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ledge, of which he gives us an account, are those of Bacon, D’Alembert, and Locke. That they are all defective he has clearly evinced. Bacon he justly represents as the first who attempted any thing of importance on this subject; and his classification has been the chart upon which all subsequent system-makers have wrought their experiments. D'Alembert followed the scheme of lord Verulam, and his veneration for Bacon seems, on this occasion, to have prevented him from giving due scope to his own powerful and fertile genius, and has engaged him in the fruitless task of attempting, by means of arbitrary difinitions, to draw a veil over incurable defects and blemishes, p. 10.

It would have increased the interest which literary men will feel in the Dissertation, had Mr. Stewart given us D'Alembert's · Encyclopedial True;' and Bacon's chart, of which he frequently speaks. That our readers may have an opportunity of judging of the classification of the latter, we shall extract from his . Advancement of Learning' his general divisions of knowledge, and, so far as is compatible with our prescribed limits, his subordinate ramifications of the generic sciences.

What, then, accomplished the immortal reviver of science in Europe!--The human mind, he says, has three faculties, which are called Memory, Imagination, and Reason. That is the truest partition of human learning, which hath reference to the three faculties of man's soul, which is the seat of learning. History is * referred to memory, poesy to the imagination, philosophy to rea

By poesy, in this place, we understand nothing else, but feigned history, or fables. As for verse, that is only a stile of expression. And that this distribution is truly made, he shall easily conceive that hath recourse to the originals of intellectuals. In. dividuals only strike the sense, which is the port or entrance of the understanding. The images or impressions of those individuals accepted from the sense, are fixed in the memory, and at first enter into it entire, in the same manner they were met: afterwards the understanding ruminates upon them and refines them; · which then it doth either merely review, or in a wanton delight,

counterfeit and resemble; or by compounding and dividing, digest • and endue them. So it is clearly manifest that from these three fountains of memory, of imagination, and of reason, there are these three • emanations, of poesy, of history, and of philosophy, and that there can

be no other nor no more: for history and experience, we take for 'one and the same, as we do philosophy and science."* His three generic sciences, it appears therefore, are history, poesy, and philosophy; and from these all the specific sciences are to be deduced, if they can be; or else the commencement of the classification is defective. Let us now place before our readers the emanation of sciences, from the intellectual faculties of memory, imagination, and reason.

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* Adv. of Learn. b. 2. c. 1 Oxford Edition, 1640.

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Principles of Things

1. Summary or Primative Philosophy.

Axioms of universality

Transcendants of Entity.
I. God. Hence Divine Philosophy, or Natural Theology

I.
Speculative

I.
Philosophy. Physiques.

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Variety of

Things.
11. Forms.
Metaphysiques. Final causes.

Hot.
Cold.
Dense.
Grave.
Light, &c.

Abstracts.

11.
Operative Phi-
losopby.

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II.
Special or deri-
vative Philoso-
ply, respecting

His preroga-
tives.

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His miseries.

Ş Intellectual

{ and moral.
Indication of the Mind by the Body; and of
Body by the Mind.
Impression upon the Body by the Mind; and
upon Mind by the Body.
Body which

Arts medicinal.
origin.

Arts of Decoction.

Arts of Activity. Pictures.
ates
Arts Voluptuary Music.

S Rational.
Substance,

Sensible.

Intellect, Reason, Imagination,
Soul
Faculties,

Memory, Appetite, Will, Voluntary

Motion, Sense, and Perception.
Use of the faeul-

Logic.
ties.

Ethics.

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I.
Humane Philo-
sophy. propers
referring to

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Conversation.
Negotiation.
Government of
states.

