power, and the loftier range of genius, were no distinctions of his. He was assuredly neither poet, orator, nor philosopher; nor was he, in any sense, a great man. In a moral point of view, we think the errors of his youth resulted from a wretchedly mis-arranged education, a restless vanity, an ill-regulated ardour, and the great faults of the times in which he lived. Yielding to present excitement, he was the creature of impulse,—it was fortunate for him when the momentum was in the right direction. Such it was, we think, when given by Sir Francis Delaval, in the awful last moments of a fruitless life,-for we feel assured, that there was a favourable turn in Mr. Edgeworth's conduct from that period. Without such admonition, we are no less certain, that Mr. Edgeworth's future course would have been much less prudent than it proved. The death of his first wife was another event in his history which improved Mr. Edgeworth's character. A happier marriage led him to cultivate, more than he had done, domestic habits; and we have every reason to give the fullest credit to his daughter in her detail of his success. When he settled in Ireland, his good qualities, of which he had many, found time to operate; and we equally believe in all that is said of him as a country gentleman and a magistrate. We do not, however, think that he was a very great accession to the Irish House of Commons, in any other way than in his practical knowledge of Irish rural affairs; and of the condition, manners, and disposition of the lower orders; which qualified him no higher than to form what is called in Parliament a good Committee-man. In short, Mr. Edgeworth was a clever, active, somewhat bustling, on the whole amiable, very happy, and not a little self-satisfied man,who had one great distinction, and one alone,-he was the father of Maria Edgeworth.

ART VI.-Memoir of the early Campaigns of the Duke of Wel lington in Portugal and Spain. By an Officer employed in his Army. Pp. 234. London, John Murray. 1820.

WE E have read this simple, unpretending, and gentlemanlike narrative with much pleasure. It is the plain tale of a gallant soldier, whose feelings are perfectly under his command, and are not once allowed, even when he touches on events which divided his countrymen into intemperate factions, to disturb, in him, that equanimity and candour which are the best pledges of truth, and the greatest ornaments of the historian. We were attracted to

the work by the title, which instantly suggested to us reflections of the greatest interest. There needs no annalist, for our generation, of the later glories of Wellington and his army. These are engraven on every memory and on every heart. But we may lose sight of their earlier deeds in the very blaze of their final triumphs. We thank the author for recalling our thoughts. We had nearly forgotten the details of the incipient efforts of our gallant countrymen, against the most gigantic power that ever threatened the liberties of mankind; nor were we before so much aware of their interest, We have followed with equal profit and delight the earlier steps of that memorable ascendancy, of which one extraordinary man laid the foundation in the face of overwhelming force, and in the midst of universal despondency. He was an extraordinary man, who despaired not when even England was spell-bound by the ominous agency of French victory-when the British soldier, distrusting his guides, distrusting himself, set an unassured foot on the great arena of Continental Europe, and leader after leader checked his advance, or compelled his retreat when Napoleon's countless hosts had crossed the Pyrenees, and, in all the confidence of Napoleon's presence, possessed the land-when Spain herself had begun to thwart, to hate, and almost to starve her deliverers-and last, perhaps worst to bear, England's generous purpose was on the wane, and in her very Senate were advocated abandonment of the oppressed, and compromise with the oppressor. He was an extraordinary man, who stood alone erect, undaunted, unwearied, almost unperplexed; and, calmly estimating his enemy, his followers, hinself, gave his pledge to his country, and turning a fearless front to the tremendous force before him, cheered his admiring com rades, and taught them confidence in themselves.

Sir Arthur Wellesley went to Portugal in 1808, with the command of a detachment only of the army sent to aid in the deliverance of the Peninsula. Older officers were speedily to follow him; to a man imbued with that over-respect for their pretending enemy, which dictated timid movements and rendered even victories fruitless. Sir Arthur Wellesley, well aware of this, resolved to prove his own bolder plan before the more cautious measures of his superiors should overtake him. Rolleia and Vimiera were his proofs. But Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Hew Dalrymple, arrived, and it was not Sir Arthur Wellesley's fault that Cintra followed. We much admire the temper with which our author limits himself to a simple expression of regret, that the advance was countermanded; that the flying enemy, bivouacked in sight; that they almost dictated the terms of their own surrender.

