10

Justinian's Designs in the West

[523-533 Catholics had long been carried on, everyone hoped for the end of the "horrible secular captivity." In Italy, Theodoric's prolonged toleration had reconciled no one to him, and his ultimate severity exasperated his Roman subjects. A dumb agitation held sway in the West, and the coming of the Emperor's soldiers was eagerly awaited and desired. What is more surprising is that the barbarian kings themselves acknowledged the justice of the imperial claims. They also still reverenced the Empire whose lands they had divided, they thought of themselves as vassals of the basileus, received his commands with respect, and bowed before his remonstrance. Hilderic, who had reigned over the Vandal kingdom since 523, was proud to proclaim himself the personal friend of Justinian. The two interchanged presents and embassies, and the Emperor's head replaced that of the king on the Vandal coinage. Amalasuntha, who had governed Italy since 526 in the name of her son Athalaric, made it her first care to recommend the youth of the new prince to Justinian's kindness: and the prince himself begged for the imperial favour the day after his accession. He recalled with pride the fact that his father had been adopted by Justin, and that he could therefore claim kinship with the basileus. So great was the prestige of the Roman Empire throughout the West that even the opponents of the imperial policy, such as Witigis or Totila, were willing to acknowledge themselves the Emperor's vassals.

Justinian realised this: he also realised the essential weakness of the barbarian kingdoms - their internal dissensions, and inability to make common cause against a foe. Therefore from the first he took up the position of their overlord, waiting until circumstances should furnish him with an opportunity for more active interference. This occurred, as far as Africa was concerned, in 531. At this time a domestic revolution substituted Gelimer, another descendant of Gaiseric, for the weakly Hilderic. Hilderic at once appealed to Byzantium, begging the Emperor to support the cause of his dethroned vassal. Byzantine diplomacy at once interfered in the haughtiest manner, demanding the restoration, or at any rate the liberation of the unhappy king, and evoking the decision of the dispute to the Emperor's court. Gelimer alone, perhaps, among the barbarian princes, recognised the fact that concessions, however large, would only postpone the inevitable struggle. Therefore he flatly refused the satisfaction required, and replied to the Byzantine demands by redoubled severity towards his political and religious enemies. The struggle had begun, and all was ready for the imperial restoration.

III

Besides holding several trump cards, Justinian possessed another advantage in the redoubtable war machine constituted by the Byzantine army with its generals. The imperial army, in Justinian's time, was

533]

(ὑπασπισταί).

formed essentially of mercenaries, recruited from all the barbarians of the East and West. Huns, Gepids, Heruls, Vandals, Goths and Lombards, Antae and Slavs, Persians, Armenians, men from the Caucasus, Arabs from Syria, and Moors from Africa served in it side by side, glad to sell their services to an Emperor who paid well, or to attach themselves to the person of a celebrated general, to whom they would form the guard and staff (vaσTIOтaí). The greater number of these soldiers were mounted. Only the smallest part of the troops consisted of infantry which, being heavily equipped, was more notable for solidity than mobility. The cavalry, on the other hand, was excellent. Barbed with iron, armed with sword and lance, bow and quiver, the heavy regiments of Byzantine cuirassiers (cataphracti) were equally formed to break the enemy's ranks from a distance by a flight of arrows, or to carry all before them by the splendid dash of their charge. This cavalry generally sufficed to win battles, and the old regiments, proved as they were by a hundred fights, and matchless in bravery, made incomparable soldiers.

However, in spite of these qualities, the troops were not lacking in the faults inseparable from mercenary armies. Convinced that war should maintain war, and owning no fatherland, they pillaged mercilessly wherever they went. With an insatiable greed of gold, wine and; women, and with thoughts always bent on plunder, they easily slipped the yoke of discipline, and imposed unheard-of conditions on their generals. Even treason was not below them, and more than one victory was lost by the defection of the troops on the field of battle, or their disorganisation in the rush for plunder. After a victory, things were still worse. Only anxious for leisure in which to enjoy their ill-gotten gains, they were deaf to entreaty, and the efforts of the generals to restore discipline frequently led to mutiny in the camp. The officers, of whom the greater number were barbarians, were not much more to be trusted than the men. They also were greedy, undisciplined, and jealous of each other, always a willing prey to intrigue and treason.

