men, when they obstinately maintain and defend the cause of error or of vice. It is 'self' that always lies at the bottom; it is not so much the vice, as 'self,' that is to be defended; and if you can but separate 'self' from the vice, the vice will soon fall under the common sentence of reason, and be left to be condemned with its fellows.

By this honest, this holy art, our Lord convinced the lawyer who put the question of the text to him. He asked the question, intending that none should be admitted into the number of his neighbors who were not nearly allied to him; of the same nation at least. Our Saviour states a case to him, and puts it so, that his prejudices were all thrown out and silenced. The consequence was, that he who wanted to exclude almost all mankind from a right to his good offices, in a few minutes owns even the Samaritan, his most hated enemy, to be the Jew's neighbor; and by owning and accepting the Samaritan's good offices done to the Jew under the relation of a neighbor, he confessed the Samaritan's right, in that relation, to expect and receive the good offices of the Jew.

By the same method the prophet Nathan made David, in the very height of sin and extravagance, give sentence on himself and his iniquity. The wretched king had taken the wife of Uriah to his bed, and had slain the husband by the sword of the children of Ammon. When he received the message of Uriah's death, which ought to have filled him with horror and confusion, he sent this comfort to the captain of the host, which, no doubt, his false heart had first administered to himself; Let not this thing displease thee, for the sword devoureth one as well as another:' and so satisfied he was with his reasoning on this accident of war, as he was willing to esteem it, that he soon sent for the unfortunate brave man's widow, and she became his wife. In this state of security and enjoyment the prophet Nathan comes to him: had he openly taxed him with the murder, perhaps the king had justified himself, and said to the prophet as he did to his captain, The sword devoureth one as well as another;' or perhaps the prophet had been rebuked for his saucy intrusion, and been forced to fly the presence of the angry king: but the prophet came with a complaint to the king of a great oppression, which a very rich man

David was ready

had been guilty of towards a very poor one. to hear and redress such wrong; for this case stirred no prejudices; himself seemed unconcerned in it. The prophet's case was this a rich man had a friend come to visit him; and for his entertainment he sent and killed a poor neighbor's solitary ewe lamb, which had been bred tame among his children, and was a great fondling, though he had large flocks of his own, and many herds, which would have yielded him any entertainment for his friend; but he spared his own numerous flocks, and robbed his poor neighbor of his one lamb, to feast his friend. The case was hard in itself, and the prophet had represented it with all the moving and tender circumstances that could be thought on. David, fired at such flagrant injustice and oppression, swore, 'As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die.' When the king had passed sentence, then the prophet opened the secret, and said, Thou art the man:' the ewe lamb was the wife of Uriah, whom thou hast taken from her husband, though thou hadst wives and concubines in abundance: thou hast not only robbed the poor man of his one ewe lamb, but thou hast added murder to thine oppression; thou hast killed the poor man also; thou hast slain Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon. The king on this charge had no retreat left to his justification: he that had declared the man should die who had killed his poor neighbor's lamb, could not justify himself who had killed his poor neighbor, that he might the more easily enjoy his wife; and therefore he had nothing left but this plain confession, I have sinned against the Lord.'

Thus our Saviour also, under the parable of a householder and his vineyard, made the Jews bear witness to the justice of God, in rejecting their nation from being his people. When he had represented how ill the husbandmen treated the Lord of the vineyard; how they abused his servants and destroyed his Son; even the Jews could give righteous sentence in their own case, veiled under these figures, and adjudge the wicked husbandmen to destruction, and the vineyard to be let to better tenants.

It is no hard matter to get truth out of men, if you can once get beyond their prejudices, and separate the truth from all

J

personal views and interests; for reason is sufficiently clear, where it is not clouded and obscured by passion and affection. The heathen moralists seem to be sensible of this, when they clothe the most beneficial instructions in the dress of fable: the only reason of which is, that no man is concerned in the success of a fable, and therefore will judge impartially; which, if the instruction were brought home to him, and applied to his own case, he would not perhaps do. A passionate man will be restrained from his revenge by no prudential considerations; he despises them all; they are all the lessons of cowardice and the tokens of a mean spirit; and yet he never reads the fable of a horse, who, to revenge himself, called in a man's assistance, and taught him how to mount, from which time he lost all liberty, and has been a slave ever since, but he laughs at the horse's folly, and his impotent desire of revenge.

The consequences from what has been said are plain, and I shall but just touch them.

First, it is evident that the true art of convincing any man of his error is to throw him as much as possible out of the case; for the less a man is concerned himself, the better he judges. You are not to stir and fret his prejudices, but to decline them; not to reproach him with the error you condemn, but to place the error at a sufficient distance from him, that he may have a true light to view it in.

Secondly, in private life it is plain from hence that innocence is the only true preservative of reason and judgment: guilt will dispose you to seek excuses and subterfuges, and mislead you in your opinion of yourself and your duty. When once you find yourself laboring to justify your actions, and searching for expositions that may suit your inclinations, from that moment you may date your loss of freedom.

Thirdly, if you find yourself involved in the case you are to judge of, instead of seeking for new reasons and arguments to form your opinion by, you had much better look back, and reflect what sense you had of this matter before the cause was your own; for it is ten to one but that judgment was much more free and impartial than any you will make now or consider, if the case admits it, what is the sense of the sober and virtuous part of the world; you may more safely trust them than your

self where your passions are concerned: at least suppose your enemy in the same circumstances with yourself, and doing what you find yourself inclined to do, and consider what judgment you should make of him, and so judge of yourself: by these means perhaps we may preserve ourselves from the fatal influences which vice and passion have over the reason and understanding of mankind.

SUMMARY OF DISCOURSE LVI.

ROMANS, CHAP. XIV.-VERSE 16.

ST. PETER describes the condition of Christian warfare, adding the example of Christ, who, when he was reviled, reviled not again. Here one would think no man would overact his part; reproach and contempt are not riches, against the temptations or too eager pursuit of which we need be warned. We are apt to shrink at calumny, and excuse ourselves from duties, which performed would expose us to envy or ill-will: what then is the meaning of the text? Does Christ call us to suffer revilings, and his Apostle calls us to avoid them? But suppose that it is not inconsistent with our Christian duty to avoid the reproach of the world; yet can we stop malice when we do our duty, or prevent others from speaking ill of our good? Is it not enough therefore to do good, without securing it from the attempts of malice and envy? to suffer patiently the malice of wickedness, but must we partake the guilt of it too? and shall it be imputed a crime to us, that we let our good be evil spoken of? Such reasonings the text may suggest at first; but maturely considered, it will teach us how to pursue things in themselves truly praiseworthy; not only how to be good ourselves, but useful in the world, by exercising a truly Christian prudence and address in promoting the interest of virtue and religion. The gospel calls us not to court persecution for the sake of our profession: it is not for the interest of religion, or the glory of our Master, voluntarily to expose ourselves or doctrine to the contempt of the world: in both cases our Saviour has directed us otherwise, (Matt. vii. 6.) :