heart was true to the world's old love of liberty; but when the Jacobins came into power, and blood began to flow, he went down to his family château in Normandy, with a supply of gunpowder, which he caused to be stored in the vaults, then paid off all his servants, and sent them away with the exception of one young page, who would not leave him. For many an hour the peasantry saw the lights flashing from window to window, and the figures of the marquis and his page passing from vault to turretchamber, like those who sought for hidden treasure, or to look their last on haunts they might see no more; but at midnight De Marigny and the youth rode out together. The marquis carried the keys of his castle in one hand, and a flaming brand in the other, and, saying that there would never again be peace or justice in France, he threw the torch on the ground, before his father's gate, where his own hands had laid the train, and then rode fast away, followed by his faithful page. The country round was shaken that night as if by an earthquake, for the stately

château of De Marigny was blown from its foundations, and the morning sun rose upon its shapeless, blackened ruins, but neither De Marigny nor his page were ever seen on French ground after.

"And I have lived to be a spectator, though not an unconcerned one, of scenes more strange and terrible than all the nameless voices of that wild night prophesied, and to find the evening of my days falling on still ominous and troubled times. Years have darkened around, friends have passed from me, and the haunts of youth lie, like far and sunny isles, which my bark can reach no more; but there is one spot still green, with its early attraction to my steps, and that," said the worthy narrator, with a rather comic expression gathering over the momentary gravity of his countenance, "is the box, pit, or gallery-for, observe, I am not particular-of a Parisian theatre; but, believe me, messieurs, I never see the curtain fall, or enter while it remains unlifted, without remembering, in all its mysterious power, le Jeu de Noël,"

Naples, May 30, 1845.

J. M. M.

ANOTHER Series of victories had been

gained, hostile armies had again been dispersed; but the faulty principles on which the victors had based their operations prevented their situation from being improved by the success which they had achieved. Nor were the advantages followed up in a manner that could atone for previous error. Marshal Wurmser, instead of being closely confined within the walls of Mantua, and forced to subsist on the stores of the fortress, which would probably have obliged him to surrender by the end of October, was allowed to retain possession of the Seraglio, a considerable district of country, to extend his foraging parties far and wide, even beyond the Po, and to receive supplies from the surrounding country. When we consider how closely the sanguinary chance-games of Arcole and Rivoli were afterwards balanced, we are brought to the conviction, which every page of Napoleon's history forces upon us, that battle and an appeal to the exertions of brave soldiers was his only, as it was his constant resource, in all situations of difficulty. There were many circumstances which at this time tended to render the situation of the French army of Italy very precarious, notwithstanding the victories they had gained. The republican government mistrusted the court of Turin; they could not prevail upon the King of Sardinia to join them in the war against Austria, without relinquishing a greater share of the spoil than they were disposed to part with. The mountainous frontiers between France and Piedmont were also infested at this time by a number of plundering bands, composed of smugglers and disbanded soldiers, and known by the name of Barbets, who

were supposed to be encouraged or tolerated, at least, by the Sardinian government, which was also believed to be in close and friendly communiIcation with the court of Vienna. The relations with Genoa were on no better footing.

Lombardy was still tranquil; but though the French were popular with the middle classes, a fierce spirit of hostility was entertained against them by the peasantry, nobility, and clergy-ample cause for apprehension in case of future disaster. The provisional government of Milan had, however, raised a corps of 3000 men, which, though not admitted into the French line, helped to render some of the detached corps of the French army disposable.

The Directory were at this moment keenly alive to the necessity of concluding a peace; and as they were determined to retain Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, their intention was to restore Lombardy to the emperor, as an equivalent; they did not, therefore, encourage any revolutionary proceedings in Italy. Bologna, Ferrara, and Rovigo had, as related, placed themselves under provisional governments; and Napoleon, disregarding the treaty he had concluded with the Grand Duke of Modena, superseded the ducal regency by a provisional government of his own choosing, and combined the four provinces in a federal union, under a representative government. This government also raised a corps of 2000 or 3000 men for the service of the republic.

The Directory disapproved greatly of these proceedings; but as every thing appeared to have originated with the States themselves, things were allowed to remain as they were.

