war. For these reasons, he heartily concurred in the amendment of his right hon. friend. it was theirs and not ours; but we had only that one consolation. It was a war in which little glory could be acquired by success, in which success itself must be mixed with feelings which would embitter any glory that could be derived from it, and in which the smallest defeat would be attended with a disgrace infinitely disproportionate to the highest advantages that could be expected from such a contest. Engaged in such a war, what was the plain and clear course and policy to be pursued by the government of this country? To be ready to seize every opportunity to put an end to it,-not to omit even the smallest occasion of bringing about an amicable discussion to allay that feeling of irritation in which the war had origi Sir James Mackintosh having been accused of sacrificing justice and humanity to his sanguine views of progressive civilization, observed, in explanation, that if in the year 1600, any European powers at war with England, under pretence of humanity for the Indians, and of the injustice which they always suffered from Europeans, had compelled us to promise by treaty that we should make no purchases of land from these Indians, the whole of North America would at this day have contained fifty thousand cannibals, instead of ten millions of British free. men, who may be numbered among the most intelligent, the most moral, the bravest, and the most hap-nated. Even supposing the war py of the human race. Sentence of desolation and barbarism would have been passed on a considerable portion of the globe. Our ministers, in this proposal, had tried to doom to the same fate all that yet remained to be reclaimed. Speech of Marquis WELLESLEY, respecting the Negotiation for Peace with America, pronounced in the British House of Lords, April 13, 1815. Marquis Wellesley rose, pursuant to notice, to lay before their lordships the grounds of his motion relative to the manner in which the late negotiation with America had been conducted. The war with America he had considered as almost one of the most calamitous events that could befall this country; and when that event did unhappily take place, we had at least one consolation, that the aggression which led to had been attended with the greatest success on our part, he could not conceive one object which Great Britain could have, except that of putting an end to it. Fatally deluded as ministers had been by the appearance of affairs in Europe, which induced them to change the ground which they had originally taken, and to rest upon a point which had never before been brought into the discussion-for that such was the delusion under which they acted, he was convinced the question now came to be, what was the course which our ministers ought to have taken? They ought not to have been deluded by the fatal error that their success against one power ought to be turned against another-by the fatal error, that instead of immediately and magnanimously making use of that success as the means of bringing about an amicable adjustment of differences with America, they ought to consider it as a ground of rising in their demands and urg⚫ ing undue pretensions. The only use of the greatest success in the case of America, would be to enforce such demands as were fair and moderate. Nothing could be more erroneous than that policy which would turn America from views of internal improvement, of commerce, of civilization, and from that line of pursuits which enabled us, with respect to that country, to give full scope to those great principles of political economy by which the intercourse of the world would be most beneficially regulated. It was the clear and manifest interest of both parties to cultivate that amicable connec. tion resting on these solid principles which rendered the mutual advantage so important. The effect of war was to turn them from these views of peace and internal improvement, to views of a far different and less beneficial nature. A state of war would naturally lead that rising community to look to the formation of a great military, and even a naval power, to be turned against the parent from which that community issued. After a long continued war, peace would leave us in a condition, with respect to that country, very different from that in which we before stood; for if America did become a great military power, she would mix herself with the disputes and arrangements of all the civilized world, and this country would find a rival springing up in that people which had issued from its bosom. The pursuits of commerce and peace, and internal improvement, might be then but secondary concerns; and the great object would be to cultivate and establish a great military and naval power to act even on our frontiers, as they had in fact done by their naval exertions on the lakes, about which we had heard so much. This was the view in which our ministers ought to have considered the subject. The great fundamental principle on which they should have acted, was to turn America from this fatal policy, as adverse to the real interests of America as to those of this country; and to neglect no opportunity of bringing the fatal contest into which we had been unfortunately driven, to an amicable conclusion. He assured the noble earl (Liverpool) it would give him great satisfaction if he could approve of the manner in which the ministers had carried on the war, or the principles upon which they appeared to have conducted the negotiation. It