companion and son-in-law of the prophet, but has become the heir of his prophetic spirit, which then lives on in his sons. The Ali dynasty—so at least say the legitimists—are the only true priestly Imāms, the only legal Caliphs. The struggle for the house of the prophet, for the Banū Hāshim, becomes more and more the watchword of the opposition party, who, after their political overthrow in Irāk, removed their sphere of operation to Persia. There however this Arabian legitimism united with Iranian claims, and, in the fight for the Banu Hashim, the Persians were arrayed against the Arabs. With this war-cry the Abbasids conquered. Political The death of the prophet's Although Husain's expedition to Karbalā had ended in a fiasco, the Umayyads were not destined to get off so lightly against the opposition of the Medina people, an opposition of the old elective theocracy against the new Syrian dynasty. Their opposition candidate was 'Abdallah, son of that Zubair who had fallen in the fight against Ali. Yazid was |