had heard with great pleasure the speech | tem of illicit distillation by strong and coof the right hon. the secretary for Ireland, ercive laws, than to encourage the cona speech which abounded in those liberal stant interposition of the military. He sentiments which he was led to expect regretted that resource had been had to from him after all he had heard of his con- the military on this occasion. He, howduct in that country. It was his firm con- ever, approved of the conduct of the Irish viction, however, that this was the occa- government in not censuring the sheriff, sian of all others in which they were bound or even causing an inquiry to be made to appoint a committee to investigate the into his conduct; and he did so on this grievance complained of, principle because he had always considered it most injudicious in the government of Ireland to interfere at all with ministerial officers. Mr. Bathurst said, that the late acts did not apply to county meetings, which stood entirely on the basis of common law. The only question which the House had to consider was, whether this was the most proper tribunal before which the inquiry could be carried on. If the sheriff had done wrong, what punishment was the House to inflict on him, or had they the same means of examining evidence which were possessed in courts of law? If they were to appoint a committee, this would not prevent individuals who thought themselves aggrieved from seeking their remedies against the sheriff in the ordinary courts of justice. Now, what a strange situation would the House be placed in, if two distinct proceedings took place on the same subject of investigation? If that House passed a resolution of censure or of acquittal, it would not prevent the parties complaining from instituting legal proceedings. Sir J. Mackintosh said, that the matter of the present motion might be divided into two parts the first relating to the conduct of the Irish government in refusing to interfere, after the address presented; the second relating to the line of conduct which, under existing circumstances, it would befit the House of Commons to adopt. With respect to the first question he did not materially differ from the practical conclusion of the right hon. secretary for Ireland, and that of his predeces sor. He thought, upon the whole, that the non-interference of the Irish government was fairly accounted for; but one of the reasons assigned for that interference struck him as a little singular. His right hon. friend contended, that it would have been improper for the government of Ireland to have removed the sheriff from his office, even if they knew that he had misconducted himself in it. That might, as a general principle, be true; but if it were true, what should be said of ministers who, without inquiry, and even without hearing removed from his post one of the most illustrious, virtuous and respectable men in England-giving him the first intimation of his dismission, too, in a way which would have been thought harsh from a private mas ter to a menial servant, namely, by a parae graph inserted in a ministerial newspaper? If so much respect was due to the sheriff of Dublin, surely a little respect ought to have been shown to the illustrious indivi, Mr. Peel, in voting against the motion, dual (earl Fitzwilliam) to whom he had wished to guard against any possible mis- alluded, The House ought to examine construction; for he certainly could not into the cause of so much rigour on the express any approbation of the conduct one hand and so much lenity on the other; of the sheriff in the introduction of the the lenity was shown to a man who cut military. Such an approbation would short a proceeding likely to terminate in contradict the principles upon which he strictures upon the government; the ri had uniformly acted when he held an offi- gour was exercised towards one who facial situation in Ireland. He had been ac- voured the expression of public opinion, cused of extreme severity in the measures With respect to the second question, it which he adopted at that time; but had been argued that the violation of inbe thought it better to put down the sys-dividual right was not a wrong for the in Mr. J. P. Grant thought the House was bound not to leave the protection of the right of petitioning to the courts of law. If such outrages as those which had been committed in Dublin were to be treated as mere acts of indiscretion, there would be an end to that guardianship which the House was bound to exercise over the rights and liberties of the people. Mr. R. Martin contended, that even if the conduct of the sheriff were as illegal as it had been represented, still the subject was not one that ought to be investigated by a court of law. VOL. IV. 3 N quiry of the House of Commons. Now, argument he pursued on that occasion, if a private individual suffered injury as a that he had not even omitted to allude to the private individual, no doubt the care of case of earl Fitzwilliam; although between his interest belonged to himself; but the lord lieutenant of a county, who was ne where, even in the case of a private per- cessarily in the confidence of government, son, a constitutional right was violated, an and a sheriff there did not appear much injury was suffered by the whole people of resemblance in character. The hon. and the British empire. But he must go far- learned gentleman's argument was, that ther. It had been said, that for the wrong as no magistrate could be prosecuted in in question a legal remedy