Certainly the faulty organisation of the army explained some of these failings. The commissariat was badly arranged, pay generally in arrears, while the treasury officials and the generals sought, under various pretexts, to cheat the soldiers. Thus if the army was to be of any use, everything really depended on the Commander-in-Chief. Justinian had the good fortune to find excellent generals at the head of his armies; they were adored by the troops, and able, by a mixture of skilful energy and firm kindness, to keep them in hand and lead them where they wished. Such were the patrician Germanus, the Emperor's nephew, who commanded in turn in Thrace, Africa, and Syria; Belisarius, the hero of the reign, conqueror of the Persians, Vandals, and Ostrogoths of Africa and Italy, and the last resource of the Empire in every peril; and lastly the eunuch Narses, who concealed under a frail appearance

!

12

Conquest of Africa

[533

indomitable energy, prodigious activity, and a strong will. He was a wonderful general, who completed the ruin of the Goths, and chased the Alemannic hordes from Italy.

The numerical force of the imperial armies must not be exaggerated. Belisarius had scarcely 15,000 men with which to destroy the Vandal kingdom, he had still less in his attack on the Ostrogothic realm, only 10,000 or 11,000; and altogether 25,000 to 30,000 sufficed to break down the Ostrogothic resistance. The weakness of this force added to the faulty organisation explains the interminable length of Justinian's wars, specially during the second half of the reign. It also illustrates the fundamental vice of the government, which was the perpetual, disproportion between the end aimed at, and the means employed for its accomplishment. Lack of money always led to reduction of expenses and curtailment of effort.

However, when in 533 the chance of intervention in Africa presented itself, Justinian did not hesitate. Grave doubts as to the success of the distant enterprise were felt at court, and in the Council John of Cappadocia pointed out its many perils with a somewhat brutal clearness. Before this opposition, added to the critical condition of the treasury and the discontent of the soldiers, Justinian himself began to waver. On the other hand, the African bishops, surrounded as they were with the halo of martyrdom, revived the prince's flagging zeal and promised him victory. As soon as it became known that imperial intervention was probable, risings against the Vandal domination broke out in Tripolitana and Sardinia. Furthermore, Justinian could not hesitate long, because of the strength of the motives impelling him forward, his burning desire of conquest, and his absolute trust in the justice of his claims and in divine protection. He himself took the initiative in making the final decision, and events proved that in doing so he was wiser than his more prudent ministers.

The African campaign was equally rapid and triumphant. On 22 June 533 Belisarius embarked for the West. Ten thousand infantry, and from five to six thousand cavalry were shipped in five hundred transport-ships, manned by twenty thousand sailors. A fleet of war-ships (dromons) manned by two thousand oarsmen convoyed the expedition. The Vandals could offer little resistance to these forces. During the last hundred years they had lost in Africa the energy which had once made them invincible; and in spite of his boasted bravery, their king Gelimer proved himself, by his indecision, sensitiveness, lack of perseverance, and want of will power, the worst possible leader for a nation in danger. The neutrality of the Ostrogoths, which Byzantine diplomacy had secured, gave Belisarius every chance of fair play. Early in September 533 he was able to disembark unhindered on the desert headland of Caput-Vada. He was well received by the African people, and marched on Carthage,

533-546]

Conquest of Africa

13

while the imperial fleet turned back, skirting the coast in a northerly direction. On September 13 the battle of Decimum was fought, and shattered Gelimer's hopes by a single blow, while Carthage, the chief town and only fortress in Africa, fell into the conqueror's hands undefended. In vain the Vandal king recalled the forces which he had detached for service in Sardinia, and endeavoured to regain his capital. He was forced to raise the blockade, and on the day of Tricamarum mid-Dec. 533) the Byzantine cavalry again overcame the impetuosity of the barbarians. This was the final and decisive defeat. All Gelimer's towns, his treasures, and family fell in turn into Belisarius' hands. He himself, hemmed in in his retreat on Mt Pappua, was forced to surrender, on receiving a promise that his life should be spared, and that he should be honourably treated (March 534). In a few months, contrary to all expectations, a few cavalry regiments had destroyed Gaiseric's kingdom.

