...his object; nor has he formed a just " notion of the nature of truth and of the human mind. — " He seems, too, not to have been sufficiently aware, that...of existence, • of personal identity, of truth, be" sides many others, may be said (in one sense) to be "innate in the mind; inasmuch as they are necessarily...

...his object ; nor has he " formed a just notion of the nature of truth and of " the human mind. — He seems, too, not to have been " sufficiently aware,...words, " when we affirm that there is nothing in the intel" lect which was not previously in the senses, we " must be always understood to except the intel"...

...Sensation and association will probably be found to account for nearly all the appearances. Thus * There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. t There is nothing in the intellect but the intellect itself. in ethics, the existence of a moral sense...

...sliall bring to it. If the ancient Aristotelean maxim — "pregnant with systems" — be admitted, that "there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense," how important the addition made by Leibnitz, "except the intellect itself;" for in that mental...

...ideas." Locke replied, "Sense and Reflection are the sources of all our ideas." Leibnitz replied, " There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense; except the intellect itself:" which latter remark is altogether beside the question. And yet...

...because our mind is innate to itself, and finds all these in its own furniture. It is true, indeed, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense, — except the intellect itself." He makes a similar observation in reference to Locke, in Letter...

...because our mind is innate to itself, and finds all these in its own furniture. It is true, indeed, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense, — except the intellect itself." In [another^ place he says, — " Hence arises another question,...

...because our mind is innate to itself, and finds all these in its own furniture. It is true, indeed, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense, — except the intellect itself." In [another]] place he says, — " Hence arises another question,...

...because our mind is innate to itself, and finds all these in its own furniture. It is true, indeed, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense, — except the intellect itself." In [another] place he says, — " Hence arises another question,...

...tasting, smelling, and touching — no other, and it was an old maxim of the schoolmen, and not a bad one, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. Natural knowledge, then, is derived, and is originally received from, what have been denominated, sensations....