existed. He a court of law, for an erroneous exercise denied most positively that there was any of discretion, not attributable to corrupt legal remedy whatever. Where could a motives, it was indispensably necessary definition be found of the duties of a high that parliament should charge itself with sheriff at a public meeting? But, to come the punishment of magistrates for all ofto the latter part of the sheriff's conduct. fences against the constitution, which Was there redress at law for the employ- were not punishable in a court of law. ment of the military? Suppose an action He was far from saying, that no case of brought for common assault, the military this nature ought to be investigated by would defend themselves by pleading the the grand inquest of the nation; but the command of the sheriff. No one would question was, whether the present was doubt that the sheriff had a discretion to that case? Adverting to the precedents act. The question would be, not whether produced from the reign of Charles the he rightly used that discretionary power, 2nd and from the Irish parliament, he but whether he did use it: and the sol- contended, that they were inapplicable in diers must be acquitted. Then, change the present instance. Even if the House the course of proceeding-would the she- were to investigate the business, it must riff himself be answerable in a court of be at the bar, and not in a committee law? Every member knew that to con- above stairs, that a charge affecting the vict a civil magistrate, corrupt motives character and, perhaps, the personal limust be made out. Suppose a sheriff, aberty, of a sheriff of a county, must be short time after any little error on the right side, to receive a lucrative employment-and there had been such an instance-would that fact be enough to support an allegation of corrupt motive? It would not. In fact, to say that the House of Commons was not to inquire into the wrongs committed by public officers, was to say that, nine times in ten, public offieers might commit wrongs with impunity. Mr. Shaw said, he had been present at the meeting in question, and thought the conduct of the sheriff indiscreet, but not corrupt. He objected to the interference of the House, because a remedy was open at common law, and because he believed that that remedy was likely to be resorted to. Lord Castlereagh sincerely regretted the occurrence in question, and especially the introduction of military force. The question, however, was, what course it was prudent at present to pursue. He was by no means surprised at the opinions expressed by the hon. and learned gentleman who had just sat down, because they were strictly consistent with those delivered by him on the Manchester question. The hon. and learned gentleman had, indeed, followed so strictly the course of heard. If the House of Commons were to take upon itself to inquire into the conduct of all public meetings, it would have a copious task, and might divest itself of all its other functions. Lord Bective was of opinion, that the high sheriff of Dublin had conducted himself with great judgment and propriety. Mr. Creevey said, he had been misunderstood in his observations on a former occasion on the right of petition. He on that occasion alluded to the year 1680. He never thought that it would fall to his lot to vindicate the conduct of a Russell and a Cavendish, in the part they had taken against such a wretch as Jefferies. It was the denial of the right of petition, seven years after that period, which caused James 2nd to lose his throne; and he hoped that should the right of the people of England be again invaded in a similar manner, the people would have spirit enough to do themselves that justice which had formerly been done under the auspices of a Russell and a Cavendish. Mr. W. Wynn was opposed to an inquiry into this subject as it was not, strictly speaking, a breach of the privilege of parliament. Cavendish, Charles Crespigny, sir W. De Crawley, Saml. Calvert, N. Cole, sir Chris. Davies, T. H. Newport, sir J. Nugent, lord Noel, sir G. Ossulston, lord Phillips, Geo, R. Philips, G. Power, R. Price, Robt. Rice, T. S. Ramsden, J. C. Ricardo, David Ridley, sir M. Robarts, Ab. Robinson, sir G. Rickford, Wm. Smith, hon. R. Smith Wm. Sebright, sir J. Talbot, R. W. Tennyson, C. Warre, J. A. Williams, Wm. Wilson, sir R. Wood, Matthew Wyvill, M. Whitmore, W. White, Luke Westenra, hon. H. TELLERS. Fitzgerald, M. Russell, lord J. PAIRED OFF. Forbes, visct. Shelly, sir John Lawley, F. Ponsonby, hon. F. Sykes, D. Mostyn, sir Thos. Lloyd, sir E. ADDRESSES FOR MONEY-STANDING ORDER.]-On the motion of Mr. Wynn, it was resolved, "That this House will not proceed upon any motion for an address to the Crown, praying that any money may be issued, or that any expense may be incurred, but in a committee of the whole House; and that the same be declared a standing order of the House." CONDUCT OF MR. JUSTICE BESTPETITION OF THOMAS DAVISON.]