The benefits which the French de

rived from these arrangements were counterbalanced by the augmented hatred excited against them in the hearts of the other party, and which the first turn of fortune would be sure to call into activity. The Pope and the King of Naples could turn the scales against the Republicans. The Neapolitans were still in arms, and their forces were assembled on the frontiers; the Roman government, more clear-sighted than the other Italian governments, had resisted all the insolent demands lately made by the French, and continued its military preparations. It was probable that both powers would declare themselves; and allowing that they could only bring 30,000 men into the field, it was evident that such an army striking-in along with the next advance of the Austrians, would liberate Mantua, clear Lombardy, and replace things exactly where they had been at the opening of the campaign. The good fortune of Napoleon averted the danger. The defeat of Wurmser and the flight of Jourdan, which events happened about the same time, accelerated the peace with Naples. The news of the first-mentioned action naturally reached Naples before the other, and the terrified court instantly sent orders directing the Neapolitan minister at Paris to conclude a peace at all costs; and as the Directory had on their part been rendered very pliant by the defeats sustained in Germany, matters were soon arranged. The treaty was signed on the 10th of October, and the King of Naples retired from the scene at the very time when Fortune was inviting him to act a great and brilliant part.

The pope, judging rightly enough that his fate was decided upon, as we know from Napoleon's letters that it was, continued his preparations, expecting, no doubt, to be assisted by Austria, as he was evidently too feeble to act an independent part.

It may well be supposed that Napoleon, thus encompassed by foes, pressed hard for reinforcements, and we consequently find that 26,000 men were gradually sent into Italy. When they arrived is not mentioned, as many were, no doubt, drafts from the regimental dépôts. On this subject his mendacity exceeds its usual

extravagance; and as he addresses the government, who could hardly fail to know the truth, it shews, also, with what extreme contempt he regarded them. Writing on the 14th November, on the eve of the battle of Arcole, he says, "Not a day passes without bringing 5000 men to the Austrian army; and though our want of reinforcements has been known for two months and more, we have only received a single battalion of the 40th,-bad troops, not accustomed to fire." In his Memoirs he says, on the other hand, "The Directory promised much, and performed little; they sent twelve battalions, however, which arrived at Milan during the months of September and October." That there could be no great error in the last statement is certain, for at the end of October his army had again 42,000 men effective in the field, notwithstanding the losses it must have sustained during the previous operations. The army was, probably, in good order at this time, as all the resources of the country were at the disposal of the victor, who, it seems, sent 20,000,000 livres to Paris for the use of the government.

It was during the period of which we are speaking that Corsica was reunited to France. Some supplies, together with a body of Corsican patriots, having been embarked at Leghorn, obtained for Napoleon the honour of this conquest also: but from his letters to the Directory it is evident that he took little interest in the affairs of his native island, and made no particular exertion for its recovery.

Though the letters written at this particular moment by order of government, bear testimony of far greater honesty of purpose than those of Napoleon, the Directory were determined, nevertheless, to shew that on some points they could descend to the level of their general. Marshal Wurmser happening to be a native of one of the lately conquered provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, they passed a decree declaring him liable to be arraigned as an emigrant. This act of republican legislation was sent to Napoleon, and it was intimated to him that he might threaten the Austrian field-marshal with its execution if the latter con

tinued to delay the surrender of Mantua. It does not appear that any attempt was made to intimidate a man of honour by such unworthy proceedings. Napoleon's project of burning Trieste, though objected to in the first instance, was too congenial to the spirit which animated the French government of the period to be altogether lost upon them. After Wurmser's defeat the general is, therefore, desired to acquaint the Emperor of Austria, that such a measure will be immediately resorted to unless an ambassador is sent to Paris for the purpose of concluding a peace. Napoleon obeyed, and addressed a letter to the emperor, written in the real carmagnole style, which so well accorded with the Vandal threat it contained. No answer was ever sent, and it may be a question whether it was delivered. During the interval of repose of which we have been speaking, Napoleon resided principally at Milan; and though he was the conqueror and absolute ruler of the country, he was more on the level of ordinary society, and more within the reach of observation, than at any subsequent period of his life; and it is known to many who, like the author of these sketches, had afterwards opportunities of mixing in Italian society, that the most intellectual members of that society looked upon him as a man of moderate capacity and of very limited information. Those who thought so, however, were silent, while sycophants and panegyrists were loud enough, and with the world at large the loudest talkers generally carry the day.

Having seen how the French were situated, let us observe how matters stood with the Austrians, when they prepared for their third invasion of Lombardy. In Germany success had crowned their efforts. Jourdan had been defeated, and Morcau forced to retire. The troops which had guarded the northern passes of the Tyrol thus became disposable, and were enabled to join Davidowitch, who had reformed his army in that province after the rout of Calliano. Friuli, Quasdanowitch, who had been separated from Wurmser at the battle of Bassano, had assembled the remnants of his corps behind the Piava. Both generals were rapidly

In

reinforced; regiments were brought from the interior of Austria, new corps raised, the dépôts were emptied, and all recruits and convalescents fit for service hurried on to their respective battalions, so that by the end of October nearly 50,000 men were ready for the field. Marshal Alvinzy was placed in command of this hastily collected force. As the principal divisions of the French army were stationed at Trent, Bassano, Verona, and Villa França, the Austrians must have known, independently of their frequent communication with Mantua, that the fortress was not closely blockaded, and in no very immediate danger; and yet with this knowledge clearly before them, they hurried this new army on to its relief, without a single fair ground on which a prospect of success could be founded."