was not on this day that he need argue, that peace, merely as such, could not be considered as a subject or ground of solid satisfaction. It was the situation in which peace ought to place us, that formed the only solid ground of satisfaction. This principle had been amply recognized and acted upon by this country with respect to other quarters. Peace-mere peace-had been offered, but rejected by their lordships and the nation. It was not, therefore, the mere circumstance that peace had been concludedit was not the mere words or aspect of the treaty that ought to decide their lordships to approve of it, if it could be shown from information and documents indisputable, that the peace had been concluded under circumstances in which neither honour nor security had been provided for. In discussing this question, their lordships had to consider what had been done to bring the war to a termination. It would be recollected, that soon after the war broke out, two propositions were made for an armistice, and a discussion of the points in dispute in the mean time. He did not blame ministers for their conduct on that occasion, being perhaps of opinion, that the carrying on negotiations for peace during an armistice, was generally an imprudent course of proceeding; but he only wished to call their lordships' attention to this fact, that at that time there was no expression of the slightest desire to alter the grounds of dispute; and that with respect to the impressment of seamen, a wish was expressed to come to a full and fair discussion, in order, if possible, to form some amicable arrangement on that difficult and arduous subject. The next point to be considered in the view of the question which he had stated, was the proposed mediation of Russia, and he had never yet been able to discover why that mediation had not been accepted. Their lordships were aware that the business of a mediator was merely to bring the parties ⚫ together for the purpose of amicable discussion. The business of an arbitrator was no doubt different, and perhaps with respect to our maritime rights, the emperor of Russia might not have been the most proper arbitrator, supposing we had been disposed to admit of any arbitration on that head; for, essential as these rights were to this country, yet they were not, perhaps, more popular with some nations in Europe, than they were on the other side of the Atlantic. But the emperor of Russia's mediation was not accepted. Yet at last, in a question about territory, in which the dignity and honour of a country might be as much involved as in any question whatever, the emperor of Russia, though not accepted as a mediator, was to be the arbitrator. With respect to the emperor of Russia, however, there was no character existing at the present day, no character recorded in history, which more commanded his respect, his admiration, and, as far as the expression might be used as to the sovereign of another country, his affection, than that great monarch; but he rather imagined that the mediation was refused, because at that moment a notion had arisen some where, that as America had been the aggressor, the contest ought not to be brought to a close without some measure of revenge, without some punishment for her indiscretion-than which a more unwise and destructive sentiment could not be conceived. After the refusal of the mediation of the emperor of Russia, a proposal was made for a direct negotiation. To that proposal, he had no objection; it was in every respect proper, if it was right to have rejected the offer in the first instance. But after this proposal was accepted, what was done? The American commissioners arrived at Gottenburgh, from whence they proceeded to Ghent, two months before our commissioners were sent to meet them. He would allow that, in ordinary cases, this would be a matter of little importance; but in the teeth of a war, and of a war so conducted, who could undertake to calculate the consequences that might ensue? It had been said that the transaction at Washington could not have been prevented, even if peace had been made on the first day the commissioners met; but might it not have been prevented if they had met before? He would now call the attention of the house to the state of Europe at that time. A series of glorious successes had attended the arms of his majesty and of the allies. We had concluded peace at Paris; peared by his gestures to contraand, long before that event, it ap-dict what he had said, but he spoke peared not to be doubted, that the result must be favourable to the objects for which we were contending. This country might then have met America with a great artillery of character, and then was the time to have come forward with powerful strength and moderate demands. But, instead of taking any advantage of the situation in which we stood, we sent a paltry force of nine thousand men from Bordeaux, and by an expedient the most preposterous, endeavoured to supply the want of military strength, by the force and magnitude of our diplomatic demands. He would contend that the instructions sent by the American government to its commissioners, were such as to admit of peace. On one branch, it was true, they had no instructions. They were not authorised to cede territory, or to negotiate Indian pacification. They thought it could never have entered the heads of the negotiators at Ghent to have made the first demand, or to have introduced the second, in the way in which it was introduced, under an idea of altering the relations of