• Orations, cpisles, and apophthegmes,' lord Bacon informs us are .appendices to history. In like manner, he Appends mathematics,' divided into arithmetic and geometry,' to natural philosophy;' the doctrine of angels and spirits,' to natural theology;' and problems and placits,' or propositions to physics;' because he could not mathematically arrange them in any place. From logic he derives Elocution, and from Elocution the sciences of Grammar, Method, and Rhetoric. We have not time to pursue him through all his ramifications of logic, ethics, and the civil history of man; nor is it needful; for we have followed him to his disclosure of all the sciences. Our readers have now before them, the famed classification of all human knowledge by Bacon; which Mr. Stewart says, has not been much improved by all the labours of Locke, D'Lembert, Diderot, the Germans, and the great lights of the eighteenth century. Of ever obtaining such a philosophical partition as he deems desirable, the professor seems to despair. So did not Bacon. He says, 'touching impossibility, I determine thus; all those things are to be held possible and performable, which may be accomplished by some person, though not by every one; 6 and which may be done by the united labours of many, though not by any one apart; and which may be effected in a succession of ages, though not in the same age; and in brief, which

may

be ' finished by the public care and charge, though not by the ability ' and industry of particular persons. Adv. of Learn. B. II. Proem. Bacon requests, moreover, in his Preface, p. 19. that men “would

cheer up themselves, and conceive well of the enterprise; and not 'figure unto themselves a conceit and fancy, that this Our Instau* ration is a matter infinite, and beyond the power and compass of * Mortality; seeing it'is in truth the right and legitimate end and

period of Infinite Error.' . It seems to me,' he says, that men neither understand the Estate they possess, nor their abilities to

purchase; but of the one to presume more, of the other less, than - indeed they should. So it comes to pass, that over-prizing the • Arts received, they make no further inquiry; or undervaluing themselves, more than in equity they ought, they expend their abilities upon matters of slight consequence, never once making experiment of those things which conduce to the sum of the bu«siness. Wherefore, Sciences also have, as it were their Fatal Co* lumns; being men are not excited, either out of desire or hope, to

penetrate further. Persons who have entertained a design to make trial themselves, and to give some advancement to sciences, and to propagate their bounds, even these authors durst not make an open departure from the common received opinions; nor visit the Head-springs of nature, but take themselves to have done a great matter, and to have gained much upon the age, if they may but interlace, or annex any thing of their own; providently considering with themselves, that by these middle courses, they may both conserve the modesty of assenting; and the liberty of "adding.'

Stewart's Dissertation, which is introductory to the Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, deserves the greater part of the encomiums passed upon it in the Edinburgh Review for September 1816. • This discourse is the most splendid of Mr. Stewart's works;' says that critical journal, and places the author at the head of the elegant writers on philosophy in our language,' p. 192. Splendid as it is, we cannot ascertain wherein it excels his other works, unless it be in this, that it is his last; which with some writers, as with some hearers of sermons, is a sufficient reason for pronouncing it the best. In his sketch of classifications, Stewart proceeds not beyond the essays of three literary luminaries; and is defective in not giving a candid narrative of several reputable enterprizes of this nature which might bave been found in the annals of literature.

He represents Locke as attempting to distribute into classes, the whole of human knowledge, while the Edinburgh Reviewer is of a different opinion. Stewart seems, in his opinion, to suppose that the “plans of Bacon and Locke are for different distributions of the same subject. But they plainly relate to different matters. That of Bacon respected all the objects of those faculties of the human mind called intellectual, which in the philosophy of his age, were dis, tinguished from the senses on the one hand, and from the will on the other. The object of Locke was more limited. His distribu. tion is only of what falls under the compass of the understanding;' meaning, by that term, what Bacon denotes by • Reason.' Mr. Locke, therefore, proposed only a subdivision of one of Bacon's classes, that namely of Philosophy:' and Dr. Smith uses the same language when speaking of a similar distribution adopted by the Greeks. It is plain, indeed, that an arrangement which includes history and the fine arts, cannot be intended to apply to the same subject with one which excludes them. That of Bacon, therefore, is a distribution of all the objects of mind;--that of Locke, only of what are strictly called sciences." In reply to this ingenia ous reviewer, and in defence of Stewart whom he modestly assails on this point, we quote Locke himself, who must have known what was his own design. "A man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the contemplation of things themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or the signs the mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer information. All which three, viz. things as they are in themselves knowable; actions as they depend on us, in order to happiness; and the right use of signs in order to knowledge, being toto colo different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly seperate and distinct one from another.'* He means then to classify every thing about which man can employ his thoughts, or what he elsewhere calls the whole of human knowledge. The * Essay on the Understanding. B. iv. ch. 21. sec. 5.

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VOL. X.

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