The Marshal said that the King, his master, did not love war; — that he, the Marshal, as little desired to continue it; that the whole French nation hated him; that were he to meet with one misfortune, the King himself could not protect him;—that he had already all the honour he wished for, and all the rewards for his services that he could ask, or the King grant; — that, in this situation, broken as he was also in his health, he could not but feel eager for a peace, that he knew his master did likewise. He, at last, proceeded to tell Ligonier, that the King of France desired he would return to the Duke of Cumberland, and assure His Royal Highness, in his name, of his wish to put an end to the war;

and

that he thought this object would be best attained by themselves at the head of their respective armies; that he knew the honour of the Duke too well to imagine he would engage in any thing without his Allies; but that, as the two armies would soon withdraw to winter-quarters, there would be time for His Royal Highness to receive the opinion of those Allies; - and that he doubted not but they would have the wisdom to trust their interests to His Royal Highness's hands. "As to the King of France," De Saxe added, "he looks to nothing for himself; he is willing to restore all "Flanders as it now is, except Furnes, which he expects to "keep if you insist on the total demolition of Dunkirk; but if "you will let that harbour remain as it is, he will then desire "nothing but the restitution of Cape Breton.' Even this restitution was only proposed as an exchange for Madras, which the French had lately succeeded in wresting from the English. "Genoa," continued the French Marshal, "ought to "be restored, if taken, to the Republic, and the Duke of "Modena reinstated'in his own dominions; and Spain must, "for the honour of France, be included and considered." All other details were skilfully passed over as easy of adjustment.*

These unexpected overtures produced much pleasure, but some perplexity, in England. The Duke of Cumberland, * Mr. Pelham to Mr. Walpole, July 30. 1747.

1747.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.

353

who transmitted them, was eager to retain in his own hands the honour of negotiation, and the King showed no less anxiety to gratify his favourite son; while, on the other hand, the Ministers trembled at his well-known violence of temper, and total inexperience in diplomatic affairs. It was apprehended that the secret object of France might perhaps be only to sow jealousies amongst the Allies, or to inveigle the hasty Duke into the signature of rash and ill-judged preliminaries. At length the Ministers consented to entrust the nominal negotiation to His Royal Highness; but prevailed upon the King that the Earl of Sandwich, already employed as plenipotentiary in the Breda conferences, should be sent to head-quarters as the assistant (the Court phrase for director) of the Duke. Sandwich accordingly hastened over to Holland, and had a secret interview at Liege with the Marquis de Puisieulx, the French Minister of foreign affairs. Nothing was decided between them as to the terms of a peace, but it was agreed to take the negotiation from military hands, and refer it to a Congress to be held at Aix la Chapelle.

It soon appeared, however, that the wishes of the Allies for peace were not sincere or not lasting. The Empress Queen, irritated at the conduct of the French, in commencing and urging the war, was not willing to close it without some signal triumph, or solid advantage, over them. The Prince of Orange and Duke of Cumberland, much as they differed on other points, agreed in a thirst of military fame, and a consequent desire of further military operations. George the Second was anxious, at this period, to conciliate the head of the Empire; and for this, and his other petty German objects, coveted either exorbitant terms of peace, or an indefinite prolongation of war. Thus, therefore, though the first overtures of France had been readily welcomed, amidst the dejection of military failures and reverses, they were not cordially pursued. The measures to assemble the intended Congress were so slow and dilatory, on the part of the Allies, that the plenipotentiaries could not meet before Mahon, History. III.

23

the ensuing year; while, on the other hand, their preparations for the next campaign were urged forward with unwonted activity and ardour. It plainly appeared that their secret object was to delay the negotiation until it might proceed conjointly with the military movements, and until the brilliant successes, which they foolishly anticipated, should enable them to dictate whatever terms they pleased.

In the British Cabinet, the prudence of Mr. Pelham, which induced him to sigh for peace, was always counteracted, and, in general, overpowered, by another more selfish prudence, that watched and trembled at the first symptoms of Royal displeasure. The Duke of Newcastle, eager at all hazards to retrieve his own favour with the King, and incapable of any more long-sighted views, became a decided partisan and promoter of the war, and most frequently drew his reluctant brother in his train. To the Pelhams nearly all the other Ministers selected, in general, for their subservience tamely bowed; but not so the Earl of Chesterfield. From the first moment of his admission into the Cabinet, he had made peace the main object of his care; he now urged the pressing necessity, and the excellent opening, for it, with an eagerness that began to alienate his sovereign, and to embroil him with his colleagues. It was with great difficulty that, when Parliament met in October, the discordant Ministers could concur in any expressions for the Royal Speech. Lord Marchmont, who was then in London, and familiar with many of the leading statesmen, relates in his Diary, - "Lord Chesterfield told me there was "as yet no Speech; that they had put it to the Chancellor, "who had desired to know what he was to say; that he saw "he could not please them all three, the Duke of Newcastle, "Lord Chesterfield, and Mr. Pelham; and therefore desired "hints, which as yet were not given him..... That Mr. Pel"ham and the Duke now conversed only through Mr. Stone, "being apt to fall into a passion when they conversed toge"ther; that they would surely break, if Mr. Pelham did not

1747.