the Indians towards the American states. This was the undoubted reason why they had no instructions upon these points. There was an extraordinary fact connected with this subject, that was amusing, if one could be amused in contemplating those transactions-that while our negotiations for the peace and independence of the Indian nations were going on, a peace was actually concluded by Mr. Madison with many of them, one of the terms of which was, that they should enter again under the protection of the United States. The noble earl opposite, (Liverpool) ap on the authority of the existing documents. In this manner the negotiation commenced. Our first proposition was one that never was before suggested, with a view to peace or war, or even as a matter of speculation and argument. We demanded a cession of territory, on the ground that it formed the natural limit of Canada. This territory included the whole of the lakes, and a large strip of ground on the other side. It was accompanied with a further condition, that they should build no fortresses on the banks of the lakes, nor adopt those measures which were necessary to protect their commerce against the Indians. On the subject of natural limits, he could not help amusing himself with inquiring from whence the doctrine had issued. He remembered it was once introduced by the famous Mr. Anacharsis Clootz, the orator of the human race, who, in a book called “Revolutionary Diplomatics," had described the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Ocean, and the Rhine, as the natural limits of France. He was surprised to find, that after we had conquered the French revolution, and carried our arms into Paris, this doctrine should be revived by a secretary of state, and applied to America. But was this done in the time of our strength? Was the demand insisted on in a commanding attitude? No such thing; we approached in formâ pauperis; we laid the British crown at the foot of the American president, and besought that to us, the weaker party, he would afford that security which we knew to be necessary to defend us against his pretensions. And what was the security we asked? That he should aban first than would ultimately be insisted on. In conformity with this principle, the commissioners conceived it to be wise and prudent tó ask more, in the commencement of the negotiation, than in the latter end they conceived it proper to adhere to. Amongst some negotiators, of remote times, this principle was certainly acted on. And, with reference to their conduct, the negotiation of the present treaty resembled, in a great degree, many of the proceedings he had recently seen. Every precedent was adopted, as if it were the offspring of some sacred doctrine don all means of defence. Again, when we were asked by the Americans, why did we bring forward this demand at a moment when we professed to be negotiating in the spirit of peace? Our answer was, because your ambition is so unbounded. What could be expected after this? We set up monstrous, egregious, and unreasonable demands, and justified them by the ambition of that party upon whom we made them. When the question was asked, "Is this a sine quâ non?" the answer that followed was, perhaps, the most extraordinary that was ever given by a set of diplomatists" We will not tell you whether it is or not— we have already given you one sine qua non-and, until that is decided, we will not give you any information as to another." But this point, in whatever way considered, whether as a sine quâ non or not, was completely rejected no attempt was ultimately made to insist on it-it formed no part of the present treaty. Now, he would ask, was it necessary to insist on this point? If it was, what security could be found in a treaty which did not contain a word on the subject? The ground on which you called for it was, not your strength, but your weakness. You stated that a mutual possession of the lakes produced additional danger in war, and formed a perpetual source of disagreement in peace, and you insisted on additional security whether as a sine quâ non or not, the noble marquis did not pretend to say, since it was a matter very difficult to be unravelled. He had, however, been informed, that it never was intended to insist on this proposition, as a sine quâ non-but that it was thought to be a grand display of diploma-present. A glorious career of suctic address, to demand more at and, it was here supposed, that if persons, at a former period, had ultimately taken less than they at first demanded, that, therefore, in all cases, it was proper to ask for more than, if resisted, you would deem it necessary to take. But here he would observe, that insincerity must, generally, be the basis of such conduct-that insincerity was unworthy of all public councils-and he desired to abjure a participation in any such feelings or principles. It was true, indeed, that occasions might occur, in which it was requisite, while treating, to make demands which it was not intended to insist upon; but the circumstances inviting this course were of a peculiar nature, and none but cases of an extraordinary description could call for, or justify it. In the case of Great Britain, he contended, that should have been stated at first, which it was intended to have been abided by at last. If ever there was a case in which the system of making a great demand, and afterwards receding from it, was inapplicable to the circumstances under which it was resorted to, that case was the cess in war a long series of ad |