But this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defensive. It is, therefore, next in order, and equal in importance, that the discretionary powers which are necessarily vested in the Monarch, whether for the execution of the laws or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon public principles,* and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies of a Court.' He follows the plan and operations of the cabal to the most momentous effect, if we admit it to have actually taken place, its influence on parliament. The House of Commons was originally considered as a CONTROUL, issuing immediately from the people, and SPEEDILY to be resolved into the mass from whence it arose. In this respect, it was in the higher part of govern

ment what juries are in the lower. The capacity of a magistrate being transitory,

Whatever might be the fact as to favouritism at that time, the constitutional and impartial reader will admit this general description to be just,

and that of a citizen permanent, the latter capacity, it was hoped, would, of course, preponderate in all discussions, not only between the people and the standing authority of the Crown, but between the people and the fleeting authority of the House of Commons itself. It was hoped, that, being of a middle nature between subject and government, they would feel with a more tender and nearer interest every thing that concerned the people, than the other remoter and more permanent parts of legislature. This character can never be sustained un-. less the House of Commons shall be made to bear some stamp of the actual disposition of the people at large. It would (among public misfortunes) be an evil more tolerable, that the House of Commons should be infected with every epidemical phrensy of the people, as this would indicate some consanguinity, some sympathy of nature, with their constituents, than that they should, in all cases, be untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people. The virtue, spirit, and ESSENCE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

consist in its being the EXPRESS IMAGE OF It was

THE FEELINGS OF THE NATION.*

not designed to be a controul upon, but for, the people.' Having given this account of the intention of a House of Commons, he proceeds to a description of its state at that time, which, whether just or not, is at least very eloquent. A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial magistracy, an anxious care of public money, an openness, approaching towards facility, to public complaints: these seem to be the true characteristics of an House of Commons. But an addressing House of Commons, and a petitioning nation; an House of Commons full of confidence, when the nation is plunged in despair; in the utmost

! * The ardour of Mr. Burke's mind transported him on this occasion farther than cool reason could justify. The virtue of the House of Commons, as of the other branches of the legislature, consists in promoting the interest and happiness of the nation, which, in many cases, is better attained by restraining its feelings, than by perfect sympathy with them, whatever may be their tendency. Legislative wisdom and benevolence seek the permanent welfare, not the temporary gratification of a people,

harmony with Ministers, whom the people regard with the utmost abhorrence; who vote thanks, when the public opinion calls upon them for impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the general voice demands account; who, in all disputes between the people and administration, presume against the people; who punish their disorders, but refuse even to enquire into the provocations to them: this is an unnatural, a monstrous state of things in this Constitution. Such an assembly may be a great, wise, aweful senate; but it is not to any popular purpose an House of Commons. He pursues the secret influence to its effects on foreign affairs, which he maintains also to be per

nicious.

His REMEDY for the evil has not a grain' of democracy in its composition. He does not propose an uncontrouled power of the people to prevent an uncontrouled power of the court. His object is to counterpoise the secret oligarchy of favouritism by an open aristocracy of talents, virtue, property, and

rank, combined together on avowed principles, agreeable to the Constitution, and supported by the approbation and confidence of the people. His plan is, that not popular favour alone shall determine who is to manage government, but popular favour combined with the constituents above mentioned. He thinks that the government should be in the hands of those at the same time most qualified and most interested in the welfare of the whole. These are men of talents, rank, property, and independence. He contends that an aristocracy so composed will, in all moral probability, promote the good of the country more effectually than either the people themselves, on the one hand, or court minions, on the other. In a word, he proposes that independent property should govern, and not dependent favouritism. The interests of the people, he conceives, should be placed in the hands of the independent yeomen, gentlemen, mer chants, and manufacturers of the kingdom, whose situation, from either their fortune or industry, renders them free, independent

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