Justinian, always optimistic, considered the war at an end. He recalled Belisarius, who was decreed the honours of a triumph; while he himself, somewhat arrogantly, assumed the titles of Vandalicus and Africanus. Furthermore he adorned the walls of the imperial palace with mosaics representing the events of the African war, and Gelimer paying homage to the Emperor and Theodora. He hastened to restore Roman institutions in the conquered province, but at this very moment the war broke out afresh. The Berber tribes had passively allowed the Vandals to be crushed; now it was their turn to rise against the imperial authority. The patrician Solomon, who had succeeded Belisarius, energetically put down the revolt in Byzacena (534) but he was unable to break through the group of Aures in Numidia (535): and soon the discontented troops, dissatisfied with a general who was strict and demanded too much from them, broke into a serious mutiny (536). Belisarius was obliged to leave Sicily for Africa at once, and arrived just in time to save Carthage, and defeat the rebels in the plains of Membressa. To complete the pacification it was found necessary to appoint the Emperor's own nephew Germanus governor of Africa. After performing prodigies of courage, skill, and energy, he succeeded at last in crushing out the insurrection (538). But four years had been lost in useless and exhausting struggles. Only then was the patrician Solomon, invested a second time with the rank of Governor-General, able to complete the pacification of the country (539). By a bold march be forced labdas, the strongest of the Berber princes and the great chief of the Aures, into submission. He overran Zab, Hodna, and Mauretania Sitifensis, forcing the petty kings to acknowledge the imperial suzerainty. Under his beneficent rule (539-544) Africa once more experienced peace and security. His death occasioned another crisis. The revolted Berbers made common cause with the mutinous soldiers. A usurper Guntharic murdered Areobindus, the Governor-General, and proclaimed his own independence (546). Africa seemed on the point of slipping from the

14

Invasion of Italy

[533-548 Empire, and the fruits of Belisarius' victories were, to quote Procopius' phrase, "as completely annihilated as though they had never existed." This time again, the energy of a general, John Troglita, overcame the danger. After two years of warfare (546-548) he beat down the Berber resistance, and restored, permanently at last, the imperial authority.

After fifteen years of war and strife Africa once more took her place in the Roman Empire. Doubtless it was not the Africa that Rome had once possessed, and of which Justinian dreamed. It included Tripolitana, Byzacena, Proconsularis, Numidia, and Mauretania Sitifensis. The Byzantines also occupied Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearic Isles, all dependencies of the African government. But with the exception of several scattered places on the coast, of which the most important was the citadel of Septem (Ceuta) at the Pillars of Hercules, the whole of West Africa broke away from Justinian. Mauretania Caesariensis and Mauretania Tingitana always remained independent, joined to the Empire only by the loosest bond of vassalage. However, within these limited boundaries the work of the imperial restoration was not in vain. It is clear that Justinian's reign left a lasting impress on the lands drawn once more into the bosom of the monarchy.

The conquest of Africa by Belisarius furnished Justinian with a splendid base for operations in Italy, where he hoped to carry out his ambitious projects. As had been the case in Africa, circumstances provided him, in the nick of time, with a pretext for interference in the peninsula.

Amalasuntha, daughter of Theodoric, and regent for her young son Athalaric, had soon succeeded in arousing the discontent of her barbarian subjects by her Roman sympathies. Made uneasy by the growing opposition, she put herself into communication with the Court at Constantinople, begging of the imperial benevolence an asylum in the East should she need it. In return she offered all facilities for the fleet of Belisarius to revictual in Sicily in 533, and finally allowed herself to be persuaded to propose to Justinian the conquest of Italy (534). The death of the young Athalaric (October 534) further complicated the princess's position. In order to strengthen it, she made her cousin Theodahad her partner; but a few months later a national revolution, like that which had hurled Hilderic from the throne in Africa, deposed Theodoric's daughter. Amalasuntha was imprisoned by order of her royal husband, and soon afterwards assassinated (April 535). As had been the case in Africa, but even with increased imperiousness, the Byzantine diplomacy demanded satisfaction for the arrest of a princess allied to and protected by Justinian. Her death proved to be the wished-for casus belli.

As if to complete the remarkable parallelism presented by Italian