But in that expression there is a depth of feeling, eloquent be yond all the reproaches ever poured out by balked enterprise or disappointed patriotism. We give the author's description of

Vimiera.

"Junot separated his army to attack the positions of our right and left at the same moment, connecting his two wings by the force under General Kellerman. They were, however, at too great a distance from each other, and their attacks were unconnected. The left column was first engaged with the brigade of Brigadier General Anstruther; it attempted to turn his right, but after a contest of some duration, in which the superiority of the British fire, in the first instance, and afterwards of British bayonets, was completely proved, the enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, and forced to abandon his undertaking. The right column (which had moved to the left of the British,) began its attack upon the brigades of Major-Generals Ferguson and Nightingale, at the time that the left had been beaten by Brigadier-General Anstruther. It commenced with considerable vigour, but the steadiness with which it was received soon stopped its career; in less than half an hour. the column was beaten and pursued beyond the heights; General Bregnier and six guns taken. A French regiment afterwards rallied near the village of Ventoso, at the extremity of the hill, and made an attack in column of mass to recover the guns; but it was completely routed with great loss. The attack upon the village of Vimiera, as the decisive effort, was made by the reserve, in close column, supported by artillery, but it was most gallantly resisted by the 50th and part of the 43d regiments, who charged the flank of the column, and totally defeated it. Two squadrons of the 20th regiment of cavalry moved upon it when broken, and cut down and took prisoners a considerable number of those composing it, who were escaping from the infantry."

This was in all its features a battle for Sir Arthur Wellesley to found his future hopes upon. He saw the over-confident enemy more easily foiled, and more disgracefully routed in all their attacks, than he had ever expected. He saw demonstrated the imposing aspect, but real weakness, in the face of a resolute enemy, of the French attack in solid masses. Breadth of fire from determined lines, and a bayonet charge which closed on all sides of the arrested host, instantly and invariably reduced the columns to helpless confusion. We have heard officers say, that the difficulty of escape, in consequence of the pressure on such occasions, has occasioned a carnage, which has excited the compassion of the victors, and stayed their hands.

"A short time before the victory was decided, Sir Harry Burrard arrived from the frigate, on board which he had remained during the night. Sir A. Wellesley was preparing to follow up the advantages he had gained, and had already brought up Brigadier-General Bowes' and Major-General Ackland's brigades, (who had as yet been in the reserve and unengaged,) with which he had intended to pursue the enemy. He had also directed MajorGeneral Hill to be ready to move, from his right, along the road which he was in possession of, and which led to the nearest line to Torres Vedras. But Sir Harry Burrard, conceiving that such movement would be attended with risk, desired Sir A. Wellesley to discontinue the pursuit, and to rest satisfied with the advantages that had been gained. Sir A. Wellesley re

monstrated on the field, against the order to halt; but it was of no avail; the decision was not to be changed or modified; the enemy retired at his leisure; our light troops even, were not ordered to attend these movements, and a part of the rear guard remained upon a hill, within a short distance of our position, till the following morning. Without wishing to cast any reflection on the conduct of Sir Harry Burrard, admitting that he was placed in a situation of great difficulty, yet it is impossible not to regret, that the person in whose mind the plan of the campaign originally was formed, was not allowed to execute it throughout. The system which Sir Arthur Wellesley had laid down, had now been altered in three inost essential points. First, The not proceeding, on the morning of the 21st, to turn the left of the enemy by the movement he had ordered upon Mafra, thereby changing the operations of the army from the offensive to the defensive. Secondly, The not pursuing the enemy after the victory of Vimiera; and lastly, The having changed the direction of Sir John Moore's corps from its march upon Santarem to its junction with the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley."