-Mr. Denman said, he held in his hand a Petition on a subject highly important to the due administration of justice. The petition was from Thomas Davison, formerly of Duke-street, West Smithfield, but now a prisoner confined in Oakhampton gaol. The petitioner complained of having been fined whilst making his defence by Mr. Justice Best, before whom he was tried in October last, at Guildhall. The petitioner was tried for a blasphemous libel, and in the course of his defence he was fined three times by the learned judge. The first was a fine of 20%. inflicted on the petitioner, because he stated to the jury, that no counsel at the bar would enter into an honest defence of the defendant under existing circumstances. The defendant, in the course of his defence, was afterwards fined twice, each time in a sum of 40%.; so that during his defence he was fined 100l. He was not aware that there was any instance of any man having been ever fined for what was said by him whilst defending himself against a charge brought against him in a court of justice. That fact was worthy the attention of the House. The petitioner had entered into a sort of legal argument." He had cited the case of sir Walter Raleigh, who was certainly on his trial" severely handled by sir E. Coke, but who in his defence uttered sentiments which were at the time deemed to approach to high treason; nevertheless the court heard him, without any attempt to impose a fine for his expressions. The next case was that of Prynne, Bastwick, and Burton, who were brought before the star-chamber, where it was the practice to proceed in a great degree by written documents. Prynne and the others, in their written defence, arraigned the conduct of archbishop Laud in terms of such severity, that the archbishop urged the star-chamber to reject the defence, and fine the parties for venturing to make it. The star-chamber, however, refused to reject the defence, although they admitted its culpability; and observed that, scandalous as it was, and an aggravation of the offence, yet as the defendants deemed it necessary for their own cause it ought to be received. There was also the case of colonel Lilburne, in the time of the Commonwealth; and although he indulged in the most violent attack and vituperation upon the judges, yet he was not only not fined, but, was acquitted. In examining the books, he also found, in the 1st of Henry 5th, the case of lord Cobham, who was tried for heresy, an offence which, if the power existed, was very likely to call for the interposition of the judge, if a defendant pressed his sentiments with unusual warmth; and yet in that case, although lord Cobham arraigned the conduct of the archbishop of Canterbury, to whom he applied the most violent language, yet he was never stopped. There was a late case of the "King v. Williams," before lord Kenyon, where a gentleman of the bar was defending the party for publishing Paine's " Age of Reason," and was interrupted by the learned lord, who considered him as embarking directly in the defence of the doctrines promulgated in the book. The learned counsel informed the judge, that unless he could proceed in the line he had been pointing out, it was impossible for him to do justice to the case of the defendant. The court, upon hearing this declaration, refrained from interrupting him during the remainder of his defence. Indeed, every reference which he had made to the practice of the courts confirmed him in his opinion that the power of fining under such circumstances was novel. When he denied the right of the judge to inflict a fine upon a defendant, he begged not to be understood as for a moment calling in question the undoubted right of the court to punish for contempts, to remove obstructions, to preserve order, and to vindicate its own dignity in the most prompt and effectual manner. But, when it went beyond the necessary removal of obstructions, and the vindication of its own dignity, he thought its proceedings ought to be watched with a jealous eye. The power of fining, in the manner in which Mr. Justice Best was represented to have fined this defendant, was capable of obstructing, rather than aiding the ends of justice. Suppose for instance, a man were indicted for a libel, he had a variety of protections thrown around him by the law, before he could be visited with any penalty. There were all the advantages which he might have from any defect in the technicalities of form, and there was the verdict of a jury. But, in the case of a fine imposed in this man ner, the defendant had nothing to depend upon but the will of the judge. There were many other reasons which forced themselves upon the mind in considering this subject. The defendant stated one very powerful one;-namely, that the imposition of the first fine had intimi dated him, and prevented him from going on with his defence in the manner he in tended, and which would have been calculated to serve his cause with the jury. It would be no answer to say that, notwithstanding the fine, the defendant went on fluently and firmly; for no person but himself could state what passed in his mind at the moment. The defendant, in conducting his own cause was only exercising a discretion which was open to all men and most certainly it had happened, that individuals had succeeded with juries, where, in all probability, counsel would have failed. A defendant might be indicted for a libel under circumstances which, if he suffered judgment to go by default, might expose him to no greater punishment than a fine of 50l. And yet, according to this doctrine, if he ventured to defend himself, he might, by incurring the displeasure of the judge, incur a ruinous accumulation of fines far exceeding the penalty had he pleaded guilty at the outset; so that the spirit of his defence might possibly lead to a tenfold aggravation of the penalty which would attach to a conviction for the offence, had he not said a word in exculpation. Suppose the party were a poor man and unable to pay a fine of this nature, then he must square his defence according to his poverty, and proceed to address the