DISSATISFACTION OF CHESTERFIELD.

355

"think it would be the ruin of them both; that Mr. Pelham's "only concern was, that he might not be personally attacked "in the House of Commons; and that, provided he was not "made the object there, he was easy. For this end, Pitt, "and the Lyttletons, and Grenvilles, must have every thing "they asked; and now held half the places in the King's "gift; and then the old set, who hated these, came and "asked when there would be no more Lyttletons, and Gren"villes to be pleased, that they might have room for some"thing! Lord Chesterfield added, that Mr. Pelham had the 66 same opinion of the Duke that we had; and that the King "had a most mortal hatred to him, worse than to any man in "his dominions."*

The project of Chesterfield, in entering the Cabinet, had been to govern George the Second through Lady Yarmouth, as he once had hoped through Lady Suffolk.** Over the one lady, as formerly over the other, his insinuating manners gained him an entire control; but, in neither case, did the King allow political power to the mistress. The assiduities of Chesterfield, therefore, served rather to rouse the watchful jealousy of Newcastle than to secure his own ascendant. In his great public object, the peace, he could make no progress. In his more personal requests, he found himself no less thwarted by his colleagues, who had formed, as he says, a settled resolution, that no person should be promoted through his influence. This last question he brought to an issue, in the case of his cousin Colonel George Stanhope, youngest son of the late Prime Minister, an officer of merit, who had distinguished himself both at Dettingen and at Culloden. For him Chesterfield solicited a regiment; but,

* Lord Marchmont's Diary, October 27. 1747.

**"Lord Chesterfield, who was as much for peace as Lord Harrington, "aimed at superior, if not supreme power, with the King. In the means "he succeeded fully, having gained Lady Yarmouth's good-will, and had "all the help she can give, most cordially. In the end he failed entirely; "having brought His Majesty to no more than civility, familiarity, and, 66 perhaps, liking to his conversation." Mr. Fox to Sir C. H. Williams, February 17. 1748. Though no friend to Chesterfield, Fox goes on to admit that "his Lordship's province was most offensively encroached upon" by Newcastle and Sandwich.

though His Majesty gave away five in succession, the name of Stanhope was always omitted.* Under these circum

stances, "what must the world think," said he, "but that I "continue in for the sake of 5000l. a year?”** and, in January, 1748, he formed the resolution to resign. As he writes to his confidential friend at the Hague: "Could I "do any good I would sacrifice some more quiet to it; but, "convinced as I am that I can do none, I will indulge my "ease, and preserve my character. I have gone through "pleasures while my constitution and my spirits would allow "me. Business succeeded them; and I have now gone through every part of it, without liking it at all the better "for being acquainted with it. Like many other things, it is "most admired by those who know it the least. . . . . I have "been behind the scenes both of pleasure and of business; I "have seen all the coarse pulleys and dirty ropes which ex"hibit and move all the gaudy machines; and I have seen "and smelt the tallow-candles which illuminate the whole "decoration, to the astonishment and admiration of the "ignorant multitude. . . . . Far from engaging in opposi "tion, as resigning Ministers too commonly do, I shall, to "the utmost of my power, support the King and his Go"vernment; which I can do with more advantage to them "and more honour to myself when I do not receive 50001, "a year for doing it. ... My horse, my books, and "my friends will divide my time pretty equally; I shall "not keep less company, but only better, for I shall "choose it."***

The first step of Chesterfield towards resignation was to draw up an able memorial, setting forth the dangers of the war, and the necessity of taking serious measures to close it; and finding that he could engage but one of his colleagues to concur in these opinions, he, on the 6th of February,

Lord Marchmont's Diary, October 27. 1747; and February 5. 1748.

H. Fox to Sir C. H. Williams, February 17. 1748.

** Lord Marchmont's Diary, December 24. 1747.

*** Lord Chesterfield to Mr. Dayrolles, January 26., February 9., February 23. 1748.