We question if this country at the time had a clear title to reproach Sir H. Burrard for his cautious movements. We shall only remind our readers that the opinion was very prevalent, that Sir A. Wellesley was a rash officer. Knowing what we now do, there is much interest in looking back on the first beginnings of the bolder system, which at length delivered the world. "The feeling of the army which had fought the battle of Vimiera, was at this time most hostile to the armistice which had been agreed upon. The expression of a private, in one of the regiments which had most gallantly asserted the superiority of the British arms, deserves to be recorded. Whilst marching in his column to Sobral, he appeared to be looking for something which he had lost; and upon being asked what he was in search of, replied, Ten days, which he believed he should never find again."

It was conditioned that nothing but military baggage should be embarked by the French army. The author narrates some paltry larcenies committed by some of their officers highest in rank, most of which, however, were detected, and the articles recovered. Sir A. Wellesley returned to England; Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir H. Burrard were recalled; and the British army was entrusted to the command of Sir John Moore.

The author enters pretty fully into the events of the war in Spain, before the actual co-operation of the British troops: the surrender of Dupont and Wedel preceded the entrance of Sir John Moore into Spain. Sir J. Moore, it is well known, advanced but to retreat. The author, although he narrates that that commander began by despairing of the cause, when the armies of Blake and Castanos were dispersed, and Bonaparte was advancing to surround the British army, which was only 30,000 strong, yet does him the justice to add, that the total failure of the commissariat to establish magazines on the line of march made retreat unavoidable. He describes well the gallant affair of Corunna, and the glorious death of Sir John Moore.-"Thus ended the second campaign in which British troops had been engaged in the Peninsula. It would be a melancholy task to canvass it throughout. The

last action was worthy of the men who have since delivered Spain from its merciless invaders; but the movements which preceded it were far from being generally approved. Great difficulties were, indeed, opposed to Sir J. Moore; but it would appear, that, in his own mind, they were too highly rated. He discharged his duty to his country, however, with his utmost zeal. He died fighting to maintain its glory, and his name will ever be ranked amongst its heroes."

Next April, Sir A. Wellesley arrived to take the command of the troops which had remained in, or been sent to Portugal. Vigour, confidence, and success revived. The short but brilliant campaign of ten days on the Douro justified the change of measures." No operation could be more difficult, or require greater bravery in the troops to execute, or talent in the general to combine; but complete success attended it. Marshal Soult was surprised; the British army passed the river in spite of every obstacle, and of the superior humbers which were brought to overwhelm the first regiments that crossed; and the French army was driven, with the loss of its sick and wounded, of great part of its baggage, and of a considerable number of guns, from the town of Oporto."

On the following day, Sir A. pursued, and the enemy abandoned their whole baggage, and fled out of Portugal by the mountain roads to Orense. No part of their experience of the British troops and leaders, tended more than this brief campaign to regulate, for the future, the presumption of the French soldiers and their Marshals. Whilst Sir A. Wellesley was employed in chasing Marshal Soult out of the country, the French had five other Marshals, Victor, Ney, Mortier, Suchet, and Jourdan, with 130,000 men in the Peninsula. The British army amounted to 24,000 men. The Spaniards, in woful organization, and utter uselessness, were 110,000; the Portuguese, 15,000, not yet ready for the field. In estimating the relative value of British and French troops, we have always pressed the vital consideration of a hypothetical change of their relations. Let the reader imagine the effect, had the 130,000 men been entirely British troops, and the 24,000 been French, less helped than hindered by their numerous Spanish and Portuguese allies!

Talavera was the first trial of strength after the affair of the Douro. The obstinate contest of these three sanguinary days, is too well recollected to require to be here repeated. The facts are candidly and clearly stated by the author. The only circumstance worthy of record of the Spanish contingent who acted, or rather did not act, on that occasion, is, that believing themselves either actually attacked, or about to be, they let out the secret of the presence of the whole allied army, which it was yet expedient to conceal, by every individual Spaniard boldly firing off his musket, as nearly in the direction of the expected danger as he had time to calculate. A very natural result of so well-directed a fire is thus described. "Several of the officers of