jury with his mind fettered with the terror of an indefinite imprisonment, should he drop a phrase at which the judge might take objection. There was another very strong objection which he had to this mode of proceeding, it was this:-that it committed the judge, as it were, personally with a defendant, a most unfavourable and unsuitable circumstance to appear in a court of justice. [Hear.] It was true that in this particular case, Mr. Justice Best, in charging the jury, took care to assure them that what had been done by the defendant should not operate against him in his mind, in summing up the evidence. The hon. and learned gentleman then read the prominent parts of the petition. He repeated his doubt upon the right of the court to construe these expressions of the defendant (however improper they might have been) into a contempt of court. All he desired at present was to have this petition printed; He meant to move nothing further unless he received some encouragement from the House. He certainly thought the subject of the highest importance; for it might so happen that the defendant could have saved himself from his present sentence; and, in that view, the circumstances, when examined, might possibly justify an address to the Crown for a mitigation of punishment. He begged to disclaim any desire to countenance interference with the decisions of courts of justice. The greatest mischief must result from such a practice, unless in extreme cases. He then moved, that the said petition be brought up. Mr. Hobhouse thought that the petition deserved the attention of the House. Although he had searched with the utmost care, he had been unable to find a single case bearing on the question before the House. The absence of any similar exercise of power by a judge, amounted, he apprehended, to a proof of the illegality of the practice; for, according to lord Coke, as usage proved the intendment of the law, so non-usage proved what was not intended by the law. The strongest authority in favour of the existence of such a power was that of judge Holt, who said, that if a defendant was guilty of contempt, the judge might issue a warrant against him, if the contempt was committed out of court, or fine him if it was committed in court. This, however, was only the dictum of a judge, and as such could not be opposed to the law of the land. When judge Jeffries was on the bench, William Penn had been fined forty marks for refusing to take off his hat in court, and the jury had been imprisoned for giving a verdict contrary to the opinion of the bench. But, though Penn had insulted the bench, he was not fined for any expression made use of in his defence, but solely for refusing to pull off his hat; and surely what had been too much for judge Jeffries to do ought to be too much for any judge of the present time. In the 3rd Institute of Coke, p. 142, there was a report of the case of William Bruce, who, though he had grossly insulted the court, had not been fined for his conduct. A verdict having been found against Bruce, he addressed the judge in those words "Roger! Roger! now thou hast thy will of me," and on being asked what he meant, he added," what for a long time thou hast sought, my loss and my shame; and I will think of it, and reward or recompense it." Here though the judge had been insulted, and though the offence of the defendant was deemed so great that he had afterwards been indicted for it, still it had not been attempted to fine him. But, if even a thousand adjudged cases could be produced in favour of the practice, they were not to be regarded as legal precedents, if contrary to the common law of the land. If the law allowed the imposition of such arbitrary fines, Mr. Fox's libel bill was useless; for a defendant might by this power be so crippled in his defence, as not to be able to avail himself of the benefit which that act was intended to give. Let the expressions used by the defendant in this case have been ever so gross, that had nothing whatever to do with the question before the court; for, however the grossness of the language might be proper matter of consideration in awarding the amount of a fine, it never could of itself give a judge the power of fining. The late lord Ellenborough on the trial of Eaton, though the defendant introduced the most blasphemous and libellous matters in the course of his defence, had said, that he thought it better for the ends of justice to let him go on. The House should bear in mind that the ermine with which a judge was clothed did not invest him with infallibility. The present case was one that loudly called for the interference of that House, and he hoped they would see the propriety of putting a stop to a practice so inconsistent with every principle of justice. The Attorney General said, he did not understand that his learned friend had denied the legality of the proceeding of the learned judge; though the hon. seconder had roundly denied it. His learned friend, however, doubted the legality of the power to fine a defendant for contempt. His learned friend could not have been present when the question was fully discussed in the court of King's-bench and when all the judges gave their deliberate opinions upon it. The petition called in question the propriety of the decision of that court. The offence for which the defendant was tried, was not a political, but one of the most disgusting of blasphemous libels. He would read one short passage. Lord John Russell believed it was contrary to order to read any statement from |