The Austrians could bring about 40,000 into action; but the long series of defeats had avowedly injured the morale of the old troops, from whom the new ones would naturally take their tone and feeling. The French, leaving 10,000 or 12,000 men to observe Mantua, and acting on a theatre of war of extraordinary strength, could take the field with about 30,000, all tried soldiers, emboldened by victory and by the confidence they placed in themselves and their leaders, advantages that far overbalanced the numerical superiority of four to three, which their adversaries possessed. Nor was there any good reason for believing that the new commander would be able to atone for the deficiency of his army. It is evident that Alvinzy belonged to the same class with Wurmser and Beaulieu: like them, he was a brave, able, and honourable man; but, like them, he was without the high energy of character and fiery genius which could alone rally the sinking spirit of an army, rekindle the hopes and aspirations of the brave, and carry the whole mass, torrent like, along with him in a daring and gallant career. Fortune smiled upon his first efforts, and boldness might have won her; but it was wanting, and the goddess having shewn the leaders of mighty hosts who was the real disposer of victory, returned to her first favourite, to abide at his will till,

According to the new plan of operations proposed by the Austrians, the main body of their army, consisting of about 25,000

men

under the field-marshal himself, was to advance towards Bassano and the Brenta, while Davidowitch, with 14,000 men, should attack Trent, force the pass of Calliano, and then aid, as circumstances might best direct, the main army in striking a decisive blow in the neighbourhood of Verona. Marshal Wurmser was to support the movement by a general sally from Mantua. The difficulty of making separate corps act in perfect concert and fall on at the proper time and place renders all such complicated operations extremely precarious, however much they may heighten success and augment the trophies of victory when the day is won. But to win the day must be the first object sought for; and the Austrians evidently threw away their best chance of success when they neglected to combine their army before they fought a general action. Events had surely rendered it apparent that the French army was far more active and movable than their own, and more capable of executing rapid manœuvres. A stand

up battle, fought in open field, and with all forces, was their game, for it would have given them the benefit of the acknowledged steadiness of their troops, of the tactical training of the soldiers, and of their power of moving with accuracy. In such a field, also, their numerical superiority would have told to advantage, instead of being frittered away between separate corps, whose partial success brought no gain to the general cause. The Austrians courted defeat at the outset, and were yet nearly proving successful.

Napoleon, apprehensive that Davidowitch might fall with superior numbers on General Vaubois, who was stationed at Trent with his division, ordered him to drive in the Austrian posts and alarm them for their own safety. This measure, at the very moment when operations were about to commence, naturally led to the result which it was intended to avert. Vaubois attacked

the Austrians at St. Michael on the 2d November without any decisive result; the consequence was that the Austrians concentrated their forces and fell upon him on the 3d and again on the 6th and 7th, and hit him so severely that he was driven from Trent, Calliano, and Mori. Here Davidowitch, astonished no doubt at the giant strides he had made, thought proper to halt and remain inactive for eight days, at the very time when minutes were worth ages. The cause of this incomprehensible delay, which occasioned the failure of the whole enterprise, has never been explained. The Austrians, who have so fairly and liberally furnished the documents necessary for a right understanding of these campaigns, have left this difficult point still in the dark. On the 17th November Davidowitch awakened from his stupor and attacked the French in the position of Rivoli; the Republicans were again defeated, and, as it would seem, with great loss; they fell back to Castello Nova, where they were next day followed by the Austrians, who were thus close in rear of Napoleon's left wing and within a single march of Mantua. And where now, when victory was in sight, were the field-marshals? where was Alvinzy, and where Wurmser? The answer is a sad one; but the tale, however afflicting, must be told, and many a tale of woe must follow before we see the light of hope and gladness break through the dark gloom which these reverses cast over the political horizon of Europe.

On the 5th November Alvinzy reached the Brenta, the French troops giving way before him. Napolcon, though informed of Vaubois' ill-success on the 3d, determined nevertheless to save the foe the trouble of a longer march, and to advance himself to a very dangerous distance indeed from his basis of operation and give them the meeting. He attacked them at Citadella on the 6th, but was forced, after a severe struggle, to withdraw from the combat. He informs us, indeed, that this was owing solely to Vaubois' second defeat and the capture of Mori by the Austrians, the news of which reached head-quarters at two o'clock on the morning of the 7th.